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Foreword	  	   When	  I	  wrote	  the	  Foreword	  to	  Roger	  Lohmann’s	  The	  Commons	  in	  1992,	  I	  noted	  that	  the	  book’s	  analysis	  was	  acute,	   its	   scope	  broad,	   its	  writing	   crisp,	   and	   its	  vision	   that	  of	   the	  poet.	   I	  observed	   that	   the	   argument	   of	   the	   book	   transcended	   disciplines	   and	   sectors.	   I	   said	   that	   the	  book	  was	  in	  many	  respects	  the	  first	  definitive	  large-­‐scale	  theory	  of	  the	  voluntary	  and	  nonprofit	  sector.	   	  I	  advised	  readers	  to	  approach	  the	  book	  as	  they	  would	  a	  voyage	  to	  a	  new	  land.	   	  And	  I	  added	   that	   the	  work	  held	   the	   potential	   of	   defining	   our	   field	   at	   the	   point	   of	   its	   full	   scholarly	  emergence.	  	   More	   than	   twenty	  years	  have	  passed	   since	   those	  words,	   followed	  by	   that	   remarkable	  book,	  were	  published	  by	  the	  most	  significant	  nonprofit	  sector	  press	  of	  that	  era.	  	  And	  with	  the	  appearance	  of	  Voluntary	  Action	  and	   the	  New	  Commons,	   I	  need	   to	  modify	  none	  of	  what	   I	   said	  about	   the	   first	   edition,	   nor	   to	   indicate	   that	   this	   fully	   revised,	   extended,	   and	   updated	   new	  edition	  falls	  short	  of	  any	  of	  my	  original	  descriptors.	  	   This	   new	   book	   builds	   on	   its	   predecessor,	   but	   extends	   it	   in	   a	   number	   of	   important	  directions.	   	   The	   connections	   it	   provides	   to	   the	  Ostroms’	   celebrated	  work	  with	   the	   commons	  concept	  are	  welcome,	  as	  is	  the	  extension	  of	  the	  theory	  and	  its	  powerful	  conceptual	  vocabulary	  in	  a	  number	  of	  powerful	  new	  directions.	  	   I	  concluded	  the	  1992	  Foreword	  by	  noting	  that	  the	  author	  had	  done	  his	  work,	  and	  it	  was	  now	  time	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  us	  to	  read,	  learn,	  and	  apply	  his	  wisdom	  and	  understanding	  to	  our	  own	  work.	   	  Perhaps	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  many	  who	  have	  claimed	  to	  understand	  society’s	  third	  sector	  have	  yet	  to	  give	  this	  work	  the	  careful	  reading	  it	  deserves—after	  all	  they	  are	  busy	  with	  their	  own	  efforts	  to	  understand	  this	  multi-­‐faceted	  and	  elusive	  field.	  	  	  But	   Roger	   Lohmann	   continues	   his	   work,	   and	   this	   remarkable	   volume	   is	   his	   latest	  contribution	   to	   a	   field	   he	   has	   served	   with	   such	   grace	   and	   commitment	   over	   the	   years.	   	   I	  remember	  a	  few	  years	  back,	  when	  his	  colleagues	  in	  ARNOVA	  gave	  him	  the	  warmest	  response	  I	  recall	   them	   providing	   any	   colleague,	   when	   he	   was	   recognized	   for	   his	   stewardship	   of	   that	  organization’s	  pioneering	  list-­‐serve	  network.	  Now	  Skywriters	  Press	  appears	  to	  present	  this	  classic	  work	  to	  both	  scholars	  in	  the	  field	  and	   intelligent	   readers	   on	   a	   global	   scale.	   	  Welcome	   to	   this	   entrant	   to	   the	   new	   commons	   of	  publication	   and	  dialogue,	   and	   congratulations	   to	  Roger	  Lohmann	   for	  his	   remarkable	   energy,	  determination,	   and	   creativity	   in	   advancing	   this	  work.	   	   VOLUNTARY	  ACTION	  AND	  THE	  NEW	  COMMONS	  now	   takes	   its	  place	   as	  one	  of	   the	  most	  basic	  books	   to	   read	  about	   society’s	   third,	  voluntary,	   nonprofit,	   and	   civil	   sector,	   and	   the	   actions	   and	   organizations	   that	   undergird	   its	  many	  efforts	  and	  contributions.	  Jon	  Van	  Til	  Seelyville,	  Indiana	  	  	  	  and	  Budapest,	  Hungary	  September	  2014	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1.	  Introduction	  It	   has	   been	   nearly	   a	   quarter	   of	   a	   century	   since	   publication	   of	   The	   Commons:	   New	  
Perspectives	   on	   Nonprofit	   Organization,	   Voluntary	   Action	   and	   Philanthropy.	   In	   that	   time,	   a	  number	  of	  insightful	  and	  interesting	  critical	  commentaries	  on	  this	  volume	  have	  been	  published,	  and	   I	   have	   published	   numerous	   journal	   articles,	   book	   chapters	   and	   presented	   a	   number	   of	  unpublished	   conference	   papers	   sharpening,	   honing,	   and	   focusing	   aspects	   of	   the	   original	  perspective.	   I	   have	   not	   tried,	   until	   this	   project,	   to	   lay	   out	   in	   one	   place	   a	   complete	   revised	  statement	  of	  my	  entire	  commons	  approach	  to	  the	  third	  sector.	  Since	  its	  original	  appearance	  in	  1992	  The	  Commons	  has	  been	  out	  of	  print	  and	  hard	  to	  get	  a	  hold	  of.	  The	  initial	  publisher	  took	  the	  book	  out	  of	  print	  after	   less	  than	  a	  year	  and	  later	  returned	  the	  publication	  rights	  to	  me.	  There	  was	  a	  lesson	  in	  this	  for	  me,	  but	  not	  the	  one	  supposedly	  taught	  by	  market	  demand.	  I’ve	  always	  been	  rather	   fond	  of	  Frost’s	   less	   traveled	   road;	   it	  has	   for	  me	  made	  all	   the	  difference	   time	  and	  again.	   To	   this	   was	   added	   the	   promise	   to	   myself	   to	   avoid	   commercial	   publishers,	   and	  subsequently	   all	   of	   my	   other	   books	   have	   been	   (and	   will	   be)	   published	   by	   non-­‐commercial	  presses.	  I	  think	  of	  it	  as	  my	  own	  personal	  movement	  into	  the	  third	  sector.	  
The	  Commons	  (Lohmann,	  1992A)	  is	  one	  of	  the	  few	  genuine	  theory	  efforts	  in	  the	  field	  of	  third	  sector	  studies	  and	  friends,	  colleagues,	  sympathetic	  critics,	  and	  others	  have	  been	  urging	  me	  to	   produce	   a	   new	   edition	   of	   the	   original	   book	   for	   years.	   However,	   competing	   demands	   and	  projects	   always	   got	   in	   the	   way,	   even	   as	   additional	   nuances,	   implications	   and	   facets	   of	   the	  commons	   perspective	   continued	   to	   accumulate.	   I	   have	   tried	   here	   to	   reflect	   the	   germ	   of	   the	  original	  idea	  and	  many	  of	  the	  additional	  accretions	  in	  what	  follows.	  This	  is	  in	  no	  sense	  a	  second	  edition,	   however.	   In	   retirement	   the	   time	   is	   right	   for	   me	   to	   set	   down	   in	   one	   place	   a	   new	  statement	  of	  the	  entire	  perspective	  that	  I	  now	  call	  the	  new	  commons	  theory	  of	  voluntary	  action.	  A	  number	  of	  the	  issues	  discussed	  in	  the	  original	  volume	  have	  since	  been	  resolved	  and	  are	  not	  revisited	  here.	  Most	  notable	  among	  these	  is	  the	  sense	  of	  “the	  nonprofit	  sector”	  as	  a	  congeries	  of	  tax-­‐exempt,	  tax-­‐deductible	  corporate	  entities.	  Other	  issues	  have	  simply	  been	  shunted	  aside	  and	  ignored	  in	  the	  ongoing	  conversations	  of	  a	  rapidly	  expanding	  field	  and	  in	  what	  follows	  I	  seek	  to	  revive	  a	  number	  of	  those.	  	  Most	  importantly,	  the	  new	  prominence	  of	  the	  commons	  in	  social	  theory	  and	  practice	  on	  the	  Internet	  and	  elsewhere	  offers	  additional	  motivation	  for	  reexamining	  the	  original	  viewpoint.	  A	  number	  of	  new	   implications	  and	  perspectives	  on	  commons	   theory	  have	  served	   to	  broaden,	  deepen	   and	   more	   systematically	   integrate	   it	   into	   the	   larger	   body	   of	   social,	   economic	   and	  political	  theory	  and	  link	  it	  more	  deeply	  to	  the	  third	  sector.	  I	  have	  laid	  all	  of	  this	  out	  here	  as	  well	  as	  I	  am	  able.	  	   The	  Commons	  appeared	  concurrently	  with	  a	  tidal	  wave	  of	  interest	  in	  civil	  society,	  in	  the	  immediate	  wake	  of	  the	  historic	  events	  in	  Europe	  and	  Latin	  America	  that	  came	  to	  a	  head	  in	  the	  revolutions	  of	  1989-­‐91.	  Revolution	  is	  really	  not	  too	  strong	  a	  word	  for	  the	  momentous	  events	  of	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those	   tumultuous	   years,	   yet	   very	   real	   questions	   can	  be	   raised	   at	   present	   about	  whether	   that	  tidal	  wave	  may	  be	  subsiding,	  at	  least	  as	  it	  relates	  to	  civil	  society.	  Those	  of	  us	  who	  were	  around	  at	  the	  time	  now	  have	  the	  benefit	  of	  an	  additional	  quarter	  century	  of	  perspective	  from	  which	  to	  consider	   the	   important	  questions	  raised	  during	   that	  momentous	  period.	  Those	  who	  were	  not	  often	  find	  themselves	  approaching	  many	  of	  the	  same	  questions.	  Since	  then,	  a	  large	  and	  growing	  host	   of	   new	   voices	   and	   new	   perspectives	   have	   joined	   the	   discussion	   as	   what	   was	   then	   the	  exciting	  new	   field	   termed	   third	   sector	   studies	  which	  has	   continued	   to	  grow	  and	  mature	  both	  intellectually	  and	  organizationally.	  For	  reasons	  noted	  below,	  the	  social	  economic,	  political	  and	  cultural	   spaces	   outside	   of	  markets	   and	   governments	  might	   as	  well	   be	   referred	   to	   not	   as	   the	  third,	  but	  as	  the	  first	  sector	  and	  the	  research	  and	  scholarly	  field	  that	  has	  grown	  up	  as	  first	  sector	  
studies	   (Young,	   1988).	   There	   is	   ample	   reason	   to	   believe	   that	   both	   government	   and	   market	  institutions	  are	  typically	  formed	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  voluntary	  action,	  and	  there	  is	  some	  evidence	  (in	  the	  ruins	  of	  the	  temple	  site	  at	  Gobekli	  Tepe,	  dated	  to	  9000	  B.C.E.	  for	  instance)	  that	  voluntary	  action	   associated	   with	   religion	   preceded	   both	   the	   political	   state	   and	   economic	   market.	  However,	   we	   will	   stick	   with	   the	   conventional	   usage	   third	   sector	   here	   simply	   for	   ease	   of	  understanding,	  recognizing	  that	  it	  implies	  no	  serial	  order	  of	  importance.	  Some	   of	   the	   most	   important	   implications	   and	   amendments	   to	   my	   original	   commons	  theory	  perspective	  that	  are	  included	  in	  the	  main	  text	  can	  be	  noted	  briefly	  here.	  First,	  and	  most	  importantly,	  I	  stand	  by	  both	  the	  original	  model	  of	  the	  commons	  as	  an	  explanation	  of	  voluntary	  action,	  and	  by	  grounding	  of	   the	  perspective	   in	  pragmatic	  perspectives	  highlighting	  the	  role	  of	  communicative	  action,	  social	  interaction,	  situational	  definition,	  and	  language,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  rationalist,	  individualist	  and	  positivist	  perspectives	  of	  conventional	  rational	  choice.	  If	  anything,	  the	  perspectives	  that	  informed	  that	  earlier	  work	  have	  strengthened	  since	  that	  time,	  both	  in	  my	  thinking	  and	  more	  generally.	  	  Not	  everything	  about	  the	  foundations	  of	  my	  presentation	  remains	  intact,	  however.	  In	  the	  original	   publication,	   I	   used	   the	   phrase	   “nonprofit	   organizations,	   voluntary	   action	   and	  philanthropy”	   repeatedly	   as	   a	   summary	   phrase	   for	   the	   unit	   of	   analysis	   and	   theorizing	   even	  while	  I	  criticized	  the	  very	  idea	  of	  nonprofit	  organizations	  as	  a	  meaningless	  neologism.	  In	  what	  follows,	  I	  have	  substituted	  the	  phrase	  “voluntary	  action”	  for	  the	  original	  trilogy	  even	  as	  I	  added	  several	   others	   such	   as	   mutual	   aid	   and	   self-­‐help,	   social	   movements,	   social	   problems	   and	  “knowledge	  commons.”	  This	  focus	  pays	  homage	  to	  the	  forms	  of	  voluntary	  action	  discussed	  by	  Alexis	   de	   Tocqueville	   (1835)	   as	   well	   as	   Alfred	   (Lord)	   Beveridge	   (1948)	   in	   reference	   to	   the	  nongovernmental	   programs	   and	   services	   of	   the	   British	   welfare	   state	   and	   to	   the	   U.S.	   legal	  category	  of	  “public	  charities”	  –	  although	  not	  necessarily	  all	  instances	  of	  the	  actual	  awarding	  of	  tax	  exempt	  status.	  Some	  allowance	  must	  be	  made	  for	  human	  error,	  of	  course,	  and	  for	  political	  culpability:	   The	   exercise	   of	   political	   influence	   necessarily	   means	   that	   in	   a	   number	   of	   cases	  missions	  and	  activities	  that	  stretch	  the	  very	  idea	  of	  “public	  charity”	  to	  the	  breaking	  point	  and	  beyond	  have	  been	  awarded	   tax	   exempt	   status.	  No	  effort	   is	  made	  here	   to	   explain	   such	  efforts	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except	  as	  exceptions	   to	   the	  rule.	   In	   that	  and	   for	  other	  reasons	   the	  notion	  of	  a	  Weberian	   ideal	  type	  is	  very	  useful	  in	  keeping	  our	  focus	  on	  some	  measure	  of	  theoretical	  purity	  and	  clarification.	  The	  focus	  here	  is	  strongly	  on	  voluntary	  action	  in	  the	  U.S.	  This	  is	  not	  out	  of	  any	  sense	  of	  xenophobia	   or	   disinterest	   in	   the	   worldwide	   “association	   revolution”,	   but	   rather	   because	   the	  argument	  developed	  here	  speaks	  directly	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  issues	  that	  have	  arisen	  in	  the	  ‘Usonian’	  context.	   Usonian	   is	   an	   acronym	   coined	   by	   the	   architect	   Frank	   Lloyd	  Wright	   to	   refer	   to	   “The	  United	  States	  of	  North	  America”	  (a	  place	  he	  called	  Usonia).	  It	  seems	  a	  particularly	  fitting	  term	  in	  cases	   like	   this	   where	   distinctions	   must	   be	   made	   with	   Canada,	   Mexico	   and	   other	   American	  nations,	   North	   and	   South.	   The	   reality	   is	   that	   my	   career	   has	   been	   a	   Usonian	   one,	   spent	   in	  community	  and	  university	   settings	   in	   the	  U.S.	  This	   is	   the	  context	   I	  know	  best	  and	  am	  able	   to	  discuss	  examples.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  I	  have	  little	  doubt	  that	  most	  of	  the	  new	  commons	  theory	  of	  voluntary	   action	   has	   important	   applications	   outside	   the	   U.S.,	   but	   I	   will	   leave	   it	   to	   others	   to	  develop	  these.	  The	  special	  focus	  here	  is	  on	  voluntary	  action	  in	  the	  independent	  sectors	  of	  communities	  as	  these	  stand	  apart	  from	  both	  governments	  and	  markets.	  The	  sector	  notion	  has	  several	  points	  of	  origin,	  but	  as	  far	  as	  I	  am	  aware,	  Richard	  W.	  Scott	  and	  John	  W.	  Meyer	  (1982)	  were	  the	  first	  to	  introduce	   the	   concept	   of	   sectors	   of	   organizations.	   Such	   independent	   sectors	   include	   a	   broad	  range	   of	   forms	   of	   philanthropy	   and	   charity	   as	   recognized	   in	   various	   nations	   under	   assorted	  ‘public	   charity’	   provisions,	   as	   well	   as	   all	   ‘associations’	   and	   ‘assemblies’	   subject	   to	   the	   First	  Amendment	   of	   the	   U.S.	   Constitution	   and	   Section	   2	   of	   the	   Canadian	   Charter	   of	   Rights	   and	  Freedoms,	  Article	  20	  of	  the	  U.N.	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights,	  Article	  11	  of	  the	  Convention	  for	  the	   Protection	   of	   Human	   Rights	   and	   Fundamental	   Freedoms,	   and	   other	   legal	   recognitions	   of	  rights	  of	  association,	  assembly,	  speech	  and	  religion.	  The	   discussion	   that	   follows	   is	   set	   on	   slightly	   different	   footings	   than	   the	   1992	  presentation.	   Several	   of	   the	   eight	   assumptions	   on	   which	   the	   original	   presentation	   was	  grounded	   were,	   upon	   further	   consideration,	   not	   really	   assumptions	   at	   all.	   These	   original	  assumptions	   were	   labeled	   affluence,	   authenticity,	   continuity,	   intrinsic	   valuation,	   near-­‐universality,	  ordinary	  language,	  rationality,	  social	  action,	   	  (Lohmann,	  1992,	  47-­‐54).	  They	  were	  treated	   functionally	   as	   assumptions	   to	   frame	   that	   original	   presentation.	   The	   argument	   for	  seeing	   voluntary	   action	   through	   the	  model	   of	   the	   commons	  was	   not	   empirically	   or	   logically	  dependent	  upon	  five	  of	  the	  original	  eight.	  Each,	  if	  stated	  in	  somewhat	  different	  form,	  represents	  a	  testable	  proposition.	  These	  strike	  me	  now	  as	  premises	  of	  one	  sort	  or	  another	  that	  I	  wanted	  to	  set	  aside	  and	  take	  for	  granted	  in	  the	  original	  presentation.	  In	  what	  follows,	  they	  are	  offered	  as	  premises	  integrated	  into	  the	  overall	  presentation,	  although	  a	  small	  number	  are	  still	  recognized	  as	   essential	   assumptions.	   This	   simplified	   handling	   means	   that	   much	   less	   must	   be	   taken	   for	  granted	  than	  previously	  suggested.	  	  I	  have	  written	  a	  great	  deal	  since	  1992	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  places	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  voluntary	  action.	  Much	   of	  my	   attention	   has	   been	   devoted	   to	   extending	   and	   refining	   the	   perspective	   of	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commons	   theory	   to	   voluntary	   action.	   Some	  of	  my	   concern	   in	   intermediate	   publications	   since	  that	  time	  has	  been	  directed	  at	  refuting	  the	  occasional	  misleading	  interpretation	  of	  my	  work	  and	  intentions.	   Uppermost	   on	   that	   list	   has	   been	   the	   faulty	   suggestion	   that	   my	   main	   purpose	   in	  introducing	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  commons	  into	  third	  sector	  studies	  was	  to	  offer	  a	  metaphor	  and	  label	  for	  the	  empirical	  reality	  that	  others	  have	  labeled	  the	  third	  sector,	  the	  nonprofit	  sector	  and	  even	  civil	  society.	  For	  example, Sievers	  (2010)	  p.	  146,	  note	  2,	  offers	  one	  such	  misreading	  of	  my	  intent.	  Each	  of	  these	  concepts	  has	  important	  descriptive	  and	  explanatory	  uses,	  yet	  I	  do	  not	  and	  never	  have	  believed	  the	  commons	  to	  be	  coterminous	  with	  any	  of	  them.	  	  As	   most	   commentators	   have	   realized,	   merely	   shortening	   the	   label	   for	   a	   third	   sector	  consisting	  exclusively	  of	  tax-­‐exempt	  corporations	  was	  never	  my	  intention	  and	  it	  still	  is	  not.	  As	  noted	   below,	  while	   I	   have	   no	   quarrel	  with	   the	   idea	   of	   a	   sector	   of	   nonprofit	   corporations	   the	  economic	   positioning	   and	  political	  machinations	   of	   such	   a	   national	   interest	   group	   is	   very	   far	  from	   my	   interest.	   Meanwhile,	   opportunistic	   social	   entrepreneurs,	   false	   prophets,	   scheming	  careerists,	  politicians,	  true	  believers	  and	  others	  will	  continue	  to	  take	  full	  advantage	  of	  nonprofit	  incorporation,	   tax	   exemption,	   tax	   deduction,	   and	   other	   legal	   arrangements	   for	   institutional,	  group	  and	  personal	  gain.	  	  This	  too	  is	  outside	  my	  keen.	  This	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  focus	  of	  many	  of	  those	  who	  wish	  to	  follow	  David	  Horton	  Smith	  in	  examining	  “the	  dark	  side”	  of	  voluntary	  action.	  While	  such	  matters	  are	  an	  appropriate	  topic	  for	  a	  study	  of	  deviant	  behavior	  in	  voluntary	  action,	  I	  do	  not	  find	  them	  normative	  in	  any	  sense.	  Such	  recent	   topics	   as	   hybridity	   do	   not	   deal	   with	   social	   facts	   I	   find	   at	   all	   surprising,	   unusual	   nor	  particularly	   interesting.	   My	   principal	   concern	   here	   is	   with	   the	   distinctive	   purposes	   and	  missions	   that,	   under	   the	   best	   of	   circumstances,	  motivate	   those	   engaged	   in	   philanthropic	   and	  charitable	   pursuits,	   and	   the	   relation	   between	   such	   purposes	   and	   the	   resources	   and	  organizations	  that	  result.	  As	  I	  first	  noted,	  in	  1992,	  this	  is	  basically	  the	  territory	  of	  an	  ideal	  type	  to	  be	  contrasted	  with	  the	  ideal	  types	  of	  the	  state	  and	  the	  market	  order.	  My	  original	  position	  remains	   that	   the	  association	  of	  people	  engaged	   in	  common-­‐goods	  production	   are	  more	   representative	   of	   the	   “real”	   third	   sector	   of	   legal	   intent	   than	   any	   of	   the	  deviant	   entities	   of	   those	   who	   misuse	   or	   violate	   the	   public	   trust	   or	   even	   of	   the	   legitimate	  nonprofit	  firms	  engaged	  in	  quasi-­‐market	  production	  of	  educational	  or	  health	  or	  other	  nonprofit	  services	   under	   contract	   with	   government.	   Instead	   of	   merely	   posing	   an	   issue	   of	   differing	  descriptions	  of	  a	  known	  and	  understood	  real	  world	  in	  what	  follows	  the	  effort	  here	  is	  to	  theorize	  an	   alternative	   reality	   that	   touches	   part	   of	   but	   goes	   far	   beyond	   what	   is	   usually	   included	   in	  discussions	  of	  a	  third	  sector	  of	  tax	  exempt	  corporations.	  In	  what	  follows,	  I	  add	  assemblies	  and	  knowledge	  commons	  –	  not	  only	  academic	  disciplines	  and	  research	  associations,	  but	  also	  social	  movement	  and	  social	  problem	  associations	  and	  other	  related	  forms	  of	  collective	  behavior	  –	  to	  this	   initial	   focus.	   My	   consistent	   interest	   is	   in	   common	   goods	   production	   in	   associations	   and	  assemblies	  as	  both	  an	  interesting	  and	  a	  largely	  unexplained	  phenomenon;	  one	  that	  is	  of	  some	  importance	   for	   the	   continued	   future	   development	   of	   human	   freedom,	   democratic	   social	  relations	  and	  cultural	  fulfillment.	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Reviews	  and	  Updates	  
 Commons	   have	   been	   on	   my	   mind	   for	   a	   significant	   part	   of	   my	   adult	   life.	   Most	   of	   the	  changes	  in	  the	  new	  commons	  theory	  of	  voluntary	  action	  reflected	  in	  what	  follows	  came	  about	  as	   I	   thought	  more	   about	   the	  matter	   and	   considered	   additional	   examples.	   A	   small	   number	   of	  changes	   came	   about	   because	   of	   criticisms	   of	   my	   earlier	   work	   both	   published	   and	   private,	  including	  anonymous	  reviews	  of	  this	  manuscript.	  Misreadings	  of	  my	  intent	  regarding	  the	  third	  sector	  as	  a	  commons	  have	  already	  been	  noted.	  One	  of	   the	  small	  but	   important	  changes	  noted	  below	   is	   the	   addition	   of	   a	   brief	   section	   discussing	   the	   role	   of	   conflict	   in	   common	   goods	  production.	   Eleanor	  Brilliant,	   in	   a	   review	   in	  Social	  Work	   (2001)	  was	   among	   those	  noting	   the	  absence	  of	  conflict	  from	  my	  previous	  statement	  (Lohmann,	  1992).	  	  While	  it	  may	  at	  first	  appear	  to	  some	  readers	  that	  it	  is	  somewhat	  incongruous	  to	  suggest	  the	  need	  to	  discuss	  conflict	  in	  what	  is,	  fundamentally,	  a	  theory	  of	  cooperation,	  Brilliant’s	  (2001)	  point	  is	  a	  good	  one	  and	  I	  have	  made	  a	  conscientious	  effort	  here	  to	  deal	  with	  it.	  In	  the	  same	  vein,	  some	   readers	  will	   find	   the	   notable	   absence	   of	   power	   considerations	   herein.	   This	   is	  mostly	   a	  matter	   of	   language	   choice.	   Power	   as	   it	   is	   often	   conceived	   is	   treated	   as	   a	   form	   of	   individual	  human	   capital,	   and	  not	   infrequently,	   a	   zero-­‐sum	  game.	  For	  our	  purposes	   in	   voluntary	   action,	  power	  has	  both	  positive	  and	  negative	  aspects.	  On	  the	  positive	  side	  are	  both	  group	  efforts	  at	  co-­‐production	  and	  individual	  philanthropic	  efforts	  for	  the	  greater	  good,	  while	  the	  negative	  facets	  of	   power	   arise	  when	   individuals	   seek	   to	   thwart	   or	   neutralize	   those	   same	   efforts,	   or	   (usually	  covertly)	  use	  new	  commons	  for	  their	  own	  personal	  gain	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  others.	  Rather	  than	  treating	  power	  as	  a	  separate	  topic,	  recognition	  of	  the	  power	  of	  persons	  and	  organizations,	  their	  positions	  and	  money,	  is	  folded	  in	  throughout	  the	  discussion	  of	  resources.	  	   Another	  line	  of	  criticism	  has	  been	  that	  my	  perspective	  on	  commons	  in	  the	  original	  1992	  publication	   did	   not	   take	   sufficient	   account	   of	   the	   main	   lines	   of	   commons	   theory	   and	   in	  particular	   the	  work	   of	   the	   late	   Elinor	   Ostrom	   and	   her	   associates	   in	   the	   Bloomington	   School.	  Mike	   Krashinsky	   (1995)	   first	   voiced	   this	   view	   in	   a	   review	   of	   The	   Commons	   published	   in	  
Nonprofit	   Management	   and	   Leadership.	   Charlotte	   Hess	   raised	   a	   similar	   concern	   in	   a	   general	  review	  of	  commons	  research	  (2000).	  Originally,	  this	  claim	  seemed	  to	  me	  to	  miss	  the	  point	  that	  while	  the	  Bloomington	  approach	  was	  a	  “collective	  choice”	  perspective	  grounded	  in	  the	  rational	  individualism	   of	   rational	   choice,	   I	   was	   seeking	   to	   get	   beyond	   that	   same	   view	   which	   in	   my	  estimation	  had	  little	  or	  nothing	  to	  say	  explicitly	  about	  voluntary	  action,	  charity	  or	  philanthropy	  to	   a	   broader	   insight	   on	   collective	   behavior	   in	   which	   group	   or	   collective	   choice	   was	   but	   one	  among	   many	   elements.	   	   Yet,	   a	   growing	   body	   of	   recent	   work	   on	   the	   new	   commons	   and	   in	  particular	  on	  knowledge	  commons	  has	  opened	  several	  important	  links	  to	  the	  general	  commons	  theory	  perspective,	  as	  we	  shall	  see	  in	  Chapters	  2	  and	  3	  below.	  I	  tried	  to	  sort	  through	  this	  in	  an	  essay	  on	  commons	  in	  the	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Civil	  Society	  (Lohmann,	  2009).	  There	  I	  detected	  three	  distinct	  lines	  of	  commons	  research	  that	  I	  called	  natural	  commons,	  human-­‐influenced	  commons,	  and	   social	   commons.	  The	  emphasis	   in	   the	  present	   study	   is	  purely	  upon	   social	   commons,	   and	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more	  specifically	  new	  commons	  and	  knowledge	  commons.	  As	  we	  shall	  see	  below,	  philanthropy	  and	  charity	  are	  very	  much	  about	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  human,	  and	  collective	  voluntary	  action	  in	  commons	  is	  right	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  many	  of	  those	  concerns	  (McCully,	  2008).	  	   It	  is	  probably	  fair	  to	  say	  that	  most	  nonprofit	  economists	  have	  not	  known	  quite	  what	  to	  make	  of	  The	  Commons	   and	  my	  seeming	  assault	  on	  attempts	   to	  understand	  public	  charity	  and	  philanthropy	   as	   a	   domain	   of	   economic	   rationality.	   A	   number	   are	   personal	   friends	  who	   don’t	  wish	  to	  insult	  me,	  while	  others	  may	  be	  just	  plain	  confused	  by	  some	  of	  my	  statements	  and	  what	  seemed	   to	   be	   my	   idiosyncratic	   and	   unprovoked	   aspersions	   on	   their	   discipline.	   So	   they	   said	  nothing.	  An	  important	  exception	  to	  this	  uncharacteristic	  reticence	  has	  been	  the	  unique	  criticism	  offered	  by	  Peter	  Boettke	  and	  David	  Prychitko	  (2004a;	  2004b).	  While	  expressing	  considerable	  sympathy	  for	  my	  commons	  theory	  project,	  they	  develop	  a	  focused	  and	  convincing	  dismissal	  of	  my	   reliance	   on	   Adam	   Smith’s	   concept	   of	   unproductive	   labor.	   Their	   criticism	   is	   a	   fair	   one;	  economists	   have,	   indeed,	   moved	   beyond	   Smith’s	   original	   (1983	   [1776])	   treatment	   of	  unproductive	   labor,	   and	   it	  was	   a	   false	  move	   for	  me	   to	   include	   it	   in	   the	   earlier	   version	  of	   the	  theory,	   even	   though	   my	   intent	   in	   doing	   so	   wasn’t	   quite	   as	   they	   portray	   it.	   The	   prospect	   of	  “reinventing”	   this	   feature	   of	   classical	   economics	   that	   they	   attributed	   to	   me	   probably	   never	  would	  have	   occurred	   to	  me	  had	   they	  not	   raised	   it.	   I	  was	  mostly	   intrigued	  by	   the	   similarities	  between	   some	   of	   Smith’s	   examples	   of	   unproductive	   labor	   and	   what	   have	   traditionally	   been	  treated	   as	   public	   charities.	  While	   I	   find	   their	   perspective	   a	   provocative	   one	   that	   has	   led	   to	   a	  number	  of	  important	  revisions	  in	  what	  follows,	  I	  can’t	  entirely	  escape	  the	  impression	  that	  they	  read	  more	  into	  my	  original	  misstep	  than	  I	  had	  ever	  intended.	  Mostly,	  I	  found	  it	  interesting	  that	  Adam	  Smith	  had	  classified	  several	  examples	  of	  what	  now	  appear	  to	  be	  voluntary	  action	  under	  his	   heading	   of	   “unproductive	   labor.”	   I	   was	   little	   concerned	   with	   the	   broader	   economic	  theoretical	   implications	  of	   that	   coincidence.	  And,	   at	   the	   time	   I	  was	  quite	  aware	   that	  until	   the	  mid-­‐1980s,	  macro-­‐economists	  continued	  to	  regard	  nonprofit	  expenditures	  as	  consumption	  for	  purposes	   of	   computing	   national	   GDP.	   From	   that	   vantage	   point,	   the	   Austrian	   insistence	   on	  nonprofit	  efforts	  as	  productive	  was	  a	  welcome	  one.	  	   While	  Boettke	  and	  Prychitko	  are	  correct	  that	  reviving	  the	  concept	  of	  unproductive	  labor	  is	   not	   a	   sound	   basis	   for	   an	   adequate	   economic	   treatment	   of	   the	   non-­‐market	   phenomena	   of	  voluntary	  action,	   they	  did	  not	  offer	  much	  beyond	  encouragement.	  Both	  are	  economists	  of	   the	  Austrian	   School	   of	   Ludwig	   Von	   Mises	   and	   Frederick	   Hayek,	   a	   perspective	   which	   sets	   even	  higher	   store	   on	   rational	   individualism,	   if	   that	   is	   possible,	   than	   the	   mainline	   neo-­‐classical	  economics	   which	   was	   the	   principal	   foil	   of	   much	   of	   my	   early	   work	   on	   commons	   theory.	  Nonetheless,	  it	  is	  interesting	  that	  some	  of	  the	  principal	  differences	  between	  Austrian	  and	  neo-­‐classical	   economic	   schools,	   notably	   over	   the	   role	   of	   calculation,	   are	   particularly	   relevant	   to	  commons	  theory.	  They	  have	  also	  shown	  me	  that	  Lionel	  Robbins‘	  definition	  of	  economics	  as	  “the	  science	  which	  studies	  human	  behavior	  as	  a	  relationship	  between	  given	  ends	  and	  scarce	  means	  which	   have	   alternative	   uses”	   that	   I	   have	   used	   since	   the	   1992	   book	   as	   well	   as	   several	   other	  features	   of	   the	   Austrian	   perspective	   are	   entirely	   in	   line	   with	   my	   original	   critique	   of	   an	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economics	  based	  nonprofit	   theory	  (Lohmann,	  1990A).	  That	  critique	   is	  discussed	  below	  as	  the	  Lettuce	   Paper.	   Such	   criticism	   has	   enabled	   me	   to	   inch	   forward	   several	   small	   steps	   with	  formulation	   of	   the	   continuing	   need	   for	   an	   economics	   of	   voluntary	   action.	   A	   number	   of	  suggestions	  along	  that	  line	  are	  incorporated	  below. 
Some	  Personal	  History	  	  	  For	   some	   readers	   familiar	   with	   my	   work	   on	   the	   new	   commons	   theory	   of	   voluntary	  action,	  this	  initiative	  may	  appear	  to	  have	  begun	  with	  my	  Lettuce	  paper	  presented	  at	  the	  Kansas	  City	   AVAS	   meeting	   in	   1987.	   The	   project	   actually	   goes	   back	   20	   years	   before	   that,	   to	   my	  involvement	  in	  the	  Community	  Action	  Program	  of	  the	  war	  on	  poverty	  where	  I	  first	  encountered	  some	   of	   the	   challenges	   and	   paradoxes	   of	   the	   commons,	   and	   where	   I	   received	   my	   initial	  grounding	  in	  nonprofit	  law	  and	  social	  policy	  in	  the	  Minnesota	  Community	  Action	  program	  from	  Gene	  Flaten	  and	  Larry	  Gallagher.	  	  
Input-­‐Output	  Modeling	  As	  a	  graduate	  student	  at	   the	  Heller	  School	  at	  Brandeis	  University,	   I	   spent	  more	   than	  a	  year	  on	  a	  dissertation	  project	  seeking	  to	  develop	  an	  input-­‐output	  model	  of	  a	  set	  of	  phenomena	  that	   then	   had	   no	   name	   but	   has	   since	   become	   known	   to	   many	   as	   the	   nonprofit	   sector.	   That	  original	  effort	   foundered	  when	   I	   realized	   that	  neither	  my	  quantitative	  skills	  nor	   the	  available	  data	  were	  not	  up	  to	  the	  rigors	  of	  input-­‐output	  modeling.	  	  Even	  so	  I	  thought	  I	  might	  contribute	  a	  tentative	   conceptual	  model	   of	   the	   “social	   welfare	   sector”.	   That	   effort	   produced	   two	  working	  papers	  in	  the	  early	  1970s.	  The	  first	  of	  these	  efforts	  was	  a	  conceptual	  outline	  of	  an	  input-­‐output	  model	   using	   revenue	   flows	   among	   human	   services	   organizations,	   grounded	   loosely	   in	   the	  analogy	   of	   Leontief’s	   input-­‐output	   economics	   (Lohmann,	   1971A).	   It	  was	  well	   received	  by	  my	  major	  professor,	  Robert	  Morris,	  and	  by	  other	  doctoral	  students	  who	  read	  it,	  but	  dismissed	  by	  several	   economists	   with	   whom	   I	   shared	   it	   as	   a	   proposal	   for	   “mere	   social	   accounting”.	   Tom	  Holland,	  Sheldon	  Gelman,	  Ruth	  Brandwein	  and	  my	  wife	  Nancy	  were	  among	  the	  contemporary	  nonprofit	   scholars	  who	  were	  also	  at	  Heller	  at	   that	   time	  and	  subjected	   to	  my	  musings	  on	   this	  topic.	   I	  understand	  now	  several	  of	  the	  reasons	  that	  they	  reached	  this	  conclusion	  based	  on	  my	  lack	  of	  an	  adequate	  general	  conceptual	  basis	  for	  what	  later	  became	  “sectors”	  and	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  adequate	  conception	  of	  utility	  among	  many	  of	  us.	  At	  the	  time,	  of	  course,	  it	  seemed	  to	  me	  to	  reflect	  simply	  hide-­‐bound	  contrariness.	  The	  whole	  project	  drew	  mostly	  blank	  stares	   from	  the	  public	  administrators,	  social	  workers	  and	  social	  scientists	  I	  saw	  as	  the	  intended	  audience.	  I	  was	  after	  all	  proposing	  to	  study	  the	  economic	  organization	  of	  something	  that	  literally	  did	  not	  exist.	  	  The	  second	  paper	  was	  an	  argument	  for	  getting	  beyond	  the	  exclusive	  community	  focus	  of	  nonprofit	  social	  services	  and	  the	  need	  to	  look	  more	  closely	  at	  the	  national	  networks	  that	  were	  already	  coalescing	  into	  the	  national	  nonprofit	  coalition	  that	  formed	  around	  Independent	  Sector	  in	  the	  1980s	  (Lohmann,	  1971B).	  	  As	  recently	  as	  1976,	  representatives	  of	  nineteen	  national	  peak	  associations	  could	  plausibly	  present	   themselves	  as	   the	   voluntary	  sector:	  American	  Red	  Cross,	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Boy	   Scouts,	   Girl	   Scouts,	   Campfire	   Girls,	   Council	   of	   Jewish	   Federations	   and	   Welfare	   Funds,	  Family	   Service	   Associations,	   Boys	   Clubs,	   Girls	   Clubs,	   Goodwill	   Industries,	   National	   Social	  Welfare	   Assembly,	   National	   Association	   for	   Mental	   Health,	   National,	   YMCA,	   National	   YWCA,	  National	   Conference	   of	   Catholic	   Charities,	   National	   Federation	   of	   Settlements	   and	  Neighborhood	  Centers,	  National	  Urban	  League,	  Salvation	  Army,	  Travelers’	  Aid,	  and	  United	  Way	  (Feldesman	  &	  Hughes,	  1976)	  it	  emerged	  a	  decade	  later	  (See	  also	  Boulding,	  1990).	  Boulding’s	  distinction	  of	  exchange,	  threat	   and	   integrative	   systems	   bears	   an	   affinity	   to	   Amatai	   Etzioni’s	   distinction	   of	   coercive,	  remunerative	  and	  normative	  compliance	  in	  organizations.	  Together,	  the	  two	  offer	  early	  systems	  and	   organizational	   level	   conceptions	   pointing	   toward	   a	   “third”	   (integrative	   and	   normative)	  sector	  beyond	  the	  market	  (exchange)	  and	  the	  state	  (threat).	  A	  few	  years	  later,	  I	  used	  Boulding’s	  work	  on	  grant	  economics	  (1972;	  1981)	  and	  Etzioni	  (1963)	  as	  key	  components	  of	  my	  first	  book	  
Breaking	   Even:	   Financial	   Management	   in	   Nonprofit	   Human	   Services	   (1980).	   Then,	   as	   now	   I	  believed	   community	   level	   sectors	   of	   related	   services	   to	   be	  more	   important	   conceptually	   and	  empirically	  than	  national	  sectors.	  
	  The	  Lindblom	  County	  Model	  In	  retrospect	  I	  got	  as	  much	  wrong	  with	  these	  early	  efforts	  as	  I	  got	  right,	  but	  this	  pair	  of	  papers	   represented	   the	   beginnings	   of	   what	   has	   turned	   out	   to	   be	   a	   decades-­‐long	   scholarly	  project.	   Enamored	   at	   the	   time	   with	   the	   communitarian	   potential	   of	   community-­‐level	   social	  planning,	  I	  returned	  to	  this	  theme	  in	  a	  community	  input-­‐output	  study	  of	  the	  human	  services	  of	  Knoxville,	  TN	  (Lohmann,	  1976).	  This	  was	  my	  first	  serious	  attempt	  to	  grapple	  with	  the	  notion	  of	  sectors	   of	   institutions,	   albeit	   only	   in	   the	   context	   of	  my	   understanding	   at	   the	   time	   of	   human	  services.	  This	  was	  also	   the	   first	  point	  at	  which	  my	   interest	   in	   technology	  entered	   the	  picture.	  When	  I	  first	  gained	  access	  to	  the	  Excel	  software	  in	  1984,	  I	  combined	  some	  of	  these	  ideas	  with	  my	   equally	   long-­‐standing	   interest	   in	   Charles	   Lindblom’s	   incremental	   decision-­‐making	   and	  developed	   a	   community-­‐level	   budget	   simulation	   based	   in	   part	   on	   some	   simple	   input-­‐output	  revenue	   flow	   calculations.	   The	   original	   model	   was	   written	   with	   Multiplan,	   the	   Excel	  predecessor	  on	  my	  128K	  (!)	  Mac.	  I	  have	  been	  hesitant	  to	  mention	  it	  in	  print	  previously,	  because	  record	  of	   the	  project	  was	   lost	   for	  several	  years,	  a	  casualty	  of	   the	   transition	   from	  Multiplan	  to	  Excel	  and	   the	  various	  operating	  system	  upgrades	   that	  occurred.	  Recently,	  a	  paper	  printout	  of	  the	   original	  model	   surfaced	   from	   the	   depths	   of	   the	   filing	   cabinet	   in	  my	   office	   and	   I	   can	   now	  reconstruct	  the	  original	  model	  in	  Excel.	  I	  named	   the	  simulation	  Lindblom	  County	   in	   recognition	  of	   the	   incremental	   logic	   that	   it	  was	  meant	  to	  demonstrate	  and	  Charles	  Lindblom’s	  foundational	  role	  in	  formulating	  that	  logic.	  As	  someone	  schooled	  primarily	  in	  the	  practice	  literature,	  I	  did	  not	  know	  until	  years	  later	  that	  Lindblom	  apparently	  got	  this	  notion	  from	  the	  work	  of	   the	  Austrian	  School	  economists,	  and	   in	  particular,	   Frederick	   Hayek.	   The	   Lindblom	   County	   model	   described	   a	   fictitious	   rural	   county	  with	  one	  “large”	  community	  (±25,000	  population)	  and	  four	  smaller	  ones	  (±1,000),	  25	  nonprofit	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organizations	  and	  10	  funding	  sources.	  The	  model	  used	  a	  series	  of	  Likert-­‐type	  scales	  and	  some	  very	  simple	  Excel	  equations	  to	  distribute	  funds	  from	  the	  funders	  to	  the	  agencies.	  Even	  so,	  I	  still	  could	  not	  solve	  some	  of	  the	  fundamental	  conceptual	  problems	  of	  the	  model.	  Since	  then,	  I	  have	  several	   times	   begun	   larger	   and	  more	   elegant	  models	   involving	   different	   types	   of	   nonprofits,	  foundation	  and	  other	  entities	  but	  this	  project	  remains	  incomplete.	  At	  Brandeis,	  Roland	  Warren’s	  conceptual	  pairing	  of	  vertical	  and	  horizontal	  integration	  of	  community	   institutions	   in	   national	   networks	   was	   also	   important	   to	   my	   work.	   Along	   with	  Boulding,	  Warren’s	  (1967)	  work	  deserves	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  another	  of	  the	  tacit	  forerunners	  of	  the	  third	  sector	  perspective	  as	   it	  came	  into	  prominence	  in	  the	  1980s	  as	  Carl	  Milofsky	  has	  written	  (Milofsky,	  2008).	  There	  is,	  in	  fact,	  a	  substantial	  body	  of	  community	  research	  and	  other	  work	  by	  sociologists,	   social	   economists,	   social	   workers	   and	   others	   prior	   to	   1980	   that	   has	   been	  fundamental	   in	   this	   regard,	  but	   is	   seldom	  recognized	  as	  such.	   In	  addition	   to	  Roland	  Warren’s	  work	  which	   as	   Carl	  Milofsky	   (2008)	   has	   noted	  was	   at	   the	   time	   of	   his	   (Warren’s)	   retirement	  evolving	   in	   yet	   other	   interesting	   directions.	   There	   are	   others	   worth	   consideration	   as	   well.	  Associations	   and	   what	   we	   know	   as	   nonprofits	   are	   a	   critically	   important	   theme	   throughout	  Lloyd	  Warner’s	   Yankee	   City	   studies,	   for	   example.	   Studies	   of	   voluntary	   associations	   for	   older	  people	   by	   Arnold	   Rose	   were	   not	   only	   important	   for	   social	   gerontology,	   but	   also	   figure	  importantly	  in	  his	  theory	  of	  power	  (1967).	  	  As	  already	  noted,	  Kenneth	  Boulding	  was	  one	  of	  the	  important	  pre-­‐cursors	  of	  contemporary	  third	  sector	  studies.	  I	  should	  note	  also	  that	  years	  prior	  to	   his	   involvement	   in	   ARNOVA	   and	   ISTR,	   Ralph	   Kramer	   was	   publishing	   on	   the	   “voluntary	  sector”	   in	   the	   social	   work	   literature,	   along	   with	   Robert	   Morris	   (1966;	   1977),	   Alfred	   Kahn	  (1959),	  Violet	  Sieder	   (1966),	  Simon	  Slavin	   (1980),	  David	  Austin	   (1983)	  and	  other	  pioneering	  social	   work	   scholars.	   Among	   the	   middle	   generation	   between	   Addams	   and	   the	   1960s	   was	  Eduard	   C.	   Lindeman	   (1936).	   Warren,	   Robert	   Morris,	   Arnold	   Gurin	   and	   others	   at	   the	   Heller	  School,	  as	  well	  as	  Boulding,	  Amitai	  Etzioni,	  and	  several	  generations	  of	  sociologists	   from	  Amos	  Warner,	   Lloyd	   Warner,	   Arnold	   Rose,	   through	   Nicholas	   Babchuk	   down	   to	   the	   present	   and	   a	  number	  of	   foundation	   researchers,	   as	  diverse	   as	   Leonard	  Ayers,	   Shelby	  Harrison,	   John	  Glenn	  and	  F.	  Emerson	  Andrews	  all	  deserve	  recognition	  as	   important	  precursors	  of	  key	  pieces	  of	  the	  third	   sector	   model	   as	   it	   has	   developed	   (Milofsky	   (2007);	   Warren	   (1963	   [1987]);	   Warren	  (1967);	  Warner	  and	  Lunt,	  1941;	  Warner	  1963).	  In	   general,	   my	   efforts	   in	   the	   early	   1970s	   were	   personally	   heuristic	   but	   ultimately	  unsuccessful.	   Adequate	   data	   and	   models	   with	   which	   to	   characterize	   nonprofit	   and	   public	  entities	   quantitatively	   were	   not	   yet	   available.	   At	   a	   most	   fundamental	   level,	   the	   notion	   of	  nonprofit	   production	   of	   goods	   and	   services	  was	   not	   yet	   accepted	   and	   nonprofit	   activity	  was	  generally	  regarded	  as	  consumption.	  The	  implications	  of	  this	  were	  clear	  enough:	  In	  an	  industrial	  society,	   religion,	   social	   service,	   cultural	  production	  and	  philanthropy	  were	  seen	  reductions	  of	  GDP	  -­‐	  drains	  on	  national	  resources.	   	  The	  conceptual	  basis	   for	  seeing	  sectors	  of	  production	  by	  nonprofit	   firms	   in	   positive	   national	   and	   international	   terms	   was	   still	   in	   the	   future,	   and	   the	  model	   of	   community-­‐level	   voluntary	   associations	   as	   purely	   social	   domains	   of	   the	   ineffectual	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well-­‐intended	  remained	  too	  strong	  to	  see	  any	  possibility	  of	  aggregating	  national	  networks	  into	  sectors.	   Further,	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   any	   genuine	   typological	   framework	   like	   the	   NTEE,	   and	  various	  other	  proposals,	  including	  most	  recently	  the	  Massachusetts	  Catalog	  for	  Philanthropy,	  it	  was	  difficult	  to	  see	  relations	  among	  different	  types	  of	  organizations	  and	  yet	  set	  any	  meaningful	  bounds	  on	  Boulding’s	   integrative	  system.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  in	  the	  case	  of	  human	  service	  organizations,	   the	   United	   Way	   UWASIS	   and	   UWASIS	   II	   typological	   efforts,	   led	   by	   Russy	  Sumariwalla	  and	  others	  at	  United	  Way	  of	  America,	  were	  important	  preliminary	  steps	  toward	  a	  general	  nonprofit	   typology	   like	  NTEE,	   as	  well	   as	  politically	   important	   steps	   leading	  up	   to	   the	  founding	  of	  Independent	  Sector.	  	  Like	   other	   untenured	   assistant	   professors,	   the	   practical	   demands	   of	   career	   survival	  trumped	  pursuing	  my	   real	   long-­‐term	   interests	   for	   a	   number	   of	   years	   in	   the	   1970s	   and	   early	  1980s.	  Toward	  that	  end,	  I	  was	  more	  successful	  in	  the	  short	  run	  in	  getting	  work	  published	  on	  a	  mixed	  bag	  of	  narrow,	  highly	  technical	  applied	  and	  methodological	  problems	  than	  in	  publishing	  incomplete	   and	   tentative	   work	   on	   big,	   bold	   (some	  might	   say	   brash)	   theoretical	   topics.	   As	   a	  result,	   further	   theorizing	   had	   to	   await	   tenure	   and	   promotion.	   In	   retrospect,	   these	   were	   all	  necessary	  predecessors	  to	  my	  later	  work	  on	  commons	  theory.	  But,	  it	  was	  not	  until	  the	  Lettuce	  paper,	  presented	  at	  AVAS	  in	  1987	  and	  published	  in	  1990	  that	  my	  interest	  in	  commons	  theory	  really	  began	  to	  congeal.	  Meanwhile,	  many	  others	  in	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  fields	  were	  on	  roughly	  the	  same	  trajectory	  in	   pursuing	   the	   insights	   of	   Hardin's	   1968	   article	   on	   "The	   Tragedy	   of	   the	   Commons".	  	  Researchers	   in	   ecology,	   life	   sciences,	   and	   environmental	   studies	   showed	   far	   more	   interest	  throughout	   the	   70s	   in	   this	   idea	   than	   anyone	   in	   the	   social	   sciences.	   Recently,	   business	  writer	  Peter	  Barnes	  used	  the	  commons	  to	  convey	  his	  ideas	  on	  changes	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  capitalism	  that	  he	  called	  Capitalism	  3.0	  (Barnes,	  2006).	  	  In	  the	  event,	  he	  also	  used	  the	  concept	  of	  sector	  in	  yet	  another	   way.	   "By	   the	   commons	   sector”	   Barnes	   wrote,	   “I	   mean	   an	   organized	   sector	   of	   our	  economy.	  It	  embraces	  some	  of	  the	  gifts	  we	  inherit	  together	  but	  not	  all.	  In	  effect	  it’s	  a	  subset	  of	  
the	  given	  commons	  that	  we	  consciously	  organize	  according	  to	  commons	  principles”	  (Barnes	  2006:	  6).	  Emphasis	  added).	  Although	  offering	  little	  specific	  guidance	  on	  the	  matter,	  Barnes	  does	  point	  toward	  the	  sector	  conception,	  the	  importance	  of	  gifts	  and	  giving,	  and	  that	  commons	  are	  part	  of	  our	   collective	   heritage.	  Nature,	   community	   and	   culture,	   he	  wrote,	   are	   "the	   three	   forks	   of	   the	  commons	   river”	   (Barnes	   2006:	   5).	   Like	   nearly	   all	   writers	   on	   commons	   Barnes	   expresses	  interest	   in	   expanding	   it.	   Barnes’	   notion	   of	   the	   commons	   sector	   has	   immediate	   application	  discussed	   further	   below	   in	   a	   division	   of	   the	   nonprofit	   sector	   into	   two	   distinct	   sectors:	   the	  commons	   sector	   of	   nonprofits,	   nongovernmental,	   voluntary	   and	   social	   organizations,	   and	   the	  sector	  of	  nonprofit	  firms	  that	  David	  Billis	  (2010)	  terms	  hybrid	  organizations.	  My	   explorations	   of	   commons	   in	   third	   sector	   studies	   are	   found	   in	   a	   series	   of	   ARNOVA	  conference	   and	  working	   papers	   since	   1987	   (1987;	   1989;	   1991A;	   1991B;	   1992;	   1993;	   1996;	  1997;	  2002;	  2004A;	  2004B;	  2006;	  2007),	  papers	  presented	  at	  other	  conferences	  (1989;	  1995;	  1996),	  journal	  articles	  (1990;	  1992;	  1995A;	  1995B;	  2005),	  books	  (1992;	  2002;	  2005)	  and	  book	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chapters	   (including	  2011A	   and	  2011B).	   I	   first	   outlined	   the	   implications	   of	   viewing	   voluntary	  action	  as	  treasonous	  in	  a	  2006	  colloquium	  presentation	  at	  the	  Mandel	  Center	  at	  Case	  Western	  Reserve	   University.	   While	   it	   has	   been	   somewhat	   distinct	   in	   ARNOVA,	   my	   work	   on	   the	   new	  commons	   theory	   of	   voluntary	   action	   is	   only	   one	   small	   facet	   of	   a	   much	   larger	   mosaic	   of	  interdisciplinary	  commons	  studies	  and	  applications.	  Much	  of	  the	  work	  on	  commons	  is	  centered	  on	  the	  International	  Association	  for	  Study	  of	  the	  Commons	  (IASC).	  See	  Lohmann	  (2008A)	  and	  (2008B)	  for	  some	  recent	  attempts	  to	  connect	  with	  that	  commons	  literature,	  where	  perspectives	  on	  association	  and	  social	  networks	  are	  notably	  absent.	  This	  body	  of	  work	  includes	  an	  important	  component	  of	  environmental	  theory	  (the	  line	  of	  inquiry	  initiated	  by	  Hardin,	  1968),	  an	  historical	  premise	  of	  welfare	  reform	  theory	  (Cloward	  and	  Pivin,	  1971),	  a	  vibrant	  perspective	  on	  the	  new	  institutional	  economics	  (in	  the	  hundreds	  of	  publications	  by	  Elinor	  and	  Vincent	  Ostrom	  and	  their	  Indiana	   colleagues,	   some	   of	  which	   are	   cited	   here),	   a	   highly	   provocative	   legal	   solution	   to	   the	  complex	  issue	  of	  ownership	  of	  information	  in	  cyberspace,	  e.g.,	  the	  Creative	  Commons	  initiated	  by	  Lawrence	  Lessig	  (2001),	  an	  equally	  provocative	  conceptualization	  of	  an	  entirely	  new	  form	  of	  “social	   production”	   offered	   by	   Yochai	   Benkler,	   (2004)	   whose	   book	   The	   Wealth	   of	   Networks	  (2006)	  harkens	  back	  to	  Adam	  Smith,	  and	  untold	  numbers	  of	  euphoniously	  named	  “commons”	  web	   sites,	   conferences,	   reception	   rooms,	   apartments,	   condominiums	   and	   real	   estate	  subdivisions	  employing	  the	  commons	  metaphor	  for	  its	  cache.	  The	  commons	  has	  truly	  become	  a	  very	  popular	  idea.	  Yet	  the	  theoretical	  core	  of	  two	  of	  Barnes’	  three	  forks	  in	  the	  commons	  river	  –	  community	   and	   culture	   –	   remains	   almost	   entirely	   at	   the	   level	   of	   Hardin’s	   simple	   (indeed,	  simplistic,	  as	  we	  shall	  see)	  metaphor.	  
	  “The	  Lettuce	  Paper”	  In	  1987,	  I	  presented	  a	  paper	  at	  the	  Association	  of	  Voluntary	  Action	  Scholars	  (AVAS,	  the	  organizational	   predecessor	   of	   ARNOVA)	   conference	   in	   Kansas	   City	   stating	   the	   need	   for	   new	  theoretical	  perspectives.	  David	  Horton	  Smith	  has	  made	  the	  same	  point	  several	  times	  before	  and	  since	  (Smith,	  1974;	  1981;	  1992;	  2000;	  2006).	  First	  identified	  in	  the	  1960s,	  that	  need	  still	  exists	  half	  a	  century	  later.	  The	  key	  image	  in	  my	  1987	  paper	  (published	  in	  1989)	  suggested	  that	  talk	  of	  charitable	   and	   philanthropic	   establishments	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   absence	   of	   profit	  made	   as	  much	  sense	  as	  characterizing	   lettuce	  as	  a	  non-­‐mammal.	   Issues	  of	  definition	  and	  classification	  which	  animated	   this	   lettuce	   paper	   (later	   published	   in	   1990	   and	   reprinted	   several	   times	   since)	   still	  remain	  largely	  unresolved:	  The	  rubric	  of	  philanthropy	  as	  the	  private	  production	  of	  public	  goods	  in	  Robert	  Payton’s	  evocative	  (1988)	  phrase,	  accounts	  for	  something	  of	  major	  importance,	  but	  is	  only	   a	   partial	   solution.	   Not	   all	   nonprofit	   production	   produces	   public	   goods	   and	   not	   all	  philanthropy	  is	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  nonprofits.	  	  It	   has	   long	  been	   equally	   clear	   (Lohmann,	   1995)	   that	   at	   least	   the	   larger,	   professionally	  staffed	   nonprofit	   firms	   engaged	   in	   public-­‐goods	   production	   form	   a	   discernible,	   measurable	  corporate	  nonprofit	  sector	  in	  the	  U.S	  and	  a	  number	  of	  other	  nations.	  I	  have	  repeatedly	  tried	  to	  make	   clear,	   however,	   that	   it	   is	   a	  mistake	   to	   attribute	   the	   full	   range	  and	   scope	  of	   third	   sector	  activity	   outside	   households,	   governments	   and	   markets	   to	   this	   rather	   narrow	   sector	   of	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incorporated,	   professionally	   staffed	   nonprofit	   firms.	   Nor	   is	   it	   sufficient	   to	   take	   tax-­‐exempt	  corporations	  as	  the	  definitive	  or	  exclusive	  form	  of	  voluntary	  action.	  To	  do	  so	  is	  to	  submit	  to	  the	  classification	  anomaly	  referred	  to	  in	  the	  lettuce	  paper.	  The	  space	  outside	  markets	  and	  states,	  it	  seems,	   consists	  of	  numerous	  overlapping	  sectors	  of	  modern	  organizations	  each	  characterized	  by	   a	   single	   trait:	   nonprofit,	   not-­‐for-­‐profit,	   nongovernmental,	   social,	   social	   or	   human	   service,	  philanthropy,	  civil	  society,	  and	  others.	  Recognizing	   the	  existence	  of	  any	  one	  of	   them	  does	  not	  disprove	  or	  nullify	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  others.	  David	  Horton	  Smith	  (1991)	  first	  made	  this	  point	  years	   ago	  with	   a	   paper	   outlining	   third,	   fourth	   and	   fifth	   sectors.	  What	  was	  missing	   from	   that	  view	   and	   is	   still	   largely	  missing	   in	   the	   field	  was	   a	   sense	   of	   the	   larger	  whole	   of	   which	   these	  sectors	  are	  parts.	  I	  tried	  to	  address	  this	  in	  Lohmann	  (2013).	  	  Several	   other	   points	   made	   in	   the	   lettuce	   paper	   still	   merit	   consideration:	   (1)	   some	  unspecified	  portion	  of	   production	  outside	   of	   government	   and	  markets	   remains	   and	  probably	  will	  always	  remain	  unmeasured	  by	  macroeconomic	  metrics	  associated	  with	  the	  “third	  sector”	  notion;	  (2)	  the	  notion	  that	  measurable	  public	  goods	  and	  incommensurable	  common	  goods	  are	  one	  and	  the	  same	  thing	  is	  simply	  wrong.	  Unmeasured	  and	  particularly	  immeasurable	  common	  goods,	  composed	  principally	  I	  argue	  in	  what	  follows	  of	  club	  goods	  and	  community	  goods,	  cannot	  be	  subsumed	  under	  the	  public	  goods	  umbrella	  and	  merit	  separate	  consideration.	  Indeed,	  we	  are	  confronted	  with	  a	  second	  important	  facet	  of	  the	  classification	  anomaly.	  Activities	  best	  described	  in	   terms	   of	   production	   of	   club	   and	   community	   goods	   deserve	   to	   be	   treated	   as	   important	   on	  their	  own	  terms,	  not	  as	  weak	  sisters	  or	  poor	  relations	  of	  measurable	  production	  of	  public	  goods	  by	   nonprofit	   firms.	   That	   was	   true	   in	   1987	   and	   it	   remains	   true	   today.	   The	   full	   range	   of	  productive	   organizations	   operating	   in	   the	   third	   space	   outside	   government	   and	   the	   market	  order	  produce	  not	  only	  public	  goods,	  but	  also	  club	  and	  community	  goods.	  The	  lettuce	  paper	  contained	  an	  outline	  that	  I	  immediately	  began	  expanding	  and	  in	  1992,	  the	  book-­‐length	  The	  Commons:	  New	  Perspectives	  on	  Nonprofit	  Organizations,	  Voluntary	  Action	  
and	  Philanthropy	  was	  published	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Jossey-­‐Bass	  nonprofit	  series.	  The	  book	  received	  (and	   continues	   to	   receive)	   positive	   critical	   attention,	   but	   sales	   were	   lack-­‐luster	   and	   the	  publisher	  took	  it	  off	  the	  market	  in	  relatively	  short	  order.	  	  That	  first	  full	  expression	  of	  what	  I	  am	  now	  calling	  a	  new	  commons	  theory	  of	  voluntary	  action	  outlined	  what	  Jon	  Van	  Til	  called	  “the	  first	  definitive,	   large-­‐scale	  theory	  of	  the	  nonprofit	  and	  voluntary	  sector.”	  Works	  by	  the	  author	  and	  others	  have	  continued	  since	  that	  time	  to	  further	  clarify	   the	   nature	   and	   character	   of	   this	   “third	   space”	   (Van	   Til,	   2007)	   generally	   agreed	   to	   be	  found	  alongside	  markets	  and	  states	  as	  part	  of	  some	  larger	  whole.	  Since	  that	  time	  the	  concepts	  of	  the	  commons,	  knowledge	  commons,	  creative	  commons,	  peer	  production,	  and	  the	  new	  commons	  by	  Eleanor	  Ostrom,	  Charlotte	  Hess,	  Peter	  Barnes,	  Y.	  Benkler,	  Lawrence	  Lessig	  and	  others	  have	  evolved	   in	   directions	   that	   have	   increasingly	   clear	   implications	   for	   the	   third	   sector.	   Thus,	   the	  time	   is	   ripe	   for	   a	   full-­‐scale	   reconsideration	   and	   updating	   of	   the	   new	   commons	   theory	   of	  voluntary	   action	   originally	   laid	   out	   in	   that	   1992	   volume.	   	   In	   the	   ensuing	   decades,	   I	   have	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published	   scattered	   insights	  on	  many	  aspects	  of	   the	   commons	  perspective.	  But	   all	   these	  new	  developments	  have	  not	  been	  brought	  together	  under	  a	  single	  umbrella	  until	  now.	  
Theory,	  Word	  Play	  and	  Discourse	  Language	  use	  and	  discourse	  has	  always	  been	  fundamentally	  important	  to	  the	  commons	  project,	  as	  part	  of	  the	  subject	  matter	  and	  in	  framing	  of	  the	  discussion.	  Along	  with	  that	  goes	  the	  occasional	  bit	  of	  word	  play,	  generally	   for	  serious	  purposes,	  as	   in	  the	   lettuce	  paper	  (Lohmann,	  1992A).	  This	  attention	  to	  words	  began	  in	  observing	  the	  tendency	  of	  ‘nonprofit’	  literature	  to	  pile	  on	   negations	   like	   non-­‐	   and	   not-­‐	   and	   not-­‐for-­‐	   that	   did	   not	   really	   express	   negative	   ideas	   or	  contradictions	  but	  merely	  differences.	  As	  such,	  they	  informed	  us	  what	  voluntary	  action	  was	  not,	  and	   in	   the	   process	   presented	   voluntary	   action	   in	   contrast	   to	   what	   are	   really	   unrelated	   and	  irrelevant	  concepts	  of	  profit	  and	  governance.	  All	  of	  this,	  as	  I	  suggested	  several	  decades	  ago,	   is	  quite	  as	  absurd	  as	  classifying	  lettuce	  as	  a	  non-­‐mammal:	  Lettuce	  is	  a	  non-­‐fur	  bearing,	  non-­‐milk	  producing,	  non-­‐child	  bearing,	  non-­‐warm-­‐blooded	  non-­‐animal.	  Further,	  as	  a	  non-­‐mammal,	  lettuce	  is	  highly	  ineffective,	  being	  sedentary	  and	  not	  warm-­‐blooded.	  All	  other	  mammals	  are	  much	  faster!	  It	  is	  also	  remarkable	  non-­‐agile,	  and	   not	   protective	   of	   its	   young.	   On	   the	   whole,	   lettuce	   is	   a	   miserable	   excuse	   for	   a	  mammal!	  (Lohmann,	  1989)	  	  	   To	   get	   past	   that,	   the	   word	   usage	   woven	   throughout	   the	   new	   commons	   theory	   of	  voluntary	  action	  has	  been	  both	   intentional	   and	   strategic:	  An	  attempt	   to	   try	   to	   state,	   describe	  and	  explain	  clearly	  and	  unequivocally	  what	  things	  may	  be,	  rather	  than	  what	  they	  are	  not.	  The	  term	  endowment	  for	  example	  as	  it	  is	  widely	  used	  (i.e.,	  intellectual	  endowment	  and	  the	  genetic	  endowment	  of	  persons)	   is	  useful	  as	  a	  one-­‐word	  synonym	  for	  a	  common-­‐resource	  pool	  of	  any	  type.	  This	  usage	  embraces	  the	  narrow,	  legalistic	  meaning	  of	  restricted	  funds	  but	  also	  opens	  the	  possibility	  of	  other,	  more	  general	  references.	  Likewise,	   I	  and	  others	  have	  sought	  to	  revive	  the	  term	   philanthropology	   originally	   used	   by	   Amos	  Warner	   (1894)	   to	   describe	   the	   study	   of,	   or	  science	  of,	  philanthropy;	  one,	  as	  it	  were,	  of	  the	  sciences	  of	  man	  (the	  original,	  general	  meaning	  of	  anthropology).	  Both	  in	  1992	  and	  even	  more	  here,	  I	  have	  relied	  heavily	  on	  the	  language	  device	  of	  the	  portmanteau	  –	   the	  merging	  of	   two	  separate	  word	   fragments	   in	   terms	   like	   smog	  or,	  more	  recently,	   bankster.	   One	   of	   the	   most	   useful	   terms	   coined	   in	   the	   original	   1992	   book	   was	  benefactory,	  grounded	  in	  the	  analogy	  of	  the	  18th	  century	  usage	  of	  manufactory,	  later	  shortened	  to	  factory.	  A	  large	  and	  important	  class	  of	  common	  resource	  pools	  and	  a	  significant	  number	  of	  hybrid	   nonprofit	   firms	   function	   as	   factories	   for	   the	   production	   of	   benefit	   to	   others,	   thus,	  benefactories.	  Likewise,	  just	  as	  an	  auditorium	  is	  a	  place	  for	  hearing,	  a	  celebratorium	  can	  be	  said	  to	  be	  a	  place	  for	  celebration	  and	  observance	  –	  both	  important	  common	  goods.	  In	  this	  revised	  statement	  of	  the	  theory,	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  additional	  portmanteaus,	  adaptations,	   coinages	   and	   borrowed	   terms	   that	   have	   been	   added,	   including	   adhocracy,	  baudekin,	   cafe	   society,	   celebratorium,	   civility	   covenant,	   communocracy,	   dual-­‐dyad	   exchange,	  third	   sector,	   florescence,	   focused	   public,	   gift	   economy,	   good	   and	   bad	   commons,	   guru	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association,	  hermony,	  knowl,	  performatory,	  philanthropod,	  posse,	  scene,	  and	  moeuratorium.	  In	  addition,	   the	   perspective	   now	   incorporates	   a	   number	   of	   important	   concepts	   and	   ideas	  developed	   by	   others,	   including	   asabiya,	   autopoiesis,	   allopoesis,	   canopy,	   colonization,	  conscientization,	   corporatization,	   giving	   circles,	   honorrea,	   illfare,	   imaginarium,	   interpretive	  community,	   khvost,	   knowledge	   commons,	   kula	   cycle,	   life	   world,	   market	   order,	   moeur,	   moral	  order,	  moral	   economy,	   peak	   association,	   peer	   production,	   reconciliation,	   social	   capital,	   social	  economy,	   social	   movement,	   social	   problem,	   solidarity,	   vernacular	   culture,	   and	   the	   wealth	   of	  networks.	  
A	  Caveat	  
 It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  a	  caveat	  here.	  While	  contemporary	  associations,	  assemblies,	  civil	  society,	  nonprofit	  organizations,	  philanthropy	  and	  the	  broader	  third	  sector	  discussed	  here	  are	  world-­‐wide	  phenomena,	  the	  discussion	  here	  is	  framed	  largely	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  U.S;	  Largely	  but	  not	  exclusively.	  One	  major	  concession	  to	  European	  thinking	  on	  this	  matter	  is	  my	  substitution	  of	  the	  term	  solidarity,	  based	  in	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  European	  civil	  society	  movement	  in	  place	  of	  the	   1992	   term	   mutuality,	   which	   was	   grounded	   in	   the	   earlier	   work	   of	   Kropotkin.	   Although	  “mutuals”	  are	  part	  of	  the	  standard	  European	  definition	  of	  civil	  society	  organizations,	  in	  the	  U.S.	  mutual,	   e.g.,	   insurance	   companies	   like	   the	   many	   with	   Mutual	   in	   their	   names	   are	   mostly	  considered	  part	  of	  the	  business	  community	  and	  not	  the	  third	  sector.	  There	  are	  two	  reasons	  for	  this:	  First,	  most	  of	  my	  practice,	  teaching	  and	  life	  experience	  have	  been	  within	  the	  U.S.,	  and	  this	  is	  the	  area	  I	  know	  best.	  I	  can’t	  even	  claim	  mine	  to	  be	  a	  North	  American	  perspective,	  as	  Evers	  &	  Laville	   (2004)	   would	   have	   it,	   because	   while	   certain	   aspects	   of	   the	   Canadian	   third	   sector	  experience	   add	   luster,	   color	   and	   flavor	   to	   the	   discussion	   here,	   there	   are	   also	   important	  differences	  that	  are	  too	  subtle	  to	  fully	  explore	  in	  this	  work.	  Moreover,	  even	  though	  the	  Eurasian	  experiences	  with	  common	  property	  had	  profound	  influences	  in	  the	  colonial	  and	  early	  national	  U.S.	  experience,	  and	  European	  observers	  like	  Tocqueville	  have	  always	  been	  an	  important	  part	  of	   the	   mix,	   many	   of	   the	   key	   concepts	   discussed	   originated	   in	   the	   U.S.	   and	   the	   U.S.	   case	   is	  distinctive	  enough	  to	  justify	  exploration	  on	  its	  own	  merits.	  Secondly,	  there	  is	  the	  consideration	  of	  personal	  limits	  of	  knowledge:	  I	  spent	  my	  career	  in	  the	  local	  social	  service	  context	  of	  the	  U.S.	  and	  my	  avocational	  interests	  are	  all	  primarily	  local	  to	  Usonian	  (U.S.	  of	  North	  America)	  society	  and	  culture.	  Finally,	   there	   is	   the	   principle	   of	   self-­‐determination,	  which	   I	   have	   labeled	   hermony:	  As	  noted	  in	  the	  1992	  book	  and	  throughout	  what	  follows,	  new	  commons	  are	  by	  law	  and	  tradition	  (and	  should	  continue	  to	  be)	  maximally	  free	  to	  define	  themselves	  and	  determine	  their	  own	  fate	  –	  their	  membership,	  their	  identity,	  their	  resources	  and	  their	  missions.	  As	  a	  longtime	  participant	  in	  new	  commons	  in	  several	  regions	  of	  the	  U.S.	  (with	  a	  few	  international	  experiences	  as	  well),	  I	  can	  only	  write	  based	  on	   that	  experience.	  Others,	  with	  different	  experiences	   in	  other	   contexts	  and	  cultures	  will	  have	  to	  comment	  on	  how	  extensive,	  even	  universal,	   these	  observations	  may	  be.	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We	  make	  a	  living	  by	  what	  we	  get.	  	  We	  make	  a	  life	  by	  what	  we	  give.	  
~	  Winston	  Churchill	   	   	   	   	  
2.	  Voluntary	  Action	  Lifeworlds	  	  We	  may	  be	  on	  the	  verge	  of	  important	  new	  steps	  in	  the	  advancement	  of	  democracy	  in	  the	  present	  era	  (Anderson,	  2007;	  Barber,	  1984:	  117;	  Bernstein,	  1976;	  2010)	  Cohen	  and	  Arato,	   2000;	   Cooke,	   2000;	   Fishkin,	   1996;	   Fung,	   2003;	   Gutmann	   and	   Thomson,	   1996;	  Habermas,	  1996;	  Joas,	  1993;	  Mansbridge,	  1999:	  706;	  Rabinder,	  2004;	  Ryfe,	  2005;	  Selznick,	  1995;	  Vitale,	  2006,	  et.	  al.).	  Yet,	  this	  hopeful	  note	  deserves	  to	  be	  viewed	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  range	  of	  underlying	  concerns,	  including	  continuing	  and	  resurgent	  autocracy	  in	  the	  world,	  as	   well	   as	   poverty,	   violence,	   environmental	   degradation,	   increasing	   inequality,	   the	  growing	  power	  of	  corporations,	  the	  loss	  of	  legitimacy	  of	  public	  institutions	  and	  a	  range	  of	  other	  concerns.	  Optimism	  is	  not	  the	  only	  contemporary	  current,	  although	  it	  has	  been	  the	  dominant	   note	   in	   third	   sector	   theorizing.	   There	   is	   concern	   in	   some	   quarters	   that	   the	  political	  world	  may	  actually	  be	  moving	  away	  from	  democracy	  entirely	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  autocracy	   or	   oligarchic	   trends	   with	   names	   like	   professionalism	   (Hodges,	   2003)	   or	  something	  termed	  horizontality	  (Maeckelbergh	  2013).	  Larry	  Diamond	  (2008)	  asserted	  in	  
Foreign	  Affairs	  that	  the	  world	  was	  experiencing	  a	  “democracy	  recession”.	  	  The	   situation	   in	   the	   United	   States	   is	   similarly	   perplexing	   as	   the	   Lincolnesque	  formula	   of	   democracy	   as	   government	   of	   the	   people,	   by	   the	   people	   and	   for	   the	   people	   is	  challenged	  on	  many	  fronts,	   including	  political	  corruption,	  divided	  government,	  resurgent	  nativism,	   increasingly	   vocal	   claims	   that	   the	   U.S.	   is	   not	   a	   democracy,	   but	   instead	   a	  constitutional	   republic,	   legal	   doctrines	   of	   “originalism”	   that	   attempt	   to	   strangle	  contemporary	  political	  expression	  based	  in	  real,	  alleged	  and	  outright	   fictional	   traditions,	  attempts	  to	  counter	  religious	  pluralism	  with	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  country	  was	  founded	  as	  a	  Christian	   nation,	   and	   much	   more.	   Whether	   democracy	   in	   the	   world	   is	   expanding	   or	  contracting	   democratic	   ideals	   continue	   to	   have	   great	   appeal	   for	   a	   broad	   spectrum	   of	  thinkers	   in	   the	   third	   sector.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   movement	   away	   from	   voluntary	  associations	   toward	  professionally	  staffed,	  managed	  and	  bureaucratized	  organizations	   is	  not	  only	  tolerated	  but	  even	  celebrated.	  	  Despite	   these	  diverse	  and	  contradictory	   trends,	   something	  approaching	  a	  current	  consensus	  among	  American	  political	  philosophers	  in	  recent	  decades	  seems	  to	  affirm	  that	  the	  first	  next	  step	  in	  the	  developing	  story	  of	  democracy	  is	  expected	  to	  be	  movement	  in	  the	  direction	   of	   deliberative	   democracy.	   Others	   appear	   to	   be	   holding	   out	   strongly	   for	   civic	  republicanism.	  Several	  of	  the	  authors	  above,	  for	  example,	  have	  offered	  detailed	  proposals	  along	  those	  lines.	  Both	  are	  positions	  I	  respect	  and	  support	  (Lohmann	  and	  Van	  Til	  2011).	  Yet,	  either	  would	  hardly	  be	  the	  end	  of	  the	  story.	  What	  is	  apparent	  is	  that,	  regardless	  of	  the	  directions	   in	  which	  practice	  and	  actuality	  are	  moving	  at	  any	  given	  moment,	  normatively	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speaking	   the	   past	   few	   decades	   have	   been	   an	   exciting	   time	   for	   the	   exploration	   of	  possibilities	  and	  potentialities	  inherent	  in	  the	  human	  condition.	  And	  theory	  and	  practice	  of	  the	  third	  sector	  have	  been	  prominent	  in	  that	  regard.	  In	   the	   following	   pages,	   we	   will	   take	   an	   extended	   look	   at	   a	   related	   prospect	  currently	  receiving	   insufficient	  attention.	  The	  view	  of	  democracy	  outlined	  below	  is	  quite	  different	   from	   the	   conventional	   figure	   appearing	   in	   political	   and	   social	   theory.	   At	   least	  since	   Hobbes	   and	   Locke,	   and	   perhaps	   even	   since	  Machiavelli,	   political	   theory,	   with	   the	  major	   exception	   of	   Volume	   Two	   of	   Tocqueville’s	   Democracy	   in	   America	   has	   been	  preoccupied	   with	   government	   as	   the	   pre-­‐eminent	   expression	   of	   political	   society	   and	  interested	  only	  in	  cursory	  glimpses	  of	  voluntary	  association	  outside	  of	  markets	  and	  states.	  There	  has	  been	  a	  vast	  resurgence	  of	  interest	  in	  political	  theory	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  John	  Rawls’	  theory	  of	  justice,	  and	  a	  strong	  practical	  tilt	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  civic	  engagement	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  civil	  society	  renaissance	  amid	  the	  declining	  prospects	  of	  socialist	  idealism.	  Even	  so,	  the	  actual	  emergence	  of	  an	   independent	   third	  sector	  as	  a	   coherent	   institutional	  domain,	  structured	   and	   constituted	   largely	   by	   voluntary	   action	   and	   not	   just	   a	   handmaiden	   of	  markets	  and	  states	  has	  gone	  largely	  unremarked	  in	  social	  and	  political	  theory.	  Where	  it	  is	  noted,	  as	  in	  Jean	  Cohen	  and	  Anthony	  Arato’s	  majestic	  volume,	  Civil	  Society	  (1992),	  primary	  attention	   is	   still	   on	   a	   rather	   undifferentiated	   class	   of	   voluntary	   associations	   with	   little	  recognition	  of	  the	  rapidly	  growing	  body	  of	  knowledge	  of	  the	  third	  sector	  and	  its	  distinctive	  institutions.	  Much	   the	   same	   can	   be	   said	   for	   the	   economic	   and	  managerial	   idea	   that	   the	   third	  sector	   is	   in	   some	   fundamental	   sense	   a	   national	   rather	   than	   local	   phenomenon,	  representing	  part	  of	  a	  shift	  away	  from	  the	  pluralism	  of	  a	  federal	  state	  to	  a	  one-­‐dimensional	  national	  one.	  That	  data	  on	  the	  third	  sector	  are	  aggregated	  on	  a	  national	  basis	  currently	  in	  the	   U.S.	   is	   beyond	   dispute.	   That,	   however,	   is	   purely	   an	   artifact	   of	   U.S.	   tax	   policy	   and	  corporate	  law	  out	  of	  which	  data	  collection	  patterns	  originated	  and	  were	  first	  studied.	  The	  wider	  third	  sector	  beyond	  tabulated	  corporations	  is	  an	  emerging	  reality,	  and	  a	  great	  deal	  more	   than	   a	   data	   construct.	   The	   case	   is	   made	   here	   for	   what	   large	   numbers	   of	   people	  already	  know	  and	  believe:	  The	  third	  sector,	  as	  a	  space	  outside	  markets,	  governments	  and	  households,	  is	  predominantly	  a	  community	  phenomenon	  in	  a	  very	  robust,	  pluralistic	  and	  multi-­‐faceted	  sense,	  and	  national	  tabulations	  and	  peak	  associations	  are	  but	  one	  expression	  of	  this	  complex	  phenomenon.	  The	   view	   of	   voluntary	   action	   outlined	   here	   seeks	   to	   take	   the	   emphasis	   off	   data	  tabulation	   and	   nonprofit	   corporations	   engaged	   in	   service	   delivery	   and	   call	   attention	  instead	  to	  the	  central	   importance	  of	  the	  political,	  economic,	  social	  and	  cultural	  dynamics	  of	  voluntary	  action.	  The	  nonprofit	  model	  has	  largely	  evolved	  within	  the	  narrow	  confines	  of	  the	   economic	   and	   bureaucratic	   issues	   of	   administrative	   theory	   and	   professional	   service	  delivery	  and	  efforts	  (Lohmann,	  2013).	  Theoretical	  discussions	  of	  the	  civil	  society	  model	  in	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third	   sector	   studies	   have	   evolved	   within	   similar	   confines	   and	   sought	   to	   apply	   the	  paradigm	  of	  inherited	  political	  and	  social	  theory,	  which	  has	  little	  place	  for	  voluntary	  action	  beyond	  Tocqueville’s	  oft-­‐quoted	  but	  rather	  attenuated	  comments.	  The	  complex	  fact	  is	  that	  observations	  nearly	  200	  years	  old	  should	  not	  be	  used	  by	  themselves	  to	  explain	  or	  justify	  contemporary	  happenings,	  yet	  a	  good	  deal	  of	  what	  this	  18th	  century	  French	  aristocrat	  had	  to	   say	   on	   the	   subject	   does	   still	   ring	   true	   today.	  What	   follows	   is	   not	  merely	   an	   effort	   to	  describe	   and	   characterize	   the	   existing	  wider	   third	   sector,	   however.	  This	   is	   in	   important	  respects	  a	  normative	  perspective	  that	  seeks	  to	  point	  toward	  potentialities	  and	  capabilities	  of	  collective	  action	  in	  the	  third	  sector,	  some	  of	  which	  exist	  at	  present,	  others	  have	  emerged	  at	  times	  in	  the	  past,	  or	  still	  others	  could	  emerge	  in	  the	  future.	  	  A	  key	  feature	  that	  ties	  all	  of	  the	  otherwise	  diverse	  elements	  and	  themes	  presented	  here	   together	   is	   the	   notion	   of	   a	   commons,	   both	   as	   economic	   organization	   of	   collective	  resources	  and	  as	  social,	  political	  and	  cultural	  organization	  of	  the	  interpersonal	  relations	  of	  groups	   and	   associations.	   In	   the	   agricultural,	   forest	   and	   fishery	   resources	   sectors	   “old	  commons”	   have	   been	   around	   for	   many	   centuries;	   largely	   spontaneous	   and	   extra-­‐legal	  expressions	   of	   community	   regard.	   The	   suggestion	   is	   made	   here	   that	   as	   many	   of	   the	  communal	   functions	   of	   these	   old	   commons	  were	   disrupted	   and	   even	   crushed	   by	   rising	  nation-­‐states	   in	   early	   modern	   Europe,	   with	   very	   little	   notice	   or	   attention	   species	   of	  entirely	  new	  common	  resource	  pools	  began	  to	  emerge.	  They	  were	  voluntarily	  constituted,	  mission-­‐oriented,	   and	   often	   pooling	   entirely	   new	   and	   different	   types	   of	   resources	  including	   information	   and	   knowledge,	   interpersonal	   influence,	   public	   opinion,	   prestige	  and	  other	  factors.	  Beginning	  in	  the	  17th	  century,	  the	  very	  novelty	  of	  these	  new	  commons	  kept	  them	  from	  emerging	  as	  an	  important	  figure	  in	  political	  and	  social	  theory	  even	  as	  the	  practices	   continued	   to	   grow	   there.	   It	  was	   not	   until	   the	   last	   decades	   of	   the	   20th	   century,	  however,	   after	   almost	   three	   centuries	   of	   scattered	   and	   seemingly	   unrelated	   examples	  treated	  mostly	  as	  minor	  data,	  that	  researchers	  and	  theorists	  began	  to	  detect	  the	  common	  core	  and	  threads	  of	  all	  this	  and	  suggest	  the	  connections	  they	  called	  the	  third	  sector.	  Decades	  ago,	  Samuel	  Huntington	  laid	  down	  an	  important	  part	  of	  the	  basic	  challenge	  to	   be	   taken	   up	   here	   by	   quoting	   Tocqueville:	   “If	   [people]	   are	   to	   remain	   civilized	   or	   to	  become	   so,	   the	   art	   of	   associating	   together	  must	   grow	   and	   improve	   in	   the	   same	   ratio	   in	  which	   the	   equality	   of	   conditions	   is	   increased.”	   Tocqueville	   is	   usually	   quoted	   as	   writing	  “men”,	   or	   in	   the	   original	   French	   hommes	   but	   if	   this	   statement	   is	   to	   have	   continuing	  meaning	   for	  us	   today,	   “people”	  meaning	  both	  men	  and	  women	  or	  even	  humanité,	  seems	  the	  more	  appropriate	  choice.	  We	  need	  not	  commit	  an	  anachronism	  by	  this	  update	  as	  long	  as	  it	   is	  clear	  that	  our	  concern	  is	  not	  with	  what	  the	  Frenchman	  wrote	  in	  the	  19th	  century,	  but	  identifying	  what	  continuing	  meaning	  this	  statement	  can	  have	  for	  us	  today	  and	  in	  the	  future.	  Those	  who	  believe	  that	  future	  democratic	  polities	  should	  be	  restricted	  to	  men	  only,	  or	  even	  men	  of	  property	  should	  be	  on	  notice	  that	  their	  view	  is	  not	  shared	  here.	  They	  will	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have	  to	  do	  their	  own	  theorizing	  and	  form	  their	  own	  associations!	  The	  rights	  of	  association	  and	  assembly	  apply	  to	  all	  people.	  Huntington	  went	  on	  “in	  much	  of	  the	  world	  today,	  equality	  of	  political	  participation	  is	  growing	  much	  more	  rapidly	  than	  is	  the	  ‘art	  of	  associating	  together’”	  	  (Huntington	  1965).	  In	  the	  same	  period	  of	   time,	  Walter	  Reuther,	  head	  of	   the	  U.S.	  autoworkers’	  union	  and	  the	  only	  non-­‐African	  American	  speaker	  at	  the	  1963	  March	  on	  Washington	  set	  the	  tone	  for	  the	  future	  with	  his	   statement	   that	   it	  was	   “the	  beginning	  of	   a	   great	  moral	   crusade	   to	   arouse	  America	  to	  the	  unfinished	  work	  of	  American	  democracy”.	  In	  fact,	  that	  march	  was	  probably	  one	  of	  the	  real	  beginning	  points	  of	  the	  U.S.	  third	  sector	  which	  was	  in	  relatively	  short	  order	  joined	  by	  the	  financial	  and	  program	  streams	  of	  the	  War	  on	  Poverty,	  Model	  Cities,	  Medicaid,	  and	  a	  host	  of	  other	  public	  initiatives	  in	  such	  diverse	  fields	  as	  social	  services,	  housing	  and	  urban	   development	   and	   support	   for	   the	   arts.	   Many	   of	   these	  were	   initially	   tied	   to	  what	  Reuther	   labeled	   the	   “great	   moral	   crusade”	   (now	   generally	   known	   as	   the	   civil	   rights	  movement)	  while	  others	  –	   like	  support	   for	  education	  and	  the	  arts	  –	   later	   flew	  under	  the	  same	  banner	  of	  “the	  unfinished	  work	  of	  American	  democracy.”	  In	  Reuther’s	  time,	  he	  and	  many	  others,	  including	  a	  cohort	  of	  those	  who	  subsequently	  became	  third	  sector	  scholars,	  saw	  the	  third	  sector	  that	  emerged	  as	  an	  adjunct	  of	  public	  initiative.	   My	   view	   is	   that	  while	   this	  may	   have	   been	   the	   original	   intent,	   it	  was	   followed	   in	  short	   order	   of	   a	   period	   of	   autonomization	   and	   growing	   independence	   of	   third	   sector	  institutions	  (and	  reduced	  public	  subsidies).	  Regardless	  of	  the	  original	  intentions	  of	  public	  policy	   makers	   then	   and	   since,	   leaders	   of	   nonprofit,	   charitable	   and	   philanthropic	  organizations	   gradually	   realized	   that	   as	   a	   result	   of	   mandates	   built	   into	   the	   policies	  themselves,	  public	  policy	  makers	  could	  not	  legally	  control	  them,	  and	  they	  were	  free	  to	  set	  their	  own	  course.	   Huntington’s	   and	   Reuther’s	   views	   are	   altogether	   consistent	   with	   more	   recent	  observations	  that	  despite	  massive	  expansion	  of	  the	  condition	  of	  political	  equality	  for	  racial	  and	   ethnic	  minorities	   and	  women	   in	  most	   of	   the	  world’s	   democracies	   civic	   engagement	  and	   participation	  may	   actually	   be	   in	   decline,	   in	   part	   due	   to	   the	  mitigating	   influence	   of	  television	  (Putman	  2000;	  but	  see	  also	  Skocpol	  and	  Florina	  1999).	  Putnam	  wrote	  that	  only	  a	   few	  years	   into	   the	   age	   of	   the	   Internet	   and	  well	   before	   the	   advent	   of	   social	  media	   and	  entirely	   new	   forms	   of	   engagement	   and	   participation.	   Yet,	   others	   might	   argue	   the	  measurable	   declines	   Putnam	   noted	   must	   be	   viewed	   in	   light	   of	   even	   greater	   and	   more	  significant	  qualitative	  declines	   in	   the	  meaning	  of	  membership,	  as	  nominal	   “members”	   in	  gigantic	   organizations	   of	   thousands	   and	   even	   millions	   of	   members	   create	   little	   or	   no	  opportunity	  for	  participation	  or	  engagement	  beyond	  the	  affirmation	  of	  joining.	  What	   follows	   below	   is	   a	   concern	   for	   the	   basic	   practices	   –	   associations,	  organizations,	   rules,	   decisions,	   methods	   and	   approaches	   –	   capable	   of	   balancing	   formal	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political	   equality	   and	   the	   institutions	   and	   arrangements	   of	   participation.	   We	   begin,	  perhaps,	   with	   three	   questions:	   1)	   what	   are	   the	   most	   important	   implications	   of	   the	  invention,	  discovery	   in	  recent	  decades	  of	   the	   third	  sectors	  of	  voluntary	  action,	  nonprofit	  organization,	  philanthropy,	  social	  economy	  and	  others;	  2)	  have	  we,	  as	  a	  result,	  in	  the	  past	  half-­‐century	  made	  any	  important	  advances	  in	  the	  art	  of	  associating	  together	  for	  civic	  and	  social	  purposes?	  Further,	  if	  those	  gains	  have	  been	  primarily	  intellectual,	  3)	  have	  we	  made	  commensurate	  gains	  in	  social	  and	  political	  theory	  or	  other	  forms	  of	  the	  widespread	  public	  recognition	   of	   our	   collective	   abilities?	  When	  we	   look	   over	   the	   published	   literature,	   the	  answer	  to	  the	  second	  question	  is	  pretty	  clearly	  yes.	  To	  answer	  the	  first	  and	  third	  questions	  is	  a	  more	  complicated	  challenge	  to	  be	  explored	  over	  the	  chapters	  that	  follow.	  In	  Appendix	  A	  below,	  I	  identify	  more	  than	  30	  separate	  dimensions,	  spheres	  and	  plausible	  components	  or	  sub-­‐sectors	  of	  what	  the	  mission	  statement	  of	  Voluntary	  Sector	  Review	  labels	  “the	  wider	  third	  sector,”	  ranging	   from	  the	  nonprofit	  sector,	  civil	   society,	  and	  social	  economy,	   to	  gift	  economy,	  mutual	  aid,	   social	  enterprise	  and	  philanthropy.	  But	   these	  have	  yet	   to	  gain	  any	  measure	  of	  acceptance.	  To	  the	  extent	  any	  democratic	  transformations	  are	  actually	  underway	  or	  take	  place	  in	   the	   foreseeable	   future,	   they	   will	   be	   apparent	   in	   our	   daily	   life	   worlds,	   our	   collective	  experiences	   of	   living	   with	   one	   another	   as	   well	   as	   in	   our	   theories	   of	   the	   practice	   of	  democracy.	  Certainly,	  that	  has	  been	  the	  case	  in	  the	  U.S.	  during	  the	  past	  half	  century	  as	  the	  major	  changes	  associated	  with	  the	  spread	  of	  universal	  suffrage,	   the	  end	  –	  or	  at	   least	   the	  transformation	  –	  of	  racial	  injustice,	  deinstitutionalization	  of	  the	  mentally	  ill	  and	  mentally	  retarded	   into	   the	   larger	  community,	  a	  wide	  array	  of	  women’s	  movements,	   the	  collective	  movements	  for	  full	  recognition	  of	  civil,	  political	  and	  social	  rights	  of	  gay,	  bisexual,	  lesbian,	  and	   transgendered	   persons,	   and	   the	   waves	   of	   new	   immigrants	   who	   have	   joined	  communities	   throughout	   the	  post-­‐industrial	  world,	  made	   their	  homes	   there	  and	  become	  part	   of	   us.	   The	   term	  new	   social	  movement	   has	   been	   used	   by	  many	   different	   sources	   in	  several	   fields	  as	  an	  umbrella	  term	  for	  all	  of	  these	  and	  other	  developments.	  This	  has	  also	  been	   the	   case	   with	   the	   many	   local	   and	   national	   reactionary	   movements	   –	   all	   those	  collective	  ‘now,	  just	  wait	  just	  a	  minute!’	  responses	  –	  that	  these	  changes	  have	  engendered	  from	  the	  Ku	  Klux	  Klan	  and	  the	  John	  Birch	  Society	  to	  defeat	  of	  the	  Equal	  Rights	  Amendment	  and	   the	   Tea	   Party,	   and	   the	   assorted	   ‘new	   Right’	   movements	   in	   France,	   Hungary	   and	  throughout	  Europe	  (Della	  Porta,	  2009;	  Della	  Porta,	  Kriesi	  &	  Rucht,	  2009).	  	  Organized	   reaction	   in	   such	   cases	   not	   only	   includes	   white	   citizen’s	   councils,	  Southern	   private	   schools	   and	   national	   home	   schooling	   movements	   and	   the	   ‘Southern	  Strategy’	  which	  turned	  the	  Republican	  Party	  from	  a	  national	  into	  a	  mostly	  regional	  party,	  but	  also	  radical	  conservative	   judicial	  activism,	   the	  “pro-­‐Life”	  movement,	  and	  widespread	  reactions	  against	  gay	  marriage	  (Aistrup	  1996;	  Badger	  1997;	  Clark	  2006;	  Kotlowski	  1998;	  Lax	  &	  Phillips	  2009;	   Liu	  &	  Taylor	  2005).	  Vaguely	   similar	   reactions	   are	   also	   to	  be	   found	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among	  the	  professional	  reservations	  of	  members	  of	  helping	  professions	  like	  social	  work,	  nursing	   and	   clinical	   psychology	   to	   the	   unfettered	   homelessness,	   criminal	   activity	   and	  related	  problems	  experienced	  by	  deinstitutionalized	  persons	  turned	   loose	  on	  the	  streets	  (Lamb	  &	  Bachrach	  2001;	  Stroman	  2003)	  and	  to	  assorted	  proposals	  to	  equalize	  or	  level	  the	  relations	  between	  professionals	  and	  clients,	  e.g.,	  through	  mutual	  aid	  and	  self	  help	  groups	  (Borkman,	  1999).	  	  One	   constant	   in	   all	   of	   these	   “progressive”	   and	   “reactionary”	   movements	   whose	  labels	  often	  mask	  underlying	  similarities	  has	  been	  the	  role	  of	  organized	  voluntary	  action	  on	  the	  part	  of	  people	  demonstrating	  the	  arts	  of	  associating	  together.	  Civic	  engagement	  in	  democratic	  society	  and	  culture	  may	  happen	  at	  any	  of	  a	  multitude	  of	  levels:	  through	  formal	  memberships	   in	   associations,	   volunteer	   work	   in	   service	   delivery	   or	   advocacy	  organizations,	   or	   simply	   expression	   of	   interest,	   awareness,	   and	   intellectual	   engagement	  with	   others	   in	   following,	   understanding	   and	   discussing	   such	   movements,	   events	   and	  activities.	  	  Modern	  democracy	  is	  often	  construed	  narrowly	  as	  the	  right	  of	  citizens	  to	  a	  voice	  in	  the	  composition	  of	  their	  governments. A	  broader	  brush	  is	  used	  here.	  Democracy	  is	  treated	  not	  as	  a	  theory	  of	  government	  but	  as	  a	  distinct	  approach	  to	  society	  and	  culture;	  a	  way	  of	  reconciling	  the	  confusion	  arising	  where	  the	  anarchy	  of	  ‘do	  your	  own	  thing’	  individualism	  meets	  civil	  society.	  The	  nineteenth	  century	  American	  sociologist	  Lester	  Ward	  was	  an	  early	  proponent	  of	   something	   like	   the	  view	  expressed	  here.	  The	   twentieth	  century	  sociologist	  Amitai	  Etzioni	   called	   this	  The	  Active	   Society	   (1968).	  This	   expansive	   vision	  of	  democracy	  accounts	   not	   only	   for	   polity	   but	   also	   for	   society,	   economy	   and	   culture	   and	   has	   many	  antecedents.	   It	   is	   fundamental	   to	   Tocqueville’s	   observation	   of	   the	   uniqueness	   or	  exceptional	  nature	  of	  nineteenth	  century	  American	  democracy.	  We	  tend	  to	  forget	  that	  the	  first	   epigraph	   in	   the	   table	   of	   contents	   for	   Book	   I,	   Part	   1,	   Chapter	   3,	   of	   Democracy	   in	  
America	   is	   translated	   in	   the	   iconic	   Reeve-­‐Bowen-­‐Bradley	   translation	   as	   “The	   striking	  characteristic	  of	   the	   social	   condition	  of	   the	  Anglo-­‐Americans	   is	   its	   essential	  democracy.”	   It	  goes	  on	  to	  observe,	  “that	  the	  salient	  point	  of	  the	  social	  state	  of	  the	  Anglo-­‐Americans	  is	  it’s	  
being	  essentially	  democratic.”	  (Italics	  added)	  Both	  statements	  arguably	  point	  to	  conditions	  much	  like	  what	  Ward	  termed	  sociocracy.	  Since	  Tocqueville’s	  time,	  they	  have	  also	  come	  to	  characterize	   the	   aspirations	   of	   a	   sizeable	   portion	   of	   the	   world’s	   population.	   Both	  translations	   summarize	   Tocqueville’s	   conclusion	   that	   the	   “social	   state”	   or	   “social	  condition”	  (or	  what	  we	  are	  more	  inclined	  to	  call	  society	  and	  culture)	  in	  19th	  century	  Anglo-­‐America	  were	   fundamentally	  democratic.	   It	   is	   suggested	  here	   that,	   regardless	  of	  what	   is	  happening	  with	   the	   relations	  of	   government,	   business	   and	  nonprofit	   corporations,	   large	  patches	  of	   this	  social	  and	  cultural	  democracy	  continue	  to	  exist	  and	  have	  spread	  through	  much	  of	  the	  modern	  world.	  Complicating	  a	  solid	  understanding	  of	  this	  perspective	  is	  that	  one	   important	   synonym	   of	   the	   term	   state	   is	   “condition”.	   For	   this	   reason,	   the	   modern	  
  29 
notion	  of	  a	  “state”	  sector	  may	  be	  completely	  absent	  in	  Tocqueville	  and	  will	  be	  left	  out	  here.	  Reference	   instead	   is	   made	   throughout	   to	   government,	   polity	   and	   political	   system,	   as	  appropriate.	  Numerous	   ideas	   and	  phrases	   coined	  by	  Tocqueville	   in	  particular,	   including	  “habits	  of	  the	  heart”,	  “self-­‐interest	  properly	  understood”,	  association	  as	  “the	  mother	  of	  all	  sciences”,	   and	   others	   are	   well	   recognized	   on	   both	   the	   left	   and	   right	   as	   important	  benchmarks	   in	   contemporary	   understanding	   of	   the	   role	   of	   voluntary	   action	   in	   the	  democratization	  of	  society	  and	  culture.	  Lester	   Ward	   was	   another	   19th	   century	   observer	   in	   the	   decades	   following	  Tocqueville.	  He	  was	  also	  the	  first	  American	  sociologist	  of	  note	  and	  it	  has	  been	  suggested	  by	   no	   less	   a	   figure	   than	   the	   historian	   Henry	   Steele	   Commager	   that	  Ward	   was	   also	   the	  intellectual	  father	  of	  the	  American	  welfare	  “state”	  (Ward	  &	  Commager	  1967).	  It	  is	  possible	  to	  tease	  out	  of	  Ward’s	  writings	  ideas	  with	  important	  implications	  for	  our	  evolving	  views	  of	  the	   independent	   sector	   and	   its	   role	   in	   the	   future	   of	   democracy.	   In	   Dynamic	   Sociology	  (1883,	  as	  quoted	  in	  Martindale	  1960:	  72)	  Ward	  rejected	  both	  the	  anomic	  individualism	  of	  Herbert	   Spencer	   and	   the	   social	   utopianism	   of	   Auguste	   Comte,	   whose	   term	   altruisme	  continues	   to	   provoke	   and	   inspire.	   Yet,	   the	   precise	   19th	   century	   dualism	   of	   individualist	  utopia	  vs.	  social(ist)	  utopia	  that	  Ward	  found	  faulty	  continues	  as	  a	  mainstay	  of	  U.S.	  political	  rhetoric	  today	  in	  the	  anarchic	  utopianism	  of	  Sen.	  Rand	  Paul	  and	  the	  Tea	  Partiers	  against	  the	  utopian	  idealism	  of,	  e.g.,	  diverse	  leaderless	  Occupy	  movements	  and	  other	  examples	  of	  horizontality	  (Maeckelbergh	  2013).	  It	  is	  also	  clearly	  visible	  in	  political	  cleavages	  in	  Great	  Britain,	   France,	   Greece,	   and	   numerous	   other	   examples.	   The	   nineteenth	   century	   United	  States	  may	  be	  unique	  in	  human	  history	  in	  the	  number	  and	  scale	  of	  “individualist	  utopian”	  social	   movements,	   many	   of	   which	   foundered	   on	   their	   inability	   to	   reconcile	   individual	  desire	  with	  collective	  necessity.	  Contemporary	  anarchists	  and	  rugged	  individualists	  would	  do	  well	  to	  heed	  the	  lessons	  of	  projects	  like	  Brook	  Farm,	  et.	  al.	  Ward	   favored	   the	   term	   and	   strategy	   he	   termed	   meliorism,	   defined	   as	   the	  improvement	   of	   social	   conditions	   through	   the	   application	   of	   human	   intelligence.	  While	  Ward	  was	  prescient	  in	  calling	  out	  the	  individual/social	  dualism,	  he	  probably	  sabotaged	  his	  own	   distinction	   in	   failing	   to	   differentiate	   the	   institutions	   of	   government	   from	   those	   of	  society	  and	  culture,	  an	  oversight	  that	  continues	  to	  plague	  public	  conversation	  today,	  and	  that	  has	  posed	  particular	  difficulties	  for	  the	  arts	  of	  association	  in	  the	  independent	  sector.	  The	  prospect	  of	  transcending	  that	  dualism	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  reasons	  for	  use	  of	  the	  term	  independent	  sector	  outlined	  here.	  Ward	  wrote,	  “There	  is	  one	  form	  of	  government	  that	  is	  stronger	  than	  autocracy	  or	  aristocracy	  and	  that	  is	  sociocracy.”	  This	  has	  often	  been	  interpreted	  as	  Ward’s	  endorsement	  of	   “socialism”,	   in	   the	   sense	  of	  public	  ownership	  and	  control	   and	   that	   is	   surely	   one	   possible	   interpretation.	   Yet,	   there	   is	   another	   possible	  interpretation.	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Ward	  went	  on	   to	  write,	   “The	  day	  has	  come	   for	  society	   to	   take	  affairs	   into	   its	  own	  
hands	   and	   shape	   its	   own	   destiny.”	   (Italics	   added)	   Rather	   than	   reading	   this,	   rather	  disingenuously	   it	  would	   appear,	   as	   an	   endorsement	   of	   socialism	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   society	  under	  the	  direction	  of	  government,	  perhaps	  Ward	  had	  something	  else	  in	  mind.	  It	  is	  quite	  plausible	   to	   read	   Ward’s	   mention	   of	   government	   in	   the	   rather	   specific	   sense	   of	   self-­‐governance	  and	  society	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  the	  social	   interactions,	  social	  (not	  merely	  formal)	  organizations,	  and	  social	  institutions	  of	  our	  ordinary	  daily	  lives.	  Thus,	  to	  “take	  affairs	  into	  its	  own	  hands	  and	  shape	  its	  own	  destiny”	  can	  be	  read	  as	  an	  early	  expression	  of	  something	  akin	  to	  the	  civic	  republican	  ideal	  of	  self-­‐governing	  persons	  in	  self-­‐governing	  communities;	  a	   thoroughly	   democratic	   prospect,	   but	   quite	   beyond	   the	   reach	   of	   contemporary	  representative	  democracies.	  	  Many	   observers	   today	   across	   the	   political	   spectrum	   appear	   to	   find	   such	   an	  interpretation	  of	  Ward’s	  meliorism	  and	  sociocracy	  a	  plausible	  notion,	  particularly	  at	   the	  community	   level.	   Indeed,	   something	   like	   this	  may	   already	   be	   happening	   across	   a	   broad	  sphere	  of	  human	  endeavors,	  and	  has	  been	   for	  quite	  some	   time.	  To	   the	  extent	   this	   is	   the	  case,	   it	  would	  constitute	  a	   species	  of	  genuine	   improvement	   in	   the	  art	  of	  association	   like	  that	  noted	  by	  Huntington	  as	  well	  as	  a	  real	  expansion	  of	  human	  freedom	  and	  dignity.	  It	  is	  also	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  implications	  of	  the	  emergence	  in	  recent	  decades	  of	  a	  third	  sector	  beyond	  households,	  markets	  and	  governments.	  The	  notion	  of	   a	   serial	  ordering	  of	  sectors	   or	   groupings	   of	   institutions	   (first,	   second,	   third	   sectors)	   is,	   at	   base,	   a	   faulty	   one	  that	  leads	  to	  some	  rather	  silly	  questions	  (e.g.,	  which	  came	  first,	   families,	  governments	  or	  markets?).	  This	  is	  a	  principal	  reason	  the	  terms	  government,	  market	  and	  family,	  or	  intimate	  sectors,	  and	  independent	  sector	  are	  used	  here.	  The	  reasons	  for	  calling	  it	  an	  independent,	  rather	  than	  a	  “nonprofit”	  sector	  are	  explored	  later	  in	  the	  text.	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  inherited	  19th	  century	  dichotomy	  of	  individual	  verses	  society,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  outline	  a	  view	  today	  inspired	  by	  Ward,	  Tocqueville	  and	  dozens	  of	  other	  social	  scientists	  and	  philosophers	  that	  seeks	  to	  define	  ever	  more	  clearly	  this	  entirely	  new	  set	  of	  social	   spaces.	   Inherent	   in	   these	   emergent	   new	   social,	   political,	   economic	   and	   cultural	  spaces	  abstractly	  bound	  together	  as	  a	  sector	   is	   this	  potential	  of	   the	  ability	  of	  a	  group	  or	  groups	   of	   individuals	   to	   take	   affairs	   into	   their	   own	  hands	   and	   shape	   their	   own	  destiny.	  Where	   interpretations	   of	  Ward’s	  meliorism	   often	   go	  wrong	   is	   in	   equating	   the	   ability	   of	  individual	   members	   of	   society	   to	   control	   their	   own	   destiny	   –	   to	   be	   self-­‐governing	   –	  exclusively	  with	   the	   institutions	  of	  democratic	  government	  (the	  state	  sector).	  While	   that	  idea	  is	  important	  in	  the	  idea	  of	  democracy,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  only	  possible	  interpretation.	  Since	  Ward	   time,	   entirely	   new	   additional	   spheres	   of	   human	   activity	   have	   emerged	   and	   been	  recognized	  as	  members	  of	  society	  take	  affairs	  into	  their	  own	  hands	  and	  shaping	  their	  own	  destinies	   in	   untold	   numbers	   of	   ways.	   Such	   a	   conception	   includes,	   but	   is	   not	   limited	   to,	  democratic	   government	   in	   Abraham	   Lincoln’s	   sense	   only	   two	   decades	   before	  Ward,	   of	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“government	  of	   the	  people,	   by	   the	  people,	   and	   for	   the	  people”.	  Humans	  have,	   of	   course,	  been	   engaged	   in	   assembling	   and	   associating	   outside	   of	   households,	   markets	   and	  governments	   for	   thousands	   of	   years.	   For	  most	   of	   that	   time,	   however,	   the	   sanction	   and	  authority	   of	   tradition,	   maintaining	   established	   order,	   obligations	   to	   ancestors,	   heeding	  divine	  commands	  and	  other	  similar	  “external”	  forces	  prevailed.	  	  In	  that	  context,	  the	  notion	  that	  a	  group	  of	  people	  might	  get	  together	  and	  decide	  to	  do	  something	  of	   their	  own	  volition	   is	  a	  remarkable,	  even	  disruptive	  modern	  notion.	  The	  prospect	   of	   voluntary	   action	   sanctioned	   solely	   by	   the	   authority	   of	   the	   participants	  themselves	   is	   something	   entirely	   new	   and	   different	   in	   the	   world.	   It	   represents	   a	  sophisticated	   and	  pluralistic	   form	  of	  Ward’s	   sociocracy,	   in	  which	   the	   self-­‐governance	   of	  individuals	   and	   their	   society	   and	   culture	   does	   not	   replace	   governments,	   households,	   or	  markets	   but	   exists	   along	   side	   them	   in	   another,	   independent,	   institutional	   domain.	   This	  third	  sector	  (or,	  if	  you	  prefer,	  these	  independent	  third	  sectors)	  cover	  a	  very	  broad	  slice	  of	  modern	  life,	  and	  include(s)	  self-­‐governed	  small	  groups,	  modern	  membership	  associations	  complete	  with	   formal	  written	   rules	  of	   self-­‐governance,	   tax-­‐exempt	   financial	   foundations	  and	   nonprofit	   corporations	   which	   collectively	   own	   and	   control	   their	   own	   assets	   and	  programs,	   fundraising	   institutions,	   “social	   programs”,	   deliberately	   and	   self-­‐consciously	  created	   volunteer	   programs	   and	   social	   movements,	   assorted	   assemblies,	   including	  meetings,	   conferences,	   parades,	   and	   pilgrimages,	   an	   incredible	   and	   growing	   variety	   of	  listservs,	   blogs,	  websites,	   social	  media	   and	  multiple	   other	   examples	   of	   virtual	   assembly	  and	   a	   great	   deal	   more.	   Indeed,	   this	   whole	   domain	   of	   groups	   of	   self-­‐governing	   persons	  active	  together	  is	  characterized	  by	  nothing	  quite	  so	  much	  as	  its	  variety	  and	  diversity.	  	  Ward	   and	  Tocqueville	  were	   certainly	  not	   alone	   in	  noting	   the	  possibilities	   of	   self-­‐	  organization	  and	  action	  that	  were	  already	  emerging	  in	  the	  late	  19th	  century.	  Indeed,	  there	  is	  a	  large	  body	  of	  institutional	  evidence	  of	  these	  developments	  before	  and	  since.	  Moreover,	  this	   evidence	   can	   be	   found	   scattered	   across	   the	   traditions	   of	   virtually	   all	   of	   the	   social	  sciences,	   humanities,	   and	   even	   the	   STEM	   (science,	   technology,	   engineering	   and	  mathematics)	   disciplines.	   Before	   the	   19th	   century,	   the	   possibilities	   of	   self-­‐governing	  associations	  and	  assemblies	  of	  self-­‐governing	  individuals	  were	  already	  being	  glimpsed	  in	  the	  Enlightenment	  by	  George	  Hegel’s	  and	  Adam	  Ferguson’s	  models	  of	  civil	  society,	  Adam	  Smith’s	  reflections	  on	  the	  role	  of	  sympathy,	  as	  well	  as	  by	  the	  American	   founding	   fathers	  who	   made	   extensive	   use	   of	   Committees	   of	   Correspondence	   to	   further	   their	   own	  revolutionary	  ends.	  Ward,	  Tocqueville,	  and	  later	  John	  Dewey,	  George	  Herbert	  Mead,	  Jane	  Addams,	  Mary	  Parker	  Follett,	  and	  numerous	  others	  engaged	  in	  working	  with	  foundations,	  community	  organizing,	  federated	  fundraising,	  and	  small	  groups	  also	  saw	  possibilities	  here.	  	  For	  example,	  Ronald	  Lippitt	  and	  his	  associates	  applied	  this	  essentially	  democratic	  vision	  to	  organizations	  in	  the	  “democratic	  groups”	  tradition	  (1939).	  It	  can	  also	  be	  found	  in	  pioneering	  studies	  of	  association	  in	  community	  life	  by	  Ferdinand	  Tönnies	  (1955	  [1887]),	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the	  community	  studies	  by	  Lloyd	  Warner	   (1941).	  Many	  of	   these	   figures	  are	  significant	   in	  the	   political	   ideologies	   of	   New	   Deal	   liberalism	   or	   social	   liberalism.	   In	   another	   quite	  different	   set	   of	   political	   traditions,	   several	   Austrian	   School	   economists	   and	   political	  philosophers	  are	  also	  important	  in	  contemporary	  thinking	  about	  the	  third	  sector.	  Ludwig	  von	   Mises,	   Frederick	   Hayek,	   Richard	   Cornuelle,	   Eleanor	   and	   Vincent	   Ostrom,	   Gus	   De	  Zerega	   and	  others	   have	   seen	   a	   number	   of	   remarkably	   similar	   or	   compatible	   things	   that	  contribute	   to	   a	   much	   fuller	   understanding	   of	   a	   third	   sector	   of	   associating	   but	   self-­‐governing	  individuals	  capable	  of	  an	  emergent	  order	  of	  collective	  action.	  	  The	  pieces	  of	   this	  puzzle	   are	   as	  widespread	  as	   they	   are	   fragmentary.	   Jon	  Van	  Til	  (2012)	   noted	   the	   contributions	   to	   the	   notion	   of	   a	   third	   sector	   not	   only	   of	   Tocqueville	  (political	   and	   voluntary	   associations),	   but	   also	   Karl	   Marx	   (revolutionary	   association),	  Auguste	   Comte	   (altruisme),	   Max	   Weber	   (bureaucracy),	   Talcott	   Parsons	   (patterned	  variables),	   Robert	  Michels	   (oligarchy),	   James	   Pennock	   (liberal	   democracy),	   and	  William	  Kornhauser	  (mass	  society).	  To	  this	  list	  I	  would	  add,	  in	  no	  particular	  order,	  Marcel	  Mauss	  (gift	   exchange),	   Bronislaw	   Malinowski	   and	   Marshall	   Sahlins	   (gift	   circles,	   cycles	   or	  networks),	  Albert	  Beveridge	  (voluntary	  action),	  L.J.	  Hanifan	  (social	  capital),	  David	  Horton	  Smith	  (voluntary	  organization),	  Amatai	  Etzioni	  (normative	  compliance),	  Kenneth	  Boulding	  (threat,	   exchange	   and	   integrative	   systems),	   Burton	   Weisbrod	   (nonprofit	   economics),	  George	   Herbert	   Mead	   (collective	   behavior),	   Hannah	   Arendt	   (action,	   work	   and	   labor),	  Jürgen	   Habermas	   (systems	   and	   lifeworlds),	   Benjamin	   Barber	   (the	   sovereignty	   of	   the	  political),	   David	   Mathews	   (public	   deliberation),	   Anthony	   Giddens	   (third	   way),	   Elijah	  Anderson	   (cosmopolitan	   canopy),	   Harold	   Saunders	   (sustained	   dialogue),	   John	   Dryzek	  (discursive	  democracy)	  and	  Yochai	  Benkler	  (internet,	  social	  production).	  Much	   like	   the	   apocryphal	   tale	   of	   the	   elephant	   and	   the	   seven	   blind	  men,	   piecing	  together	  these	  and	  many	  other	  contributions	  yields	  a	  fuller	  picture	  of	  a	  non-­‐market,	  non-­‐governmental,	  civil,	  economic,	  and	  political	  sector	  of	  democratic	  society	  and	  culture	  that	  has	  only	  begun	  to	  come	  fully	  into	  focus	  in	  recent	  decades.	  Even	  so,	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  it	   is	   some	   large	   complex	   unity	   or	   a	   large	   and	   diverse	   number	   of	   separate	   but	   related	  developments	  remains	  open.	  No	  model	  of	  democracy	  can	  ever	  be	   fully	  realized,	  of	  course,	  and	   there	  are	  at	   the	  moment	   a	   great	   many	   such	   models:	   liberal,	   conservative,	   socialist,	   libertarian,	   social	  democratic,	   anarchist,	   new	   age,	   post-­‐modern,	  millenarian;	   and	   a	   great	  many	   others.	   As	  noted,	  most	  concentrate	   largely	  or	  exclusively	  on	  government	  or	   “the	  state”	  as	  a	  unified	  expression	  of	   the	  public	  will	   and	   the	  means	   for	   attaining	  unanimity	   in	   collective	   choice.	  However,	  voluntary	  action	  in	  some	  form	  is	  a	  fundamental	  component	  of	  nearly	  all	  models	  of	   democratic	   society,	   economy	  or	   culture	   and	  when	  our	   attention	   is	   specifically	   on	   the	  space	  outside	  of	  governments,	  markets	  and	  households,	   the	  theoretical	  across-­‐the-­‐board	  unanimity	   of	   the	   general	   will	   is	   not	   an	   essential	   consideration;	   diversity,	   plurality	   and	  
  33 
tolerance	   of	   difference	   are	   far	   more	   important.	   Voluntary	   action	   under	   conditions	   of	  diversity,	   difference	   and	   institutionalizing	   different	   forms	   of	   tolerance	   is	   an	   important	  complement	  to	  each	  of	  the	  governmental,	  market	  and	  household	  sectors.	  Because	  of	  this,	  voluntary	   action	   is	   arguably	   important	   in	   any	   imaginable	   future	   transition	   to	   greater	  democracy	   because	   of	   the	   collective	   abilities	   of	   voluntary	   actors	   to	   act	   collectively	   and	  independently	   so	   long	   as	   they	   accept	   a	   basic	   social	   compact	   of	   peaceful,	   lawful	  accommodation	   to	   other	   groups	   and	   a	   plurality	   of	   possible	  ways	   of	   life.	  Without	   such	   a	  compact,	  of	  course,	  voluntary	  action	  outside	  government,	  markets	  and	  households	  has	  the	  potential	  of	  turning	  a	  war	  of	  each	  against	  all	  into	  a	  war	  of	  some	  against	  others,	  as	  we	  have	  seen	   in	   “the	   troubles”	   in	  Northern	   Ireland,	  and	   the	  warlords	  and	  militias	   in	   failed	  states	  from	  the	  Boxer	  Rebellion	  in	  early	  20th	  century	  China	  to	  present	  day	  Somalia	  and	  Syria.	  At	  least	  since	  the	  scientific	  revolution	  of	  the	  seventeenth	  century	  voluntary	  action,	  incorporating	   the	   disciplines	   of	   collective	   self-­‐governance	   and	   peer	   review,	   is	   also	   an	  important	   and	   dynamic	   medium	   for	   generating	   new	   social	   knowledge	   and	   values,	   as	  attested	   by	   thousands	   of	   autonomous	   scientific,	   disciplinary,	   professional,	   interest	   and	  movement	   associations,	   conferences	   and	   journals.	   So	   emblematic	   is	   the	   role	   of	  modern	  science	   that,	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   a	   viable	   concept	   of	   the	   entire	   space	   discussed	   here,	   De	  Zerega	   (2011)	   characterizes	   science	   as	   the	   third	   major	   example	   of	   spontaneous	   order	  alongside	  the	  market	  order	  and	  democratic	  government.	  In	  Chapter	  7	  below,	  we	  will	  flesh	  out	  a	  very	  similar	  insight	  under	  the	  name	  of	  knowledge	  commons.	  The	   late	   16th	   and	   early	   17th	   centuries	   constitute	   a	   kind	   of	  minor	   axial	   age	   in	   the	  formation	   in	   the	   formation	   of	   this	   new	   capacity.	   This	   period	   included	   collapse	   of	  important	   parts	   of	   what	   can	   be	   termed	   systems	   of	   old	   commons	   in	   England,	   legal	  enactments	   such	   as	   the	   Elizabethan	   Poor	   Law	   and	   the	   Statute	   of	   Charitable	   Uses	   both	  adopted	   in	   1601,	   and	   formation	   of	   a	   vast	   number	   of	   royal,	   aristocratic	   and	   municipal	  literary,	  artistic,	  and	  scientific	  academies	  and	  other	  institutions	  across	  Europe.	  These	  and	  other	   related	   developments	   set	   in	   motion	   what	   evolved	   into	   a	   spontaneous	   order	   of	  entirely	  new	  ways	  of	  dealing	  with	  the	  spaces	  outside	  of	  states,	  markets	  and	  households.	  	  A	   small	   number	   of	   isolated	   and	   seminal	   legal	   and	  policy	   developments	   including	  legislation	  and	  court	  rulings	  intended	  to	  reinforce	  and	  protect	  voluntary	  action	  have	  been	  important	  components	  of	  this	  evolution	  at	  least	  since	  1601.	  No	  one,	  it	  seems,	  planned	  or	  foresaw	   this	   evolutionary	   sequence;	   and	  no	  one	  has	  ever	   controlled	  all	   of	   it	   in	  anything	  approaching	  its	  entirety.	  In	  our	  time,	  relatively	  simple	  but	  universal	  declarations	  traceable	  to	   practices	   that	   evolved	   over	   recent	   centuries	   in	   Europe,	   the	   U.S.	   and	   the	   British	  Commonwealth	   countries,	   reinforced	   by	   freedoms	   of	   association,	   assembly,	   speech	   and	  religion	  at	   the	  national	   and	   international	   level	  were	  eventually	   extended	   internationally	  and	  now	  characterize	  much	  of	  the	  world.	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The	   near-­‐universal	   norms	   that	   resulted	   have	   facilitated	   possibilities	   of	   voluntary	  action	  for	  everyone	  and	  elaborated	  models	  for	  novel	  forms	  of	  living	  together	  peacefully	  in	  communities	  across	  the	  planet.	  While	  there	  is	  reason	  to	  doubt	  the	  full	  universality	  of	  the	  nonprofit	  model,	  it	  has	  an	  established	  near-­‐universal	  presence	  today.	  Another	  of	  the	  many	  interesting	  bodies	  of	  research	  in	  this	  regard	  is	  work	  done	  in	  the	  1980s	  and	  1990s	  over	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  democracies	  can	  co-­‐exist	  without	  war.	  See	  (Weart,	  1998)	  for	  a	  review	  of	  this	  research.	  	  Those	  who	  wish	  may	  act	  voluntarily,	   in	  concert	  with	  others,	   to	   fashion	   their	  own	  life	  worlds,	  in	  part	  or	  even	  more	  or	  less	  completely.	  Certainly,	  at	  least	  some	  minimal	  levels	  of	  social	  control	  by	  governments	  and	  the	  productive	  capacities	  of	  market	  economies	  are	  necessary	   conditions	   for	  many	   forms	   of	   voluntary	   action.	   The	   capacity	   to	   rear	   children	  schooled	  in	  traditions	  and	  practices	  of	  voluntary	  action	  may	  also	  be	  necessary.	  But	  these	  alone	   cannot	   provide	   the	   necessary	   and	   sufficient	   conditions	   for	   people	   to	  make	   things	  happen	  in	  concert	  with	  one	  another	  in	  their	  daily	  life	  worlds.	  This	  is	  the	  singular	  province	  of	  voluntary	  action.	  
Living	  Together	  in	  Community	  The	  term	  democracy	  is	  inadequate	  for	  the	  task	  to	  which	  it	  is	  applied	  here.	  Yet	  there	  is	   no	   better	   term	   currently	   available.	   Perhaps	   the	   best	   we	   can	   do	   is	   re-­‐define	   and	   re-­‐conceptualize	   this	   term	   which	   reaches	   back	   to	   ancient	   Greece	   in	   new	   ways	   that	   fit	  contemporary	  circumstances.	  Recent	  suggestions	  for	  alternative	  terms	  have	  included	  such	  neologisms	   as	   polyarchy	   (Dahl	   1956),	   mutual	   partisan	   adjustment	   (Lindblom,	   1965),	  polycentricity	  (Ostrom	  1997),	  and	  spontaneous	  order	  (Polanyi	  1951)	  all	  of	  which	  need	  to	  be	  added	  to	  the	  growing	  list	  of	   important	  precursors	  of	  the	   idea	  of	  a	  sector	  of	  voluntary	  action.	  Contemporary	  social	  and	  political	  theory	  remains	  incomplete	  to	  the	  extent	  that	   it	  omits	   reference	   to	   the	   sphere	   of	   voluntary	   action.	   Families	   are	   fundamental	   to	   human	  nurture	   and	   socialization.	   Some	   minimal	   level	   of	   government	   is	   necessary	   to	   maintain	  minimal	   social	   control,	   public	   order,	   public	   safety	   and	   security	   and	   the	   enforcement	   of	  contracts.	  Note	  that	  Robert	  Nozick	  examined	  that	  very	  point	  in	  Anarchy,	  State	  and	  Utopia	  (1974)	   and	   concluded	   that	   some	   minimal	   level	   of	   state	   regulation	   and	   control	   was	  necessary.	   Observers	   across	   the	   current	   political	   spectrum	   by	   and	   large	   accept	   his	  conclusion,	  although	  there	  continues	  to	  be	  great	  disagreement	  about	  where	  that	  point	  is	  to	  be	   found.	   The	   principal	   political	   debates	   of	   recent	   years	   in	   the	   U.S.	   has	   been	   largely	  preoccupied	   with	   the	   issue	   of	   where	   that	   minimum	   should	   be	   set.	   Richard	   Cornuelle’s	  introduction	  of	   the	   independent	  sector	  was	  very	  much	  a	  precursor	   to	   those	  discussions,	  although	  the	  implication	  of	  his	  approach	  chosen	  here	  is	  largely	  residual;	  attending	  to	  the	  independent	   sector	   as	   whatever	   portion	   of	   voluntary	   action	   is	   “outside”	   the	   sphere	   of	  governmental	   public	   order	   and	   the	   market	   order.	   And	   markets	   have	   proven	   to	   be	  unprecedented	  engines	  of	  economic	  growth	  and	  wealth	  generation.	  Yet,	   there	  is	  more	  to	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life	  than	  nurturing,	  governing	  and	  trading	  and	  modern	  populations,	  societies,	  and	  cultures	  stake	   out	   a	   broad	   range	   of	   additional	   arrangements	   to	   facilitate	   living	   together.	   In	   our	  contemporary	  world,	  they	  are	  able	  to	  do	  so	  through	  voluntary	  action.	  Democratization	  of	  polities,	  economies,	  societies	  and	  cultures	  continues	  to	  spread	  in	  a	  variety	  of	   contemporary	   settings	   characterized	  by	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	   formal	  political	  and	  economic	  systems,	  all	  of	  them	  claiming	  the	  democratic	  mantle	  in	  some	  variant.	  While	  half	   a	   century	   ago	   there	   were	   fewer	   than	   thirty	   self-­‐declared	   democratic	   nation-­‐states,	  today	  there	  are	  more	  than	  100.	  Yet,	  fewer	  and	  fewer	  people	  embrace	  democracy	  purely	  as	  an	   abstract	   set	   of	   formal	   political	   principles	   by	   which	   they	   wish	   to	   be	   governed.	   For	  growing	  numbers	  even	  in	  quite	  authoritarian	  political	  regimes	  ‘democracy’	  has	  become	  a	  reflection	  of	   the	  desire	  to	  pursue	  their	  own	  individual,	   family,	  group	  and	  community	   life	  plans	   in	   peaceful	   proximity	  with	   others.	   Indeed,	   in	   several	   respects,	   democratization	   of	  society	   and	   culture	   appear	   to	   be	   overshadowing	   traditional	   notions	   of	   economic	   and	  political	   democracy	   as	   a	   system	   of	   government.	   This	   does	   not	   mean	   governmental	  institutions	   are	  becoming	   less	   important;	   it	  means	  people	   are	   increasingly	  putting	   their	  own	   notions	   of	   democracy	   into	   broader	   perspective	   in	   their	   lives.	   Even	   as	   shrinking	  minorities	  may	   vote	   in	   any	   U.S.	   election,	   and	   traditional	   civic	   engagement	   continues	   to	  decline,	  growing	  portions	  of	  U.S.	  and	  the	  world’s	  population	  affirm	  their	  desire	  to	  “do	  their	  own	   thing”	   and	   live	   their	   own	   lives	   in	   association	   with	   others	   of	   like	   mind.	   This	   isn’t	  primarily	  a	  matter	  of	  lifestyle	  movements,	  communes,	  dropping	  out,	  alternative	  lifestyles,	  or	  cults	  although	  these	  are	  certainly	  part	  of	  what	  is	  happening.	  It	  is	  also	  a	  matter	  of	  new	  forms	   of	   religious	   observance,	   community	   theater,	   Little	   League	   baseball,	   youth	   soccer	  and	   flag	   football,	  and	  the	  nearly	   infinite	  variety	  of	  other	   things	   that	  people	  choose	  to	  do	  together	  with	  others.	  It	  is	  one	  of	  the	  aspects	  of	  contemporary	  political	  democracy	  that,	  as	  often	  as	  not,	   contemporary	  politicians	  and	  bureaucrats	  may	  prove	   to	  be	  obstructions	  or	  worse	  rather	  than	  facilitators	  of	  such	  popular	  aspirations.	  	  Living	   together	   peacefully	  with	   large	   numbers	   of	   others	   only	   some	   of	  whom	   view	  your	   life	   plans	   as	   you	   do	   can	   present	   extraordinarily	   complex	   challenges	   involving	  negotiating	   assertions	   of	   individual	   rights,	   group	   prerogatives,	   ethnic,	   language	   and	  cultural	   differences	   and	   seemingly	   unstoppable	   waves	   of	   social,	   economic,	   cultural	   and	  technological	  change	  in	  familiar,	  customary	  and	  traditional	  as	  well	  as	  strange,	  unfamiliar	  fashionable	  and	  faddish	  ways	  of	  doing	  things.	  At	  times	  of	  great	  migration	  like	  the	  present	  in	   the	   Americas	   and	   Europe,	   such	   strains	   and	   tensions	   can	   at	   times	   seem	   almost	  unbearable,	   and	   even	   produce	   outbursts	   of	   violence	   and	   terrorism.	   Large	   measures	   of	  tolerance	  may	  be	  necessary	  but	   also	  difficult	   to	  muster.	  Both	   those	  who	  embrace	   social	  change	   indiscriminately	   and	   those	  who	  aspire	   to	   stand	   athwart	  history	   yelling	   “stop”	   at	  selected	  initiatives	  at	  times	  grow	  weary	  at	  the	  prospect.	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The	  metaphor	  of	  standing	  athwart	  history	  yelling	  stop	  was	  coined	  by	  the	  late	  William	  F.	   Buckley	   to	   characterize	   contemporary	   conservatism.	   Rather	   than	   a	   heroic	   gesture,	  simple	  obstruction	  like	  the	  current	  U.S.	  Congress	  may	  be	  a	  particularly	  inept	  response	  to	  certain	  kinds	  of	  social	  change.	  To	  those	  who	  seek	  to	  stand	  astride	  her,	  history	  may	  be	  quite	  capable	  of	  administering	  swift	  kicks	  to	  the	  groin!	   In	  this	  context,	  established	  methods	  of	  adaptation	  and	  adjustment	  within	   the	   intimate	   relations	  of	   families	  and	  households,	   the	  exchange	   relations	   of	   economic	   markets	   and	   the	   coercive	   powers	   of	   ordering	   and	  forbidding	   by	   governments	   have	   all	   proven	   more	   limited	   than	   circumstances	   demand:	  Families,	  whether	  nuclear	  or	  extended,	  traditional	  or	  otherwise,	  tend	  to	  divide	  the	  world	  into	  those	  who	  are	  and	  are	  not	  entitled	  to	  the	  intimacy	  of	  the	  hearth.	  In-­‐family	  solutions	  tend	  to	  be	  limited	  to	  that	  family.	  Markets	  by	  definition	  develop	  around	  common	  interests	  expressed	   in	   terms	   of	   property,	   price	   and	   prospects,	   leaving	   unresolved	   many	   issues	  characterized	   by	   indeterminate	   ownership,	   unaffordable	   prices,	   insufficient	   demand,	  inadequate	   supply,	   uncertainty	   and	   indifference.	   Liberal	   democratic	   governments	   may	  genuinely	   be	   confounded	  by	   the	   challenges	   and	  paradoxes	   of	  minority	   rights	   and,	  more	  importantly,	  the	  proper	  treatment	  of	  those	  bent	  on	  the	  supremacy	  of	  their	  own	  versions	  of	  the	  public	  good.	  In	  each	  of	  these	  cases,	  voluntary	  action	  offers	  a	  range	  of	  tools,	  options	  and	  alternatives.	   In	  what	   follows,	  we	  will	  distinguish	  the	  coercive	  (or	  command	  and	  control)	  powers	  of	  “the	  state”,	   like	  the	  power	  to	  tax,	  conduct	  wars	  and	  maintain	  civil	  order,	   from	  the	  many	  “welfare	  state”	  programs	  and	  services	  of	  modern	  democratic	  governments	  at	  all	  levels	  devoted	  to	  what	  conservatives	  and	  libertarians	  refer	  derisively	  as	  “the	  nanny	  state”;	  programs	   and	   services	   devoted	   to	   individual	   flourishing	   and	   community	   development.	  One	   of	   the	   most	   difficult,	   but	   important,	   aspects	   of	   the	   perspective	   presented	   in	   this	  volume	   is	   the	  suggestion	   that	   the	   latter	  are,	   in	   reality,	   forms	  of	   tax-­‐supported	  voluntary	  action.	   I	   worked	   with	   one	   of	   my	   professors	   in	   graduate	   school,	   Robert	   Binstock	   on	   a	  concept	   related	   to	   this	   that	   he	   termed	   new	   welfare.	   Much	   work	   obviously	   remains	   to	  clarify	  this	  idea.	  Mere	  mention	  of	  clichés	  and	  labels	  like	  welfare	  state	  and	  nanny	  state	  tend	  to	  do	  little	  more	  than	  obscure	  the	  real,	  underlying	  issues	  involved.	  In	   subsequent	   chapters	   another	   approach	   (actually	  numerous	   approaches	  within	   a	  diverse	   institutional	   domain)	   to	   the	   challenges	   of	   living	   together	   through	   democratic	  society	  and	  culture	  will	  be	  outlined	  and	  discussed.	  Unifying	  themes	  are	  voluntary	  action	  and	   the	  pooling	  of	   common	  resources	   in	   the	   spaces	  outside	  of	  households,	  markets	  and	  government;	  collective	  voluntary	  action	  outside	  the	  intimate	  imperatives	  of	  family	  life,	  the	  price	   system	  of	  markets	   and	   the	   coercive	   powers	   of	   government.	   The	   characteristics	   of	  organized,	   collective	   voluntary	   action	   are	   traced	   in	   what	   follows	   through	   the	   diverse	  forms	   of	   associations,	   nonprofit	   and	   nongovernmental	   organizations,	   cooperatives,	  foundations,	   mutual	   aid,	   self-­‐help	   groups,	   organized	   volunteering	   and	   philanthropy,	   as	  well	   as	   social	   problems	   and	   social	   movements.	   The	   established	   institutions	   of	   the	  nonprofit	  sector	  are	  characterized	  as	  nonprofit	  firms	  and	  considered	  only	  minimally.	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Basic	  to	  this	  outlook	  are	  the	  concepts	  of	  new	  commons	  and	  knowledge	  commons	  and	  the	  other	  terms	  mentioned	  near	  the	  end	  of	  the	  introduction	  above.	  Together,	  these	  diverse	  activities	  form	  a	  broad	  category	  of	  informal	  and	  formal	  social	  organization	  recognized	  in	  law	  and	  culture	  as	  well	  as	  the	  social	  organization	  of	  important	  segments	  of	  everyday	  life	  characterized	  by	  voluntary	  participation,	  shared	  purposes	  and	  pooled	  resources.	  For	  lack	  of	  a	  better	   term,	  we	  shall	  call	   this	  clustering	  of	  new	  commons	  and	  knowledge	  commons	  the	   independent	   sector.	   Such	   associations,	   groups,	   formal	   and	   social	   organizations	   have	  been	  fundamental	  features	  of	  contemporary	  democratic	  society	  and	  culture	  for	  some	  time.	  Other	  features	  of	  voluntary	  action	  have	  only	  recently	  become	  objects	  of	  major	  interest	  in	  social,	   economic	   and	   political	   theory,	   while	   some,	   such	   as	   assemblies,	   parades	   and	  pilgrimages,	  have	  failed	  to	  generate	  serious	  scholarly,	  scientific	  or	  analytical	  interest,	  and	  others,	  like	  collective	  behavior,	  social	  problems	  and	  social	  movements	  have	  been	  treated	  largely	   as	   autonomous,	   self-­‐contained	   knowledge	   domains.	   All	   of	   these	   and	   more	   are	  gathered	  here	  under	  the	  single	  heading	  of	  new	  commons.	  	  These	  and	  other	  new	  commons	  have	  proven	  to	  be	  highly	  adaptable	  forms	  of	  joint	  or	  collective	   voluntary	   action	   capable	   of	   dealing	  with	  many	   of	   the	   complexities,	   paradoxes	  and	   challenges	   of	  modern	   living	   alongside	   strangers	   (Morris	  &	  Morris,	   1986).	   Although	  organized	  voluntary	  action	  may	  at	  times	  take	  place	  without	  legal	  endorsement	  or	  even	  in	  the	   direct	   face	   of	   legal	   sanctions,	   the	   majority	   of	   new	   commons	   are	   constituted	  indigenously	  by	  what	  the	  U.S.	  Supreme	  Court	  (NAACP	  v.	  Alabama	  1958)	  characterized	  as	  a	  penumbra	  of	  state	  and	  provincial,	  national	  and	  international	  legal	  infrastructure	  that	  has	  grown	   up	   almost	   unnoticed	   over	   several	   centuries	   (Fremont-­‐Smith	   2004).	   Legal	  frameworks	   governing	   voluntary	   action	   are	   typically	  minimal	   and	   enabling	   rather	   than	  constitutional	   or	   directive.	   Yet	   this	   infrastructure,	   which	   is	   increasingly	   mirrored	   in	  democratic	   societies	   and	   cultures	   everywhere,	   provides	   protection	   sufficient	   to	   enable	  substantial	   pooling	   of	   money,	   time,	   talent	   and	   other	   resources	   by	   participants	   in	   new	  commons.	   Tax	   incentives	   and	   disincentives	   seek	   to	   encourage,	   discourage,	   and	   in	   other	  ways	  attempt	  to	  shape	  and	  mold	  behavior	  as	  incentives,	  sanctions	  and	  inducements.	  These	  have	   taken	  diverse	   forms	  as	  common	   law,	  permissive	   legislation,	   legal	  precedents,	  court	  rulings	  and	  administrative	  rules.	  Yet	  the	  ways,	  means	  and	  effectiveness	  of	  such	  influences	  on	   actual	   behavior	   in	   voluntary	   action	   remain	   unclear.	   Even	   when	   they	   are	   seemingly	  quite	  ridiculous	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  1888	  court	  ruling	  that	  corporations	  are	  legal	  persons	  (reinvigorated	   in	   the	   equally	   ridiculous	   ruling	   in	   the	   2010	   Citizens	   United	   case),	   the	  penumbra	  of	  this	  legal	  infrastructure	  has	  proved	  sufficient	  to	  undergird	  the	  formation	  of	  unique,	  powerful	  and	  interesting	  institutions	  as	  diverse	  as	  charity	  organization	  societies,	  settlement	  houses,	  children’s	  home	  societies,	  religious	  denominations,	  congregations	  and	  other	   bodies,	   the	   Public	   Broadcasting	   Service	   (PBS),	   the	   Ford	   Foundation,	   thousands	   of	  colleges,	  the	  Children’s	  Television	  Workshop,	  the	  NAACP,	  and	  museums	  as	  different	  as	  the	  Metropolitan	  Museum	  of	  Art	  in	  New	  York	  City,	  the	  Pennsylvania	  Farm	  Museum	  of	  Landis	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Valley	   in	  Lancaster,	  PA	  and	   the	  American	  Credit	  Union	  Museum	   in	  Manchester	  NH.	  This	  same	   legal	   infrastructure	  has	  proven	   flexible	  enough	   to	  accommodate	  protest	  and	  other	  movements,	   fledgling	   institutions,	   and	   established,	   bureaucratized	   and	   professionalized	  service	  firms.	  Such	  formal,	  incorporated	  and	  established	  entities	  are	  well	  known	  and	  recognized.	  In	  the	  U.S.,	  they	  constitute	  what	  is	  usually	  known	  as	  the	  nonprofit	  sector,	  a	  configuration	  that	  is	   sometimes	   mistaken	   for	   the	   entire	   space	   outside	   of	   governments,	   markets	   and	  households.	  Also	  important	  to	  the	  independent	  sector	  even	  when	  they	  are	  less	  visible	  are	  peer	  and	  friendship	  groups,	  mutual	  aid	  and	  self-­‐help	  groups,	  and	  any	  number	  of	  informal	  associations,	   or	   social	   organizations,	   like	   those	   associated	   with	   political,	   religious,	   and	  social	  movements,	  the	  organized	  efforts	  that	  arise	  in	  the	  social	  construction	  and	  definition	  of	  social	  problems.	  As	  a	  general	  guideline,	  we	  are	  looking	  here	  at	  any	  set	  of	  informally	  or	  formally	   organized	   social	   activities	   that	   might	   seek	   legal	   protection	   of	   its	   freedoms	   of	  association	   or	   assembly	   under	   national	   or	   international	   law	   and	   isn’t	   directly	   linked	   to	  government,	  market	  or	  household	  organization.	  	  Scholars	  have	  become	  used	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  using	  the	  term	  third	  sector	  to	  distinguish	  these	  institutions	  and	  organizations	  from	  markets	  and	  governments,	  seen	  as	  the	  first	  two	  sectors.	  There	  is,	  however,	  another	  quite	  different	  way	  to	  conceive	  of	  thirdness	  and	  that	  is	  to	  use	  a	  common	  sociological	  practice	  and	  suggest	   that	   in	   institutional	   terms,	   the	   family	  and	   institutions	   of	   the	   intimate	   sphere	   are	   primary	   institutions,	   and	   the	   established,	  historically	   enduring	   institutions	   of	   government	   and	   market	   (including	   formal	  professional	   and	   bureaucratic	   organizations	   and	   the	   legal	   infrastructure)	   are	   secondary	  institutions,	  both	  of	  which	  are	  distinguishable	  from	  the	  thirdness	  or	  tertiary	  institutions	  of	  the	   innovative,	   insipient,	   transitory,	   and	   otherwise	   constantly	   changing	   practices	   and	  patterns	  of	  voluntary	  action	  (Lohmann,	  1995).	  	  Law,	   tradition	   and	   customary	   practice	   combine	   to	   enable	   the	   establishment	   and	  continuous	  re-­‐creation	  of	  freedom	  of	  association	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  tertiary	  social	  spaces	  apart	  from	  families,	  markets	  and	  governments.	  In	  such	  spaces	  individuals	  and	  small	  groups	  can,	  solely	  by	   their	  own	  actions	  with	  others,	   and	  with	  or	  without	   the	  aid	  of	  outside	   sources,	  produce	   public	   and	   common	   goods	   of	   many	   different	   types	   ranging	   from	   concrete	  individual	   benefits	   and	   services	   for	   individual	   beneficiaries	   and	   mass	   audiences	   to	   the	  production	   of	   entirely	   new	   values,	   norms,	   practices	   and	   other	   instances	   of	   what	  Tocqueville	   labeled	   moeurs.	   That	   term,	   which	   in	   my	   middle	   American	   pronunciation	  rhymes	  with	  poor.	  The	   term	   is	  French	  and	  used	  extensively	  by	  Alexis	  de	  Tocqueville,	   in	  
The	  Old	  Regime	  and	   the	  Revolution	   (1998),	  with	   connotations	  considerably	  broader	   than	  the	   contemporary	   sociological	   term	  mores	   (usually	   pronounced	  more-­‐ayes	   like	   the	   eel,	  with	  perhaps	  an	  accent	  on	   the	  second	  syllable).	  Regardless	  of	   spelling	  or	  pronunciation,	  moeurs	  in	  Tocqueville’s	  broader	  sense	  figure	  prominently	  in	  the	  discussion	  that	  follows.	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What	  is	  Voluntary	  Action?	  	  Voluntary	  action	  is	  defined	  herein	  as	  collective	  action	  or	  group	  behavior	  that	  occurs	  largely	  independent	  of	  the	  incentive	  structure	  (or	  price	  system)	  of	  the	  market	  order	  or	  the	  rule-­‐making	  and	  coercive	  forces	  (subtle	  and	  otherwise)	  of	  government	  and	  away	  from	  the	  primary	   relations	   and	   intimate	   sphere	   of	   the	   family.	   In	  Mapping	   The	   Third	   Sector,	   my	  colleague	   Jon	  Van	  Til	   focused	  on	  a	  narrower	  construct	  of	  voluntary	  action:	   the	  efforts	  of	  volunteers,	  voluntary	  associations,	  and	  mutual	  aid	  and	  self-­‐help	  networks	  (all	  of	  which	  are	  included	  within	  the	  term	  as	  used	  here).	  Voluntary	  effort	  was	  defined	  as	  anything	  that	  feels	  good	  or	   is	  meaningful	  and	  is	  not	  biologically	  compelled,	  politically	  coerced	  or	   financially	  remunerated	  and	  he	  noted	   two	  additional	  dimension	   that	  are	  also	   important:	   individual	  voluntary	  effort;	  and	  “[v]oluntary	  action	  directed	  at	  the	  long	  range	  betterment	  of	  society	  and	  the	  general	  welfare”	  that,	  he	  said	  “may	  be	  the	  best	  kind	  of	  voluntary	  action	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  most	  people”	  (Smith,	  Reddy	  and	  Baldwin,	  1972:	  167	  as	  cited	  by	  Van	  Til,	  1988:	  6).	  	  The	   American	   pragmatic	   philosopher	  William	   James	   first	   introduced	   a	   very	   broad	  construction	  of	  the	  term	  voluntary	  action	  in	  his	  Principles	  of	  Psychology	  (1890).	  For	  James,	  voluntary	   action	  was	   distinguished	   only	   from	   involuntary	   action	   (such	   as	   the	   knee-­‐jerk	  reflex	   or	   retching)	   by	   its	   potential	   for	   being	   foreseen	   or	   anticipated.	  William	  Beveridge	  (1948)	   reintroduced	   the	   term	  voluntary	  action	  with	  a	  new	  and	  narrower	  meaning	  after	  World	  War	  II.	  He	  gave	  it	  a	  more	  explicitly	  social	  meaning	  emphasizing	  collective	  behavior	  away	   from	  government	   in	   the	  context	  of	   the	   launch	  of	   the	  British	  welfare	  state	  and	  as	  a	  term	   for	   referring	   to	   the	   residual	   complex	   of	   British	   voluntary	   associations,	   agencies,	  associations,	   trusts	   and	   individual	   and	  group	  philanthropy	   capable	  of	   acting	  outside	   the	  emerging	   British	   welfare	   state	   (and,	   of	   course,	   the	   market	   order).	   	   British	   third	   sector	  scholars	  still	  make	  widespread	  use	  of	  Beveridge’s	  construct,	  as	  in	  the	  title	  of	  the	  Voluntary	  
Sector	  Review.	  	  Roughly	   two	   decades	   later,	   David	   Horton	   Smith	   sought	   to	   popularize	   Beveridge’s	  term	   in	   the	   U.S.	   and	   Richard	   Cornuelle	   introduced	   the	   notion	   of	   a	   national	   sphere	   of	  voluntary	   action	   distinct	   from	   government	   for	  which	   he	   coined	   the	   term	   	   “independent	  sector”	   (Cornuelle,	   1965;	   Smith,	   1999).	   Cornuelle’s	   work	   has	   been	   subject	   to	   a	   wide	  variety	   of	   ideological	   scrutiny,	   and	   characterized,	   denounced	   or	   ignored	   by	   various	  commentators	  (many	  of	  the	  most	  vocal	  on	  the	  political	  right)	  as	  conservative,	  libertarian,	  communitarian,	   as	   well	   as	   not-­‐conservative	   enough,	   not	   libertarian	   enough,	   and	   too	  communitarian,	   and	   numerous	   other	   characterizations.	   (Annunziato,	   1993;	   Lohmann,	  2013).	   Cornuelle	   wrote	   an	   effective	   and	   widely	   read	   argument	   for	   the	   importance	   of	  voluntary	   action.	   His	   analysis	   was	   particularly	   influential	   among	   conservatives	   and	  Republicans	   and	   is	   believed	   to	   be	   among	   the	   influences	   that	   prompted	   rhetoric	   on	  voluntary	   action	   by	   Presidents	   Nixon,	   Reagan,	   Bush	   (41)	   and	   Bush	   (43)	   regarding	  privatization,	   the	   voluntary	   sector,	   a	   thousand	   points	   of	   light,	   compassionate	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conservatism,	   and	   faith-­‐based	   services.	   Remarkably,	   in	   the	   2012	   election	   Republican	  candidates	  were	  completely	  silent	  on	  the	  subject.	  Cornuelle’s	  proposed	  usage	  came	  at	  about	  the	  same	  time	  as	  and	  was	  intended	  to	  pose	  a	  significant	  alternative	  to	  the	  controversial	  public-­‐private	  efforts	  of	  Title	  II	  of	  the	  Johnson	  Administration’s	  war	  on	  poverty	  to	  allocate	  federal	   funding	  for	  a	  nationwide	  community	  action	  program	   (CAP)	   characterized	  by	  maximum	   feasible	   participation	  of	   the	  poor	   and	  other	   instances	   of	   public-­‐private	   cooperation	   in	   the	  Great	   Society.	   Cornuelle	   and	   others	  were	   concerned	   at	   the	   time	   that	   public	   funding	   and	   initiatives	   would	   consume	   the	  traditional	  voluntary	  sector	  entirely.	  In	  hindsight,	  he	  need	  not	  have	  worried.	  In	  actuality,	  what	   happened	   has	   been	   far	   more	   complex,	   not	   only	   with	   community	   action	   but	   well	  beyond.	   For	   example,	   when	   the	   Nixon	   Administration,	   following	   Cornuelle’s	   general	  outline,	  subsequently	  defunded	  the	  CAP	  program,	  the	  unexpected	  happened.	  Rather	  than	  folding	   their	   tents	  as	  Congress	  had	  supposed,	   the	  majority	  of	   the	  CAP	  agencies	   that	  had	  been	   incorporated	   as	   nonprofits,	   discovered	   the	   legal	   autonomy	   that	   came	   with	  incorporation	  and	  began	  to	  pursue	  other	  options,	  giving	  rise	   to	  an	  early	   form	  of	  what	   is	  now	  generally	  known	  as	  social	  enterprise.	  More	  than	  700	  of	   these	  CAP	  agencies	  (almost	  two	  thirds)	  continue	  to	  operate	  today.	  Each	  of	  those	  developments	  was	  important	  to	  the	  still	   evolving	   ideal	   of	   a	   sector	   of	   voluntary	   action	   apart	   from	   households,	   markets	   and	  government.	  A	   century	   earlier	   in	  Democracy	   in	  America	  Alexis	   de	  Tocqueville	   (1843)	  drew	  an	  important	  distinction	  between	  political	  and	  civil	  associations	   in	   the	  context	  of	  American	  government	   and	   society	   that	   is	   fundamental	   to	   understanding	   the	   range	   of	   voluntary	  action	  and	  helps	  explain	  why	  and	  how	  those	  CAP	  agencies	  survived.	  Congress	  may	  have	  intended	  to	  create	  a	  network	  of	  political	  associations	  at	  arms	   length	  yet	   fully	  dependent	  on	  government	  for	  resources	  as	  a	  way	  of	  avoiding	  legislative	  responsibility	  or	  culpability	  for	  this	  highly	  controversial	  move.	  By	  mandating	  the	  tax-­‐exempt,	  tax-­‐deductible	  nonprofit	  corporate	  form,	  however,	  what	  resulted	  were	  in	  every	  sense	  of	  the	  word	  civil	  associations,	  free	   to	   follow	  or	   ignore	  Congressional	   intent	   as	   circumstances	   dictated.	   Thus,	  when	   the	  budget	  cuts	  came	  due	  to	  shifting	  political	  winds,	  these	  corporations	  merely	  sought	  other	  means	  to	  their	  (by	  now)	  civil	  ends.	  In	   this	   and	   other	   ways	   Tocqueville’s	   distinction	   between	   political	   and	   civil	  associations	  continues	   to	  enliven	  and	  at	   times	  confound	  contemporary	  voluntary	  action.	  Both	  Beveridge	   and	  Tocqueville	  wrote	   in	   response	   to	   the	   legal	   context	  of	  public	   charity	  and	   philanthropy	   grounded	   in	   the	   British	   Poor	   Laws	   (1601	   and	   1834)	   and	   Statute	   of	  Charitable	   Uses	   (1601).	   There	   were	   several	   continental	   European	   correlates	   and	  precursors,	   including	   the	   17th	   century	   Dutch	   associations	   noted	   by	   Sievers	   (2010),	   and	  Jonker	  (2000)	  and	  earlier	  English,	  Germanic,	  and	  Scandinavian	  tribal	  traditions	  discussed	  below.	   Over	   the	   course	   of	   the	   decades	   immediately	   after	   Tocqueville,	   numerous	   new	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forms	  of	  voluntary	  and	  civil	  associations	  for	  civil,	  educational,	  cultural,	  religious	  and	  other	  purposes	  laid	  the	  groundwork	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  Great	  Britain,	  continental	  Europe	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  urban,	  industrialized	  world,	  for	  what	  Lester	  Salamon	  (1993)	  termed	  the	  “	  worldwide	  association	  revolution”	  of	  the	  late	  20th	  century.	  	  From	   early	   on	   this	   has	   been	  much	  more	   than	   the	   voluntary	   associations	   usually	  associated	  with	  Tocqueville’s	  name.	   In	  an	  unprecedented	  development	  during	  the	  1830s	  and	   1840s,	   for	   example,	   there	   was	   a	   sudden	   burst	   of	   utopian	   community	   foundings	   in	  American	  life	  that	  was	  followed	  a	  decade	  or	  two	  later	  by	  friendly	  visiting	  societies	  in	  Great	  Britain	  and	  the	  U.S.	  and	  the	  subsequent	  Charity	  Organization	  movement	  to	  organize	  and	  rationalize	  them	  in	  “scientific	  charity”	  (Carden,	  1998;	  Hicks,	  2001;	  Holloway,	  1966;	  Lewis,	  1995;	  Peterson,	  2005;	  Plant,	  1984;	  Schmidt,	  2010;	  Trattner,	  1994).	  Less	  noted	  except	  by	  historians	   were	   the	   subsequent	   efforts	   by	   natives	   and	   immigrants	   to	   the	   Americas	   to	  fashion	  thousands	  of	  “private”	  colleges	  and	  universities,	  religious	  hospitals,	  new	  forms	  of	  mutual	  insurance	  and	  burial	  societies,	  employment	  and	  training	  organizations,	  settlement	  houses,	   social	   clubs	   and	   fraternal	   organizations	   and	   such	   familiar	   contemporary	  organizations	  as	  Boy	  Scouts,	  Girls	  and	  Boys	  Clubs,	  YWCAs,	  and	  literally	  hundreds	  of	  urban	  symphonies,	   opera	   and	   theater	   companies,	   and	  much	  more	   (Axinn	  &	   Stern	   1988;	   Beito	  2000;	  Beito,	  Gordon	  &	  Tabarrok	  2002;	  Chaves	  1998;	  Morris	  1986;	  Rauch	  1976;	  Trattner	  1994).	   The	   genuinely	   horrid	   effects	   of	   modern	   warfare	   in	   the	   American	   Civil	   War,	   the	  Crimean	  War	  and	  World	  War	  I	  were	  ameliorated	  to	  some	  extent	  by	  voluntary	  associations	  like	  the	  Red	  Cross,	  and	  by	  entirely	  new	  forms	  of	  fundraising	  (Bremner,	  1988;	  Faust,	  2008;	  Trattner	  1994;	  Zunz,	  Chapter	  2).	  Already	  by	   the	   late	  decades	  of	   the	  19th	  century,	  people	  working	  in	  charity	  and	  philanthropy	  began	  to	  refer	  in	  their	  speeches,	  articles	  and	  letters	  to	  an	   entire	   complex	   or	   “voluntary	   sector”	   of	   independent	   voluntary	   action,	   and	   produced	  efforts	   to	   characterize	   and	   systematize	  what	   they	   fashioned	   as	  philanthropy.	   Prominent	  among	   these	   was	   Amos	   Warner’s	   (1988	   [1894])	   proposal	   for	   a	   science	   he	   called	  philanthropology,	  or	  the	  study	  of	  philanthropy.	  In	  1895,	  the	  Chicago	  sociologist	  Charles	  R.	  Henderson	   may	   have	   been	   the	   first	   to	   examine	   the	   “place	   and	   function	   of	   voluntary	  associations”	   as	   key	   figures	   in	   the	   recognized	   domain	   we	   are	   calling	   the	   independent	  sector.	   Yet,	   it	   would	   be	   nearly	   another	   century	   before	   organized	   studies	   of	   voluntary	  action	   caught	   the	  attention	  of	  more	   than	  a	   few	   individuals	   in	   each	  generation	  and	  were	  organized	  as	  a	  major	  research	  enterprise.	  The	  issue	  of	  the	  proper	  relation	  of	  governmental	  and	  voluntary	  action	  took	  another	  major	  turn	  away	  from	  independence	  in	  the	  late	  1920s	  when	  Herbert	  Hoover,	  an	  engineer	  and	   voluntary	   organization	   administrator	   became	   President	   of	   the	   U.S.	   In	   the	   White	  House,	   Hoover	   actively	   promoted	   his	   doctrines	   of	   “associationism”	   and	   “association	  government”,	   which	   he	   envisioned	   as	   a	   regime	   in	   which	   government	   and	   associations	  were	  partners	  with	  government	  as	  the	  senior	  partner	  (Hawley	  1974;	  Zunz	  2011:	  Chapter	  
  42 
4).	   Associationism	   as	   a	   political	   doctrine	   was	   scuttled	   by	   events,	   particularly	   Hoover’s	  laissez-­‐faire	  response	  to	  the	  Great	  Depression	  between	  1929	  and	  1932	  only	  to	  resurface	  again	  half	  a	  century	  later	  in	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  national	  nonprofit	  sector	  laid	  out	  in	  the	  Filer	  Commission	   Report	   and	   proposals	   for	   “third	   party	   governance”	   (Brilliant	   2000;	   Filer	  1975;	  Salamon	  1987).	  By	  that	  time,	  a	  Hooverite,	  associationist	  voluntary	  sector	  with	  close	  (contractual)	   ties	   to	   government	  was	  proclaimed	  by	  14	  national	   social	   service	  umbrella	  (or	  peak)	  associations	  that	  anointed	  themselves	  as	  “the	  voluntary	  sector”	  for	  purposes	  of	  defining	  the	  terms	  for	  negotiating	  with	  the	  federal	  government	  over	  grants	  and	  contracts	  (Feldesman	   &	   Hughes	   1976;	   Gibelman	   1990).	   In	   a	   similar	   move	   a	   few	   years	   later,	   a	  national	  network	  of	  institutions	  located	  within	  the	  Washington	  beltway	  (including	  most	  of	  the	  same	  14	  and	  numerous	  others)	  co-­‐opted	  and	  redefined	  Cornuelle’s	  term	  Independent	  Sector	  and	  projected	  itself	  as	  the	  representative	  of	  all	  nonprofit	  organizations	  in	  the	  U.S.	  	  Such	  efforts	  proved	  highly	  popular	  with	  some	  but	  also	  provoked	  some	  blowback.	  From	   the	   late	   1950s,	   scattered	   voices	   in	   addition	   to	   Cornuelle’s	   were	   heard	  within	   the	  emerging	  social	  work	  profession,	  for	  example,	  objecting	  to	  the	  growth	  of	  federal	  support	  for	   voluntary	   social	   services	   and	   predicting	   negative	   implications	   for	   the	   autonomy	   of	  voluntary	  action	  even	  as	  the	  rush	  to	  federal	  funding	  was	  getting	  underway	  (Johnson	  1959;	  Kramer	   1981;	   Levin	   1966).	   As	   the	   size	   and	   scope	   of	   government	   aid	   to	   some	  nonprofit	  organizations	  grew	  substantially,	  these	  voices	  were	  largely	  drowned	  out,	  even	  as	  many	  of	  their	  concerns	  were	  realized.	   	  For	  many	  community	  groups,	  pursuit	  of	  pubic	  funding	  has	  proved	   a	   very	   quixotic	   quest.	   In	   this	   same	   period,	   isolated	   studies	   of	   voluntary	  associations	   were	   being	   published	   with	   increasing	   frequency	   in	   sociology	   and	   political	  science	   journals	   (Babchuk	  1962;	  Gordon	  and	  Babchuk	  1959;	   Jacoby	  and	  Babchuk	  1953;	  Likert	  1961;	  Rose	  1960).	  	  	  Cornuelle	   was	   concerned	   enough	   about	   the	   anticipated	   loss	   of	   independent	  voluntarism	  to	  write	  an	  influential	  argument	  for	  an	  independent	  sector	  of	  voluntary	  action	  not	   only	   separate	   from	   but	   also	   competing	   with	   government	   (Cornuelle,	   1965	   [1993].	  Cournelle’s	   highly	   original	   case	   for	   independent	   voluntary	   action	   was	   misread	   and	  dismissed	  by	  a	  number	  of	  reviewers,	  both	  liberals	  and	  conservatives,	  as	  conservative	  agit-­‐prop	   (see	   Anunziato,	   1993	   and	   Lohmann,	   2014).	   His	   vision	   of	   collective	   action	  independent	  from	  government	  ran	  directly	  counter	  to	  both	  Hooverite	  associationism	  and	  the	   “new	  welfare”	   thinking	  of	   the	  period	  and	  has	   formed	  one	  strand	  of	  voluntary	  action	  thought	  ever	  since	  (Lohmann,	  2012;	  Schulz	  &	  Binstock,	  2008).	  Cornuelle’s	   rather	  severe	  independent	  sector,	  as	  that	  sphere	  of	  voluntary	  action	  not	  dependent	  on	  or	  affiliated	  with	  government,	  stands	  as	  one	  of	  the	  fundamental	  distinctions	  or	  contrasts	   in	  contemporary	  understanding	  of	  voluntary	  action,	  along	  with	  Tocqueville’s	  political	  and	  civil	  associations,	  and	   the	   Gordon	   and	   Babchuk	   (1959)	   distinction	   between	   instrumental	   and	   expressive	  action.	   (See	   also	  Mason,	   1996)	   Independent	   voluntary	   action	   can	   be	   distinguished	   from	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both	   the	  government-­‐voluntary	   (associationist)	   co-­‐production	   that	   arose	   strongly	   in	   the	  1960s,	   and	   various	   forms	   of	   market-­‐voluntary	   co-­‐production	   (often	   termed	   social	  enterprise)	   arising	   today.	   The	   logic	   of	   Cornuelle’s	   argument	   suggests	   that	   such	  independent	  voluntary	  action	  might	  qualify	   for	  privacy	  protections	  and	  occur	  within	  the	  same	   "zone	   of	   personal	   liberty	   in	  which	   the	   government	  may	   not	   enter”	   staked	   out	   for	  consensual	  sex	  in	  the	  wording	  of	  the	  Lawrence	  v.	  Texas	  (2003)	  U.S.	  Supreme	  Court	  ruling.	  This,	   for	   example,	   would	   be	   the	   space	   occupied	   in	   the	   U.S.	   by	   all	   of	   the	   religious	  organizations	  and	  congregations	  and	  programs	  that	  elect	  their	  first	  amendment	  right	  not	  to	  formally	  incorporate	  or	  voluntarily	  file	  IRS-­‐990	  tax	  returns	  as	  exempt	  entities.	  It	  is	  also	  the	  zone	  of	  privacy	  staked	  out	  by	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  in	  Boy	  Scouts	  of	  America	  et	  al.	  v.	  Dale,	  (2000)	   as	   originally	   circumscribed	   or	   delimited	   by	   the	   "penumbra"	   of	   rights	   of	   privacy,	  association,	   due	   process	   prescribed	   in	   NAACP	   v.	   Alabama	   (1958).	   When	   these	   diverse	  strands	   are	   combined,	   a	   very	   clear	   conception	   of	   distinguishable	   realms	   of	   public	  voluntary	   action,	   divided	   into	   political	   and	   civil	   domains,	   and	   private	   voluntary	   action	  beyond	  the	  reach	  of	  the	  state	  begins	  to	  emerge.	  However,	  it	  is	  a	  very	  complex,	  multi-­‐level	  idea	  not	  easily	  reduced	  to	  a	  single	  sentence	  definition	  or	  clarification.	  
Civil	  Society	  	  There	   are	   strong	   links	   explored	   below,	   particularly	   in	   Chapter	   Twelve,	   between	  voluntary	   action	   in	   democratic	   society	   and	   culture	   and	   what	   others	   have	   termed	   civil	  society	   (c.f.	   Cohen	   and	   Arato	   1992;	   Edwards	   and	   Foley	   1997;	   Edwards	   1998;	   Edwards	  2004;	   Ehrenberg	   1999;	   Gellner	   1994;	   McLean,	   Schultz	   &	   Steger	   2002;	   O’Connell	   and	  Gardner	  1999;	  Putnam	  2000;	  Seligman	  1992;	  Sievers	  2010;	  Van	  Til	  2007;	  Walzer	  1995;	  Wagner	  2013	  and	  numerous	  others).	  Most	  of	  this	   literature,	  however,	  pays	   little	  head	  to	  these	   distinctions	   between	   political	   and	   civil	   associations,	   instrumental	   and	   expressive	  action,	  or	   independent	  action	  and	  what	  Cohen	  and	  Arato	   term	  the	  “pseudo-­‐pluralist	  and	  corporatist	  forms	  of	  interest	  representation	  and	  aggregation”	  of	  nonprofit	  firms.	  (Cohen	  &	  Arato,	  2000,	  462).	  	  The	  connections	  of	  the	  new	  commons	  theory	  of	  voluntary	  action	  to	  civil	  society	  and	  to	   such	   issues	   as	   civic	   engagement	   are	   straightforward	   and	   present	   throughout	   what	  follows,	  even	  though	  I	  make	  only	  minimal	  use	  of	  the	  actual	  term	  civil	  society.	  In	  general,	  I	  assume	  throughout	  that	  voluntary	  action	  occurs	  “in”	  or	  as	  a	  critically	  important	  dimension	  of	   the	   public	   and	   private	   precincts	   of	   civil	   society	   and	   that	   the	   foremost	   expression	   of	  modern	   civil	   society	   is	   located	   in	   communities,	   in	   the	   many	   diverse	   meanings	   of	   that	  slippery	  term,	  but	   that	   the	  topic	  of	  civil	  society	  encompasses	  a	  great	  deal	  more	  than	  the	  limited	  domain	  of	  circumscribed	  by	  the	  common	  resource	  pooling	  and	  the	  production	  of	  common	  goods	  of	  voluntary	  action.	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Much	  of	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  civil	  society	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  analysts	  like	  Cohen	  and	  Arato,	  Michael	  Edwards,	  Ernest	  Gellner,	  Robert	  Putnam,	   Jon	  Van	  Til,	  Antonin	  Wagner	  and	  others	  is	  to	  be	  found	  in	  a	  contrast	  akin	  to	  Cornuelle’s	  of	  an	  independent	  third	  sector	  with	   the	  kind	  of	   strong	   statist	   and	   totalitarian	   conceptions	  of	   social	   action	  which	  perhaps	  reached	  their	  apogee	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  A	  book	  review	  by	  Marc	   Plattner,	   for	   example,	   notes,	   “Gellner	   (1994)	   surely	   is	   right	   in	   attributing	   [the	  emergence	  of	  civil	  society	  theorizing]	  to	  a	  reaction	  against	  communism;	  the	  experience	  of	  a	   monolithic	   social	   order	   that	   forbade	   all	   independent	   social	   activity	   and	   opinion	  understandably	   sharpened	   people's	   appreciation	   for	   the	   freedom	   and	   diversity	   of	   civil	  society.	  But	   I	   think	   that	   there	   is	  more	   to	   it	   than	   that”	   (Plattner,	  1994). Such	  historically	  informed	   focus	   is	  necessarily	   light	  years	   from	  the	  original	  concerns	  with	  civil	   society	  by	  Hegel	   and	   Ferguson,	   who	   could	   not	   have	   even	   imagined	   the	   horrors	   of	   20th	   century	  totalitarianism.	  “"For	  partisans	  of	  liberty”	  Plattner	  (1994)	  continued,	  “who	  believe	  that	  the	  case	  for	  universally	  valid	  political	  principles	  is	  no	  longer	  sustainable,	  civil	  society”	  and	  we	  can	  now	  add,	   the	   subset	   of	   an	   independent	   sector	   of	   voluntary	   action	   “can	   be	   an	   especially	  attractive	   concept.	   It	   is	  wholly	   voluntary	   and	   is	   seemingly	   compatible	  with	   the	   greatest	  diversity,	  not	  only	  of	  interests	  but	  of	  principles	  as	  well.	  It	  is	  free	  of	  the	  [general]	  will	  that	  is	  inherent	   in	   the	  state-­‐-­‐no	  matter	  how	   liberal	  or	  democratic-­‐-­‐and	   it	  also	  presents	  a	  useful	  corrective	   to	   the	  materialism	   and	   individualism	   that	   are	   among	   the	  more	   questionable	  fruits	  of	  modern	  liberty."	  Plattner	  went	  on:	  “As	  Tocqueville	  emphasizes,	  civil	  associations	  serve	  both	  to	  remedy	  the	  weakness	  and	  self-­‐regardingness	  of	   individuals	  and	  to	  prevent	  the	  excessive	  growth	  of	  state	  power.	  Yet	  despite	  its	  undeniable	  importance,	  civil	  society	  is	  not	  the	  whole	  or	  even	  the	  essence	  of	  modern	  liberal	  democracy.	  It	  is	  instead	  a	  product	  of,	  and	   a	   supplement	   to,	   the	   two	   truly	   essential	   features	   of	   a	   liberal	   democratic	   order-­‐-­‐popular	   government	   and	   the	   protection	   of	   individual	   rights.”	   This	   conception	   of	  “individual	  rights”	  most	  likely	  would	  incorporate	  the	  legal	  enactments	  and	  protections	  of	  collective	  action	  discussed	  here.	  We	  must	  note	  in	  passing	  without	  further	  comment	  here,	  however,	   that	   this	   contrast	  of	   civil	   society	  particularism	  with	   “universally	   valid	  political	  principles”	  contrasts	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  universal	  “principles”	  of	  nonprofit	  organization	  and	  reveals	   an	   important	   tension	   between	   universal	   and	   particular	   communal	   values.	  More	  will	  be	  said	  about	  this	  in	  the	  chapter	  on	  communities	  below.	  
Modernization,	  Solidarity	  and	  Culture	  An	  effort	  is	  made	  in	  what	  follows	  to	  build	  upon	  and	  move	  beyond	  the	  universalist	  view	   of	   associations	   that	   we	   inherited	   from	   Tocqueville	   and	   build	   a	   case	   for	   voluntary	  action	   in	   distinction	   modern	   circumstances,	   moving	   in	   different	   directions	   than	   the	  unmitigated	   forms	   of	   voluntarism	   implicit	   in	   Parsons’	   view	   of	   society	   as	   a	   sort	   of	  association	   of	   associations	   and	   in	   Habermas’	   (1987)	   ideal	   speech	   community.	   In	   their	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massive	  study	  of	  Civil	  Society	  Cohen	  and	  Arato	  (1992)	  tell	  us	  "The	  problem	  of	  associations,	  which	   is	   excluded	   from	  Habermas'	   analysis,	   is	   parallel	   to	   that	   of	   culture,	   to	  which	   it	   is	  linked	   through	   the	   structures	   of	   the	   public	   sphere.”	   It	   is	   precisely	   those	   linkages	   that	  provide	   the	   skeleton	   tying	   together	   the	   public	   portion	   of	   new	   commons	   and	   the	   larger	  public	  sector.	  George	  McCully’s	   treatment	  of	   the	  American	  Revolution	  as	  a	  philanthropic	  project	  gives	  us	  some	  idea	  of	  how	  far	  this	  idea	  might	  be	  extended	  (McCully,	  2008).	  Cohen	  and	  Arato	  continue,	  “As	  Durkheim	  and	  Gramsci	  realized,	  the	  hostility	  of	  the	  modern	  state	  and	  economy	  to	  corporate	  bodies	  and	  associations	  could	  not	  block	  their	  reemergence	  and	  modernization.”	   	   Indeed,	  a	   remarkable	  number	  of	  modern	  states,	   from	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  Wilhelmine	  Prussia,	  the	  segregated	  “Jim	  Crow”	  U.S.	  and	  apartheid	  South	  Africa	  foundered	  in	   the	   long	   run	   in	   the	   face	  of	   the	   surprisingly	   strong	  normative	  powers	  of	   rights	  of	   free	  speech	  and	  association	  –	  key	  “powers	  of	  the	  people”	  –	  that	  have	  become	  deeply	  embedded	  in	  democratic	  culture	  and	  were	  wielded	  by	  grassroots	  associations	  and	  networks.	  	  The	  argument	  that	  Cohen	  and	  Arato	  lay	  out	  offers	  a	  distinct	  alternative	  view	  to	  the	  “substitution	   thesis”	   laid	   out	   by	   Cornuelle	   (1965	   [1993])	   for	   complete	   exclusion	   of	   the	  state	   from	   charity	   and	   philanthropy	   and	   substitution	   of	   a	   fully	   independent	   sector	   (see	  Lohmann,	   2014).	   They	   support	   a	   more	   pluralist	   view	   incorporating	   both	   state	   and	  associations	   and	   allude	   to	   the	   emergence	   of	   the	   nonprofit	   model.	   In	   this	   context,	   	   “the	  bureaucratization	  of	  associations	  and	  the	  reemergence	  of	  pseudo-­‐pluralist	  and	  corporatist	  forms	   of	   interest	   representation	   and	   aggregation,”	   such	   as	   nonprofit	   organizations	   that	  follow	  from	  active	  social	  and	  political	  movement	  phases	  are	  “a	  key	  dimension	  of	  the	  fusion	  argument”.	  Thus,	  we	  can	  conclude	  that	  the	  explanations	  of	  the	  nonprofit	  sector	  like	  those	  of	   Anheier,	   Salamon,	   et.al.,	   “cannot	   be	   considered	   the	   only	   tendency	   in	   contemporary	  associational	   life.”	   Note	   that	   Cohen	   and	   Arato	   are	   not	   denying	   the	   reality,	   scale	   or	  significance	   of	   either	   a	   nonprofit	   sector	   characterized	   by	   hybridity	   (Billis,	   2010)	   and	  carrying	   out	   the	   service	   mission	   of	   government	   by	   other	   means,	   or	   of	   an	   independent	  sphere	  of	  voluntary	  action	  in	  associations.	  Instead,	  their	  argument	  would	  appear	  to	  point	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  both.	  They	   are	   thus	   setting	   up	   a	   powerful	   case	   for	   a	   more	   pluralistic	   outlook.	   	   It	   is	  precisely	  these	  bureaucratized	  and	  professionalized	  hospitals,	  colleges	  and	  social	  service	  agencies	  tied	  by	  contract	  to	  the	  modern	  state	  and	  their	  “pseudo-­‐pluralist	  and	  corporatist	  forms	  of	   interest	   representation	  and	  aggregation”	   that	  have	  come	   to	  be	  known	  today	  as	  the	  nonprofit	  sector.	   	  Cohen	  and	  Arato	  go	  on	  to	  qualify	  a	  key	  provision	  of	   the	  structural	  case	  for	  any	  major	  civic	  significance	  of	  the	  nonprofit	  sector	  when	  they	  caution	  that	  “The	  existence	  of	  an	  immense	  number	  of	  voluntary	  associations	  in	  all	   liberal	  democracies,	  the	  emergence	  of	  new	  ones	   in	  the	  context	  of	  corporatist	  bargaining,	  and	  their	  role	   in	  citizen	  initiatives	  and	  social	  movements	  may	  not	  demonstrate	  the	  somewhat	  one-­‐sided	  Parsonian	  point	  that	  ours	  is	  the	  age	  of	  associations	  and	  not	  bureaucracy”.	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Against	   both	   Parsons’	   vision	   of	   society	   as	   voluntary	   association	   writ	   large	   and	  Gramsci’s	   thesis	   that	   the	   entire	   third	   sector	   is	  merely	   a	   tool	   for	   enforcement	   of	   a	  mass	  society	  and	  hegemonic	  control	  of	  society	  by	  the	  state	  they	  caution	  that	  “	  .	  .	  .	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  legitimate	  left	  criticisms	  of	  a	  pluralist	  thesis	  that	  occludes	  the	  highly	  differential	  access	  of	  various	   types	   of	   associations	   to	   the	   political	   system	   should	   not	   close	   our	   eyes	   to	   the	  validity	  of	  this	  thesis	  against	  all	  claims	  of	  atomization	  and	  massification	  in	  our	  societies.”	  	  From	   this,	   they	   conclude	   that	   “The	   resilience	   of	   associations	   and	   the	  periodic	   revival	   of	  their	   dynamism	   can	   be	   explained	   through	   the	   modernization	   of	   the	   life	   world	   and	   its	  normative	  contribution	  to	  the	  scarce	  resource	  of	  solidarity."	  	  (Cohen	  and	  Arato,	  2000,	  461-­‐462)	  	   That	  statement	   is	  as	   important	  to	  the	  case	  for	  voluntary	  action	  presented	  here	  as	  the	  Barber	  quotation	  on	  the	  sovereignty	  of	  political	  knowledge	  on	  p.	  174	  below.	  Together	  they	   solidify	   the	   reputation	  of	  political	  philosophers	   for	  obscurantist	  phrasing,	  but	   their	  real	   importance	   for	   the	   case	  made	  here	   is	   that,	   rather	   than	  different	   views	   of	   the	   same	  phenomena,	   the	  nonprofit	   sector	   and	   the	   sphere	  of	   voluntary	  action	   in	  what	  Cohen	  and	  Arato	  generalize	  as	  associations	  and	  which	  we	  are	  calling	  new	  commons.	  Like	  the	  Barber	  statement	  on	  the	  contingent	  sovereignty	  of	  political	  knowledge,	  however,	  this	  one	  makes	  a	  key	  argument	   for	  an	   “independent	   sphere”	  of	  voluntary	  action,	  distinguishable	   from	   the	  nonprofit	  sector	  and	  deeply	  interwoven	  with	  culture.	  The	   essence	   of	   the	   case	   for	   voluntary	   action	   presented	   here	   is	   found	   in	   the	  capability	  of	  associations,	  assemblies	  and	  knowledge	  commons	  operating	  in	  a	  sector	  apart	  from	  both	  markets	  and	  governments	   to	  realize	   their	  own	  diverse	   interests	  and	  generate	  and	   actualize	   their	   own	   non-­‐universal	   political	   principles	   and	   practices	   in	   local	  communities	  within	   an	   interdependent	   global	   community.	  Recognizing	   that	   government	  does	  not	  subsume	  all	  of	  modern	  democracy,	  and	  that	  voluntary	  action	  is	  only	  one,	  albeit	  an	   important,	   dimension	   of	   civil	   society,	   therefore,	   let	   us	   proceed	   to	   examine	   in	   the	  following	   pages	   the	   role	   of	   voluntary	   action	   in	   democratic,	   free,	   or	   open	   societies	   and	  cultures.	  We	  will	   closely	   at	   the	   collective	   dimensions	   of	   such	   action	   through	   the	   lens	   of	  commons,	   common	   resource	   pools,	   and	   knowledge	   commons	   as	   those	   terms	   have	   been	  dealt	  with	  in	  the	  highly	  specialized	  literature	  of	  commons	  studies.	  	  	  
What	  are	  New	  Commons?	  The	  term	  new	  commons	  is	  of	  relatively	  recent	  origin	  and	  has	  not	  achieved	  anything	  approaching	  widespread	  use.	  It	  is	  nevertheless	  useful	  for	  these	  purposes	  and	  is	  explored	  more	  fully	  in	  Chapter	  5.	  New	  commons	  in	  the	  sense	  used	  here	  are	  not	  merely	  clusters	  of	  pooled	  resources.	  They	  are	  also	  associations	  controlling	  those	  resources,	  distinct	  forms	  of	  collective	  social	  behavior	  and	  organization	  that	  embody	  distinct	  elements	  of	  interpersonal	  communication;	   of	   people	   interacting	   with	   one	   another,	   to	   realize	   joint	   projects.	   The	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phrase	  new	  commons	   is	  adopted	   from	  Charlotte	  Hess	  and	  Eleanor	  Ostrom	  (2001;	  2007;	  2008).	   Their	   newness	   is	   in	   contrast	   with	   more	   familiar	   ‘old’	   commons	   in	   agriculture,	  forestry	   and	   other	   primary	   industries	   such	   as	   forests	   and	   fisheries	   that	   are	   (or	   were)	  traditional,	  customary,	  of	  indefinite	  origin,	  rural	  and	  largely	  governed	  within	  common	  law	  and	   prior	   to	   the	   wave	   of	   enclosure	   movements	   in	   the	   early	   modern	   era	   were	   largely	  beyond	  the	  reach	  of	  law,	  courts,	  states	  and	  cities.	  By	  contrast,	  new	  commons	  are	  typically	  urban	  rather	  than	  rural,	  innovative,	  intentional	  and	  deliberately	  constitutional	  rather	  than	  traditional	   or	   customary,	   operating	   within	   regimes	   of	   private	   property	   ownership	   and	  grounded	   in	   increasingly	   universal	   legal	   infrastructures	   that	   enable	   and	   facilitate	   their	  formation	   and	   continuity.	   The	   expectation	   in	   the	   U.S.	   that	   a	   nonprofit	   corporation	   will	  have	  both	  articles	  of	   incorporations	  and	  bylaws	  speaks	  directly	   to	  a	  deeper	  anticipation	  that	  even	  unincorporated	  associations	  will	  ordinarily	  have	   legally-­‐enforceable	  bylaws	  or	  rules	   of	   operation	   (Fremont-­‐Smith,	   2004,	   pp.).	   	   Such	   an	   expectation	   can	   be	   found	  internationally,	  for	  example,	   in	  the	  case	  studies	  of	  the	  Workshop	  on	  Political	  Theory	  and	  Policy	   from	  which	   Elinor	  Ostrom	  derived	   the	   design	   principles	   discussed	   below.	  Where	  new	  commons	  are	  found,	  legal	  protections	  commonly	  guarantee	  a	  penumbra	  of	  freedoms	  of	   speech,	   association,	   assembly	   and	   religion,	   and	   facilitate	   the	   pooling	   of	   shared	  resources,	   and,	   even	   sometimes	   structure	   into	   public	   policy	   incentives	   and	  encouragements	   like	   tax	   exemption.	   The	   U.S.	   Supreme	   Court	   introduced	   the	   term	  penumbra	   to	   characterize	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   right	   of	   association	   in	   NAACP	   v.	   Alabama	  (1958).	   The	   full	   international	   penumbra	   protecting	   collective	   voluntary	   action	   today	  includes	  national,	  state,	  provincial	  and	  district	  legislation,	  court	  rulings	  and	  international	  guidelines	  from	  the	  U.N.,	  World	  Bank,	  International	  Monetary	  Fund,	  European	  Union,	  and	  assorted	  other	  international	  bodies.	  New	   commons	   may	   be	   legally	   constituted	   as	   formal	   organizations	   or	   informal	  associations,	   trusts,	   corporations,	   cooperatives,	   foundations,	   networks	   and	   coalitions	   of	  formal	  organizations,	  formal	  or	  informal	  networks	  of	  social	  relations	  like	  giving	  circles,	  or	  a	  complex	  hodge-­‐podge	  of	  other	  nondescript	  forms	  and	  hybrids.	  Oftentimes,	  these	  diverse	  formal	   characteristics	   are,	   like	   the	  use	  of	  Roberts’	  Rules	   of	  Order,	  merely	   adjustments	  of	  ongoing	   social	   arrangements	   and	   cultural	   conventions	   to	   formal	   and	   public	   necessity,	  rather	  than	  generative	  in	  any	  fundamentally	  important	  sense.	  In	   each	   of	   these	   guises,	   those	   involved	   are	   capable	   of	   producing	   with	   or	   without	  outside	   assistance	   diverse	   public	   and	   common	   goods,	   including	   benefits,	   services,	   and	  other	   outcomes.	   Under	   suitable	   circumstances,	   they	   are	   even	   capable	   of	   fashioning	   and	  shaping	   or	   transforming	   entire	   social	   or	   public	   spaces	   and	   fashioning	   new	   or	  unprecedented	  rules,	  practices	  and	  norms.	  In	  Chapter	  7,	  we	  will	  examine	  a	  particular	  type	  of	  new	  commons	  termed	  a	  knowledge	  commons	  (Ostrom	  and	  Hess,	  2007),	  which	  includes	  scientific	   and	   artistic	   societies,	   libraries,	   social	   problem-­‐based	   organizations	   and	   other	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similar	   entities	   as	   generators	   of	   information,	   knowledge	   and	   ultimately	   culture	   solely	  through	   individual	   and	   collective	   voluntary	   action.	   The	   discussion	   also	   points	   toward	  diverse	   forms	  of	   common	  goods	  production	  used	   in	   new	   commons	   including	   the	   use	   of	  common	  resource	  pools	  for	  production	  of	  common	  and	  public	  spaces	  capable	  of	  sustaining	  a	   wide	   variety	   of	   group	   social	   activity,	   and	   production	   and	   reproduction	   of	  moeurs,	   a	  category	   that	   includes	   practices,	   values,	   norms	   and	   rules,	   and	   other	   distinct	   types	   of	  common	  knowledge.	  Four	   distinct	   types	   of	   formal	   and	   social	   organization	   are	   identified	   as	   knowledge	  commons:	  some	  nonprofit	  firms,	  including	  some	  of	  the	  hybrid	  organizations	  (Billis,	  2010)	  producing	   or	   employing	   common	   knowledge	   at	   the	  margins	   of	   states	   and	  markets	   and	  three	  types	  of	  others	  more	  characteristic	  of	  the	  independent	  sector:	  benefactories	  utilizing	  knowledge	  and	  other	  common	  pool	  resources	  for	  producing	  individual	  and	  group	  benefits;	  
performatories,	   utilizing	   knowledge	   (including	   dramatic	   scripts	   and	  musical	   scores)	   and	  common	  pool	  resources	  for	  staging	  and	  enactment	  of	  performances;	  and	  moeuratoria,	  or	  new	  commons	  specializing	  in	  production	  and	  reproduction	  of	  moeurs.	  Each	  of	  these	  four	  is	  treated	  in	  what	  follows	  as	  an	  ideal	  type,	  whose	  characteristics	  may	  be	  found	  alone	  or	  in	  combination	  with	  any	  or	  all	  of	  the	  others.	  From	   the	   seventeenth	   century	   to	   the	   present,	   for	   example,	   scientific	   societies	  regardless	   of	   their	   level	   of	   formal	   organization	   or	   incorporation	   have	   been	   a	   type	   of	  knowledge	   commons	   specializing	   in	   producing	   new	   knowledge,	   and	   for	   much	   longer	  theological	   and	   philosophical	   schools	   have	   been	   devoted	   to	   the	   production	   and	  reproduction	   of	   sanctioned	   (sacred)	   religious	   beliefs	   and	   practices.	   Each	   of	   these	   four	  basic	  types	  also	  represents	  a	  distinct	   form	  of	  voluntary	  action	  engaged	  in	  gift	  giving	  and	  voluntary	  labor,	  and	  of	  philanthropy	  in	  the	  distinct	  sense	  of	   individual	  and	  group	  efforts	  exploring	  and	  demonstrating	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  human	  (McCully,	  2008,	  p.	  ).	  As	   noted	   above,	   diverse	   local,	   national	   and	   international	   legal	   infrastructures	  enabling	   such	  new	  commons	  have	   also	   evolved	  over	   several	   centuries.	   For	  most	   of	   that	  time,	   nonprofit,	   charity,	   foundation	   and	   association	   law	   and	   policy	   were	   remote	   legal	  backwaters	   and	   the	   moeurs	   that	   were	   generated	   were	   of	   interest	   only	   to	   narrow	  specialists	   in	   tax,	   corporate,	   gift	   and	  civil	   liberties	   law	  who	  operated	   largely	  outside	   the	  view	  of	  public	   affairs,	   interest	  or	   awareness.	   It	  was	  only	   in	   the	   final	  decades	  of	   the	  20th	  century	  that	  the	  full	  potential	  of	  voluntary	  action	  grounded	  in	  this	  legal	  infrastructure	  for	  enhancing	  global	  democratization	  of	  societies	  and	  cultures	  began	  to	  become	  more	  publicly	  evident,	   and	   politicians	   and	   public	   officials	   and	   wealthy	   merchants	   began	   to	   speak	  confidently	  (and	  misleadingly)	  of	  its	  importance	  and	  their	  roles.	  In	  truth,	  voluntary	  action	  has	   always	   been	   a	   popular	   project,	   and	   the	   generative	   role	   of	   politicians	   and	   business	  people	  is,	  in	  reality,	  minimal	  and	  marginal.	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So	  sudden	  and	  profound	  has	  been	   the	   realization	  of	   the	  enormity	  and	  range	  of	   the	  activities	   taking	   place	   in	   civil	   society	   and	   private	   life	   outside	   households,	   markets	   and	  government	  that	  social	  science,	  social	  theory,	  and	  social	  philosophy	  are	  all	  still	  struggling	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  it.	  Isolated,	  narrow	  and	  exclusive	  focus	  on	  one	  of	  the	  myriad	  topics	  of	  the	  field	   in	   new	   sub-­‐disciplines	   like	   arts	  management,	   social	   administration	   and	   foundation	  studies,	   community	   organization,	   social	   movement	   studies	   or	   social	   problem	   sociology	  bring	  to	  mind	  the	  tale	  of	  the	  seven	  blind	  men	  and	  the	  elephant.	  Except	  that	  ours	  is	  actually	  a	   tale	   of	   hundreds	   of	   partially	   sighted	   observers	   over	   many	   decades,	   two	   elephants	  (named	   market	   and	   state),	   and	   indeterminate	   herds	   of	   other	   fauna	   as	   well	   as	   flora	   of	  which	   we	   seek	   to	   make	   sense.	   	   In	   the	   chapters	   that	   follow,	   the	   discussion	   will	   bring	  together	  selected	   facets	  of	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	   topics	  under	   the	  rubrics	  of	  voluntary	  action	  and	  commons	  as	  part	  of	  that	  sense-­‐making	  project.	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An	  idea	  is	  a	  feat	  of	  association	  
~	  Robert	  Frost	  
3.	  Democracy	  in	  Society	  Gus	  De	   Zerega	   (2011)	   notes	   the	   tendency	   in	   social	   science	   and	  philosophy	   to	   confuse	  democracy	   with	   the	   sovereign	   state. To	   acknowledge	   and	   deal	   with	   this	   issue,	   the	   terms	  government	  and	  government	  sector	  will	  be	  used	  here	  to	  characterize	  what	  is	  dealt	  with	  in	  much	  third	  sector	  theory	  (and	  the	  subtitle	  of	  this	  book)	  as	  “the	  state”.	  Democratization	  of	  society	  and	  culture	   through	   voluntary	   action	   is	   important	   less	   as	   an	   extension	   of	   systems	   of	   democratic	  government	   than	   for	   its	   original	   capabilities	   as	   a	   generator	   of	   multiple	   life	   worlds	   through	  voluntary	  action	  by	  self-­‐regulating	  social	  action	  in	  self-­‐governing	  associations.	  The	  term	  “social	  democracy”	  might	   be	   less	   cumbersome	  here,	   but	   that	   phrase	   does	   not	   ordinarily	   include	   the	  democratization	   of	   culture	   and	   must	   be	   used	   carefully	   because	   it	   has	   a	   variety	   of	   other	  historical	  connotations	  and	  links	  to	  organization	  of	  the	  state	  that	  do	  not	  apply	  here.	  Even	  so,	  it	  is	  used	  occasionally	  here	  to	  refer	  to	  democracy	  in	  society	  and	  culture.	  The	  global	  world	  today	  consists	  of	  more	  than	  200	  sovereign	  nation	  states,	  some	  of	  them	  considerably	  smaller	  than	  the	  metropolitan	   regions	  of	   any	  of	   the	   largest	  nations,	   and	  more	   than	  500	  major	  actively	   spoken	  languages,	   each	   a	   common	   pool	   resource	   for	   its	   speakers.	   	   Most	   contemporary	   cities	   are	  complex	   composites	   of	   multiple	   ethnic	   and	   language	   groups,	   religions	   and	   diverse	   ways	   of	  living	  in	  which	  new	  commons	  are	  now	  found	  in	  abundance.	  In	  the	  United	  States	  alone,	  there	  are	  more	   than	   250	   cities	   classified	   as	   major	   metropolitan	   areas,	   each	   capable	   of	   sheltering,	  thousands	   of	   discrete	   religions,	   racial,	   ethnic,	   language,	   and	   cultural	   groups,	   life-­‐styles,	  neighborhoods,	  associations	  and	  assemblies,	  social	  movements	  and	  recognized	  social	  problems.	  In	  the	  midst	  of	  such	  diversity,	  how	  are	  we	  to	  best	  characterize	  the	  idea	  of	  democracy	  in	  society	  and	  culture?	  As	   John	  Dryzek	  notes,	   “There	  are	  many	  sites	   in	  which	  democracy	  can	  be	  pursued,	  and	  different	   types	  of	  democracy	  may	  turn	  out	   to	  be	  appropriate	   for	  different	  sites”	  (Dryzek	   1996:	   15).	   Thus,	   the	   voting	   and	   representation	   that	   characterize	   democratic	  governments	  may	  not	  apply	  to	  the	  sites	  of	  voluntary	  action.	  Amartya	  Sen	  tells	  us	  that	  the	  sense	  of	  democracy	  that	  emerged	  from	  Europe	  following	  World	  War	  II	  was	  to	  give	  “each	  person	  not	  only	   a	   vote	   but	   also	   a	   voice”	   (Sen	   2012).	   Speaking	   and	   listening	  may	   be	   important	   in	  many	  different	  forms	  and	  guises	  of	  democracy	  in	  society	  and	  culture.	  Dryzek	   introduced	   the	   concept	   of	   democratic	   concourse	   as	   “a	   place	   where	   ideas,	  positions,	   opinions,	   arguments,	   criticisms,	   models	   and	   theories	   run	   together.	   Within	   this	  concourse	   there	   is	   plenty	   of	   room	   for	   variety	   in	   terms	   of	   how,	   when,	   where,	   and	   by	   whom	  democracy	  might	  be	  pursued”	   (Dryzek	  1996:	  4).	  For	  our	  purposes,	   such	  places	   for	  concourse	  may	   refer	   to	   physical,	   social	   or	   cultural	   spaces	   (including	   online	   and	   virtual	   concourses).	   An	  examination	  of	   the	  capability	  of	  voluntary	  associations,	  assemblies	  and	  commons	   to	  generate	  and	  sustain	  such	  concourses	  largely	  by	  pooling	  their	  own	  resources	  is	  one	  way	  of	  approaching	  the	  current	  project.	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Our	  particular	  concern	  here	  is	  with	  the	  places/spaces	  for	  voluntary	  action.	  One	  thread	  of	  this	  involves	  input	  of	  the	  voice	  of	  the	  people	  into	  public	  policy.	  As	  Sen	  (2012)	  noted,	  if	  the	  views	  of	  policy	  makers	  “are	  to	  have	  democratic	  legitimacy,	  and	  not	  amount	  to	  technocratic	  rule,	  then	  they	   must	   be	   subject	   to	   a	   process	   of	   evolving	   public	   discussion	   and	   persuasion,	   involving	  arguments,	   counter-­‐arguments,	   and	   counter-­‐counter-­‐arguments.”	  The	   role	   of	   public	   opinion	  and	  of	  focused	  publics	  engaged	  in	  voluntary	  action	  in	  shaping,	  discussing,	  forming	  and	  changing	  such	  views	  is	  an	  essential	  aspect	  of	  modern	  life	  not	  only	  in	  government	  but	  also	  in	  democratic	  society	  and	  culture.	  This	  idea	  plays	  out	  in	  many	  different	  ways.	  Thus,	  the	  initial	  reaction	  of	  an	  audience,	   and	  not	   just	   the	   aristocracy	   of	   critics	   at	   the	   symphony	  or	   a	  Broadway	   theater	   to	   a	  premier	  of	  a	  new	  work	  can	  have	  a	  profound	  effect	  on	  later	  acceptance	  of	  that	  work.	  What	  may	  be	   less	   clear	   for	   students	   of	   commons	   and	   associations	   are	   the	   organized	   and	   associative	  aspects	  of	  such	  opinion	  formation	  and	  expression.	  Today,	  these	  are	  the	  specialized	  knowledge	  of	  another	  knowledge	  commons:	  mass	  communication	  studies.	  Concourses	  are	  also	  found	  well	  beyond	  public	  governance.	  Concourse-­‐related	  notions	  of	  democracy	   in	   society	   and	   culture	   like	   those	   discussed	   here	   most	   likely	   first	   arose	   in	   the	  aristocratic	   and	   royal	   scientific	   concourses	   in	  17th	   century	  Europe	  and	  North	  America,	  not	   in	  the	   context	   of	   formal	   governance	   of	   scientific	   activity	   but	   in	   the	   fundamental	   intercourse	   of	  scientific	   discussion,	   debate,	   publication	   among	   peer	   groups	   and	   reading	   publics.	   De	   Zerega	  (2011	  175-­‐6)	  characterizes	  the	  development	  of	  science	  in	  a	  way	  that	  shows	  this	  clearly	  to	  be	  “.	  .	  .	   a	   community	   of	   equals	   pursuing	   a	   broad	   common	   interest	   whose	   details	   are	   unknown	  developed	   gradually	   a	   culture	   of	   procedural	   rules	   ideally	   applying	   equally	   to	   all,	   thereby	  facilitating	  the	  efforts	  of	  each	  to	  discover	  those	  details.	  These	  rules	  were	  shaped	  by	  the	  projects	  they	  were	   devised	   to	   facilitate,	   but,	   whatever	   their	   other	   traits,	   they	   included	   strong	   ethical	  injunctions	   [or	   in	   present	   terminology,	  moeurs]	   in	   favor	   of	   honesty,	   equal	   standing,	   and	   the	  importance	   of	   voluntary	   agreement	   because	   the	   entire	   enterprise	   rested	   on	   persuasion	   (De	  Zerega,	  2011:	  175-­‐6).	  “The	  result”	  he	  concludes	  “was	  something	  new	  in	  human	  experience.”	  In	  the	  17th	  century,	  science	  stood	  alone	  in	  this	  regard,	  as	  charity,	  philanthropy,	  religion,	  education,	  the	  visual	  and	  performing	  arts,	  amateur	  athletics	  and	  other	  social	  and	  other	  cultural	  domains	  including	  old	  commons,	  remained	  within	  the	  thrall	  of	  more	  traditional	  and	  customary	  medieval	  norms,	  worldviews	  and	  practices	  (i.e.,	  moeurs).	  The	  democratic	  society	  and	  culture	  of	  scientific	  concourse	  in	  which	  every	  recognized	  scientist	  has	  a	  voice	  continuing	  right	  down	  to	  the	  present	  is	   characterized	   by	   what	   might	   be	   termed	   peer-­‐to-­‐peer	   equalities,	   self-­‐generating	   and	   self-­‐regulating	  social	  relations	  and	  self-­‐correcting	  knowledge	  through	  peer	  review	  and	  commentary.	  Eventually,	   similar	   democratic	   concourses,	   adapted	   to	   the	   unique	   circumstances	   of	   other	  institutional	   settings,	   developed	   also	   in	   charity	   and	   philanthropy,	   art,	   sport,	   education,	   and	  other	  forms	  of	  what	  U.S.	  tax	  law	  calls	  “public	  charities.”	  The	  Elizabethan	  Poor	  Law	  of	  1601	  and	  other	  similar	  legislative	  enactments	  were	  the	  results,	  not	  the	  causes	  of	  such	  dialogue.	  Concourse	  in	  democratic	  society	  and	  culture	  can	  usually	  be	  located	  through	  Sen’s	  idea	  of	  individual	   voice	   (or	   what	   is	   sometimes	   called	   freedom	   of	   expression)	   within	   a	   context	   of	  collective	   behavior.	   Democratic	   social	   and	   cultural	   institutions	   are	   characterized	   by	   high	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probabilities	  that	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  people	  can,	  if	  they	  choose,	  have	  a	  voice	  or	  some	  control	  over	  the	  conditions	  and	  circumstances	  of	  their	  lives,	  and	  social	  institutions	  can	  be	  arranged	  to	  facilitate	  that	  voice.	  And,	  as	  Hirschman	  (1981)	  noted,	  where	  they	  cannot	  have	  voice,	  moderns	  are	   ordinarily	   empowered	   to	   protest	   or	   exit	   that	   situation	   and	   engage	   or	   initiate	   another.	  Voluntary	   exit	   and	   admission	   are	   among	   the	  more	   important	   dimensions	   of	   the	   “mediating”	  character	   of	   voluntary	   action	   that	   Berger,	   Neuhaus	   &	   Novak	   (1996	   [1977];	   and	   Wolfe	   &	  Neuhaus	  (2009)	  drew	  from	  Tocqueville.	  There	  is	  no	  guarantee	  of	  wider	  consensus,	  formation	  of	  a	   general	   public	   will	   or	   lack	   of	   conflict.	   In	   fact,	   such	   things	   are	   to	   be	   expected	   along	   many	  differences	   and	   boundaries.	   Aesthetic	   experts	   in	   art	   or	   music,	   for	   example,	   may	   hold	   a	  particular	  artist	  or	  composer	  in	  high	  regard,	  but	  in	  democratic	  society	  everyone	  else	  who	  looks	  or	   listens	  may	   also	   get	   a	   voice	   in	   the	  matter,	   in	   terms	   of	   attendance	   (or	   not)	   at	   concerts	   or	  exhibitions,	   purchase	   of	   recordings	   or	   reproductions,	   telling	   their	   friends,	   writing	   online	  reviews,	  and	  in	  myriad	  other	  ways.	  Thus,	  for	  example,	  the	  painter	  Thomas	  Kincaid,	  who	  died	  in	  2011,	  was	  generally	  held	  in	  low	  esteem	  by	  art	  students,	  critics,	  art	  historians,	  and	  other	  arbiters	  of	   artistic	   taste,	   but	   built	   a	   huge	   popular	   following	   that	   still	   includes	   fan	   clubs,	   web	   sites,	  collectors’	  societies	  and	  a	  range	  of	  other	  associations.	  	  A	   closely	   related	   aspect	   of	   democratic	   concourse	   in	   society	   and	   culture	   involves	  reciprocal	   accountability,	   the	   individual	   and	   collective	   ability	   of	   people	   in	  democratic	   society	  and	   culture	   to	   scrutinize	   the	   actions	   of	   others,	   form	  opinions	   that	  matter	   somewhere	   and	   to	  someone,	  and	  to	  act	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  such	  scrutiny.	  (Thanks	  to	  David	  Brin	  for	  suggesting	  this	  idea	  in	  an	  email	  to	  the	  Philanthropic	  Enterprise	  e-­‐mail	  discussion	  list	  on	  April	  4,	  2012.)	  Obviously,	  if	  concourse	  is	  to	  be	  preserved	  and	  “the	  tyranny	  of	  the	  majority”	  is	  to	  be	  avoided,	  some	  provision	  must	   also	   be	   made	   in	   democratic	   society	   for	   well-­‐formed	   institutions	   protecting	   individual	  autonomy	   and	   privacy	   as	   well	   as	   for	   the	   collective	   action	   of	   minority	   factions.	   In	   voluntary	  action,	  such	  moeurs	  cannot	  ordinarily	  be	  legislated.	  They	  are	  constructed	  collectively	  by	  groups	  themselves	  within	  the	  general	  legal	  framework	  previously	  laid	  down.	  Other	   specific	   institutional	   domains	   may	   also	   be	   important	   in	   reinforcing	   such	  accountability,	  including	  economic	  markets	  and	  democratic	  political	  institutions	  that	  reinforce	  voice	   through	   advertising	   and	  marketing,	   voting	   and	   opinion	   polling,	   legislatures	   and	   courts.	  The	   range	   of	   voluntary	   action	   practices	   and	   institutions	   for	   evaluative	   and	   accountability	  purposes	  is	  truly	  more	  vast	  than	  today’s	  scholars	  of	  markets	  and	  states	  with	  vested	  interests	  in	  formal,	   social	   science	  methods	   and	   procedures	   have	   acknowledged	   and	   the	   vast	  majority	   of	  issues	  and	  problems	  will	  be	  handled	  in	  these	  ways.	  These	  may	  include	  norms	  of	  science,	  self-­‐regulating	   professions	   and	   occupations,	   public	   opinion	   (particularly	   on	   subjects	   outside	  governmental	   concern	   and	   formal	   opinion	   polling)	   and	  most	   recently	   and	   often	   crudely	   but	  vigorously,	  the	  Internet,	  and	  social	  media.	  Anyone who chooses to speak may comment on many 
news sites about particular articles, or offer signed or anonymous critiques of articles on Wikipedia 
and countless other sites.	   While	   nobility	   and	   hereditary	   aristocracy	   may	   offer	   their	   own	  expressions	  of	  such	  reciprocity	   in	  more	  traditional	  societies,	  highly	  volatile	   forms	  of	  celebrity	  and	  notoriety	  are	  often	  associated	  with	  such	  reciprocity	  in	  democratic	  society	  and	  culture.	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In	  one	  of	  the	  core	  values	  of	  democratic	  society	  and	  culture,	  everyone	  is	  entitled	  to	  their	  own	  opinions	  on	  how	  things	  are	  and	  how	  they	  ought	  to	  be	  and,	  although	  some	  opinions	  come	  to	  be	  more	  valued	  than	  others,	  they	  begin	  in	  roughly	  the	  same	  place	  and	  each	  individual	  is	  free	  to	  accept	  or	  reject	   the	  opinions,	  suggestions	  and	  proposals	  of	  others.	  A	  kind	  of	  rough	  and	  ready	  equality	   is	   thus	   one	   of	   the	   starting	   conditions	   of	   much	   voluntary	   action.	   This	   process	   may	  become	   highly	   stratified,	   however,	   and	   under	  modern	   conditions	   holders	   of	   particular	   views	  have	   an	   uncanny	   knack	   of	   finding	   others	  with	  whom	   they	   share	   common	   interests	   or	   views.	  Although	  we	   largely	   take	   it	   for	   granted,	   this	   process	   of	   forming	   factions	   greatly	   troubled	   the	  American	  Founding	  Fathers,	  as	  evidenced	  in	  James	  Madison’s	  Federalist	  #10.	  See	  Wood,	  2011,	  pp.	  127-­‐170	  for	  a	  historically	  informed	  discussion	  of	  the	  issue.	  Currently,	  we	  may	  at	  any	  time	  be	  merely	  one	  web	  search	  away	  for	  more	  than	  half	  of	  the	  human	  population.	  As	  a	  result,	  there	  is	  a	  uniquely	   important	   and	   dramatically	   expanding	   set	   of	   potential	   concourses	   in	   contemporary	  democratic	  society	  and	  culture.	  	  In	  modern	  circumstances,	  voice	  in	  concourses	  typically	  leads	  to	  a	  primitive	  but	  universal	  form	  of	  association:	  opinion	   leaders	  and	  followers.	  The	  comments	  and	  suggestions	  of	  opinion	  leaders	  are	  listened	  to	  and	  followed	  by	  others,	  and	  such	  leaders	  and	  their	  followers	  can	  quickly	  and	  easily	  form	  vast	  networks	  of	  voluntary	  association	  of	  the	  type	  we	  will	  call	  focused	  publics.	  In	   the	   cases	   of	   both	   social	   problems	   as	  well	   as	   sympathy	   and	   support	   for	   social	  movements,	  such	  associations	  often	  directly	  produce	   forms	  of	  collective	  behavior	  that	  constitute,	   in	  effect,	  very	   loose	   types	   of	   voluntary	   association.	   All	  who	   disagree	   are	   free	   in	  Hirschman’s	   terms	   to	  remain	  silent,	  dissent	  or	  exit;	  e.g.,	  change	  channels	  or	  websites,	  logoff,	  resign,	  stop	  paying	  dues,	  withhold	  donations,	  and	  a	  vast	  number	  of	  other	  possibilities,	  including	  to	  form	  or	  find	  their	  own	  new	  associations.	   If	  no	  one	  is	   left,	  nothing	  will	  happen,	  but	  those	  who	  remain	  may	  also	  prove	  capable	  of	  considerable	  feats	  of	  imagination,	  organization	  and	  action.	  Concourses	   in	   democratic	   society	   and	   culture	   resemble	   a	   continuous	   series	   of	   sandlot	  games	  of	  “choose-­‐up	  sides”,	  as	  self-­‐anointed	  leaders	  choose	  (and	  are	  chosen	  by)	  their	  followers	  who	  agree	  to	  join	  the	  team,	  form	  their	  own	  team,	  watch	  or	  find	  a	  new	  sandlot.	  This	  is	  altogether	  consistent	  with	  what	  Tocqueville	  first	  saw	  in	  the	  U.S.	  in	  the	  1830s.	  What	  once	  made	  American	  society	   unique	   is	   at	   present	   a	   taken-­‐for-­‐granted	   condition,	   to	   greater	   or	   lesser	   degrees,	   for	  much	  of	   the	  human	  race,	  although	  the	  risks	  and	  costs	  of	  choosing	  may	  be	  markedly	  higher	   in	  some	   settings	   than	   in	   others.	   Even	   so,	   the	   rudiments	   of	   the	   process	   are	   much	   the	   same	  everywhere.	  It	  is	  through	  the	  dynamics	  of	  democratic	  concourse	  that	  the	  fundamental	  structure	  of	   voluntary	   action	   in	   democratic	   society	   is	   first	   unveiled.	   Several	   decades	   ago,	   mass	  communications	   researchers	   termed	   a	   key	   aspect	   of	   this	   process	   the	   two-­‐step	   flow	   of	  communications,	  in	  which	  “mass	  communications”	  were	  discovered	  not	  to	  be	  exclusively	  direct	  from	  medium	   to	   audience,	   but	   mediated	   through	   face-­‐to-­‐face	   (and	   now	   increasingly	   online)	  opinion	  leaders	  (Lazarsfeld	  and	  Katz,	  1955).	  	  However	  insightful	  this	  finding,	  the	  authors	  dealt	  only	  with	  individuals	  and	  failed	  to	  note	  the	  association,	  group,	  collective	  behavioral	  (and	  today,	  the	   technological)	   dimensions)	   of	   the	   social	   processes	   that	   such	   flows	   imply.	   A	   plethora	   of	  examples	   in	   the	   Arab	   Spring	   of	   2011	   and	   the	   Occupy	  movements	   demonstrated	   clearly	   how	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mass	   communication	   (e.g.,	   television	   and	   websites),	   and	   point-­‐to-­‐point	   communication	   (e.g.,	  cellphones	  and	  social	  media)	  are	  now	  intimately	  tied	  to	  voluntary	  association	  and	  action	  (e.g.,	  street	   demonstrations	   and	   sit-­‐ins).	   Marianne	   Maecklinberg	   summed	   up	   many	   of	   these	  developments:	   “.	   .	   .	   People	   across	   the	   globe	   took	   to	   the	   streets	   as	   the	   effects	   of	   the	   global	  financial	   crisis	   became	  visible	   at	   the	   end	  of	  2008	  and	  especially	  in	   early	  2009.	  People	   in	   and	  beyond	  the	  Arab	  world	  revolted	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  occupied	  public	  squares	  to	  demand	  the	  fall	  of	   their	   regimes	   in	   2010	   and	   2011.	   A	   few	  months	   later,	   people	   all	   over	   Spain	   assembled	   en	  
masse 	   to	   call	   for	   “real	   democracy	   now”	   on	   May	   15th	   2011.	   That	   same	   year,	   the	   Occupy	  movement	  followed	  suit	  in	  the	  United	  States	  by	  gathering	  in	  Zuccotti	  Park	  near	  New	  York	  City’s	  Wall	  Street	  on	  September	  17th.	  One	  month	  later,	  at	  least	  951	  squares	  were	  occupied	  in	  over	  82	  different	  countries	  as	  part	  of	  an	  internationally	  coordinated	  “day	  of	  rage”	  on	  October	  15th.”	  For	   Maecklinberg	   (2013),	   Colin	   Crouch	   (2004)	   and	   others	   these	   events	   may	   signal	   a	  possible	   change	   akin	   to	   that	   anticipated	   in	   the	   very	   first	   paragraph	   of	   this	  work,	   except	   that	  they	   and	   other	   mass	   communication	   researchers	   tend	   to	   see	   a	   condition	   termed	   “post-­‐democracy”.	  Maecklinberg	  sees	  two	  possible	  directions	  for	  such	  developments.	  One	  she	  terms	  “an	  increasingly	  repressive	  state”	  while	  the	  other	  she	  terms	  horizontality,	  said	  to	  be	  “a	  form	  of	  radical	  equality.	   .	   .	   viewed	  by	  many	  as	  a	  potential	   replacement	   for	  political	   systems	  based	  on	  representation	  and	  electoral	  politics.”	  	  Concourses	  definitely	  need	  to	  be	  added	  to	  the	  list	  of	  types	  of	  organizations	  found	  in	  the	  third	  sector	  and	  through	  which	  collective	  action	  occurs,	  and	  concourse	  formation	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  sharing	  of	  common	  pool	  resources	  represents	  a	  coherent	  and	  plausible	  form	  of	  horizontality.	  
New	  Commons	  in	  Democratic	  Society	  Concourse	  in	  democratic	  societies	  and	  cultures	  in	  which	  everyone	  potentially	  is	  both	  an	  active	  contributor	  and	  a	  beneficiary,	  together	  with	  governments	  that	  respect	  the	  autonomy	  of	  democratic	   concourses	   are,	   as	   Tocqueville	   noted,	   a	   precondition	   of	   stable	   democratic	  governments	   whose	   legitimacy	   is	   at	   least	   nominally	   based	   on	   universal	   franchise	   and	   equal	  treatment	   of	   all.	   There	   is	   obviously	   some	   connection	   here	   to	   the	   sphere	   of	   voluntary	   action	  here,	   but	   too	   many	   explorations	   of	   it	   tend	   to	   lead	   quickly	   into	   the	   familiar	   territory	   of	  traditional	  political	  philosophy,	  with	  its	  emphasis	  on	  the	  state	  and	  ignore	  or	  neglect	  the	  themes	  of	  non-­‐state	  voluntary	  action	  that	  are	  basic	  to	  the	  current	  discussion.	  Such	  views	  have	  sometimes	  been	  labeled	  ‘social	  democracy’	  as	  outlined	  by	  John	  Dewey,	  perhaps	  the	  greatest	  American	  social	  philosopher	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  (Bernstein,	  2011,	  pp.	  xx;	  Diggins,	   1994;	   Ryan,	   1995;	   Westbrook,	   1991).	   To	   some	   extent,	   Dewey	   was	   treading	   a	   path	  previously	  surveyed	  by	  not	  only	  Tocqueville	  but	  also	  by	   John	  Stuart	  Mill	   and	  Walter	  Bagahot	  and	   congealed	   a	   view	   of	   democracy	   as	   “government	   by	   discussion.”	   Dewey	   linked	   the	  democratization	  of	  society	  and	  culture	  with	  a	  Chicago	  School	  of	  sociology	  perspective	  on	  “social	  individualism”	   cognizant	   of	   both	   individuality	   and	   social	   embeddedness.	   His	   contemporary,	  Charles	  Horton	  Cooley	  constructed	  a	  view	  of	  social	  organization	  that	  fits	  with	  and	  extends	  many	  of	   these	   same	   ideas	   (Cooley,	   1909).	   In	   this	   view,	   the	   individual	   is	   not	   merely	   a	   bundle	   of	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political,	  civil	  and	  social	  rights,	  interests	  and	  economic	  wants	  but	  more	  importantly	  an	  actor,	  an	  agent	   for	   herself	   or	   others,	   and	   a	   participating	  member	   of	   diverse	   associations,	   publics	   and	  communities.	  Dewey	  perhaps	  best	  summed	  up	  his	  early	  view	  of	  democracy	  beyond	  the	  state	  in	  
The	  Public	  and	  Its	  Problems,	  (1927):	  “The	  idea	  of	  democracy	  is	  a	  wider	  and	  fuller	  idea	  than	  can	  
be	  exemplified	  in	  the	  state	  even	  at	  its	  best.	  To	  be	  realized,	  [such	  democracy]	  must	  affect	  all	  modes	  
of	  human	  association,	   the	   family,	   the	  school,	   industry,	   [and]	   religion.	   .	   .	   .	  Regarded	  as	  an	   idea,	  democracy	   is	   not	   an	   alternative	   to	   other	   principles	   of	   association	   life.	   It	   is	   the	   idea	   of	  community	  life	  itself”	  (Dewey,	  1927:	  143,	  148	  emphasis	  added).	  	  Jane	   Addams	   (Elshtain,	   2002),	  Mary	   Parker	   Follett	   (Follett,	   1920;	  Mattson,	   1998)	   and	  Eleanor	   Roosevelt	   (Glendon,	   2002)	   all	   Dewey’s	   contemporaries	   and	   a	   broad	   range	   of	   other	  modernists,	  community	  activists	  and	  practitioners,	  also	  explored	  differing	  facets	  of	  this	  idea	  of	  democratic	  society	  and	  culture.	  Some	  of	  their	  important	  contributions	  will	  be	  taken	  up	  below.	  Until	  quite	  recently,	  Dewey’s	  ideas	  about	  voluntary	  action	  found	  their	  largest	  and	  most	  secure	  place	   in	  education	   theory	  and	  practice,	   social	  work	  education	  and	   in	  a	  narrow	  band	  of	   social	  and	   cultural	   institutions.	   For	   several	   decades,	   European	   philosophers	   and	   American	  conservatives	   and	   libertarians	   were	   sometimes	   in	   competition	   to	   display	   their	   disdain	   for	  Dewey	  and	  other	  American	  pragmatists,	  even	  while	  some	  of	  the	  products	  of	  pragmatic	  thought	  were	   deeply	   embedded	   in	   modern	   life.	   Thus,	   discussions	   of	   problem-­‐solving	   and	   choice	  formulations	   often	   arise	  without	   any	   explicitly	   acknowledgement	   of	   Dewey’s	   role	   in	   seminal	  formulations	   of	   these	   ideas.	   Dewey	   himself	   was	   often	   following	   paths	   already	   well	   trod	   by	  earlier	  cultural	  pioneers	  including	  Cotton	  Mather,	  Benjamin	  Franklin,	  Ralph	  Waldo	  Emerson	  as	  well	  as	  Alexis	  de	  Tocqueville,	   the	  American	  founding	  fathers,	  particularly	   James	  Madison,	  and	  all	  those	  who	  understood	  the	  new	  and	  unprecedented	  social	  possibilities	  forged	  in	  an	  America	  founded	   as	   an	   act	   of	   philanthropy;	   a	   gift	   to	   the	   18th	   century	   world	   of	   totally	   new	   forms	   of	  society,	   culture	   and	   government	   (McCully,	   2009;	   Zunz,	   2011).	   Tocqueville’s	   written	   work,	  particularly	  Democracy	  in	  America	  and	  The	  Old	  Regime	  and	  the	  Revolution	  constitute	  major	  acts	  of	   philanthropy	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   term	   is	   used	   here.	   This	   gift	   is	   increasingly	   not	   a	   peculiarly	  American	  product,	  but	  part	  of	  the	  global	  fabric	  of	  the	  everyday	  life	  world	  everywhere.	  Jane	  Addams	  expressed	  her	  own	  broad	  conception	  of	  democracy	  in	  society	  and	  culture	  on	   numerous	   occasions,	   folding	   in	   a	   measure	   of	   idealism	   that	   is	   only	   implicit	   in	   Dewey’s	  comments.	   She	  wrote	   in	  Subjective	  Necessity,	   for	   example,	   “The	  people	   themselves.	   .	   .	   crave	  a	  higher	   political	   life”	   (Knight,	   2005:	   255),	   adding	   elsewhere	   her	   belief	   that	   they	   also	   had	   the	  social	   skill	   and	   cultural	   resources	   to	   build	   such	   lives,	   without	   enumerating	   those	   skills	   and	  resources.	  Note	   that	  Addams	  uses	   the	   term	  political	   here	   in	   a	   broader	   sense	   than	  matters	   of	  government	  or	  affairs	  of	  state.	  Like	  Dewey	  and	  countless	  other	  social	  reformers	  of	  the	  late	  19th	  and	  early	  20th	  centuries,	  Addams	  linked	  the	  further	  development	  of	  democracy	  to	  Christianity,	  albeit	  in	  ways	  that	  universalize	  rather	  than	  particularize	  religion	  (Knight,	  2005:	  254).	  	  Addams	  was	   strongly	   influenced	   by	   Abraham	   Lincoln	   and,	   interestingly,	   by	   the	   Italian	   democratic	  reformer	  Guiseppi	  Mazzini,	  a	  contemporary	  of	  Tocqueville’s	  who	  observed	  that	  democracy	  was	  about	   helping	   every	   citizen	   become	   “better	   than	   he	   is”	   (Knight,	   2005:	   142-­‐3)	   and	   who	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counseled	  “[I]f	  you	  wish	  to	  attain	  [democracy],	  let	  man[sic]	  commune	  with	  the	  greatest	  possible	  number	  of	  his	   fellows”	   (Knight,	  2005:	  143)	  Mazzini’s	  sentiment	  applies	  even	  more	   fully	   if	  we	  neuter	  his	  male	  pronouns	  and	  apply	  it	  to	  the	  full	  population,	  as	  Ms.	  Addams	  undoubtedly	  would	  have.	  	   Perspectives	  on	  democratic	  society	  and	  culture	  like	  those	  of	  Tocqueville,	  Ward,	  Dewey,	  Addams	  and	  Mazzini	  have	  long	  been	  the	  workaday	  basis	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  community	  problem-­‐solving	  skills	  and	  practices	  in	  disciplines	  like	  social	  work,	  community	  sociology,	  public	  health,	  public	   administration,	   community	   arts	   and	   a	   wide	   variety	   of	   other	   applied	   social	   sciences	  engaged	   in	   voluntary	   action	   practice	   (Briggs,	   2008;	  Milofsky,	   2008;	  Warren,	   1968).	   Many	   of	  these	   moeurs	   evolved	   directly	   within	   20th	   century	   forms	   of	   community	   practice,	   involving	  community	   schools,	   community	   problem-­‐solving	   community	   organizations	   and	   other	  community	   institutions	   in	  which	  common	  pool	  resources	  were	  an	  essential	  element.	  Whether	  or	  not	  one	  finds	  any	  of	  these	  particular	  institutions,	  programs	  or	  organizations	  commendable,	  their	   underlying	   common	   commitment	   to	   democratizing	   society	   and	   culture	   must	   be	  recognized.	  Mary	  Dietz,	  a	  contemporary	  political	  philosopher	  captured	  a	  key	  aspect	  of	  Dewey’s	  view	  that	  was	  shared	  by	  Addams	  and	  others:	  a	  robust	  model	  of	  citizenship	  that	  reaches	  well	  beyond	  the	  act	  of	  voting.	  	  “[C]itizenship,	  as	  the	  people’s	  power.	  .	  .	  transform[s]	  the	  individual	  .	  .	  .	  into	  a	  political	  being.	  .	  .	  endowed	  with	  the	  capacity	  to	  speak,	  act,	  organize	  and	  potentially	  change	  the	  world”	   (Knight,	   2005:	   268-­‐9).	   The	   power	   of	   such	   citizens	   is	   only	   partially	   realized	   in	   their	  voting	   and	   engagement	  with	   government.	   Equally	   important	   is	   the	   additional	   empowerment	  that	   comes	   from	  being	  a	   ‘citizen’	   in	   the	  company	  of	  others	  who	  are	  also	   full	  participants	  and	  contributors	  to	  their	  own	  shared	  social	  and	  cultural	  life.	  This	  revised	  sense	  of	  “the	  individual”	  as	   a	   political	   being	   defined	   by	   abstract	   rights	   and	  mutual	   interests	  and	   a	   social	   and	   cultural	  being	   linked	   to	   others	   through	   engagement	   and	   social	   interaction	   is	   perhaps	   the	   most	  fundamental	  assumption	  of	  the	  new	  commons	  theory	  of	  voluntary	  action	  laid	  out	  below.	  	  In	   the	   last	   quarter	   of	   the	   20th	   century	   and	   the	   beginning	   decades	   of	   the	   21st	   century	  other,	  similar	  models	  of	  social	  democracy	  have	  been	  set	  forth,	  often	  under	  the	  umbrella	  of	  civil	  society	  and	  the	  quite	  separate	  umbrella	  of	  commons.	  The	  derivative	  model	  of	  the	  new	  commons	  outlined	  below	   is	   in	   the	  process	   of	   being	   articulated	   into	  practice	  not	   only	   in	   the	  U.S.,	   but	   in	  many	   locales	   throughout	   the	   world	   by,	   among	   others,	   international	   nongovernmental	  organizations	   (INGOs)	   and	   agencies	   of	   the	   United	   Nations,	   World	   Bank,	   and	   International	  Monetary	  Fund	  (Fisher,	  2012).	  Apart	   from	  its	  canonical	  status	   in	  economic	  theory,	   in	   the	  21st	  century	   few	   thinking	   persons,	   apart	   from	   a	   few	   originalists	   and	   contrarians,	   fully	   embrace	  anomic	  individualism	  in	  anything	  like	  the	  way	  that	  doctrine	  first	  took	  shape	  in	  the	  18th	  and	  19th	  centuries.	  The	  Deweyian	  view	  of	  “individual	  in	  society”	  noted	  above	  is	  only	  one	  of	  several	  ways	  of	  locating	  a	  bone	  fide	  view	  of	  individuals	  in	  the	  vast	  territory	  between	  Emersonian	  anomie	  and	  an	   over-­‐socialized	   view.	   Even	   so,	   full	   and	   sufficient	   awareness	   of	   the	   implications	   for	  democracy	   of	   society	   and	   culture	   faces	   powerful	   rivals	   and	   interesting	   challenges,	   including	  those	  explored	  in	  the	  final	  chapter	  below.	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Follett	  and	  Local	  Community	  Mary	   Parker	   Follett	  was	   of	   the	   same	   generation	   of	   American	   political	   philosophers	   to	  share	   and	   extend	  Dewey’s	   and	   Addams’	   perspectives	   on	   democratic	   society	   and	   culture	   at	   a	  time	  when	   other	  American	   intellectuals	   often	   saw	   the	   future	   in	   dramatically	   different	   terms.	  More	  recent	  concerns	  with	  mass	  society,	  industrial	  society,	  post-­‐modernism	  or	  post	  industrial	  “social	  systems”	  and	  similarly	  abstract	  notions	  have	  dulled	  and	  obscured	  our	  understandings	  of	  Follett’s	   vision	   and	   perhaps	   clouded	   our	   lens	   of	   social	   and	   cultural	   democracy,	   making	   it	   at	  times	  appear	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  contemporary	  world.	  In	  The	  New	  State	  (1920)	  Follett	  endorsed	  her	  own	  distinct	  conception	  of	  democratic	  society	  and	  culture	  with	  particular	  attention	  to	  the	  role	  of	  groups	  (or	  associations)	  and	  group	  participation.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  World	  War	  I	  and	  during	  the	  end	  game	  of	  the	  Progressive	  Era	  she	  posited	  that	   future	  democratic	  reform	  efforts	  should	  focus,	  not	  on	   further	   institutional	  reforms	  of	  government,	  but	  explicitly	  on	  nurturing	  political	  associations	  among	  adult	  citizens.	  (Mattson,	  2001:	  li)	  So	  strong	  was	  her	  reasoning	  that	  Dewey	  himself	   modified	   his	   earlier	   views	   and	   embrace	   Follett’s	   vision	   a	   decade	   later	   in	   the	   afore-­‐mentioned	  essay	  The	  Public	  and	  Its	  Problems.	   In	  particular,	  “Follett	  believed	  the	  association	  of	  citizens	   in	   local	   publics	   could	   transform	   the	   American	   political	   system	   and	   American	  conceptions	   of	   democracy”	   (Mattson,	   2001:	   lii).	   Interestingly,	   although	   nearly	   a	   century	   old,	  Follett’s	  visionary	  view	  of	  democracy	  still	  offers	  a	  vibrantly	  current	  model	  of	  voluntary	  action	  that	  fits	  well	  with	  contemporary	  ideals,	  especially	  proposals	  for	  participatory	  and	  deliberative	  democracy.	  	  Uncounted	   scores	   of	   field	   trials	   of	   Follett’s	   ideal	   have	   been	   undertaken	   in	   diverse	  neighborhoods	   and	   communities	   everywhere	   from	  1918	   to	   the	   present	   (c.f.	   Anderson,	   2011;	  Briggs,	   2008;	   Safford,	   2009).	   Although	   they	   have	   often	   taken	   a	   backseat	   to	   other	   more	  boisterous	  or	  more	  easily	  publicized	  visions	  of	  democracy,	  her	  ideals	  of	  democratic	  society	  and	  culture	  have	  never	  disappeared	  completely,	  and	  today	  are	  in	  a	  kind	  of	  new	  florescence	  among	  political	  philosophers.	  Follett’s	  contributions	  will	  be	  explored	  more	  fully	  below.	  Also	   among	   the	   best	   recent	   analyses,	   critiques	   and	   proposals	   is	   the	   work	   of	   the	  Australian	  political	  philosopher	  John	  Dryzek	  (1996;	  2000;	  2006)	  already	  briefly	  noted	  above.	  In	  his	   first	   book,	   Deliberative	   Democracy	   (1996)	   Dryzek	   lays	   out	   a	   profile	   that	   fits	   well	   with	  voluntary	  action	  and	  new	  commons	  and	  raises	  a	  variety	  of	  additional	  perspectives	  and	  insights.	  His	  book	  is	  a	  critique	  of	  instrumental	  rationality	  and	  objectivism	  in	  political	  institutions,	  public	  policy	  and	   the	  discipline	  of	  political	   science.	  Dryzek’s	   resulting	  critical	   theory	  offers	  a	  matrix,	  argued	  at	  a	  philosophical	  level,	  that	  ties	  together	  social	  movements,	  pluralism,	  social	  problems,	  voluntary	   action	   in	   civil	   society	   and	   communicative	   rationality,	   akin	   to	   that	   featured	   in	   the	  theorizing	  of	  the	  Chicago	  sociologists,	  Dewey,	  Mead,	  and	  a	  range	  of	  Europeans	  including	  Alfred	  Schutz,	   Jürgen	   Habermas	   and	   Hans	   Joas.	   Although	   presented	   largely	   in	   the	   political	   science	  language	  of	  government	  and	  the	  state,	  Dryzek’s	  ideas	  are	  easily	  applied	  to	  the	  voluntary	  action	  context	  as	  well.	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Democracy	  as	  Production	  Democracy	  in	  society,	  culture	  and	  community	  constitutes	  a	  form	  of	  social	  production	  in	  a	  dual	  economic	  and	  a	  dramaturgical	  sense	  of	  the	  use	  of	  resources	  (means)	  to	  produce	  goods	  (ends)	  largely	  through	  interaction	  and	  enactment.	  Let	  me	  phrase	  that	  another	  way:	  democracy	  is	  not	  merely	  a	  set	  of	  political,	  social	  and	  cultural	   institutions.	  Those	  institutions	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  an	  ongoing	  economic	  and	  dramaturgical	  production	  of	  a	  vast	   range	  of	   social	  action	   in	   the	  daily	  life	  of	  every	  modern	  society.	  Communicative	  rationality	  is	  the	  active	  ingredient	  that	  brings	  these	  two	  senses	  together	  in	  voluntary	  action.	  The	  production	  of	  democracy	  as	  a	  collective	  way	  of	   living	   together	   –	   democratic	   civilization	   -­‐	   through	   voluntary	   action,	   is	   not	   fundamentally	  dependent	  upon	  formal	  organizations,	  corporations	  or	  firms	  which	  are	  often	  as	  much	  product	  as	  cause,	  nor	  upon	  public	  grants,	  acts	  of	  legislation	  or	  judicial	  decrees,	  nor	  upon	  the	  executive	  or	  bureaucratic	  arms	  of	  government,	  although	  all	  of	  these	  may	  be	  involved.	  Democratic	  society	  and	  culture	  are	  also	  not	  natural	  or	  objective	  conditions.	  They	  are	  the	  productions	  of	  people	  in	  association	  acting	   together	   for	   common,	   shared	  purposes.	  Although	  public	   grants,	   legislation,	  regulations	  and	  other	  acts	  of	  state	  may	  serve	  to	  enhance,	  or	  impede	  democracy	  in	  society	  and	  culture	  they	  are	  not	  in	  any	  fundamental	  sense	  causal	  agents.	  	  Nor	  is	  the	  production	  of	  democratic	  society	  and	  culture	  necessarily	  dependent	  upon	  particular	  modes	   of	   market	   production,	   distribution	   or	   exchange.	   The	   production	   and	   reproduction	   of	  democratic	   society	   and	   culture,	   are	   however	   highly	   dependent	   upon	   these	   assorted	   social	  organizations,	   the	   focused	   publics	   which	   are	   an	   important	   dimension	   of	   public	   opinion,	   and	  other	  forms	  of	  social	  organization	  occurring	  in	  the	  secondary	  spaces	  (or	  non-­‐intimate	  spheres)	  outside	  formal	  governmental	  and	  market	  public	  sphere.	  This	  is	  an	  important	  reason	  for	  looking	  beyond	  the	  narrow,	  constricted	  model	  of	  organizations	  in	  the	  current	  nonprofit	  model.	  Take	  the	  example	  of	  religion,	  which	  accounts	  for	  roughly	  half	  of	  the	  revenue	  of	  what	  is	  fashioned	  the	  U.S.	  nonprofit	   sector.	  The	  point	   of	   including	   social	   and	   cultural,	   as	  well	   as	   formal,	   organization	   is	  evident	   there.	   In	   considering	   religious	   production,	   both	   economic	   and	   dramaturgical,	   the	  distinction	   can	   be	   drawn	   between	   churches	   as	   formal	   organizations	   and	   ministries	   as	   the	  network	  of	  proponents	  and	  opponents,	   listeners	  and	  speakers,	  to	  whom	  a	  particular	  minister,	  priest,	  rabbi,	  imam	  or	  other	  cleric	  ministers.	  Any	  approach	  that	  hopes	  to	  fully	  understand	  and	  explain	   the	   production	   of	   religion	   must	   also	   take	   the	   latter	   into	   account.	   Protestant	   clergy	  people,	   in	   this	  manner,	  often	  speak	  of	   (and	  distinguish)	   “the	  Church”,	   “our	  congregation”	  and	  “my	  ministry”.	  Ministry	   in	   this	  sense	  can	  be	  a	  unique,	   individually-­‐centered,	  situation-­‐specific	  organization	   or	   network	   combining	   beliefs,	   theology,	   social	   service,	   public	   speaking,	   friendly	  visiting	  in	  homes	  and	  hospitals,	  and	  numerous	  additional	  elements.	  
	  Verses	  Aristocratic	  Society	  &	  Culture	  Perhaps	   the	   idea	   of	   democratic	   society	   and	   culture	   used	   here	   might	   be	   clearer	   with	  introduction	  of	   two	  contrast	   terms:	  democratic	   society	  and	  culture	  can	  be	  contrasted	  both	   to	  the	   aristocratic	   society	   and	   culture	   of	   European	   and	   Asian	   pasts,	   characterized	   primarily	   by	  
  59 
hierarchy,	  deference	  and	  oversight,	  and	  to	  modern	  tyrannical	  society	  and	  culture	  characterized	  primarily	   by	   fear,	   repression	   and	   prohibition.	   This	   three-­‐part	   distinction	   is	   grounded	   in	  Aristotle’s	  three-­‐way	  characterization	  of	  political	  societies	  as	  democracy,	  aristocracy	  or	  tyranny	  (or	  what	  some	  label	  monarchy). Medieval	  Europe,	  Japan	  and	  China	  all	  offer	  important	  examples	  of	   the	   first	   type.	  Certain	  periods	  are	  even	  named	  for	  the	  particular	  aristocratic	  configurations	  involved:	  Medici	  Florence,	  Restoration	  England,	  Wilhelmine	  Germany,	  Meiji	  Japan	  and	  Yangban	  China,	   for	   example.	   The	   Soviet	   Empire	   (1917-­‐1989),	   Nazi	   Germany	   (1933-­‐1943)	   and	  Maoist	  China	  (1945-­‐1989)	  and	  numerous	  more	  recent	  examples	  illustrate	  the	  latter.	  In	  all	  these	  cases,	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  people	  were	  not	  free	  to	  build	  the	  kind	  of	  daily	  lives	  they	  wished	  to	  live	  in	  association	   with	   others	   of	   like	   mind.	   This	   three-­‐part	   distinction	   of	   democratic,	   hieratic	   and	  tyrannical	  social	  conditions	  is	  an	  ideal	  type.	  We	  need	  to	  look	  more	  closely	  now	  at	  the	  conditions	  and	  circumstances	  that	  characterize	  democratic	  society	  and	  culture,	  in	  particular.	  
Varieties	  of	  Democratic	  Society	  and	  Culture	  Jon	   Van	   Til	   laid	   out	   a	   range	   of	   optional	   views	   of	   democratic	   society	   in	   chapter	   3	   of	  
Mapping	   the	   Third	   Sector	   (1988).	   	   This	   book	   is	   a	   capstone	   on	   the	   legacy	   of	   voluntary	   action	  theory	  arising	  out	  of	  AVAS,	  the	  Association	  of	  Voluntary	  Action	  Scholars,	  founded	  in	  1972	  and	  sponsor	  of	  an	  annual	  conference	  each	  year	  until	  1988,	  when	  it	  was	  succeeded	  by	  ARNOVA,	  the	  Association	  for	  Research	  on	  Nonprofit	  Organizations	  and	  Voluntary	  Action.	  For	  many	  readers	  of	  this	   work,	   the	   nonprofit	   organizations/nonprofit	   management	   paradigm	   prevailed	   in	   that	  reorganization	  and	  voluntary	  action	  was	  relegated	   to	  an	  historically	   interesting	   footnote.	  The	  present	   work	   and	   much	   of	   my	   earlier	   writing	   is,	   in	   contrast	   to	   that	   view,	   intended	   to	   be	   a	  testament	  to	  the	  enduring	  legacy	  of	  the	  voluntary	  action	  paradigm	  as	  it	  has	  been	  transformed	  by	  more	  recent	  work	  on	  civil	  society	  and	  philanthropy.	  In	  many	  ways,	  that	  view	  is	  stronger	  (and	  more	   nuanced)	   today	   than	   it	   was	   in	   1989.	   Van	   Til	   (1988)	   identified	   five	   distinct	   strains	   of	  democratic	   theory	   that	   he	   termed	   populism,	   idealism,	   pluralism,	   social	   democracy	   and	   neo-­‐corporatism.	  He	   linked	   these	  and	   their	  distinct	   “sectoral	  maps”	  with	   the	  perspectives	  of	   John	  Dewey,	   Max	   Weber,	   Alexis	   de	   Tocqueville,	   Emile	   Durkheim,	   Robert	   Michels,	   Karl	   Marx	   and	  others	  (Van	  Til,	  1988:	  41-­‐45).	  Although	  each	  of	  these	  authors	  had	  important	  things	  to	  say	  for	  (and	  against)	  democratic	  government,	   it	   is	  worth	  noting	  that	  Tocqueville	  was	  the	  only	  one	  of	  them	  to	  deal	  directly	  and	  explicitly	  with	  voluntary	  action.	  Although	  Karl	  Marx,	  for	  example,	  had	  an	  extended	  career	  as	  a	  practitioner	   in	  associations	  and	  social	  movements	  his	   thoughts	  were	  elsewhere.	   For	   the	   others,	   insight	   into	   democratic	   society	   and	   culture	   must	   be	   read	   into	   or	  inferred	  from	  their	  work	  as	  Van	  Til	  has	  done.	  Populism,	   Van	   Til	   wrote	   “stands	   almost	   as	   a	   critical	   perspective	   on	   other	   forms	   of	  democratic	   theory,	  primarily	  pluralism”	   (Van	  Til,	  1988:	  41).	  That	  was	  certainly	   the	  case	  with	  historical	   populisms	   like	   assorted	   Southern	   and	  Midwestern	  populisms,	   the	   19th	   century	   “No	  Nothing”	  movement	  and	  it’s	  modern	  day	  sequel	  the	  Tea	  Party	  that	  stands	  alongside	  earlier	  as	  fundamentally	   critical	   a	   broad	   range	   of	   existing	   policies	   and	   institutions.	   Idealists,	   Van	   Til’s	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categorization	   of	  Dewey	   and	   Follett,	   are	   said	   to	   “view	  politics.	   .	   .	   as	   a	   genuine	   community	   in	  which	  people	  fulfill	  themselves	  by	  performing	  the	  humanizing	  activity	  of	  political	  participation”	  which	   is	   not	  mere	   bargaining	   and	   the	   reciprocal	   advancement	   of	   self	   interests	   of	   individuals	  and	  interest	  groups	  but	  a	  mutual	  process	  of	  education	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  community	  (Van	  Til,	  1988:	  42).	  Viewing	   “politics”	   in	   the	   light	  of	  democratizing	  society	  and	  culture	  suggested	  here	  rather	   than	   the	  narrower	  conventional	   reading	   frames	   that	   statement	   in	  an	  entirely	  different	  light.	   His	   reading	   of	   pluralism	   emphasized	   “mutual	   partisan	   adjustment”	   among	   community	  groups,	   a	   notion	   particularly	   associated	   with	   Robert	   Dahl	   and	   the	   other	   mid-­‐20th	   century	  American	   “pluralist”	   political	   scientists	   and	   sociologists.	   	   (Note:	   Other	   strains	   of	   pluralism,	  including	   German	   and	   British	   variants	   and	   the	   contemporary	   revival	   in	   the	   wake	   of	   Rawls’	  theory	  of	   justice	   [1970]	  are	  discussed	   in	  Chapter	  7.)	   In	  Van	  Til’s	   reading,	   social	  democracy	   is	  identified	  with	  critique	  in	  the	  writings	  of	  the	  numerous	  critics	  of	  mid-­‐century	  political	  science	  pluralism,	   whose	   response	   to	   the	   weaknesses	   of	   democracy,	   he	   noted,	   was	   simply	   more	  democracy.	   Several	   social	   movements	   of	   the	   last	   half-­‐century	   including	   most	   recently	   the	  Occupy	  Wall	  Street	  movement	  have	  been	  animated	  in	  part	  by	  their	  own	  distinct	  visions	  of	  social	  democracy	  with	   similarly	   strong	  overtones	  of	  naïve	   idealism,	  but	   also	  of	   the	  post-­‐democratic	  radical	  egalitarianism	  that	  Maecklinberg	  (2013)	  calls	  horizontality.	  Finally,	  neo-­‐corporatism	  is,	  according	  to	  Van	  Til	  “armed	  with	  the	  contention	  that	  the	  concerns	  of	  pluralism	  are	  passé	  and	  that	   contemporary	   political	   realities	   involve	   the	   balancing	   of	   the	   only	   three	   interests	   that	  matter	   in	   the	  world:	  government,	  business	  and	   labor”	  (Van	  Til,	  1988:	  44).	  When	  one	   looks	  at	  the	  American	  national	  government	  today,	   it	   is	  hard	  to	  avoid	  the	  conclusion	  that	  what	  matters	  has	  now	  shrunk	  to	  the	  two	  sectors	  of	  government	  and	  business.	  Voluntary	   action	   might	   be	   approached	   from	   any	   of	   these	   five	   perspectives	   or	   the	  combination	  of	  several.	  The	  new	  commons	  theory	  of	  voluntary	  action	  weaves	  together	  a	  range	  of	  views	  of	  democracy	   in	   society	  and	  culture	   from	  what	  Van	  Til	   labeled	   the	   idealist,	  pluralist	  and	   social	   democratic	   options.	   It	   is	   also	   possible	   to	   broach	   populist	   concerns	   indirectly	   by	  focusing	  on	  social	  movements	  and	  to	  pose	  an	  altogether	  different	  corporatist	  perspective	  from	  the	   one	   noted	   by	   Van	   Til:	   Instead	   of	   addressing	   the	   medieval	   concerns	   of	   the	   original	  corporatists	  or	  the	  labor-­‐centered	  concerns	  of	  the	  neo-­‐corporatists	  of	  the	  1940s	  and	  1950s,	  the	  theory	   will	   examine	   what	   might	   be	   called	   the	   neo-­‐neo-­‐corporatism	   of	   some	   nonprofit	  organization/third	  sector	  scholars	  who	  seem	  to	  regard	  publicly	  funded,	  professionally	  staffed,	  tax-­‐exempt	   nonprofit	   corporations	   as	   the	   dominant,	   exclusive,	   or	   ultimate	   form	   of	   voluntary	  action.	   Such	   a	   nonprofit	   sector	   with	   close	   ties	   to	   government	   and	   business	   and	   the	  associationism	   of	   government	   grants	   and	   contracting	   constitutes	   an	   even	   more	   distinctive	  contemporary	   form	  of	  neo-­‐corporatism	  which	   leaves	   little	   room	   for	   other	   forms	  of	   collective	  voluntary	  action.	  In	   the	   following	   chapters,	   these	   multiple	   perspectives	   on	   democracy	   are	   treated	   as	  strategic	   options	   that	   tend	   to	   shade	   over	   and	   into	   one	   another	   in	   actual	   practice.	   	   Thus	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populism,	   in	   the	   form	   of	   widespread	   participation	   is	   often	   one	   of	   the	   signature	   elements	   of	  democratization	   in	   communities.	   Likewise,	   since	  1988	  we	  have	  moved	   from	  emphasizing	   the	  direct	  juxtaposition	  of	  the	  distributed	  power	  perspective	  of	  the	  mid-­‐century	  pluralists	  and	  the	  concentrated	   power	   perspective	   of	   the	   neo-­‐corporatists	   and	   concentrated	   on	   the	   underlying	  issues.	   Three	   of	   those	   issues	   of	   particular	   interest	   to	   voluntary	   action	   involve	   diversity,	  pluralism	  and	  federation.	  
Diversity,	  Pluralism	  and	  Federation	  in	  Voluntary	  Action	  	  In	  much	  of	  the	  world	  today,	  voluntary	  action	  is	  a	  component	  of	  the	  quest	  for	  the	  good	  life	  in	  community	  under	  contemporary	  conditions.	  The	  term	  contemporary	  may	  sound	  rather	  pallid	  here,	  but	   it	   is	  used	  advisedly	  to	  explicitly	  recognize	  the	  multiplicity	  of	  perspectives	  suggested	  by	   the	   numerous	  meanings	   of	   terms	   like	   “modern”,	   “post-­‐modern,”	   “urban-­‐industrial,”	   “post-­‐industrial”,	   “developed,”	   “post-­‐patriarchal”	   “global,”	   and	   the	   like,	   with	   their	   numerous	  implications	   of	   something-­‐arising-­‐after-­‐something	   else.	   Perhaps	   nothing	   signals	   the	   diverse,	  self-­‐aware	  nature	  of	  the	  current	  human	  condition	  more	  clearly	  than	  inability	  to	  agree	  upon	  the	  age	   in	   which	   we	   live.	   In	   the	   context	   of	   recent	   major	   changes	   in	   ethnic,	   racial	   and	   gender	  relations,	   understanding	   of	   voluntary	   action	   is	   enriched	   if	   we	   blend	   contemporary	   concerns	  about	  diversity	  (e.g.	  Taylor,	  1992;	  1996a;	  1996b)	  into	  the	  rich	  and	  recently	  renewed	  legacy	  of	  civil	   society,	   the	   historic	   Tocquevillian	   vision	   of	   voluntary	   association,	   and	   the	   “democratic	  community”	  visions	  of	  Follett,	  Addams,	  Dewey,	  et.	  al.	  noted	  above	  and	  finally	  with	  a	  concern	  for	  tolerance	  of	  difference	  like	  that	  which	  first	  arose	  in	  16th	  century	  Amsterdam	  (Siever,	  2009,	  pp.	  )	  and	  became	  a	  newly	  revitalized	  issue	  (and	  dimension	  of	  third	  sectors)	  only	  recently.	  	  	  Diversity	   was	   identified	   as	   one	   of	   the	   characteristics	   of	   urban	   neighborhoods	   even	  before	  Mary	   Parker	   Follett	   made	   it	   a	   key	   concern	   in	  The	   New	   State	   (1921)	   (Mattson,	   1998:	  xlvii).	   In	   Hull	   House	   Maps	   and	   Papers	   (1895	   [1970]),	   Jane	   Addams	   and	   her	   collaborators	  identified	  more	  than	  100	  distinct	  ethnic	  and	  language	  groups	  in	  the	  Hull	  House	  neighborhood	  of	  Chicago	  in	  1895.	  Such	  local	  diversity	  was	  not	  viewed	  as	  a	  patchwork	  of	  medieval	  European	  
gemeinschaften	   –	   the	   tightly	  woven	   communities	   of	   old-­‐world	   kinship,	   custom,	   tradition,	   but	  also	   hierarchy	   and	   patrimony	   (Walker,	   1998;	  Mattson,	   1998:	   xlvii;	   Tönnies,	   1988	   [1955]).	   In	  elaborating	   his	   gemeinschaft/gesellschaft	   dichotomy,	   Tönnies	   makes	   reference	   to	   markets,	  states	  and	  families	  but	  no	  explicit	  reference	  to	  any	  component	  of	  a	  third	  or	  independent	  sector	  or	   sphere,	   although	   his	   discussion	   includes	   many	  matters	   noted	   throughout	   this	   discussion,	  including	  social	  relationships,	  conversations,	  fellowship,	  religion,	  and	  others.	  We	  can	  conclude	  from	   this,	   and	   the	   date	   of	   publication	   that	   Tönnies	   dichotomy	   is	   part	   of	   a	   now-­‐dated	  understanding	  of	  the	  world	  of	  the	  old	  commons.	  Proximity	  of	  diverse	  groups	  to	  one	  another	  in	  the	  modern	  urban	  society	  examined	  by	  Addams,	  Follett	   followed	  by	  decades	  of	  urban	  studies	  that	  characterize	  something	  entirely	  new	  and	  different:	  A	  world	  of	  us-­‐and-­‐others	  (as	  opposed	  to	  us-­‐or-­‐them)	  made	  up	  of	  people	   living	   in	  close	  and	  mostly	  peaceful	  proximity	   to	   those	  who	  were	  different	  –	  sometimes	  radically	  different	  –	  from	  themselves.	  At	  times	  this	  still	  gives	  rise	  to	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group	   conflict,	   as	   with	   many	   examples	   up	   through	   “the	   troubles”	   in	   Northern	   Ireland.	   Yet,	  contemporary	   self-­‐aware	   voluntary	   action	   practices	   contain	   within	   themselves	   the	   tools	   for	  dealing	  with	  such	  conflicts.	  Best	  of	  all,	  there	  is	  an	  established	  track	  record	  of	  voluntary	  action	  for	   problem	   solving,	   good	  will	   and	   canny	   leadership	   combined	  with	   durable	   association	   and	  relationship	  building	  overcoming	  many	  such	  problems	  at	  all	  levels	  (Lohmann	  &	  Van	  Til,	  2011).	  And	   where	   association-­‐between	   has	   proven	   unworkable,	   organization-­‐within	   remains	   a	  durable	  strategy	  for	  defense	  and	  group	  protection.	  A	  growing	  number	  of	  conflicts	  that	  do	  occur	  are,	  in	  all	  likelihood,	  the	  result	  of	  willfully	  ignoring	  or	  rejecting	  this	  impressive	  record.	  Subcultures	   (including	   co-­‐cultures,	   club	   cultures	   and	   countercultures,	   et.al)	   are	  generally	   understood	   as	   different	   or	   dissident	   groups	   within	   a	   larger	   culture	   that	   are	  considered	  and	  consider	  himself	  or	  herself	  apart	  from	  the	  main	  or	  majority	  culture.	  	  Because	  of	  the	   interwoven	   ideas	   of	   difference	   and	   majority	   involved,	   subcultures	   are	   particularly	  important	   constituents	   in	   democratic	   cultures,	   where	   the	   accent	   is	  most	   often	   on	   tolerating,	  protecting	   and	   perhaps	   even	   nurturing	   them,	   rather	   than	   repressing,	   persecuting	   and	   even	  eliminating	  them,	  although	  with	  counter-­‐cultures	  this	  may	  prove	  particularly	  difficult.	  Whether	  such	   subcultures	   are	   based	   in	   ethnic,	   religious,	   political,	   life-­‐style	   or	   other	   differences,	  associations,	  assemblies,	  organizations	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  new	  commons	  are	  vitally	  important	  -­‐	  forming	   and	   refreshing	   what	   Thornton	   (1995)	   termed	   their	   subcultural	   capital,	   particularly	  what	  are	  termed	  “non-­‐domestic	  forms	  of	  belonging.”	  In	   recent	   years,	   the	   diverse	   ethnic,	   racial	   and	   religious	   composition	   of	   cities	   nearly	  everywhere	  has	  diversified	  and	  internationalized	  already	  pluralistic	  urban	  communities.	  Faced	  with	   such	   ubiquitous	   diversity,	   questions	   of	   the	   relation	   between	   the	   heterogeneous	   urban	  whole	  and	  the	  fractious	  diverse	  parts	  within	  are	  of	  vital	  importance.	  This	  presents	  an	  entirely	  different	  context	  and	  new	  levels	  of	  complexity	  to	  the	  American	  motto	  “e	  pluribus	  unum”	  –	  out	  of	   the	   many,	   one.	   In	   a	   certain	   sense,	   that	   represents	   a	   challenge	   for	   all	   collective	   action.	  “...(M)ore	  and	  more	  it	  is	  evident”	  as	  Follett	  wrote	  in	  1918,	  ‘that	  the	  real	  question	  of	  freedom	  in	  our	   day	   [and	   worldwide	   today]	   is	   the	   freedom	   of	   smaller	   unions	   to	   live	   within	   the	   whole”	  (Mattson,	   1998:	   xlvii).	   And	  not	   just	   in	   Follett’s	   day.	   Like	   the	   current	   international	   order,	   and	  problems	  such	  as	  Iraq,	  Afghanistan	  and	  Syria,	   this	  may	  be	  one	  more	  aspect	  of	   the	  post	  World	  War	  I	  world	  order	  with	  which	  we	  are	  still	  struggling.	  	  Follett’s	  phrase	  smaller	  unions	  will	  be	  reminiscent	  for	  some	  readers	  of	  Edmund	  Burke’s	  famous	  ‘little	  platoons’.	  Burke	  wrote	  “To	  be	  attached	  to	  the	  subdivision,	  to	  love	  the	  little	  platoon	  we	  belong	  to	  in	  society,	  is	  the	  first	  principle	  (the	  germ	  as	  it	  were)	  of	  public	  affections.	  It	  is	  the	  first	  link	  in	  the	  series	  by	  which	  we	  proceed	  toward	  a	  love	  to	  our	  country,	  and	  to	  mankind.	  The	  interest	  of	  that	  portion	  of	  social	  arrangement	  is	  a	  trust	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  all	  those	  who	  compose	  it;	  and	  as	  none	  but	  bad	  men	  would	  justify	  it	   in	  abuse,	  none	  but	  traitors	  would	  barter	  it	  away	  for	  their	   own	   personal	   advantage”	   (Burke	   1790;	   retrieved	   from	  http://www.bartleby.com/24/3/4.html,	   March	   18,	   2013).	   Not	   everyone	   finds	   Burke’s	   “little	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platoons”	  notion	  a	  particularly	  coherent	  or	  useful	  notion.	  Adam	  Gopnik	  (2013),	  speaking	  for	  at	  least	  a	  portion	  of	   the	  academic	  community	  writes,	   “Burke	   is	  more	  a	  badge	   to	  be	  worn	   than	  a	  book	   to	   be	   read.”	   Currently,	   the	   most	   general	   and	   widely	   found	   examples	   of	   such	   ‘smaller	  unions’	   include	   religious	   and	   neighborhood	   associations,	   groups	   and	   clubs,	   voluntary	   and	  membership	  associations	  and	  an	  almost	  untold	  variety	  of	  other	  peaceable	  assemblies	  and	  ways	  of	  living.	  Only	  some	  of	  these	  are	  the	  kind	  of	  professionally	  staffed,	  incorporated,	  nonprofit	  firms	  that	  have	  absorbed	  so	  much	  interest	  and	  attention	  among	  nonprofit	  sector	  scholars.	  	  Not	   only	   diversity	   but	   genuine	   pluralism	   is	   fundamental	   to	   voluntary	   action	   (Hewitt	  1996;	  Lohmann	  1992).	  Charles	  Taylor,	  Canadian	  philosopher	  and	  a	  past	  member	  of	  the	  Quebec	  parliament	  during	  the	  separatist	  debates	  has	  been	  at	   the	   forefront	  of	   those	  who	  proclaim	  the	  present	   an	   age	   of	   pluralism	   (Taylor,	   Tully	   and	   Weinstock,	   1994).	   Contemporary	   pluralism	  provokes	  the	  need	  not	  only	  for	  association	  with	  those	  who	  are	  like	  us	  but	  also	  for	  association	  with	   those	   who	   are	   different,	   providing	   a	   matrix	   for	   enhanced	   group	   and	   inter-­‐group	  communication	  (Lohmann	  and	  Van	  Til,	  2011).	  Mary	  Parker	  Follett	  understood	  the	  connection	  of	  diversity	  and	  the	  need	  for	  deliberation	  to	  democratization	  nearly	  a	  century	  ago	  (as	  Mattson,	  1998	  summarized	  her	  view):	  “While	  liberal	  democracy	  based	  itself	  on	  the	  private	  act	  of	  voting	  and	  mass	  majority	  rule	  -­‐	  what	  Follett	  cleverly	  called	  the	  ‘reign	  of	  numbers’	  (Follett,	  1918:	  142)	  -­‐	  the	   new	   democracy	   would	   stress	   public	   deliberation	   and	   decision-­‐making	   at	   the	   local	   level.	  Democracy	   grew	   not,	   as	   liberals	   believed,	   out	   of	   national	   legislative	   bodies,	   but	   out	   of	   the	  contention	  and	  integration	  of	  local	  communities”	  (Mattson,	  1998:	  xlvi).	  In	  other	  words,	  we	  can	  say	  out	  of	  voluntary	  action.	  Whether	  the	  focus	  is	  overcoming	  loneliness	  and	  social	  isolation	  or	  dealing	  with	   neighborhood	   violence,	   this	   is	   as	   true	   in	   London	   and	  Berlin	   today	   as	   it	  was	   for	  Follett	  in	  Boston	  in	  1918,	  or	  for	  Addams	  in	  Chicago	  in	  1895.	  In	  contemporary	  cities,	  difference,	  diversity	  and	  pluralism	  of	  existence	  give	  rise	  to	  voluntary	  action	  and	  new	  commons.	  
Conclusion	  Democracy	  may,	  as	  many	  suspect,	  be	  ready	  for	  another	  great	  move	  forward.	  If	  so,	  one	  of	  the	   major	   building	   blocks	   for	   such	   advancement	   would	   be	   greater	   recognition	   of	   diversity,	  plurality,	  tolerance	  and	  community	  and	  the	  tools	  for	  the	  realization	  of	  democracy	  in	  society	  and	  culture	  that	  are	  already	  available	  through	  voluntary	  action	  in	  the	  independent	  sector,	  or	  social	  spaces	  that	  can	  be	  created	  outside	  government,	  markets	  and	  the	  intimate	  sphere	  of	  the	  family.	  In	   the	   chapters	   that	   follow,	   the	   model	   of	   voluntary	   action	   termed	   the	   new	   commons	   is	  identified,	  defined	  and	  its	  role	  in	  contributing	  to	  such	  democratization	  is	  outlined.
 
 
We	  can	  find	  meaning	  and	  reward	  by	  serving	  some	  higher	  purpose	  than	  ourselves,	  a	  shining	  purpose,	  the	  illumination	  of	  a	  
Thousand	  Points	  of	  Light.	  .	  .	  .	  We	  all	  have	  something	  to	  give.	  
~	  George	  H.W.	  Bush	  
4.	  A	  Third	  Sector	  Imaginary1	  The	   term	  nonprofit,	  whether	   as	   a	  modifier	   of	   organization	   or	   sector,	   has	   always	   been	  troublesome.	  Originally	  the	  province	  of	  the	  esoteric	  world	  of	  legal	  and	  tax	  specialists,	  it	  began	  to	   achieve	   wider	   recognition	   as	   an	   object	   of	   attention	   in	   the	   age	   of	   public	   grants	   that	   got	  underway	  in	  the	  1960s.	  Beginning	  in	  the	  late	  1980’s	  a	  variety	  of	  management	  scientists	  in	  the	  U.S.	  specializing	  in	  tax	  exempt	  entities	  touted	  the	  supposedly	  greater	  accuracy	  of	  the	  modifier	  “not-­‐for-­‐profit”	   while	   social	   scientists	   in	   many	   countries	   outside	   the	   U.S.	   sought	   other	  alternative	   terms,	   choosing	   not	   markets	   but	   states	   to	   contrast	   with,	   and	   coining	   the	   terms	  nongovernmental	  organization	  and	  sector.	  Despite	  the	  formidable	   ideological	  role	  of	  the	  state	  in	  this	  view,	  the	  term	  non-­‐state	  sector	  never	  seems	  to	  have	  caught	  on.	  Suddenly	   in	  the	  1990s	  each	  of	  these	  was	  eclipsed	  by	  the	  sudden,	  meteoric	  reemergence	  of	  the	  term	  civil	  society,	  which	  provoked	  a	  large	  number	  of	  suggestions	  that	  nonprofit	  or	  nongovernmental	  sectors	  either	  were	  another	  names	  for,	  or	  essential	  components	  of	  civil	  society	  (Anheier,	  2005;	  Van	  Til,	  2007).	  The	  term	   commons	   arose	   within	   roughly	   this	   same	   timeframe	   but	   its	   applicability	   to	   voluntary	  action	  was	  considerably	  less	  dramatic,	  although	  its	  fortunes	  continue	  to	  rise.	  Others	  have	  toyed	  with	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  other	  terms	  like	  social	  sector,	  caring	  sector,	  societal	  sector,	  philanthropic	  sector	  and	  others	  none	  of	  which	  have	  ever	  been	  widely	  used.	  A	  basic	   theoretical	   challenge	   for	   third	  sector	   scholars	   today	   is	   to	   speak	   in	  general	  and	  consistent	  terms	  about	  the	  institutional	  and	  normative	  orders	  forming	  in	  numerous	  countries,	  regions	  and	  urban	  centers	  around	  the	  world	  in	  recent	  decades.	   In	  one	  recent	  example,	  Huang	  (2014)	  traces	  the	  emergence	  of	  what	  is	  termed	  a	  nonprofit	  sector	  in	  contemporary	  China,	  even	  as	   they	   note	   substantial	   caveats	   and	   deviations	   from	   conventional	   thinking	   about	   what	  constitutes	  nonprofitness.	  Like	  many	  others	  before	  them,	  these	  authors	  work	  hard	  to	  shoehorn	  the	   facts	   of	   the	   situation	   in	   China	   into	   the	   received	   categories	   of	   the	   nonprofit	   model.	   The	  approach	  in	  this	  chapter	  is	  a	  slightly	  different,	  more	  critical,	  one.	  It	  proceeds	  from	  the	  position	  that	  the	  theorist’s	  job	  is	  “to	  speculate	  and	  to	  interpret	  the	  facts	  as	  he	  [sic]	  sees	  them”	  (Pennock,	  1969:	  	  285-­‐286,	  quoted	  by	  Van	  Til,	  2013).	  The	  third	  sectors	  of	  the	  world	  have	  formed	  in	  the	  social,	  economic,	  political	  and	  cultural	  spaces	   apart	   from	   (variously	   also	   said	   to	   be	   outside	   or	   between)	  markets,	   governments	   and	  households	  in	  light	  of	  a	  range	  of	  distinctive	  local	  conditions,	  including	  history,	  culture,	  law	  and	  other	   factors.	  A	  growing	   international	  group	  of	   scholars	  has	  produced	  a	   convincing,	   although	  
                                                
1 This chapter is a revised version of a paper presented at the Workshop on Theoretical Variations in 
Voluntary Sector Organizing, Queens University, Kingston Ontario, October 20, 2012.  
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more	   limited	   and	   partial	   than	   they	   will	   admit,	   model	   of	   a	   third	   sector	   based	   in	   the	   linked	  concepts	  of	  nonprofit	  organization,	  nonprofit	  sector	  and	  nondistribution	  constraints	  (Salamon,	  2003;	   Hall,	   2013;	  Wagner,	   2012).	   This	   nonprofit	  model	   is	   an	   impressive	   and	   unprecedented	  intellectual	   achievement,	   yet	   it	   is	   only	   one	   of	   a	   number	   of	   institutional	   frames	   to	   enter	   the	  collective	   imagination	   of	   theorists,	   researchers,	   practitioners	   and	   policy	   makers	   in	   recent	  decades.	  One	  approach	  to	  this	  spreading	  proliferation	  of	  models	  is	  to	  treat	  them	  as	  contenders	  or	  competitions	  for	  a	  single	  right	  answer.	  The	  approach	  taken	  here	  is	  quite	  different	  from	  that;	  to	  suggest	  that	  several,	  perhaps	  even	  all	  of	  these	  models	  are	  in	  fact	  complementary	  and	  refer	  to	  distinct,	  but	  overlapping	  ideal	  types	  meant	  to	  characterize	  empirical	  realities.	  Although	  it	  serves	  many	  purposes,	  the	  nonprofit	  model	  is	  too	  narrowly	  cast	  to	  give	  a	  full	  account	   of	   the	   rich	   diversity	   of	   events,	   activities	   and	   institutions	   that	   occur	   in	   the	   empirical,	  institutional	  and	  historical	  reality	  of	  the	  spaces	  outside	  governments,	  markets	  and	  households.	  The	  nonprofit	  model	  fails	  to	  give	  an	  adequate	  account	  in	  particular	  of	  those	  dimensions	  that	  are	  not	  formally	  organized,	  not	   legally	  recognized	  as	  corporations,	  or	  that	  occur	  beyond	  the	  legal,	  historical,	  geographical	  and	  normative	  bounds	  presumed	  by	  the	  model.	  This	   includes	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  activities,	   institutions	  and	  organizations	  that	  are	  tentative,	  preliminary	  or	  short-­‐lived	  and	  those	  that	  are	  primarily	  “informal”	  social	  and	  cultural	  institutions	  and	  practices.	  	  	  One	  ongoing	  objective	  of	  third	  sector	  theorizing	  in	  the	  recent	  past	  that	  is	  threatened	  by	  the	  growing	  hegemony	  of	   the	  nonprofit	  model	   is	  surveying	  and	  building	  a	  wunderkammer,	  or	  encyclopedic	  collection	  of	  diverse	  findings	  and	  concepts	  exploring	  the	  range	  and	  outer	  limits	  of	  the	   third	   sector.	   We	   should	   pay	   great	   heed	   to	   the	   diversity	   and	   complexity	   of	   this	   newly	  invented	  sector	  in	  its	  full	  range	  before	  we	  can	  expect	  to	  succeed	  in	  describing	  and	  explaining	  it	  more	   systematically	   as	   has	   already	   been	   done	   with	   the	   family,	   market	   and	   government.	  Arbitrarily	  using	  the	  nonprofit	  model	  to	  cut	  off	  such	  explorations	  does	  not	  serve	  that	  end.	  
The	  Nonprofit	  Model	  	  The	   third	   sector	   is	   a	   term	   increasingly	   used	   by	   politicians,	   researchers	   and	   activists	   to	  describe	  at	   least	  partly	  the	  social,	  economic,	  political	  and	  cultural	  spaces	  outside	  the	   intimate	  sphere	  of	  households,	  the	  public	  sphere	  of	  command	  and	  control	  in	  government	  and	  the	  price-­‐guided	  exchanges	  of	  the	  market	  order.	  The	  nonprofit	  model	  of	  the	  third	  sector	  posits	  nonprofit	  organizations	   as	   composing	   the	   third	   sector	   or	   the	   civil	   society	   (Anheier,	   2005;	   Hall,	   2013;	  Salamon,	  various	  publications).	   I	  have	  no	  quarrel	  with	  the	  descriptive	  and	  explanatory	  claims	  made	  by	  either	  of	  these	  authors	  or	  others	  about	  the	  nonprofit	  sector.	  My	  main	  concerns	  go	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  whether	  either	  does	  justice	  to	  the	  range	  and	  scope	  of	  the	  global	  third	  sector	  or	  ties	  it	  convincingly	  to	  liberal	  democracy.	  I	  am	  convinced	  critics	  of	  this	  idea	  are	  correct	  that	  it	  does	  not.	  This	  nonprofit	  sector	  model	  has	  been	  an	  important	  success	   in	  the	  U.S.	  where	  it	  originally	  arose	   and	   in	   a	   number	   of	   other	   locations	   around	   the	   world.	   It	   appears	   to	   recently	   have	  converged	  with	  a	  voluntary	  sector	  model	   that	  originally	  emerged	   in	  Great	  Britain	  (Beveridge,	  1948;	  Billis,	  2010)	  and	  is	  still	  in	  widespread	  use	  in	  Canada	  (Elson,	  2011;	  La	  Forest,	  2011)	  and	  elsewhere.	   Its	  very	   success	  as	  a	   research	  paradigm	  has	   reinforced	  an	  endogenous	   theoretical	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perspective	  that	  is	  scientifically	  sound,	  although	  more	  limited	  than	  its	  most	  ardent	  supporters	  admit.	  	  The	   third	   sector	   offers	   an	   account	   of	   reality	   that	   both	   researchers	   and	   those	   involved	   in	  nonprofit	   organizations	   appear	   to	   find	   convincing	   and	   are	   able	   to	   locate	   themselves	   within,	  regardless	  of	  other	  differences	  of	  mission	  or	  program.	  The	  nonprofit	  sector	  model	  is	  explicitly	  framed	  within	  but	  as	  an	  expansion	  of	  the	  pluralistic	  post-­‐WWII	  development	  model	  of	  markets	  and	  states	  (Anheier,	  1987;	  Lindblom,	  1977)	  and	  is,	  in	  part	  a	  critical	  response	  to	  the	  “crisis	  of	  the	  welfare	   state”	   (Cohen	  &	  Arato,	  1992;	  Evers	  &	  LaVille,	   2004;	  Evers,	  2005;	  Evers,	   2010;	  Evers,	  2013).	  	  In	   less	   than	   four	  decades,	   the	   idea	  of	  a	   third	  sector	  of	   legal,	  social,	  economic,	  political	  and	  cultural	   institutions	   distinct	   and	   apart	   from	   households,	   governments	   and	   markets	   has	  captured	  the	  imagination	  of	  a	  broad	  variety	  of	  researchers,	  politicians	  and	  practitioners	  across	  the	  globe.	  Over	  that	  time,	  the	  nonprofit	  model	  has	  gone	  from	  a	  novelty	  to	  the	  unofficial	  regnant	  paradigm	   for	   third	   sector	   studies,	   receiving	   at	   least	   lip	   service	   from	   a	   wide	   variety	   of	  authoritative	   institutions.	   It	   is	   an	   approach	   characterized	   by	   multi-­‐method	   and	   multi-­‐disciplinary	   studies	   of	   local,	   regional,	   national	   and	   international	   nonprofit	   organizations,	  nonprofit	   corporations,	   nonprofit	   management,	   the	   macro-­‐economic	   and	   statistical	  environments	  of	  national	  nonprofit	  sectors	  and	  institutional	  governance	  and	  leadership	  issues	  faced	  by	  nonprofit	  entities.	  Much	  of	   the	  credit	   for	   initially	   shaping	  and	   forming	   the	  nonprofit	  model	  belongs	  to	  a	  small	  network	  of	  scholars	  associated	  with	  AVAS/ARNOVA,	  an	  institutional	  group	  centered	  around	  Lester	  Salamon,	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University,	  a	  working	  group	  that	  began	  at	  INDEPENDENT	  SECTOR	  in	  Washington	  DC	  and	  a	  working	  group	  led	  by	  David	  Billis	  at	  the	  London	  School	  of	  Economics	  and	  Political	  Science	  (whose	  very	  name	  enshrines	  what	  is	  here	  termed	  the	  two-­‐sector	  model).	  	  By	   the	  nonprofit	  model,	   I	   include	  any	  research	  design	  or	  conceptual	  perspective	  or	  model	  organized	   around	   three	   principal	   structural	   terms:	   nonprofit	   corporation,	   nonprofit	  organization,	   and	   nonprofit	   sector;	   and	   a	   crucial	   legal	   and	   economic	   parameter,	   the	  nondistribution	   constraint.	   The	   nonprofit	   model	   is	   typically	   also	   focused	   on	   governance,	  management	  and	  leadership	  as	  key	  economic,	  political,	  and	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent	  social	  and	  cultural	  processes.	  	  Within	   the	   nonprofit	   model,	   management	   and	   leadership	   are	   typically	   treated	   as	  instrumental	  principal-­‐agent	  relations	  between	  CEO’s,	  governing	  boards,	  other	  managers,	  staff	  and	  draws	  sharp	  distinctions	  between	  limited	  categories	  of	  actors	  or	  roles.	  Boards	  of	  governors	  or	  directors	  are	  responsible	  for	  the	  overall	  organization	  from	  positions	  seen	  as	  largely	  outside	  “the	   organization”	   itself,	   while	   staff	   or	   personnel	   are	   paid	   employees	   who	   constitute	   or	   are	  ‘inside’	  the	  organization.	  Staff,	  and	  in	  some	  instances,	  volunteers,	  are	  said	  to	  “deliver”	  services	  to	  designated	  clients	  or	  beneficiaries	  who	  are	  generally	  viewed	  as	  passive	  receptors	  rather	  than	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active	  agents	  and	  “outside”	  the	  organization.	  	  Particular	  attention	  in	  the	  nonprofit	  model	  is	  paid	  to	   these	   and	   other	   social	   roles	   that	   are	   conceived	   as	   groups	   who	   are	   collectively	   labeled	  stakeholders.	  In	  the	  nonprofit	  model,	  the	  sociological	  term	  nonprofit	  organization	  is	  used	  more	  or	   less	   interchangeably	  with	   the	   legal	   term	  nonprofit	   corporation,	   and	   both	   are	   theorized	   as	  distinct	  species	  of	  formal	  organizations	  and	  distinctive	  third	  sector	  institutions.	  Social	  relations	  in	  the	  nonprofit	  model	  are	  treated	  largely	  in	  rational,	  instrumental	  mission	  and	  program	  terms	  as	   strategic,	   goal-­‐	   and	   outcome-­‐oriented.	   Other	   merely	   social	   relations	   are	   characterized	   as	  “informal”	  or	  simply	  ignored.	  Five	  principal	  characteristics	  are	  said	  to	  uniquely	  define	  nonprofit	  organizations.	   They	   are	   formally	   organized,	   private	   (not	   governmental	   or	   public),	   self-­‐governing	   entities,	   that	   do	   not	   distribute	   surpluses	   or	   profits	   to	   shareholders,	   and	   are	  characterized	  by	  voluntary	  participation	  (Salamon	  2003;	  Anheier,	  2005:38ff).	  	  A	  widely-­‐shared	  assumption	  among	  researchers	  working	  within	  the	  nonprofit	  model	  is	  that	  insights	  regarding	  organization	  and	  management	  studies	  adopted	  from	  business	  management	  and	  public	  administration	  can	  be	  extended	   to	   the	   third	   sector	  along	  at	   least	   two	  dimensions:	  First,	   third	   sector	   institutions	   are	   to	   be	   understood	   by	   analogy	   with	   existing	   knowledge	   of	  public	   bureaux	   and	  private	   firms	   (particularly	   corporations).	   Thus,	   social,	   political,	   economic	  and	  cultural	  dynamics	   in	   the	  other	   two	  sectors	  are	  expected	   to	  apply	  also	   to	   the	   third	   sector	  with	  suitable	  notations	  and	  explanations	  of	  exceptions	  that	  arise.	  This	  successful	  and	  convincing	  model	  has	  been	  the	  predominant	  one	  in	  leading	  journals	  and	  research	  organizations	  like	  ARNOVA	  for	  more	  than	  30	  years.	  The	  year	  1989	  offers	  a	  useful	  and	  convenient,	   if	   only	   slightly	   arbitrary,	   demarcation	   point	   for	   this	   purpose.	   It	   was	   when	   the	  European	   civil	   society	   revolutions	   got	   underway,	   ARNOVA	   was	   created	   through	   a	   re-­‐organization	   of	   the	   earlier	   Association	   for	   Voluntary	   Action	   Scholas	   (AVAS)	   and	   at	   least	   two	  major	   journals	  devoted	   to	   the	   third	   sector	  were	   founded.	  The	  dissemination	  of	   the	  nonprofit	  model	  has	  influenced	  the	  naming	  and	  mission	  of	  other	  journals,	  notably	  Nonprofit	  Management	  
and	   Leadership,	  Nonprofit	   Management,	   and	  The	   Nonprofit	   Quarterly,	   and	   has	   proliferated	   in	  nonprofit	   special	   interest	   sections	   in	   the	   Academy	   of	  Management,	   the	   American	   Society	   for	  Public	  Administration,	  the	  American	  Economics	  Association,	  and	  numerous	  other	  professional	  associations.	   As	   an	   indicator	   of	   the	   maturity	   of	   the	   nonprofit	   model	   in	   the	   U.S.,	   several	  textbooks	  have	  recently	  been	  published	  to	  aid	  in	  teaching	  the	  nonprofit	  model	  to	  students,	  thus	  assuring	  its	  continuity	  for	  at	  least	  another	  generation	  (Anheier,	  2005;	  Holland	  and	  Ritvo	  2008;	  Worth	  2009;	  Young	  2007;	  Zietlow	  2007).	  	  The	  nonprofit	  model	   first	  coalesced	  theoretically	   in	  the	   late	  1970s	  and	  was	  already	  pretty	  much	  theoretically	  complete	  by	  the	  first	  decade	  of	  the	  21st	  century.	  While	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  work	  continues	   there	   have	   been	   no	   major	   new	   terms	   introduced	   in	   recent	   years,	   no	   major	   new	  reformulations	   of	   the	   model,	   no	   major	   new	   hypotheses	   suggested,	   and	   the	   perspective	   no	  longer	  seems	  to	  provoke	  major	  “ah	  ha”	  moments	  (that	  is,	  the	  excitement	  of	  the	  truly	  novel)	  or	  talk	  of	  “paradigm	  shifts”	  among	  its	  leading	  adherents.	  This	  is	  certainly	  not	  to	  suggest,	  however,	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that	  the	  research	  program	  of	  the	  nonprofit	  model	  has	  been	  completed;	  Only	  that	  it	  has	  attained	  a	   certain	   level	   of	   maturity.	   As	   the	   Kuhnian	   paradigm	   change	   paradigm	   would	   suggest,	   the	  nonprofit	   model	   of	   the	   third	   sector	   is	   also	   accumulating	   a	   growing	   congeries	   of	   anomalies,	  exceptions	  and	  deviations	  suggestive	  of	  a	  possible	  future	  paradigm	  shift	  (Kuhn,	  1970).	  
A	  Critique	  We	  can	  expect	  the	  nonprofit	  model	  to	  be	  a	  source	  of	  ongoing	  research	  for	  many	  decades	  to	  come,	  due	  to	  such	  factors	  as	  constant	  variation	  in	  the	  number	  of	  organizations	  established	  and	  eliminated,	   the	  number	  and	  size	  of	  donations,	  and	  other	   important	  empirical	  and	  measurable	  questions.	  That	  is	  hardly	  the	  whole	  story,	  however.	  As	  a	  model	  of	  the	  third	  sector,	  the	  nonprofit	  model	  privileges	  a	  narrow	  set	  of	   corporations	  and	  mainstream	   institutions	   that	   are	   the	  most	  highly	   organized,	   best	   funded	   and	   institutionally	   closest	   to	   and	   most	   like	   existing	   business	  corporations	  and	  government	  bureaux.	  In	  so	  doing,	  the	  nonprofit	  model	  omits	  or	  downplays	  a	  vast	   range	   of	   economic,	   social,	   political	   and	   cultural	   phenomena	   that	   are	   less	   closely	   tied	   to	  established	   political	   and	   economic	   interests,	   less	   easily	   tabulated	   	   and	   thus	   less	   clearly	  observable.	  	  The	   nonprofit	   model	   also	   fails	   to	   provide	   a	   sufficiently	   comprehensive	   or	   convincing	  account	   of	   the	   full	   range	   of	   activities	   occurring	   outside	   of	   markets,	   states	   and	   households,	  including	  not	  only	  some	  nonprofit	  corporations,	  but	  also	  cooperative	  and	  mutual	  organizations,	  many	  foundations	  and	  considerable	  portions	  of	  philanthropy.	   It	  also	  miscasts	  philanthropy	  as	  simply	  fundraising	  and	  foundations	  and	  totally	  ignores	  all	  manner	  of	  volunteering,	  mutual,	  self-­‐help,	   social,	   recreational,	   educational,	   cultural,	   religious	  and	  artistic	  activities	  as	  well	   as	  most	  types	   of	   individual	   initiative	   other	   than	   the	   entrepreneurial	   and	   leadership	   behavior	   of	  nonprofit	  CEOs,	  and	  various	  forms	  of	  collective	  behavior,	  including	  religion,	  advocacy,	  political	  association,	  civil	  engagement	  and	  voluntary	  action.	  A	   full	  and	  complete	  paradigm	  of	   the	   third	  sector	  would	  not	  leave	  all	  of	  this	  out.	  Legal	  treatments	  have	  long	  left	  a	  place	  for	  individual	  initiative	  and	  informal	  associations	  in	  charity	   law,	   the	   law	  of	   trusts,	   doctrines	  of	   corporate	   ‘personality’,	   and	  other	  matters	   of	   third	  sector	  law,	  but	  the	  nonprofit	  model	  places	  great	  stock	  in	  the	  idea	  of	  incorporation,	  privileging,	  in	  particular,	   the	   importance	  of	  nondistribution	  constraints	  (Anheier,	  2005;	  Hansmann,	  1980;	  Hansmann,	   1981).	   The	   nonprofit	   model	   also	   makes	   no	   provision	   whatever	   for	   ‘peaceful	  assembly’,	  an	   important	   legal	  concept	   in	   the	  U.S.	  Constitution,	   the	  Canadian	  Charter	  of	  Rights	  and	  Freedoms,	  the	  United	  Nations’	  Universal	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights,	  and	  similar	  legal	  and	  constitutional	  documents	  in	  other	  democratic	  nations.	  Paradoxically,	   although	   they	   account	   for	   a	   considerable	   portion	   of	   all	   formal	   nonprofit	  corporations,	  whether	  measured	  by	  revenue	  or	  by	  organization	  or	  personnel	  counts,	  the	  actual,	  highly	   complex	   and	   multidimensional	   organizational	   nature	   of	   universities,	   hospitals,	   and	  religious	  organizations	  may	  be	  vastly	  understated	  by	  the	  statistical	  approach	  to	  the	  nonprofit	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model.	  In	  what	  sense	  is	  a	  university	  or	  a	  church	  a	  single	  organization	  or	  enterprise	  as	  opposed	  to	   a	   network	   or	   community	   consisting	   of	   multiple	   entities?	   Is	   a	   university	   a	   single	  organizational	   entity	   in	   name	   only?	   Is	   Harvard,	   or	   Oxford,	   or	   West	   Virginia	   University	   one	  organization,	  or	  a	  network	  of	  numerous	  organizations	  and	  hundreds	  of	  groups?	  Are	   they	  not	  vast	   and	   complex	   congeries	   of	   diverse	   smaller	   entities;	   work	   groups,	   corporations,	   trusts,	  networks	   and	  other	   arrangements	   in	   some	   semblance	  of	   economic,	   political	   and	   social	   order	  under	   a	   common	   identity?	   Likewise,	   to	   argue	   that	   any	   given	   religion	   (e.g.,	   Catholic,	   Baptist,	  Jewish,	   Islamic,	   Buddhist	   or	   Mormon)	   is	   a	   single	   organized	   entity	   in	   some	   objective	   sense	  appears	  to	  fly	  in	  the	  face	  of	  reality	  and	  ride	  roughshod	  over	  important	  theological	  distinctions	  (e.g.,	   the	  Parish,	   Synagogue	  or	  Presbytery).	   It	   also	   tends	   to	  prejudge	  and	  attempt	   to	   settle	  by	  definition	  longstanding	  issues	  and	  questions	  that	  are,	  more	  properly,	  left	  to	  the	  determination	  of	  those	  involved.	  Likewise,	   the	   informal	   or	   social	   organizational	   dimensions	   of	   social	  movements	   and	   even	  social	  problems	  receive	  inadequate	  coverage	  in	  the	  nonprofit	  model.	  	  Social	  movements	  and	  the	  organized	   social	   action	   and	   cultural	   institutions	   associated	   with	   social	   problems	   are	   often	  neglected	   or	   ignored	   until	   they	   provoke	   formal	   organizations	   or	   corporations.	   Yet	   they	   are	  treated	  in	  the	  nonprofit	  model	  (when	  they	  are	  treated	  at	  all)	  as	  preludes:	  precursors	  of	  more	  formal	   organizational	   mission	   and	   institution	   building;	   incidental	   or	   preliminary	   stages	   of	  informal	  organization	  destined	  either	   to	   fail	  or	   result	   in	   formalization.	  Thus,	   for	  example,	   the	  nonprofit	   model	   has	   been	   at	   a	   loss	   to	   adequately	   describe,	   explain	   or	   account	   for	   protest	  movements	  like	  the	  worldwide	  outburst	  of	  “Occupy”	  movements,	  since	  they	  have	  produced	  so	  few	   formal	   organizations	   to	  date.	  Maecklinberg	   (2013,	   p.	   75)	   says	   “Large-­‐scale	  protests	  have	  engulfed	  the	  world	  over	  the	  past	  few	  years.	  People	  across	  the	  globe	  took	  to	  the	  streets	  as	  the	  effects	   of	   the	   global	   financial	   crisis	   became	  visible	   at	   the	   end	  of	   2008	  and	  especially	   in	   early	  2009.	  People	  in	  and	  beyond	  the	  Arab	  world	  revolted	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  occupied	  public	  squares	  to	  demand	  the	  fall	  of	  their	  regimes	  in	  2010	  and	  2011.	  A	  few	  months	  later,	  people	  all	  over	  Spain	  assembled	  en	  masse	   to	  call	  for	  “real	  democracy	  now”	  on	  May	  15th	  2011.	  That	  same	  year,	  the	  Occupy	  movement	   followed	   suit	   in	   the	  United	  States	  by	   gathering	   in	  Zuccotti	  Park	  near	  New	  York	  City’s	  Wall	  Street	  on	  September	  17th.	  One	  month	  later,	  at	  least	  951	  squares	  were	  occupied	  in	  over	  82	  different	  countries	  as	  part	  of	  an	  internationally	  coordinated	  “day	  of	  rage”	  on	  October	  15th.”	  The	  spontaneous	  anti-­‐corporate	  uprisings	  in	  many	  nations	  associated	  with	  the	  “Occupy”	  movement	   have	   attracted	   only	   minimal	   attention	   among	   third	   sector	   scholars.	   Both	   social	  problems	   and	   social	  movements	   have	   been	   historically	   important	   to	   the	   contemporary	   third	  sector,	   and	   both	   movements	   and	   social	   problems	   routinely	   display	   a	   shifting	   variety	   of	  organizational	  forms	  including	  assemblies,	  focused	  publics	  and	  audiences.	  The	  same	  is	  true	  of	  important	  aspects	  of	  Islamic	  populism,	  including	  the	  Arab	  street	  (Palmer,	  2011).	  	  Altogether,	  the	  narrow	  focus	  of	  the	  nonprofit	  model	  has	  clarified	  a	  great	  deal	  about	  one	  part	  of	   the	   third	   sector.	   It	   is	   also	   the	   case	   that	   much	   of	   a	   genuinely	   meaningful	   third	   sector	   is	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omitted,	   downplayed	   or	   misrepresented	   in	   its	   narrow	   lens.	   Thus,	   a	   primary	   task	   for	   future	  theorizing	  of	   the	   third	  sector	  should	  be	   to	  bring	   these	  and	  other	  neglected	  dimensions	  of	   the	  third	   sector	   into	   the	   light	   and	  more	   fully	   into	   theoretical	   focus	   in	   order	   to	   understand	  more	  clearly	  how	  they	  relate	  to	  and	  differ	  from	  the	  organizations	  privileged	  by	  the	  nonprofit	  model,	  and	   from	   one	   another,	   as	   well	   as	   to	   elaborate	   more	   clearly	   their	   relations	   to	   markets,	  governments	  and	  the	  intimate	  sphere.	  
Policy	  and	  History	  In	   the	   academic	  milieu,	   the	   predominant	   theoretical	   narrative	   out	   of	  which	   the	   nonprofit	  model	   arose	   and	   that	   continues	   to	   give	   it	   legitimacy	   is	   found	   at	   the	   interface	   of	   market	  economics	  and	  liberal	  democracy	  as	  characterized	  by	  the	  two-­‐sector	  model	  of	  private	  markets	  and	  public	  states	  (c.f.,	  Lindblom	  1977;	  Salamon	  2003).	  This	  implicitly	  normative	  perspective	  is	  more	  historically	  and	  geographically	  situated	  than	  may	  generally	  be	  acknowledged	  by	  its	  most	  prominent	   advocates.	   In	  practical	  political	   terms,	   the	  entire	   ideological	   conflict	   known	  as	   the	  Cold	   War	   was	   at	   its	   most	   general	   levels	   often	   posed	   as	   conflict	   between	   the	   same	   twin	  polarities:	   Marxist-­‐Leninism	   offering	   “statism”	   on	   the	   one	   side	   and	   “free	   market	   capitalism”	  offering	  the	  virtues	  of	  the	  market	  order	  on	  the	  other	  with	  a	  pluralist	  ad	  mixture	  of	  the	  two	  in	  the	  variations	  of	   the	  welfare	  state.	   	   	  From	  this	  perspective,	   the	  end	  of	   the	  Cold	  War	  opened	  a	  gaping	   theoretical	   space	   that	   was	   quickly	   occupied	   and	   colonized	   by	   advocates	   of	   the	   civil	  society	  and	  nonprofit	  models	   (Wagner,	  2012).	  Other	   contending	  perspectives	  were	   in	  distant	  third	  and	  must	  be	  reconciled	  in	  some	  fashion	  	  Deconstructing	   the	   regime	  dominated	  by	   the	   two-­‐sector	  model	   and	  weaving	   in	   additional	  third	  sector	  possibilities	  has	  been	  a	  pervasive	  master	  narrative	  not	  just	  in	  third	  sector	  studies	  but	  also	  in	  public	  life	  in	  the	  advanced	  democracies	  of	  the	  developed	  world.	  This	  study	  is	  among	  the	   more	   far-­‐reaching	   such	   perspectives.	   The	   two-­‐sector	   narrative	   contrasting	   private	   and	  public	   sectors	   and	   its	   underlying	   rationality	   of	   self-­‐interest,	   has	  been	   foundational	   to	   a	   fairly	  broad	   range	   of	   modern	   social	   science	   disciplines	   including	   not	   only	   economics	   and	   political	  science,	   but	   also	   management	   science,	   public	   administration,	   public	   health,	   accounting,	   tax	  theory,	   corporate	   law	   social	   policy,	   and	   several	   other	   fields.	   It	   is	   a	  mistake,	   however,	   to	   see	  merely	  adding	  in	  the	  public/private	  nonprofit	  sector	  as	  an	  adequate	  solution	  to	  the	  third	  sector	  problem.	  The	  two-­‐sector	  model	   is	  but	  one	  of	  a	  number	  of	  contending	  narratives	  of	  modernism	  (Taylor,	  2004;	  Taylor,	  2007)	  Other	  models	  of	  modern	  society	  and	  culture	  not	  built	  upon	  the	  dualisms	  of	  public/private,	   economics/politics,	   market/state	   dichotomies	   emerged	   during	   the	   long	   19th	  century	   in	   anthropology,	   history,	   sociology,	   social	   work,	   philosophy	   and	   the	   humanities	   and	  cultural	   disciplines,	   all	   of	  which	   have	   consistently	   embraced	   alternative	  master	   narratives	   of	  modernity.	   Modern	   meanings	   of	   altruism,	   charity,	   community,	   mutuality,	   philanthropy,	  solidarity	  and	  numerous	  other	  key	  third	  sector	  terms	  are	  all	  embedded,	  in	  whole	  or	  in	  part,	  in	  these	  alternative	  perspectives.	  Even	  public,	  private	  and	  self-­‐interest	  have	  broader	  connotations	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than	  political	  and	  economic	  rationalism	  will	  allow.	  Scholars	  working	  within	  the	  rationalism	  and	  dualism	   of	   the	   two-­‐sector	   model	   have	   had	   to	   devote	   considerable	   effort	   –	   without	   notable	  success	  –	  to	  reconciling	  these	  ideas	  to	  their	  worldview.	  Achieving	   at	   least	   a	   limited	   degree	   of	   practical	   reconciliation	   (a	   “working	   consensus”)	  between	  these	  multiple,	  divergent	  outlooks	  has	  been	  one	  of	  the	  most	  remarkable	  contributions	  of	  third	  sector	  theory	  with	  its	  model	  of	  four	  distinct	  sectors.	  Continued	  tolerance	  for	  variation,	  diversity	   and	   difference	   in	   the	   sector	   is	   at	   least	   as	   important	   at	   this	   juncture	   as	   concern	   for	  reasoned	  consistency	  that	  seems	  to	  have	  driven	  the	  two-­‐sector	  model.	  Further	  accommodation	  of	  these	  differences	  should	  continue	  to	  be	  a	  major	  challenge	  of	  further	  third	  sector	  theorizing.	  	  For	  a	  broad	  variety	  of	  disciplinary	  specialists	  in	  economic,	  political,	  social,	  cultural	  and	  legal	  fields	   amendments	   and	   departures	   from	   the	   two-­‐sector	   model	   continue	   to	   offer	   a	   rich,	  meaningful,	   and	   powerful	   multi-­‐disciplinary	   context	   for	   ongoing	   conceptualization	   and	  conversation	  about	  the	  nonprofit	  sector	  as	  a	  third	  sector	  without	  disturbing	  the	  basic,	  public-­‐private	  dichotomy.	  Only	  a	  portion	  of	  work	  on	  social	   capital,	   for	  example,	  has	  been	  conducted	  within	   the	   political	   economic	   disciplinary	   matrix,	   working	   with	   exact	   definitions	   of	   capital.	  Others	  see	  social	  capital	  or	  human	  capital	  in	  exclusively	  social	  psychological,	  social	  structural,	  or	  cultural	  terms	  (Cairns,	  Van	  Til	  &	  Williamson,	  2003;	  Coleman,	  1998;	  Edwards	  &	  Foley,	  1998;	  Onyx,	  2000A;	  Onyx,	  2000B;	  Robinson,	  2011).	  Conceptions	  of	  philanthropy	  as	  private	  action	  for	  the	   public	   good	   have	   also	   tried	   to	   to	   take	   note	   of	   the	   paradoxical	   nature	   of	   the	   third	   sector	  without	  directly	  challenging	  the	  private-­‐public	  dichotomy	  or	  self-­‐interest	  (Payton,	  1988).	  	  The	  nonprofit	  model	  with	  its	  rationalist	  underpinnings	  has	  become	  so	  pervasive	  in	  our	  field	  that	  those	  interested	  in	  third	  sector	  studies	  in	  dissenting	  fields	  have	  been	  forced	  to	  embrace	  it	  nominally	  or	  acknowledge	  it	  regardless	  of	  their	  concerns	  about	  its	  limits.	  From	  the	  intellectual	  revolution	  after	  1992	  that	  followed	  from	  the	  political	  revolutions	  of	  1989-­‐1991,	  the	  two-­‐sector	  model	  with	  the	  addition	  of	  a	  third,	  or	  nonprofit,	  sector	  fashioned	  largely	  from	  the	  outsourcing	  of	   the	   two	  has	   functioned	   as	   a	   research	   and	   teaching	  paradigm	   	   (Anheier,	   2005;	  Kuhn	  1970;	  Wagner,	   2012).	   Antonin	   Wagner	   (2013)	   has	   argued	   that,	   for	   teaching	   purposes,	   the	   field	  currently	   has	   two	   major	   paradigms	   –	   nonprofit	   organization	   and	   civil	   society.	   Although	   his	  perspective	  may	  be	  too	  limited,	  his	  observations	  on	  those	  two	  ‘paradigms’	  are	  nonetheless	  very	  interesting	   (See	   also,	   Billis,	   2013;	   Gidron,	   2013;	   Kuti,	   2013;	   Lohmann,	   2013	   and	   Wagner’s	  response	   in	   the	   same	   issue).	   In	   this	   vein,	   civil	   society	   and	   philanthropy	   adherents	   has	  sometimes	  sought	  to	  frame	  what	  they	  see	  as	  alternative	  paradigms	  on	  roughly	  the	  same	  ground	  with	  approximately	  the	  same	  conceptual	  base;	  i.e.,	  “civil	  society	  organizations”.	  The	  two	  sector	  model	  has	   furnished	   the	  background	  and	  contextual	  assumptions	   for	  virtually	  all	  of	   the	  main	  political,	  legal	  and	  policy	  strategies	  regarding	  the	  formation,	  maintenance	  and	  development	  of	  nonprofit	  organizations,	  and	  many	  of	  the	  social	  and	  cultural	  program	  developments	  fostered	  by	  those	  organizations	  –	  including	  many	  embraced	  by	  large	  national	  foundations	  and	  international	  agencies	  –	  that	  have	  sought	  to	  characterize	  national	  third	  sectors	  over	  the	  past	  half	  century.	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In	   the	  decades	  after	  World	  War	  II	   the	  two-­‐sector	  narrative,	  coined	  modern	   liberalism	  and	  later	   new	   or	   neo-­‐liberalism,	   was	   gradually	   adapted	   to	   embrace	   the	   idea	   of	   a	   third	   sector	   of	  either	  nonprofit	  or	  nongovernmental	  organizations	  of	  mixed	  private/public	  provenance,	  swept	  along	  by	  an	  unprecedented	  wave	  of	  affluence	  and	  other	  factors.	  This	  theoretical	  and	  conceptual	  process	  was	  aided	  a	  great	  deal	  by	  increased	  public	  funding	  of	  nonprofits	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  (Boris	  and	  Steuerle,	  2006;	  Lipsky	  and	  Smith,	  1989),	  and	  continued	  pressure	  for	  nonprofits	  to	  “be	  more	  businesslike”	  on	  the	  other	  (Beatty,	  1998;	  Cordes	  and	  Steuerle,	  2009;	  Drucker,	  1964).	  	  Incredible	  as	  it	  may	  seem,	  there	  have	  been	  no	  calls	  in	  recent	  public	  life	  (outside	  academic	  writing,	  that	  is)	  for	  third	  sector	  institutions	  to	  be	  themselves	  or	  to	  do	  what	  they	  are	  capable	  of	  doing	  best.	  In	  the	  long	  wave	  of	  postwar	  economic	  advancement,	  the	  original	  two-­‐sector	  model	  spread	  widely	   and	   popularized	   the	   dichotomy	   of	   economic	   and	   political	   systems	   characterized	   by	  initiatives	   of	   private	   capital	   and	   economic	   growth	   contrasted	   with	   the	   regulation,	   planning,	  stimulus	  and	  counter-­‐cyclical	  activity	  of	  the	  public	  sector	  (Lindblom	  1977;	  Tomás-­‐Carpi	  1997,	  cited	   in	   Monzon	   and	   Chaves	   2008).	   In	   this	   political-­‐economic	   worldview,	   the	   particular	  concerns	   of	   distinctive	   third	   sector	  missions,	   whether	   voluntary	   charity,	   education,	   arts	   and	  culture,	  religion,	  or	  even	  assembly	  for	  purposes	  of	  public	  conversation	  or	  advocacy,	  have	  never	  been	  dominant	   foci.	   It	  has	  often	  been	  easy	  to	  see	  the	  thirdness	  of	   this	  sector	  as,	   in	  some	  way	  derivative	   from	   the	   first	   two,	   as	   in	   the	   assorted	   “failure	   theory”	   claims	   that	   sprouted	   in	   the	  1980s	   (Anheier,	   2005,	  pp.	  XX;	   Salamon,	  1987).	  The	   “welfare	   state”,	  mixed	  economy,	   counter-­‐cyclical	  policy,	  anti-­‐poverty	  policy	  and	  numerous	  other	  topics	  that	  have	  framed	  the	  nonprofit	  as	  the	   third	   sector	   have	   generally	   sought	   to	   blend	   economic	   growth	   with	   social	   welfare,	  particularly	   in	   the	   anti-­‐statist	   decades	   following	   the	   “civil	   society	   revolutions”	   of	   1989-­‐1992.	  But,	  above	  all,	  the	  role	  of	  the	  activist	  state	  has	  been	  central,	  and	  independent	  voluntary	  action	  has	  been	  seen	  as	  supportive,	  enabling	  and	  facilitating.	  Particularly	  after	  1989	  references	  to	  the	  third,	  nonprofit,	  nongovernmental	  or	  civil	  society	  sector	   began	   regularly	   appearing	   in	   discussions	   of	   the	   master	   narrative	   and	   have	   been	  embraced	  by	  various	  international	  bodies	  including	  the	  United	  Nations,	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  the	  European	   Union.	   Multi-­‐sector	   strategies	   for	   health	   care,	   education,	   work	   training	   and	  employment,	  and	  anti-­‐poverty	  programs	  implemented	  by	  a	  third	  nonprofit	  sector	  have	  become	  widespread.	   However,	   a	   variety	   of	   alternative	   policy	   approaches,	   notably	   post-­‐Thatcher	   and	  post-­‐Reagan	   privatization,	   civil	   society	   and	   social	   enterprise	   schemes,	   as	   well	   as	   recent	  observations	  regarding	  sectoral	  convergence	  and	  hybridization	  (Billis,	  2011)	  that	  highlight	  the	  independence	  or	  autonomy	  of	   the	   increasingly	  visible	   third	  sector	  have	  not	   fit	  especially	  well	  within	   the	   bi-­‐polar	   limits	   of	   this	   narrative.	   They	   may,	   in	   fact	   pose	   theoretical	   time	   bombs	  threatening	  to	  burst	  the	  current	  three	  sector	  model	  entirely	  at	  some	  point	  in	  the	  future.	  It	  is	  not	  clear,	   for	   example,	   why	   elected	   and	   appointed	   representatives	   in	   a	   democracy	   or	   business	  executives	  in	  large	  corporations	  should	  have	  privileged	  positions	  or	  greater	  say	  in	  the	  activities	  of	   “civil	  society”	  or	  “social	  economy”	  programs	  than	  the	  ordinary	  citizens	  who	  plan,	  organize,	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carry	  out,	  and	  seek	  stable	   funding	   for	  such	   third	  sector	  activities.	  The	  cynical	  expression	  of	  a	  new	  golden	  rule	  –	  those	  that	  have	  the	  gold	  make	  the	  rules	  –	  is	  often	  heard	  in	  today’s	  nonprofits	  and	   points	   up	   certain	   moral	   limits	   of	   the	   present	   configuration.	   These	   and	   other	   heretical	  thoughts	  underlie	  notions	  of	   the	   third	   sector	   as	   an	  equal	   or	   autonomous	   sector	  partner	  with	  business	  or	  government.	  	  Kramer	   (2004)	   elaborates	   a	   number	   of	   distinctive	   features	   of	   the	   sector	   concept	   as	   viewed	  through	   the	   lens	   of	   the	   nonprofit	   model.	  “Typically,”	   he	   says	   "it	   emphasizes	   the	   rapid	  institutionalization	  of	  the	  third	  sector	  as	  the	  core	  of	  civil	  society,	  as	  the	  state’s	  primary	  partner	  in	   the	   provision	   of	   human	   services	   and	   the	   promotion	   of	   culture	   and	   the	   arts.”	  We	  need	  not	  concern	  ourselves	  at	  this	  point	  with	  the	  long	  list	  of	  third	  sector	   institutions	  missing	  from	  this	  list.	  We	  are	   instead	  concerned	  here	  with	  his	  critique	  of	  the	  sector	  concept	   itself.	  Kramer	  cites	  three	  reasons	  to	  question	  the	  sector	  model	  based	  on	  ownership:	  Sector	  convergence	  stemming	  from	   growing	   dependence	   of	   government	   funding;	   privatization	   of	   government;	   and	   the	  establishment	   of	   nonprofit	   subsidiaries	   by	   businesses.	   To	   this	   we	  might	   respond	   that	   while	  largely	  accurate	  at	  the	  current	  moment	  in	  U.S.	  history	  none	  of	  these	  claims	  offers	  any	  reason,	  in	  principle,	  for	  rejecting	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  third	  sector	  of	  voluntary	  action	  largely	  or	  completely	  outside	   government,	   business,	   or	   for	   that	   matter,	   the	   intimate	   sphere.	   It	   may,	   as	   Kramer	  suggests,	   give	   us	   reasons	   to	   doubt	   the	   veracity	   of	   a	  model	   of	   an	   autonomous	   third	   sector	   of	  nonprofit	  organizations	  distinguished	  solely	  by	  ownership.	  (On	  this	  point,	  see	  also,	  Billis,	  2013)	  
A	  Plurality	  of	  Similar	  Institutions	  The	  approach	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  sector	  taken	  here	  is	  different	  from	  the	  approach	  based	  solely	   on	   ownership	   differences,	   and	   for	   the	   reasons	   noted	   by	   Kramer	   and	   Billis.	   We	   can	  distinguish	  sectors	  as	  differing	  types	  of	  institutional	  configurations.	  Before	  doing	  so,	  however,	  we	   need	   a	   clearer	   understanding	   of	   what	   is	   meant	   by	   that	   term.	   "Institutions	   are	   generally	  defined	  as	  stable	  sets	  of	  norms,	  rules	  and	  principles	  that	  serve	  two	  functions	  in	  shaping	  social	  relations,”	   according	   to	   Christian	   Reus-­‐Smit	   (1999,	   12),	   “[T]hey	   constitute	   actors	   as	  knowledgeable	   social	   agents,	   and	   they	   regulate	   behavior."	   In	   a	   conception	   that	   aligns	   closely	  with	   new	   commons,	   Robert	  Hawkins	   elaborated	   the	   basic	   stance	   of	   the	  Bloomington	   School:	  ““Institutions	  embody	  the	  basic	  rules	  that	  govern	  all	  public	  and	  private	  actions	  -­‐	  from	  individual	  property	   rights	   to	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   communities	   deal	   with	   public	   goods.	   They	   affect	  distribution	   of	   income,	   efficiency	   of	   resource	   allocation,	   and	   the	   development	   of	   human	  resources.	  These	  rules	  in	  their	  power	  to	  enable	  self-­‐governing	  impulses	  to	  be	  enacted	  and	  find	  support	  in	  the	  society,	  constitute	  a	  vital	  public	  resource.	  True	  public	  life,	  in	  contrast	  to	  what	  is	  either	   narrowly	   private	   or	   dominated	   by	   government	   authority,	   needs	   vigorous	   institutions.	  They	   are	   an	   essential	   element	   of	  what	   it	  means	   to	   be	   public.”	   Elinor	  Ostrom	  was	   even	  more	  explicit	  tying	  this	  idea	  to	  the	  sector	  perspective,	  noting	  that	  institutions	  are	  “the	  prescriptions	  humans	   use	   to	   organize	   all	   forms	   of	   repetitive	   and	   structured	   interactions	   including	   those	  within	   families,	   neighborhoods,	  markets,	   firms,	   sports	   leagues,	   churches,	   private	   associations	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and	  governments	  at	  all	  scales”	  (Ostrom,	  2005,	  3).	  	  	  Thus,	   from	  an	   institutional	   perspective	   sectors	  may	  be	  distinguished	  by	  differences	   in	  norms,	   rules,	   principles,	   roles,	   and	  memes	   (e.g.,	   advocacy,	   protest	   tactics	   and	   other	   forms	   of	  practical	  knowledge)	  possessed	  by	  actors	  engaged	  in	  particular	  roles	  (e.g.,	  philanthropist)	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  regulating	  repetitive	  and	  structured	  interactions	  (e.g.,	  redistributing	  income	  or	  self-­‐governing).	  	  The	  current	  nonprofit	  sector	  model	  also	  highlights	  and	  tends	  to	  valorize	  the	  roles	  of	  CEO’s,	  governing	   boards	   and	   professionals	   (as	   true	   or	   real	   “leadership”)	   and	   downplays	   the	  importance	  of	  citizenship,	  other	  participants,	  volunteers,	  and	  clients.	  In	  the	  current	  model,	  for	  example,	   nonprofit	   organizations	  of	  paid	   staff	   are	   seen	  as	  dealing	   externally	  with	  volunteers,	  clients,	  publics,	  and	  even	  board	  members,	   rather	   than	  as	   truly	  corporate	  entities	   that	   include	  these	  others	  within	  the	  organization.	  Such	  a	  view	  is	  possible	  only	  by	  emphasizing	  the	  distinct	  but	  arbitrary	  boundaries	  of	  the	  nonprofit	  model	  as	  expressed	  in	  current	  managerial	  and	  legal	  views	  and	   ignoring	  the	  real	  networks	  of	  political	  and	  social	   interaction	  and	  cultural	  exchange	  involved.	   Despite	   its	   formidable	   presence	   and	   great	   success,	   the	   nonprofit	  model	   thus	   offers	  numerous	   reasons	   for	  believing	   that	   it	   accounts	   for	   and	  explains	  only	   a	  portion	  of	   the	   entire	  space	   outside	   of	   households,	  markets	   and	   governments.	   Now	   that	   the	  model	   is	  more-­‐or-­‐less	  complete	  and	   its	   research	  program	  stable	  and	  continuing,	   third	   sector	   scholars	  ought	   to	   take	  the	  occasion	  to	  ask	  seriously	  what	  else	  there	  is	  in	  this	  space	  we	  call	  the	  third	  sector?	  
The	  Third	  Sector	  Imaginary	  	   One	  of	  the	  larger	  projects	  for	  third	  sector	  scholars	  in	  recent	  decades	  has	  been	  the	  efforts	  to	  try	  to	  imagine	  the	  full	  menagerie	  of	  institutional	  arrangements	  in	  the	  wider	  third	  sector.	  One	  suitable	   place	   to	   begin	  more	   fulsome	   consideration	   of	   the	   third	   sector	   is	   with	   a	   notion	   first	  outlined	  by	  one	  of	  the	  leading	  Canadian	  social	  philosophers	  of	  the	  past	  century.	  In	  a	  charming	  little	  volume	  entitled	  The	  Social	  Imaginary	  (2004)	  Charles	  Taylor	  called	  attention	  to	  the	  role	  of	  imagination	   in	   social	   behavior	   and	   theory,	   introducing	   a	   term	  he	   called	   the	   social	   imaginary.	  What	  is	  a	  social	  imaginary?	  In	  Chapter	  2	  Taylor	  defines	  this	  as	  "the	  ways	  people	  imagine	  their	  social	  existence,	  how	  they	   fit	   together	  and	  how	  things	  go	  on	  between	  them	  and	  their	   fellows,	  the	   expectations	   that	   are	   normally	   met,	   and	   the	   deeper	   normative	   notions	   and	   images	   that	  underlie	  these	  expectations"	  (Taylor,	  2004:23).	  	  The	  social	  imaginary	  in	  Taylor’s	  sense	  offers	  an	  interesting	  way	   to	  begin	   the	   task	  of	   reconciling	   the	  many	  divergent	  perspectives	  of	   the	   third	  sector,	  and	  furthering	  the	  complex	  challenge	  of	  imagining	  an	  entirely	  new	  institutional	  realm	  of	  human	  affairs	  in	  both	  practical	  and	  theoretical	  senses	  that	  began	  with	  the	  nonprofit	  model.	  The	  third	  sector	  offers	  an	  interesting	  example	  of	  undirected	  voluntary	  action	  in	  a	  collective	  project	  by	   researchers,	   theorists	  and	  practitioners	   imagining	  an	  entire	  new	  sphere	  of	  human	  activity	  into	  existence	  and	  order.	  As	  recently	  as	  a	  few	  decades	  ago,	  there	  were	  only	  isolated,	  vague	  and	  occasional	  references	  to	  nonprofit	  or	  voluntary	  sectors	  scattered	  across	  the	  world’s	  published	  social	  science	  literature	  and	  no	  one	  ever	  bothered	  to	  offer	  a	  coherent	  definition	  or	  systematic	  conceptualization	  of	  what	  that	  phrase	  might	  mean.	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There	  are	  numerous	  precedents	  in	  the	  social	  sciences	  for	  what	  has	  gone	  on	  since.	  Among	  the	  most	  widely	  known	  of	  these	  would	  be	  Adam	  Smith’s	  distillation	  of	  the	  market	  order	  in	  the	  industrial	   dynamics	   of	   his	   day.	   Equally	   significant	   are	   the	   imaginings	   of	   Hobbes,	   and	   many	  others	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  modern	  nation	  state.	  And	  then	  there	  is	  the	  vast	  imaginary	  of	  modern	  socialism.	  Beginning	  with	  Henri	  de	  Saint-­‐Simon’s	  coinage	  of	  the	  term	  socialism	  to	  contrast	  with	  
laissez-­‐faire	  individualism,	  the	  various	  utopian,	  anarchistic,	  democratic,	  Christian,	  Marxian	  and	  other	  socialisms	  as	  well	  as	  the	  various	  reactions	  they	  provoked	  over	  the	  long	  19th	  century,	  also	  offered	   a	   large	   and	   multi-­‐faceted	   succession	   of	   social	   imaginings	   of	   how	   society	   should	   be	  arranged	   and	   changed.	   From	   a	   quite	   different	   angle,	   Adam	   Smith,	   Adam	   Ferguson	   and	   the	  Scottish	  moralists	  initiated	  a	  quite	  different	  chain	  of	  imaginings	  involving	  the	  nature	  of	  modern	  morality.	  From	  the	  standpoint	  of	  social	  theory,	  the	  current	  social	  imaginary	  of	  the	  third	  sector	  theory	  represents	  an	  important	  branching	  in	  both	  of	  those	  long	  successions.	  And	  these	  are	  just	  a	  few	  of	  the	  many	  social	  imaginaries	  that	  have	  shaped	  and	  molded	  modern	  social	  science	  theory	  and	  understandings.	  Since	  the	  1970s,	  a	  large	  number	  of	  people	  have	  similarly	  and	  collectively	  imagined	  into	  existence	   an	   empirical	   institutional	   realm	   and	   theoretical	   figure	   never	   before	   seen	   or	  understood	  and	  that	  they	  and,	  increasingly,	  we	  all	  call	  "the	  third	  sector".	  Some	  have	  tied	  their	  imaginings	  directly	  to	  an	  earlier	  18th	  century	  social	  construct	  called	  civil	  society	  (see	  Cohen	  &	  Arato,	  1992;	  Wagner,	  2012).	  These	  new	  images	  and	  institutions	  imagined	  by	  not	  only	  theorists,	  but	   also	   researchers	   and	   practitioners	   willing	   to	   act	   on	   their	   imaginings,	   together	   with	  associated	   evidence	   and	  data	   have	   outlined	   in	   great	   and	   increasing	   detail	   "how	   things	   go	   on	  between	  them	  and	  their	   fellows"	  with	  greater	  and	  greater	  attention	  to	  the	  "deeper	  normative	  notions	   and	   images	   that	   underlie	   these	   expectations".	   What	   a	   provocative	   way	   the	   social	  imaginary	   offers	   to	   summarize	   what	   has	   actually	   been	   happening	   in	   third	   sector	   studies	   in	  recent	  decades!	  In	  an	  organizational	  sense,	  Taylor’s	  social	  imaginary	  offers	  up	  a	  description	  of	  the	  social	  space	   for	   collective	   rethinking	   and	   reworking	   of	   just	   about	   any	   social	   realities.	   The	   social	  imaginary	  might	  be	  seen	  as	  yet	  another	  reworking	  of	   the	  society/individual	  or	  public/private	  dichotomies;	   in	   this	   case,	   asocial	   reconfiguration	   of	   Bergson’s	   elan	   vitale	   placing	   greater	  emphasis	  on	  the	  context	  of	   interpersonal	  relations	  and	  less	  on	  the	  solipsist	  exploration	  of	  the	  workings	  of	   the	   inner	  self.	  At	  any	  rate,	  both	  current	  and	   future	  models	  of	   the	   third	  sector,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  host	  of	  related	  ideas	  like	  social	  capital,	  philanthropy,	  and	  social	  enterprise	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  products	  recently	  emerging	  from	  our	  third	  sector	  social	  imaginary;	  the	  gradual	  convergence	  of	   the	  social	   imaginings	  of	  many	  different	   sources.	  This	  does	  not	   imply	   that	   such	   imaginaries	  are	  in	  any	  important	  sense	  fictions,	   like	  characters	  in	  a	  novel,	  or	  fantasies	  like	  a	  six-­‐year	  old’s	  fantasies	  of	  fairies,	  trolls	  and	  unicorns).	  Most	  are	  intended	  to	  be	  rigorously	  empirical,	  and	  solid	  evidence	  of	  their	  existence	  is	  one	  of	  the	  acid	  tests	  for	  the	  viability	  of	  such	  imaginings.	  Taylor’s	  social	  imaginary	  is	  more	  on	  the	  order	  of	  the	  visioning	  and	  scenario-­‐building	  exercises	  popular	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in	  some	  nonprofit	  management	  circles.	  	  Social	   imagining,	   in	  Taylor’s	   terms,	   is	   a	   reality-­‐based,	   complex	   social	  process	   in	  which	  selected	   realities	   –	   including	   organizations,	   institutions,	   and	   social	   relations	   not	   previously	  noted	   or	   understood	   -­‐	   are	   visualized,	   formulated	   or	   reconfigured	   as	   plausible,	   realistic,	  empirical	  and	  researchable	   constructs;	   the	  most	   creative	  parts	  of	   research	  design	  and	   theory	  building.	   Social	   imagining	   is	   a	   multi-­‐dimensional	   process	   involving	   naming,	   identifying	  characteristics,	   and	   linking	  new	   constructs	   to	   other	   known	   concepts.	  A	   remarkable	  period	  of	  social	  imagining	  accurately	  describes	  what	  has	  been	  happening	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  third	  sector	  for	  the	  past	  forty	  years,	  and	  in	  a	  less	  intense	  sense,	  for	  more	  than	  two	  centuries,	  since	  Hegel	  and	  Ferguson	  first	  imagined	  their	  quite	  different	  constructs	  and	  images	  of	  civil	  society	  (Cohen	  and	  Arato,	  1992,	  pp.	  83-­‐116).	  	  	  Another	  more	  current	  example	  would	  be	  assembly,	  a	  legal	  and	  constitutional	  term	  with	  many	   empirical	   referents	   in	   meetings,	   public	   lectures,	   concerts,	   conferences,	   parades,	  pilgrimages	   like	   the	   annual	   Islamic	   haj,	   and	   popular	   assemblies	   such	   as	   garage	   bands,	   jam	  sessions,	   rock	   concerts,	   flashmobs,	   and	   many	   other	   comparable	   gatherings.	   Apart	   from	   the	  organizing	   committees	   and	   other	   formal	   organizations	   governing	   some	   assemblies,	   the	  organized	   nature	   of	   this	   important	   form	   of	   social	   organization	   seems	   to	   have	   garnered	   no	  attention	  among	  researchers	  interested	  in	  the	  third	  sector,	  and	  the	  suggestion	  that	  assemblies	  are	  an	  important	  part	  of	  the	  third	  sector	  probably	  would	  be	  quite	  controversial.	  We	  will	  explore	  this	  very	  question	  in	  Chapter	  Eight	  below.	  	  
Imagining	  the	  Wunderkammer	  	  	   Theoretical	  discussions	  in	  the	  social	  sciences	  generally	  tend	  to	  neglect	  or	  downplay	  the	  important	   role	   of	   imagining	   new	   ways	   to	   configure	   known	   or	   emerging	   social	   realities.	  	  However,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  emerging	  third	  sector,	  we	  might	  arbitrarily	  begin	  a	  brief	  review	  of	  the	  social	   imaginings	  which	  together	  brought	  us	   the	   idea	  of	  a	   third	  sector	  with	  George	  Hegel,	  whose	  re-­‐imagining	  of	  his	  social	  world	  in	  terms	  of	  civil	  society	  embodies	  vigorous	  antecedents	  of	   our	   current	   notions	   of	   households,	   markets,	   states	   (Cohen	   and	   Arato,	   2000).	   From	   there	  others	   can	   also	   be	   credited:	  Alexis	   de	  Tocqueville	   (political	   and	   voluntary	   associations),	   Karl	  Marx	   (revolutionary	   association),	   Auguste	   Comte	   (altruisme),	   Max	   Weber	   (bureaucracy),	  Robert	  Michels	  (oligarchy),	  Talcott	  Parsons	  (his	  AGIL	  pattern	  variables	  approximate	  one	  view	  of	   the	   division	   among	   sectors),	   James	   Pennock	   (liberal	   democracy),	   and	  William	  Kornhauser	  (mass	  society)	  (Van	  Til,	  2012).	  To	  this	  list	  I	  would	  also	  add,	  in	  no	  particular	  order,	  the	  creative	  imaginings	  of	  Marcel	  Mauss	   (gift	   exchange),	  Bronislaw	  Malinowski	   and	  Marshall	   Sahlins	   (gift	  circles,	   cycles	   or	   networks),	   Albert	   Beveridge	   (voluntary	   action),	   L.J.	   Hanifan	   and	   Robert	  Putnam	   (social	   capital),	  David	  Horton	   Smith	   (voluntary	   and	   grassroots	   organization),	  Amatai	  Etzioni	  (normative	  compliance),	  Kenneth	  Boulding	  (threat,	  exchange	  and	  integrative	  systems),	  Elinor	   Ostrom	   (common	   resource	   pools	   and	   knowledge	   commons),	   Vincent	   Ostrom	  (polycentricity	   and	   constitutional	   order),	   John	  Dewey	   (democratic	   society	   and	   culture),	  Mary	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Parker	   Follett	   (groups	   in	   democracy),	   Kurt	   Lewin	   &	   Ronald	   Lippitt	   (democratic	   group	  leadership),	  Richard	  Cornuelle	  (independent	  sector),	  Burton	  Weisbrod	  (nonprofit	  economics),	  George	  Herbert	  Mead	  (collective	  behavior),	  Hannah	  Arendt	  (the	  distinction	  of	  action,	  work	  and	  labor),	   Jürgen	   Habermas	   (systems	   and	   lifeworlds),	   Benjamin	   Barber	   (the	   sovereignty	   of	   the	  political),	  David	  Mathews	  (public	  deliberation),	  Anthony	  Giddens	  (third	  way),	  Elijah	  Anderson	  (cosmopolitan	   canopy),	   Harold	   Saunders	   (sustained	   dialogue),	   John	   Dryzek	   (discursive	  democracy),	   Yochai	   Benkler	   (social	   production)	   and	   a	   great	   many	   others	   including	   certain	  concepts	  of	  the	  internet	  and	  social	  media	  that	  are	  still	  evolving.	  Without	  the	  collective	  impact	  of	  these	  various	  imaginings,	  the	  modern	  third	  sector	  is	  literally	  unimaginable.	  Each	   of	   these	   and	  many	   other	   contributions	   have	   imagined	   important	   bits	   and	   pieces	  added	  to	  the	  increasingly	  robust	  idea	  of	  a	  third	  sector.	  We	  can	  readily	  add	  the	  names	  of	  dozens	  of	   active	   ARNOVAns	   to	   this	   list	   for	   their	   social	   imaginings	   –	   their	   intuitions,	   insights	   and	  metaphors	  that	  serve	  as	  contributions	  to	  the	  study	  of	  formal	  organizations	  and	  a	  third	  sector	  of	  institutions.	  Collectively	  and	  imaginatively,	  all	  of	  these	  people	  have	  conceptualized	  multiple	  bits	  and	   pieces	   adding	   to	   our	   current	   understanding	   of	   the	   institutional	   space(s)	   outside	   the	  household	  and	  apart	   from	  the	  market	  order	  and	  government.	  That	   is,	   to	  the	  third	  sector.	  And	  what	   they	   have	   suggested	   to	   us	   collectively	   adds	   up	   to	   a	   great	   deal	   more	   than	   simply	   the	  important	  but	  limited	  notion	  of	  nonprofit	  organizations	  and	  nondistribution	  constraints.	  	  The	  emergence	  and	  acceptance	  of	  the	  very	  idea	  of	  the	  third	  sector	  has	  been	  a	  collective	  production	   of	   the	   very	   type	  we	   seek	   to	   account	   for	   and	   explain.	  My	   own	   preferred	   term	   for	  describing	   and	   summing	   up	   such	   production	   processes	  would	   be	   knowledge	   commons	   (Hess	  and	   Ostrom,	   2007),	   as	   elaborated	   in	   Chapter	   Ten.	   No	   one	   legislated	   the	   third	   sector,	  commanded	   it	   or	   demanded	   it.	   It	   has	   no	   price	   structure	   although	   political	   and	   economic	  systems	   are	   quite	  willing	   to	   exploit	   its	   relative	   advantages	  when	   it	   suits	   their	   purposes.	   The	  practical	   efforts	  we	   call	   the	   third	   sector	   have	   been	   a	   collective	   production	   and	   our	   evolving	  collective	  understandings	  –	  our	  knowledge	  –	  of	   the	   third	   sector	  are	  also	  a	   collective	  product.	  That	   is	   not	  mere	  metaphor.	   The	   idea	   of	   a	   third	   sector	   simply	   did	   not	   exist	   in	   any	   form	   sixty	  years	  ago,	  and	  now	  it	  stands	  as	  a	  major	  institutional	  product	  of	  modern	  life	  in	  many	  different	  communities,	   countries	   and	   regions.	   Yet,	   within	   the	   narrow	   theoretical	   terms	   set	   out	   by	   the	  nonprofit	  model,	  there	  is	  no	  meaningful	  way	  to	  recognize	  the	  entirety	  of	  this	  major	  production.	  	  In	   seeing	   the	   third	   sector	   as	   a	   recent	   and	   still	   incomplete	   act	   of	   collective	   practical,	  theoretical	  and	  legal	  social	  imagination	  –	  we	  are	  concerned	  with	  a	  variety	  of	  very	  real	  things,	  an	  entirely	   new	   set	   of	   ideas	   constructing	   or,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   older	   concepts	   like	   civil	   society,	   re-­‐constructing,	   an	   entirely	   new	   way	   of	   viewing	   important	   parts	   of	   our	   collective	   human	  experience	  –	  what	   it	  means	   to	  be	  human.	  The	   third	  sector	   imaginary	  has	  been	  created	  out	  of	  virtually	   no	   prior	   materials	   except	   shared	   experiences	   in	   daily	   living.	   The	   interconnected	  phenomena	  of	  gifts	  and	  donations,	  voluntary	  association	  and	  pooling	  of	  common	  resources	  in	  grants,	   funds,	   endowments	   and	   the	   like,	   together	   with	   all	   of	   the	   organizations	   and	   other	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phenomena	  associated	  with	   the	   third	   sector	   construct	   register	  only	  as	  details	   and	  data.	  They	  have	   had	   no	   essential	   role	   in	   the	   social,	   economic,	   political	   and	   cultural	   ideas	   held	   together	  under	  the	  broad	  heading	  of	  social	  and	  political	  theory	  until	  the	  past	  few	  years.	  A	  survey	  of	  social	  and	  political	  theory	  by	  Kimmel	  &	  Stephen	  (1998)	  for	  example,	  speaks	  only	  of	  state,	  market	  and	  society.	  Currently,	   thanks	   to	   the	   nonprofit	   model,	   the	   basic	   theoretical	   paradigm	   sufficient	   for	  understanding	  nonprofit	  organizations	  as	  a	  (not	  the)	  third	  sector	  is	  theoretically	  speaking	  fairly	  complete,	   and	   there	   are	   numerous	   civil	   society	   models	   that	   deal	   with	   citizenship	   and	   civic	  engagement	  questions.	  Even	  so,	  no	  adequate	  general	  model	  defines,	   encompasses	  or	  outlines	  the	   rest	   of	   the	   third	   sector	   or	   brings	   it	   together	   with	   the	   nonprofit	   sector	   or	   civil	   society	  perspectives.	  Unlike	  1914	  or	  1964⁠	  when	   the	   term	  nonprofit	   already	  existed	  but	  no	   research,	  theoretical	  or	  practice	  model	  of	  any	  third	  sector	  could	  have	  been	  found,	  by	  2014	  there	  is	  broad,	  widespread	  agreement	  on	  the	  basic	   terms	  which	  render	  nonprofit	  research	   intelligible.	  These	  dates	   are	   arbitrary	   and	   selected	   merely	   as	   100	   years	   ago	   and	   50	   years	   ago.	   The	   American	  Institute	  of	  Graphic	  Arts,	  to	  take	  one	  of	  many	  possible	  examples,	  was	  founded	  in	  1914,	  and	  the	  Organization	  of	  Afro-­‐American	  Unity,	  was	  founded	  in	  1964	  as	  one	  component	  of	  the	  overall	  civil	  rights	  movement	  of	  the	  time.	  Neither	  founding	  is	  particularly	  well	  or	  convincingly	  explained	  by	  the	   nonprofit	   model.	   Even	   so,	   policy-­‐makers	   schooled	   in	   the	   two-­‐sector	   model	   still	   find	   it	  altogether	  too	  easy	  to	  overlook	  some	  or	  all	  of	  the	  third	  sectors.	  E.g.,	  see	  Eisenberg	  (2013)	  for	  a	  recent	  example.	  Something	  similar	  can	  be	  said	  for	  each	  of	  a	  range	  of	  other	  middle-­‐range	  topics	  that	   have	   received	   attention	   in	   third	   sector	   studies,	   including	   philanthropy,	   social	   capital,	  voluntary	   associations,	   foundations,	   social	   movements,	   collective	   behavior,	   citizen	  participation,	   social	   problems,	   commons,	   mutual	   aid,	   self	   help,	   giving,	   fundraising,	   social	  production,	   organized	   religion,	   civic	   and	   political	   action	   by	   citizens,	   interest	   groups,	   and	   a	  number	  of	  other	  specific	  topics,	  organizations	  and	  institutions.	  Specific,	  detailed	  research	  work	  within	   each	   of	   these	   areas	   can	   be	   expected	   to	   be	   ongoing	   in	   the	   future	   as	   it	   is	   at	   present.	  However,	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  expect	  that	  a	  more	  adequate	  general	  model	  of	  the	  third	  sector	  will	  arise	   from	  that	  research.	  Like	  the	  other	  theoretical	   figures	  mentioned,	  such	  a	  wider	  third	  sector	  has	  yet	  to	  be	  imagined	  in	  its	  entirety.	  
The	  Third	  Sector	  Paradigm	  Part	   of	   what	   we	   currently	   lack	   is	   a	   sufficiently	   robust	   theoretical	   paradigm	   of	   the	  institutions	  of	  the	  third	  sector	  beyond	  nonprofit	  organizations.	  We	  need	  to	  find	  ways	  to	  make	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  spaces	  between	  households,	  markets	  and	  governments	  coherent,	  meaningful	  or	   to	   relate	   all	   of	   these	   diverse	   topics	   together	   within	   a	   genuine	   three-­‐sector	   model	   in	  something	  more	  than	  a	  purely	  cursory	  manner.	  Robert	  Merton’s	  sociological	  thesis	  of	  “theories	  of	   the	  middle	   range”	  has	  made	  accommodation	  or	  at	   least	   lip	   service	   to	   the	  master	  narrative	  phrase	   third	   sector	   relatively	   easy	   and	   painless	   without	   actually	   solving	   anything.	   By	   de-­‐emphasizing	  the	  role	  and	  importance	  of	  any	  “grand	  theory”	  of	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  full	  third	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sector	  the	  middle	  range	  approach	  makes	  it	  possible	  to	  justify	  just	  about	  any	  narrower	  focus	  on	  any	   immediate,	  narrow	   issue	  or	  practical	  problem	  or	   topic.	  Through	  Merton’s	  hypothesis,	  we	  can	  all,	  it	  seems,	  agree	  to	  go	  our	  own	  ways:	  Even	  those	  who	  reject	  the	  institutional	  pluralism	  of	  the	   three	   sector	  model	   including	  Kathedersozialisten,	  or	  academic	   socialists	   suspicious	  of	   any	  notion	  of	  ‘civil	  society’	  and	  market	  fetishists	  ready	  to	  see	  price	  and	  cost	  dynamics	  everywhere	  can	   equip	   themselves	   to	   contribute	   to	   the	  multi-­‐disciplinary	   conversation	   over	   the	   nonprofit	  third	  sector	  without	  the	  inconvenience	  of	  disruptive	  contradictions.	  	  To	  be	  sure,	  critical	  voices	   from	  left	  and	  right	  have	  been	  concerned	  with	  critiquing	  specific	  aspects	  of	   the	   liberal	  democratic	   sector	  narrative.	   	   Leftist	   critics	   following	   in	   the	   footsteps	  of	  Gramsci	  have	  addressed	   the	  hegemonic	  nature	  of	  civil	   society	  on	   the	  one	  hand	  and	  sought	   to	  valorize	  the	  instrumental	  role	  of	  government	  in	  sector	  formation	  and	  development.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	   conservatives	  and	   libertarians	  have	  raised	  specific	   issues	  of	   taxation,	  bureaucratization,	  and	  professionalization,	  and	  sought	   to	  valorize	   the	  role	  of	   the	  market	  order	  and	  spontaneous	  order	  in	  general	  (Brooks	  2000;	  Boettke	  and	  Prychitko,	  2004;	  Cornuelle	  1965;	  Ealy	  2011).	  Yet,	  such	   monism	   from	   any	   quarter	   seems	   misplaced.	   The	   fundamental	   plurality	   of	   the	   mixed	  economy	   of	   markets,	   states	   and	   third	   sectors	   remains	   one	   of	   the	   most	   essential	   features	   of	  liberal	  democracy.	  	  In	   the	  wake	   of	   the	   collapse	   of	   the	   Soviet	   empire	   after	   1989,	   theorists	   across	   the	   political	  spectrum	   have	   sought	   to	   frame	   their	   own	   versions	   of	   “civil	   society”	   as	   a	   third	   institutional	  sector	   between	   the	  predominant	  private/market	   and	  public/government	   sectors	   (E.g.,	   Cohen	  and	   Arato	   1992;	   Gellner	   1994;	   Seligman	   1992;	   Srubar	   1996).	   Efforts	   to	   revive	   18th	   century	  ideas	  of	   civil	   society	  and	   to	  accommodate	   them	  with	   the	  nonprofit	   sector	  have	  been	  ongoing	  (Van	   Til	   2007;	   Wagner	   2013),	   and	   more	   recently,	   others	   have	   sought	   greater	   attention	   to	  another	   revival,	   the	   “social	   economy”	   (Lohmann	   2007;	   Monzon	   and	   Chaves	   2008;	   Quarter,	  Mook,	  and	  Armstrong,	  2009;	  Vaillancourt	  2009).	  	  
The	  European	  Critique	  A	   group	   of	   European	   third	   sector	   scholars	   have	   over	   the	   past	   decade	   focused	   and	  sharpened	   what	   is	   to	   date	   the	   most	   extensive	   criticism	   of	   the	   nonprofit	   model	   of	   the	   third	  sector,	  which	  they	  term	  the	  “North	  American	  Model”	  (Evers	  and	  LaVille,	  2004;	  LaVille,	  2011).	  The	  2011	  statement	  by	  LaVille	  outlines	  five	  principal	  concerns	  with	  the	  nonprofit	  model:	  -­‐	  It	  privileges	  trust	  as	  a	  nonprofit	  activity,	  when	  in	  reality	  many	  other	  organizations	  and	  institutions	  that	  are	  not	  nonprofits	  are	  equally	  capable	  of	  engendering	  trust.	  -­‐	  It	  overstates	  the	  theoretical	  centrality	  of	  the	  nondistribution	  constraint,	  which	  is	  really	  only	  important	  in	  some	  legal	  systems.	  	  -­‐	  It	  places	  excessive	  reliance	  on	  instrumental	  rationality	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-­‐	   It	   is	   largely	   conflict	   averse	   (e.g.,	   has	   nothing	   meaningful	   to	   say	   about	   Tea	   Party	   &	  Occupy	  movements)	  -­‐It	   incorporates	   an	   implied	   hierarchy	   placing	   the	   third	   sector	   in	   a	   secondary	   or	  derivative	   status	   (e.g.,	   third	   sector	   is	   derived	   residually	   from	  market	   failure	   or	  government	  failure)	  	  Each	   of	   these	   offers	   an	   important	   criticism	   of	   the	   nonprofit	   model.	   The	   first	   three	  statements	   together	   offer	   an	   alternative	   entre	   or	   rationale	   for	   the	   view	   expressed	   here	   that	  there	   is	   more	   to	   the	   third	   sector	   than	   nonprofit	   organizations.	   Religions,	   social	   movements,	  assemblies	   and	   a	   variety	   of	   other	   organized	   activities	   and	   institutions	   that	   are	   not	   formal	  organizations	  have	  been	  quite	  capable	  of	  engendering	  trust	  among	  their	  participants	  for	  many	  centuries	  before	  the	  formal	  nondistribution	  constraints	  of	  nonprofit	  corporations	  were	  devised.	  Just	   as	   importantly,	   governments	   and	  market	   oriented	   firms	   are	   also	   capable	   of	   engendering	  trust	   among	   their	   citizens	   and	   customers.	   The	   final	   two	   points	   speak	   directly	   to	   the	   often-­‐apolitical	  nature	  of	  the	  “civic”	  nonprofit	  model	  and	  the	  circumstances	  under	  which	  the	  present	  nonprofit	   sector	   arose	  out	  of	   the	   circumstances	  of	  post-­‐war	  politics	   and	  economics,	   in	  which	  denial	  of	  fundamental	  conflicts	  was	  often	  a	  major	  consideration.	  We	   should	   note	   first	   that	   the	   continental	   critique	   is	   really	   only	   directed	   at	   the	   U.S.	  version	   of	   the	   nonprofit	   model	   which	   is	   in	   no	   real	   sense	   a	   North	   American	   one	   since	   the	  Canadian	   and	  Mexican	   nonprofit	   sectors	   are	   both	   quite	   different	   from	   the	   U.S.	   one.	   The	   real	  target	   of	   the	   critique	   appears	   to	   be	   rather	   directly	   what	   they	   perceive	   as	   the	   intellectual	  imperialism	  of	  the	  Johns	  Hopkins	  Comparative	  studies.	  As	  part	  of	  their	  critique,	  Evers	  and	  Laville	  (2004)	  reproduced	  the	  venerable	  “Pestoff	  triangle”	  graphic	  view	  (shown	  in	  Figure	  4.1)	  of	  the	  relation	  between	  market,	  state	  and	  third	  (voluntary)	  sector	  (Pestoff,	  1998).	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Figure	  4.1	  
The	  Pestoff	  Triangle	  	  
	  The	   Pestoff	   schematic	   has	   several	   advantages	   and	   illustrates	   numerous	   important	  points.	   It	  demands,	  however,	  a	  higher	  standard	  of	  rigorous	   logic	   than	   is	  usually	  applied.	  The	  schematic	   is	   in	  no	  sense	  a	  portrait	  of	  reality;	   it	   is	  purely	  a	   logical	  construct;	  an	   ideal	   type.	   In	  addition,	  it	  is	  not	  drawn	  to	  scale	  and	  one	  cannot	  make	  any	  inferences	  or	  draw	  any	  conclusions	  about	  the	  size	  or	  importance	  of	  any	  of	  the	  sectors	  from	  it.	  Nevertheless,	  we	  can	  recognized	  that	  it	   attempts	   to	   portray	   the	   totality	   of	   the	   four-­‐sectors	   within	   the	   boundaries	   of	   the	   greater	  triangle,	   and	   their	   (logical)	   proximity	   to	   one	   another.	   The	  major	   problems	  with	   the	   Pestoff	  triangle	  (and	  perhaps	  the	  largely	  unstated	  vantage	  point	  of	  the	  broader	  European	  critique)	  are	  that	   it	   portrays	   a	   four	   sector	   view	   that	   appears	   to	   completely	   subsume	   the	   third	   sector	  	  (identified	  in	  Figure	  4.1	  as	  a	  circle	  labeled	  the	  voluntary	  sector)	  entirely	  subsumed	  within	  the	  greater	   triangle	   formed	   by	   the	   apexes	   of	   three	   “more	   basic”	   market,	   state	   and	   households	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(identified	   in	   Figure	  4.1	   as	   the	   community).	   Is	   this	   a	  mere	   accident,	   or	   is	   it	   a	   reflection	  of	   a	  broader	   theoretical	   outlook?	  We	   can’t	   know	   for	   sure.	   Perhaps	   it	   is	   purely	   an	   irony	   that	   the	  chart	  also	  sets	  the	  third	  sector	  apart	  from	  the	  community;	  both	  points	  I	  tried	  to	  convey	  in	  an	  exchange	   with	  Wagner	   (Lohmann,	   2013;	   Wagner,	   2013)	   in	   Voluntary	   Sector	   Review.	   In	   the	  graphic,	  the	  circular	  Voluntary	  Sector	  is	  clearly	  of	  a	  different	  geometric	  order	  riding	  atop	  the	  six	  triangles	  formed	  by	  the	  solid	  and	  dotted	  lines,	  but	  we	  get	  no	  hint	  of	  whether	  that	  difference	  is	  theoretically	  significant	  or	  not.	  There	   is	   also	   the	   suggestion	  within	   the	   logic	   of	   the	   figure	   of	   additional	   institutional	  possibilities	   beyond	   the	   basic	   four	   sectors	   (or	   pure	   types)	   but	  we	  have	  no	   labels	   to	   suggest	  what	   they	   may	   be.	   I	   believe	   they	   represent	   instances	   of	   what	   Billis,	   et.	   al.	   (2010)	   term	  “hybridity”.	   Somewhat	   subversively	   perhaps,	   the	   dotted	   lines	   extending	   beyond	   the	  boundaries	   of	   the	  main	   triangle	   appear	   to	   suggest	   that	   there	  may	  be	   something	  beyond	   the	  bounds	   of	   the	   four	   sectors:	   the	   three	   triangles	   and	   the	   overlaid	   circle.	   Additional	   sectors,	  perhaps?	  There	  is	  no	  indication	  in	  Pestoff	  (1989),	  Evers	  and	  Laville	  (2004)	  or	  anywhere	  else	  that	  I	  am	  aware	  of	  what	  that	  something	  else	  might	  be.	  	  Figure	  4.1.	  has	  the	  virtue	  of	  noting	  several	  dimensions	  and	  possibilities	  beyond	  the	  dyad	  of	  public	  and	  private.	  Of	  particular	  note	  are	  the	  three	  unlabeled	  triangles	  (each	  broken	  into	  two	  parts	  by	  arcs	  of	  circle)	   that	  seem	  to	  portray	  something	  akin	  to	  what	   in	  an	  unpublished	  paper	  (Lohmann,	  2002A)	  I	  labeled	  the	  intersectors.	  	  Using	  the	  terms	  and	  logic	  of	  the	  chart,	  we	  can	  identify	  these	  as	  the	  informal	  public	  sector	  (on	   the	   left),	   for-­‐profit	   public	   sector	   (on	   the	   right),	   and	   informal	   for-­‐profit	   sector	   (at	   the	  bottom).	   In	  many	   respects,	   the	   final	   space	   (in	   Pestoff’s	   chart,	   the	   triangle	   subsumed	   entirely	  within	   the	   blue	   circle)	  may	   be	   the	  most	   interesting	   intersector	   for	   our	   purposes.	  Within	   the	  logic	  of	   the	   figure,	   it	   corresponds	  closely	   to	  what	   is	  here	   labeled	   the	   independent	   sector	  as	  a	  pure	  type,	  entirely	  outside	  the	  bounds	  of	  market,	  state	  and	  households.	  If	   we	   employ	   one	   of	   the	   conventions	   of	   mathematical	   graph	   theory	   –	   that	   geometric	  shape	  is	  unimportant	  –	  we	  can	  redraw	  the	  Pestoff	  triangle	  as	  a	  set	  of	  intersecting	  circles	  as	  in	  Figure	  4.2	  without	  losing	  any	  of	  its	  essential	  information.	  In	  this	  revised	  drawing	  the	  outer	  ring	  of	  letters	  represent	  the	  pure,	  or	  ideal-­‐typical	  sectors	  of	  the	  state	  or	  government	  (G),	  market	  (B,	  for	  business),	  third	  sector	  (A,	  for	  associations)	  and	  intimate	  sphere,	  or	  household	  sector	  (H).	  At	  the	   center	   of	   Figure	   4.2	   are	   five	   unlabeled	   intersectors	   composed	   of	   logical	   possibilities	   of	  combining	  three	  and	  all	  four	  of	  the	  basic	  types	  (GAH,	  ABH,	  GAB,	  GHB	  and	  AGHB).	  All	  together,	  this	   makes	   for	   a	   total	   of	   thirteen	   logical	   combinations	   of	   the	   original	   four	   ideal	   types,	   or	  intersectors.	   In	   all	   likelihood,	   it	   is	   the	   empirical	   combinations	   that	   correspond	   to	   these	  intersectors	  that	  some	  commentators	  have	  misread	  as	  evidence	  of	  sector	  convergences.	  While	  this	   may	   at	   first	   appear	   curious,	   even	   slightly	   absurd,	   closer	   examination	   is	   likely	   to	   prove	  fruitful:	  Thus,	  for	  example,	  a	  type	  of	  “converged”	  association	  of	  interest	  to	  the	  third	  sector	  that	  might	   encompass	   all	   four	   sectors	   (AGHB)	   would	   be	   a	   social	   club	   (A)	   of	   retired	   military	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officers(G),	   who	   live	   together	   (H)	   and	   sell	  memorabilia	   and	   insignia	   to	   support	   their	   shared	  household	  (B).	  Surely,	  this	  is	  not	  a	  highly	  probable	  or	  frequent	  total	  convergence,	  but	  it	  is	  also	  not	  at	  all	  out	  of	  the	  realm	  of	  possibility.	  It	  serves	  to	  illustrate	  the	  underlying	  premise	  that	  the	  thirteen	  logical	  combinations	  shown	  in	  Figure	  4.2	  may	  be	  used	  as	  a	  typology	  to	  account	  for	  or	  classify	  all,	  or	  nearly	  all,	  existing	  organizations	  by	  sector.	  	  
Figure	  4.2	  
Thirteen	  Logical	  Sectors	  and	  Intersectors	  
	  Is	   it	   also	   possible	   to	   be	   any	  more	   specific	   about	   differences	   between	   these	   sectors	   as	  ideal	  types?	  I	  think	  so.	  Figure	  4.3	  shows	  a	  conception	  of	  three	  sectors	  as	  ideal	  types	  included	  in	  
The	   Commons	   (1992),	   with	   some	  minor	   adjustments.	   (The	   reader	   will	   note	   that	   the	   “fourth	  sector”	  –	  a.k.a.,	  the	  intimate	  sphere	  –	  is	  not	  included	  in	  this	  conception,	  but	  is	  included	  in	  Figure	  4.2	  (the	  circles	  marked	  with	  an	  H,	  for	  household.)	  	  
  84 
Figure	  4.3	  
Four	  Sectors	  as	  Ideal	  Types	  
	  
	   Commons	   Market	   State	  
Participation	   Uncoerced	   Uncoerced	   Coercive	  
Purpose	   Shared	  	   Maximization	   Authoritative	  
Resources	   Common	   Private	   Public	  
Goods	   Common	  Goods	   Private	  Goods	   Public	  Good	  
Reciprocity	   Mutuality	   Quid	  pro	  quo	   Equity	  
Social	  
Relations	  
Fairness	   Caveat	  
Emptor	  
Law	  
Source:	  Lohmann,	  The	  Commons	  (1992),	  p.	  60.	  In	   another,	   more	   recent	   analysis,	   Antonin	   Wagner	   attributes	   the	   nonprofit	   model	  directly	   to	   Lester	   Salamon	   and	   the	   Johns	   Hopkins	   program	   and	   concludes:	   “It	   is	   tailored	   to	  serve	  an	  economic	  purpose,	  namely	  to	  gather	  data	  on:	  •	  resources	  (funds,	  employees,	  volunteers)	  obtained	  by	  certain	  organisations	  and	  	  	  	  allocated	  to	  the	  provision	  of	  goods	  and	  services;	  •	  the	  organisations	  from	  which	  these	  resources	  are	  obtained;	  •	  the	  division	  of	  labor	  established	  between	  different	  kinds	  of	  organisations	  in	  	  	  	  providing	  the	  services;	  •	  the	  households	  to	  which	  these	  services	  are	  delivered.”	  (Wagner,	  2012,	  313)	  Given	   the	  widespread	   acceptance	  of	   the	  Nonprofit	  Model	   in	   the	  U.S.	   and	   elsewhere,	   it	   hardly	  seems	  fair	  to	  single	  out	  a	  single	  institution,	  particular	  individuals,	  or	  group	  of	  researchers.	  So,	  let	  us	  assume	  that	  debate	  over	  the	  nonprofit	  organization	  model	  of	  the	  third	  sector	  should	  be	  conducted	  only	  in	  part	  as	  a	  debate	  over	  applicability	  to	  countries,	  nations	  and	  cultures.	   	  From	  that	  perspective,	  there	  should	  be	  no	  doubt	  that	  the	  current	  nonprofit	  model	  provides	  a	  highly	  viable	   account	   of	   the	   nonprofit	   corporate	   sector	   in	   the	   U.S.	   (c.f.,	   Hall,	   2013)	   and	   that	   the	  questions	   it	   raises	   are	   of	   more	   general	   interest	   in	   the	   various	   international	   third	   sector	  research	  communities	  alluded	  to	  in	  Appendix	  A.	  From	  this	  light,	  LaVille’s	  critiques	  might	  more	  appropriately	  be	  rephrased	  as	  the	  following	  questions:	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1. What	   institutions	   and	   forms	   of	   organization	   are	   found	   outside	   markets,	  governments	  and	  households?	  And,	  how	  do	   they	  engender	   identity,	   solidarity,	  trust	  and	  social	  capital?	  2. Do	   any	   other	   social,	   cultural	   and	   political	   arrangements	   serve	   the	   same	  purposes	  or	  social	  functions	  (notably,	  engendering	  identity,	  solidarity,	  trust	  and	  social	   capital	   formation)	   as	   tax	   exemption,	   tax	   deductions	   and	   legal	  nondistribution	  constraints?	  3. What	  alternatives	  to	   instrumental	  rationality	  are	  evident	   in	  understanding	  the	  full	  range	  and	  scope	  of	  the	  third	  sector?	  4. What	   is	   the	  appropriate	  theoretical	  role	   for	  conflict	   in	  third	  sector	   institutions	  largely	  built	  largely	  on	  trust,	  cooperation	  and	  social	  harmony?	  5. Can	  the	  third	  sector	  be	  reframed	  for	  policy-­‐makers	  and	  other	  adherents	  of	  the	  two-­‐sector	  model	   in	  ways	   that	  pose	  more	  plausible	  views	  of	   the	   full	   sector	  as	  something	  more	  than	  just	  nonprofits?	  	  
The	  Wider	  Third	  Sector	  	  Some	   might	   suggest	   that	   we	   limit	   our	   vision	   to	   the	   nonprofit	   sector	   and	   civil	   society	  alternatives.	  In	  doing	  so	  there	  is	  insufficient	  acknowledgement	  of	  the	  numerous	  other	  research	  paradigms	  or	  disciplinary	  matrices	  currently	  extant	  in	  third	  sector	  studies	  that	  are	  arguably	  as	  significant	   as	   those	   two.	   There	   is	   no	   room	   to	   consider	   the	   equally	   seminal	   concepts	   and	  cumulative	  contributions	  to	  understanding	  the	  totality	  of	  the	  contemporary	  wider	  third	  sector.	  	  When	  we	  encounter	  the	  full	  range	  and	  scope	  of	  a	  list	  of	  all	  the	  possible	  elements	  of	  the	  third	  sector	   like	   the	   one	   in	   Appendix	   A,	   we	   come	   up	   against	   a	   paradox:	   All	   of	   these	   diverse	  perspectives	  currently	  have	  significant	  research	  and/or	  practice	  communities	   in	  place	  willing	  to	   defend	   their	   veracity	   and	   centrality.	   However,	   the	   wider	   third	   sector	   currently	   has	   no	  research	   community	   currently.	   Thus,	   it	   is	   relatively	   easy	   for	   anyone	   to	  make	   and	  defend	   the	  claim	   that	   any	   one	   of	   these	   ‘paradigms’	   can	   adequately	   define	   the	   third	   sector.	   	   Thus,	   for	  example,	   the	   claim	   that	   nonprofit	   organization	   and	   civil	   society	   are	   the	   two	   dominant	  paradigms	  and	  all	  others	  are	  merely	   terms,	   concepts	  or	  components	  of	   those	   two	  views	   is	  as	  plausible	  as	  the	  opposite	  claim	  that	  they	  are	  merely	  parts	  of	  any	  of	  the	  other	  paradigms.	  A	  full,	  genuine	   and	   mature	   third	   sector	   paradigm	   will	   need	   to	   find	   ways	   and	   build	   research	   and	  practice	   communities	   that	   take	   all	   of	   these	   and	   perhaps	  more	   into	   account.	   This	  may	   be	   the	  foremost	   challenge	   currently	   facing	   the	   field	   of	   third	   sector	   studies,	   and	   the	   contents	   of	   this	  volume	  offer	  only	  one	  small	  start	  in	  that	  direction.	  
Conclusion:	  ‘And’	  Not	  ‘Or’	  What	  are	  the	  implications	  of	  accepting	  the	  view	  presented	  here	  that	  the	  nonprofit	  sector	  is	  a	   third	  sector,	  not	   the	  sum	  and	  substance	  of	  the	  wider	   third	  sector?	  However,	   there	   is	  one,	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largely	   methodological	   implication	   that	   appears	   to	   offer	   an	   important	   starting	   point.	   That	  would	  be	  to	  abandon	  –	  or	  more	  importantly	  –	  to	  adapt	  the	  futile	  search	  for	  a	  “first	  principle”	  or	  primary	  construct	  from	  which	  the	  entire	  nature	  of	  the	  third	  sector	  can	  be	  deduced,	  and	  instead	  embrace	   the	  notion	   that	   the	   third	  sector	   is	   truly	  polycentric	  and	  pluralistic	   in	  character.	  This	  follows	   directly	   from	   the	   notion	   of	   a	   sector	   of	   self-­‐defining,	   self-­‐governing	   entities.	   	   Each	   of	  what	   appear	   at	   present	   to	   be	   its	   multiple	   theoretical	   cores	   should	   be	   treated	   as	   if	   it	   has	  something	   important	   to	   contribute,	   whether	   that	   contribution	   is	   derived	   from	   traditional	  academic	  disciplines	   like	  economics,	  history	  and	  sociology,	   the	  newer	  practice	  disciplines	   like	  social	  work	  and	  public	  administration,	  specialty	  fields	  like	  art	  history	  and	  sports	  management,	  or	  practice	  domains	  with	  no	  or	  very	  limited	  academic	  bases,	  like	  volunteering,	  fundraising	  and	  philanthropy.	  	  In	   this	  regard,	  purportedly	  umbrella	  concepts	   like	  nonprofit	  organization,	  civil	   society,	  commons,	  social	  economy,	  the	  social	  sector,	  et.	  al.	  will	  continue	  to	  offer	  in	  the	  future.	  	  But	  their	  various	  advocates	  (including	  this	  author)	  should	  agree	  to	  abandon	  any	  pretense	  of	  claims	  that	  any	  particular	  term	  or	  concept	  holds	  the	  key	  to	  understanding	  the	  wider	  third	  sector,	  or	  even	  offers	  a	  suitable	  starting	  point	  from	  which	  to	  deduce	  the	  order	  or	  character	  of	  the	  entire	  sector.	  	  It	   has	   become	   clearer	   each	   year,	   for	   example,	   since	   the	   concept	   of	   the	   commons	  was	  introduced	  to	  third	  sector	  studies	  (Lohmann,	  1991;	  Lohmann,	  1992)	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  common	  resource	  pools	  controlled	  by	  their	  governing	  boards	  but	  not	  ‘owned’	  by	  anyone	  in	  the	  full	  sense	  legal	  and	  philosophical	  sense	  of	  that	  term,	  are	  important	  parts	  of	  the	  third	  sector.	  But,	  nothing	  in	   the	   idea	   of	   common	   resource	   pooling	   should	   be	   read	   as	   requiring	   or	   demanding	  abandonment,	   or	   worse	   rejection,	   of	   similar	   insights	   about	   voluntary	   associations,	   nonprofit	  sectors,	   philanthropy,	   nongovernmental	   sectors,	   foundation	   sectors,	   civil	   societies,	   social	  economies,	   social	   sectors,	   voluntary	   action,	   social	   production,	   altruistics,	   or	   any	   of	   the	   other	  candidates	  for	  a	  keystone	  term.	  A	  substantive	  name	  for	  the	  third	  sector	  as	  a	  whole	  is	  only	  one	  of	  the	  many	  questions	  still	  to	  be	  answered,	  and	  far	  from	  the	  most	  important.	  So	  long	  as	  adherents	  of	  these	  diverse	  perspectives	  can	  continue	  producing	  useful	  and	  interesting	  results,	  the	  general	  field	   of	   third	   sector	   studies	   will	   continue	   to	   benefit	   from	   such	   plural	   outlooks,	   and	  representatives	  of	  multiple	  disciplines	  will	  find	  reasons	  to	  continue	  to	  contribute.	  Our	  attitude	  toward	  such	  perspectives	  should	  continue	  to	  be	  not	  which	  view	  is	  correct,	  but	  rather	  so	  what?	  If	  we	  accept	  your	  view	   that	  your	  perspective	   is	   important,	  what	   insights	   and	  understandings	  does	  it	  yield?	  	  Of	   course	   there	  will	   come	  a	   time	  (or	  more	   likely	  several	   times)	  when	  choices	  must	  be	  made,	  insights	  must	  be	  consolidated	  and	  our	  plural	  foci	  will	  narrow	  somewhat.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  recognize,	  however,	  that	  such	  consolidations	  are	  not	  exclusively	  matters	  of	  logic	  and	  theory.	  	  That	  is	  one	  of	  several	  important	  implications	  of	  LaVille’s	  suggestion	  above	  that	  we	  get	  beyond	  exclusive	   preoccupation	   with	   instrumental	   reason.	   There	   are	   also	   importantly	   social	   and	  political	   processes	   and	   cultural	   dynamics	   and	   particularities	   involved	   here,	   and	   it	   would	   be	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rather	  foolish	  of	  a	  group	  of	  social	  scientists	  and	  humanists	  to	  ignore	  that.	  Thus,	  the	  particular	  events	  that	  went	   into	  the	   formation	  of	  ARNOVA	  in	  1988-­‐1989	  and	  the	  past	  or	   future	  entry	  of	  researchers	  and	  scholars	  from	  each	  discipline,	  country	  and	  cultural	  system	  into	  the	  fertile	  mix	  of	  third	  sector	  studies	  have	  had	  major	  implications	  growing	  out	  of	  that	  particular	  decision	  to	  re-­‐define	   the	   field	   from	   an	   earlier	   academic	   and	   practice	   focus	   on	   small	   groups	   and	   voluntary	  action	  to	  “nonprofit	  organizations	  and	  voluntary	  action”	  (the	  NOVA	  of	  the	  name).	  	  Ultimately,	  perhaps	   the	  most	   important	  exogenous	   impact	   that	   the	   cacophony	  of	   third	  sector	  studies	  can	  reasonably	  be	  expected	  to	  produce	  is	  adjustment	  or	  modification	  in	  the	  basic	  two-­‐sector	   model	   itself.	   To	   date,	   these	   modifications	   have	   been	   limited	   to	   a	   few	   such	  adjustments.	  National	   economic	  data,	   for	   example,	  now	  routinely	   take	   into	  account	  nonprofit	  unemployment.	  However,	   in	  several	  other	  respects	   the	  three-­‐sector	  model	  remains	  a	  pride	  of	  two	  lions	  and	  one	  rather	  easily	  ignored	  mouse.	  Most	  researchers,	  theorists	  and	  practitioners	  in	  third	  sector	  studies	  continue	  to	  believe	  that	  our	  mouse	  is	  roaring	  but	  mostly	  at	  an	  acoustic	  level	  that	  is	  still	  well	  above	  the	  range	  of	  the	  lions’	  ears.	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I	   have	   resolved	   to	   open	   a	   new	   route,	   which	   has	   not	   yet	   been	   followed	   by	   anyone,	   and	   may	   prove	   difficult	   and	  
troublesome.	  
~	  Niccolo	  Machiavelli,	  Discourses.	  Introduction	  to	  Book	  One	  
5.	  New	  Commons	  In	  this	  chapter	  we	  will	  explore	  three	  inter-­‐related	  themes	  more	  fully:	  Specifically	  we	  will	  introduce	   the	   concept	   of	   the	   new	   commons	   and	   draw	   a	   distinction	   between	   new	   and	   old	  commons,	  deeply	  embedded	  in	  existing	  communal	  institutions	  of	  rural	  life,	  and	  new	  commons,	  which	  must	  forge	  their	  own	  communal	  nexus	  in	  urban	  settings.	  In	  addition,	  we	  will	  set	  out	  to	  distinguish	  between	  the	  old	  common	  pool	  resources	  of	  shared	  property	  in	  primary	  industries	  like	   agriculture,	   forestry	   and	   fishing,	   and	   new	   common	   pool	   resources	   beyond	   simply	  information	   and	   also	   social	   relations	   outside	   families,	   markets	   and	   states.	   Further,	   we	   will	  attempt	   to	   sketch	   the	   case	   for	   a	  necessary	   connection	  between	  new	  commons	  and	  voluntary	  action.	   Then	   finally,	   we	   will	   introduce	   an	   example,	   the	   suburban	   commons.	   Not	   a	   part	   of	   a	  traditional	   or	   sedimentary	   society	   and	   established	   practice,	   such	   a	   commons	   can	   only	   be	  created	  through	  voluntary	  action.	  Voluntary	  association	  and	  collective	  action	  can	  occur	  anywhere.	  In	  this	  and	  the	  following	  chapters	   we	   will	   explore	   the	   special	   role	   of	   new	   commons	   in	   modern	   voluntary	   action	   of	  different	   types	   in	   a	   distinct	   modern	   circumstance;	   voluntary	   associations,	   groups	   and	  assemblies	  organized	  outside	  markets	  or	  governments	  within	  a	  supportive	   legal	  environment	  of	   freedom	  of	   association	   and	   assembly	   and	   characterized	  by	   voluntary	  participation,	   shared	  purposes	   and	   shared	   resources.	   The	   phrase	   new	   commons	   as	   used	   here	   is	   a	   term	   of	   art	  intended	   to	   cover	   a	   wide	   variety	   of	   related	   instances	   that	   will	   be	   detailed	   in	   subsequent	  chapters.	  
New	  Commons:	  A	  Bricolagé	  Bricolagé	  is	  a	  term	  of	  art	  for	  a	  collection	  of	  objects	  made	  from	  available	  materials.	  The	  commons	   theory	   of	   voluntary	   action,	   like	   voluntary	   action	   and	   the	   third	   sector,	   are	   such	  collections,	  made	   from	  an	  assortment	  of	  known	  and	  accepted	   insights	  stemming	   from	  a	  wide	  variety	   of	   different	   traditions,	   cultures,	   practices,	   disciplines	   and	   professions.	   The	   term	   ‘new	  commons’	  was	  coined	  by	  Charlotte	  Hess	  and	  the	  late	  Elinor	  Ostrom	  to	  refer	  to	  “various	  types	  of	  shared	  resources	  that	  have	  recently	  evolved	  or	  have	  been	  recognized	  as	  commons.	  .	  .	  without	  pre-­‐
existing	  rules	  or	  clear	   institutional	  arrangements”	  (Hess,	  2008:	  1.	  Emphasis	  added).	  Commons,	  in	  their	  sense,	  refer	  to	  common	  resource	  pools	  or	  CRPs,	  together	  with	  rules	  that	  govern	  flows	  into	  and	  out	  of	   those	  common	  pools,	  and	  assumed	  agents	  to	  regulate	  such	  flows.	  Much	  of	   the	  new	   commons	   theory	   of	   voluntary	   action	   is	   concerned	  with	   spelling	   out	   further	   information	  about	   the	   particular	   character	   of	   agentry	   in	   a	   distinct	   class	   of	   new	   commons	   and	   associated	  rule-­‐making	  procedures.	  Hess	  is	  a	  professional	  librarian	  instrumental	  in	  establishing	  the	  Digital	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Library	  of	  the	  Commons	  online	  (http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/).	  Ostrom	  is	  a	  co-­‐founder	  of	  the	  Indiana	   University	   Workshop	   on	   Political	   Theory	   and	   Policy	   Analysis	   and	   a	   Nobel	   Prize	  laureate.	   New	   commons	   in	   their	   sense	   are	   closely	   interwoven	   in	   the	   following	   pages	   with	  another	   of	   their	   terms,	   knowledge	   commons	   (Hess	   &	   Ostrom,	   2007)	   with	   the	   intent	   of	  elaborating	   on	   both.	   The	   latter	   term,	   as	   the	   name	   suggests,	   is	   particularly	   concerned	   with	  knowledge	   as	   a	   common	   pool	   resource.	   Knowledge	   commons	   are	   the	   particular	   focus	   of	  Chapter	  7	  below.	  Hess	  and	  Ostrom,	  et.	  al.	  use	  the	  term	  new	  commons	  to	  encompass	  a	  great	  deal	  that	   is	   familiar	   to	   third	   sector	   scholars	   and	   some	   things	   that	   are	   not.	   Their	   listing	   includes:	  “scientific	  knowledge,	  voluntary	  associations,	  climate	  change,	  community	  gardens,	  wikipedias,	  cultural	  treasures,	  plant	  seeds,	  and	  the	  electromagnetic	  spectrum”.	  In	  what	  follows,	  a	  number	  of	  additional	   species	  of	   the	  genus	  new	  commons	  are	  added	   to	   this	   listing	  as	  well.	  Their	   focus	   is	  largely	  on	  “the	  physical	  resources,	  the	  user	  communities,	  the	  literature,	  and	  some	  of	  the	  major	  collective	  action	  activities”	  of	  such	  efforts	  (Hess,	  2008:	  1)	  but	  straining	  toward	  inclusion	  also	  of	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  non-­‐physical	  entities	  and	  social	  and	  cultural	  resource	  pools;	  (Lohmann,	  1992).	  Their	  list	  of	  examples	  above	  is	  something	  of	  a	  mélange,	  including	  topics	  characterized	  variously	  by	  the	  resources	  involved,	  by	  agents	  and	  by	  outcomes.	  Yet,	  each	  of	  their	  types	  of	  new	  commons	  is	  also	  concerned	  with	  voluntary	  action	  in	  the	  sense	  used	  here.	  Elaborating	  the	  character	  of	  that	  connection	  between	  voluntary	  action	  is	  a	  fundamental	  purpose	  of	  this	  entire	  volume.	  Use	  of	  the	  term	   new	   commons	   in	   the	   specific	   context	   of	   the	   third	   sector	   is	   compatible	   with	   the	   Hess-­‐Ostrom	  definition,	   but	   different	   from	   their	   typical	   focus.	   It	   deliberately	   highlights	   the	   groups	  and	   associations,	   assemblies	   and	   voluntary	   action	   involved	   and	   elaborates	   the	   production	   of	  non-­‐universal	  common	  goods,	  a	  concept	  that	  is	  examined	  more	  fully	  in	  Chapter	  5	  below.	  	  Scientific	  knowledge,	  climate	  change	  activities,	  the	  design,	  construction	  and	  use	  of	  wikis,	  community	   gardening	   and	   knowledge	   of	   the	   electromagnetic	   spectrum	   do	   not	   exist	   in	   some	  metaphysical	   dimensions	   of	   their	   own,	   and	   they	   are	   not	   physical	   resources,	   although	   some	  physical	  objects	  may	  be	  involved.	  Each	  of	  these	  is	  a	  subject	  embedded	  in	  the	  conscious	  projects	  of	  particular	  individuals	  and	  groups,	  invoking	  or	  implying	  researchers,	  theorists,	  practitioners	  and	   students.	   They	   are	   all	   of	   interest	   here	   as	   the	   shared	   cognitive	   constructs	   or	   knowledge	  commons	   of	   people	   engaged	   in	   associations	   and	   assemblies	  who	   use	   their	   shared	   or	   pooled	  knowledge	   as	   resources	   in	   pursuit	   of	   diverse	   projects	   they	   imagine,	   structure	   and	   carry	   out	  (Taylor,	   2004).	   Groups	   of	   scientists,	   technicians,	   activists,	   gardeners,	   engineers	   and	   others	  voluntarily	   associate	  with	   one	   another	   because	   of	   their	   shared	   interests	   and	   their	   desire	   for	  such	  knowledge	  pooling.	  	  The	  particular	  focus	  on	  the	  association	  and	  assembly	  here	  is	  not	  intended	  as	  a	  critique	  of	  other	  approaches	  to	  the	  explorations	  of	  commons	  studies	  or	  of	  contemporary	  nonprofit	  studies.	  It	  is,	  in	  fact,	  supplemental	  to	  both.	  As	  Hess	  (2008:	  3)	  notes,	  “The	  difficulty	  in	  writing	  about	  new	  commons	   is	   its	   seemingly	   limitless	   diversity”.	   The	   present	   work	   strives	   only	   to	   deal	   with	  selected	   aspects	   of	   that	   diversity	   by	   limiting	   the	   scope	   of	   immediate	   concern	   to	   collective	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human	   social	   interaction.	   For	   example,	   studies	   that	   focus	   exclusively	   on	   the	   electromagnetic	  spectrum	  as	  a	  common	  resource	  pool	  or	  public	  property	  domain,	  apart	  from	  the	  interactions	  of	  the	  associations	  of	  engineers	  and	  scientists	  who	  share	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  resource	  are	  not	  an	   immediate	   concern	   here.	   Similarly,	   the	   protracted	   conflicts	   that	   may	   arise	   are	   proper	  subjects	  for	  deviance	  research	  or	  conflict	  studies,	  but	  also	  are	  not	  the	  central	  focus	  here.	  We	  are	  interested	  primarily	  in	  the	  social,	  political,	  economic	  and	  cultural	  dynamics	  of	  cooperation	  and	  collaboration	  in	  voluntary	  action	  as	  an	  ideal	  type.	  	  Hess	  and	  Ostrom	  (2007)	  call	  attention	  to	  the	  recent	  evolution	  of	  new	  commons,	  but	  offer	  little	  in	  the	  way	  of	  explanation	  of	  why	  or	  when	  new	  commons	  evolved,	  nor	  connect	  it	  with	  the	  larger	   themes	   of	   democracy	   in	   society	   and	   culture	   discussed	   above.	   New	   commons	   are	  presented	   here	   as	   crescive	   or	   invented	   political	   and	   cultural	   institutions:	   creatures	   of	  interaction	  in	  daily	  life,	  law	  and	  policy.	  The	  origins	  of	  new	  commons	  can	  be	  located,	  in	  part,	  in	  the	  historic	  enclosures	  in	  England	  and	  elsewhere.	  The	  underlying	  attitudes	  and	  practices	  are	  to	  be	  found	  in	  a	  philanthropy	  that	  developed	  first	  in	  ancient	  Athens	  and	  in	  the	  communal	  nature	  of	  the	  Italian	  city	  states	  (a	  subject	  explored	  in	  Chapter	  Eleven),	  the	  shared,	  collective	  aspects	  of	  the	  American	   colonial	   and	   frontier	   experiences,	   tribal	   and	   village	   life	   in	   ancient	   and	   medieval	  Europe.	   However,	   it	   was	   particularly	   in	   the	   adaptations	   of	   modern	   legally	   sanctioned	  institutions	   and	   practices	   to	   intentionally	   constitute	   establish,	   maintain	   and	   enforce	   the	  freedoms	  of	  association	  and	  assembly	  while	  protecting	  collectively	  held	  resources,	  that	  the	  real	  origins	  of	  new	  commons	  are	   found.	  This	  discovery	   reaches	   to	   some	   strange	  places,	   including	  U.S.	  tax	  policy.	  None	  of	  these	  influences	  are	  definitive;	  yet	  all	  were	  influential	  in	  some	  way.	  The	  Magna	  Carta	  (1215)	  and	  the	  Statute	  of	  Charitable	  Uses	  in	  Great	  Britain	  (1601),	  German,	  British	  and	  other	  Statutes	  of	  Apprentices;	   the	  Mayflower	  Compact	   (1620),	   the	  U.S.	   First	  Amendment	  (1789),	  the	  Dartmouth	  College	  case	  (1834),	  Section	  501	  of	  the	  Internal	  Revenue	  Act	  (1935),	  Boy	  
Scouts	  of	  America	  v.	  Dale	  (2000)	  and	  the	  Citizens	  United	  decision	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Supreme	  Court	  in	  2010	  are	  among	  the	  most	  important	  of	  these	  gradual,	  cumulative	  changes	  in	  the	  specific	   legal	  climate	  of	  voluntary	  action	  in	  the	  U.S.	  Quite	  different	  and	  distinct	  patterns	  of	  legal	  sanction	  and	  prescription	  are	  evident	  in	  other	  nations.	  The	  general	  modern	  trend	  toward	  the	   legal	  recognition	  and	  enabling	  of	  new	  commons	  has	  not	  until	  very	  recently,	  been	  an	  effort	  for	  the	  planned	  constituting	  of	  a	  third	  sector.	  It	  was	  instead	   a	   response	   to	   the	   rise,	   clarity	   and	   refinement	   of	   the	   governmental	   institutions	   of	   the	  nation	  state,	  the	  rise	  of	  individualism	  and	  humanitarianism,	  and	  partial,	  fragmentary	  efforts	  to	  protect	   communal	   and	   collective	   resources	   in	   the	   face	   of	   the	   nearly	   universal	  institutionalization	   of	   Lockean	   systems	   of	   public	   law	   protecting	   private	   property.	   In	   such	  systems,	   every	   thing	   is	  property	  and	  all	  property	  belongs	   to	   someone,	  whether	  an	   individual	  person,	  institution,	  corporate	  or	  public	  entity.	  This	  inevitably	  raises	  the	  question	  characteristic	  of	  private	  property	   regimes:	   to	  whom	  do	   the	   commons	  belong?	  One	  standard	  answer	   to	   that	  question	  is	  further	  privatization	  (or	  enclosure).	  In	  recent	  centuries,	  a	  vast	  number	  of	  common	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lands	   and	   properties	   of	   vague,	   indefinite	   or	   undetermined	   ownership	   were	   brought	   within	  property	  regimes	  and	  subsequently	  enclosed	  and	  privatized.	  These	  enclosure	  processes	  along	  with	   industrialization	   frequently	   brought	   about	   major	   disruptions	   of	   entire	   traditional	  communities,	  practices,	  occupations	  and	  ways	  of	  life,	  This	  was	  already	  clear	  in	  the	  18th	  century,	  e.g.	   in	   Oliver	   Goldsmith’s	   poem,	  The	   Deserted	   Village.	  Enclosure	   also	   brought	   to	   the	   fore	   the	  issue	  of	  ownership	  and	  the	   legal	  status	  of	  common	  properties	  and	  common	  goods.	   In	  the	  U.S.	  yet	   another	   type	   of	   new	   commons,	   municipal	   corporations	   were	   apparently	   also	   one	   of	   the	  developments	  to	  come	  out	  of	  such	  clarifying	  exercises.	  Awareness	  of	  enclosure-­‐related	  losses	  of	  common	   resources	   –	   many	   of	   which	   have	   sometimes	   been	   summarized	   as	   part	   of	   a	   more	  general	  “loss	  of	  community”	  –	  has	  been	  continuous	  and	  ongoing,	  and	  provoked	  many	  counter-­‐measures,	  most	  notably	  legal	  protections	  of	  economic	  resources	  (financial	  assets),	  entirely	  new	  institutionalized	  practices	  to	  invent	  and	  protect	  freedoms	  of	  speech,	  religion,	  public	  charity,	  and	  philanthropy,	   and	   new	   or	   reorganized	   forms	   of	   collective	   behavior	   in	   associations	   and	  assemblies).	  Because	  the	  third	  sector	  in	  its	  full	  character	  is	  only	  a	  recent	  emergence,	  and	  an	  object	  of	  study	  and	  analysis,	  the	  full	  implications	  of	  the	  transformation	  from	  commons	  to	  new	  commons	  has	  yet	  to	  come	  completely	   into	  focus,	  as	  noted	  in	  Chapter	  3.	  The	  rise	  of	   the	  modern	  political	  state	  and	  the	  market	  order	  are	  extensively	  studied	  and	  clearly	  theorized	  (e.g.,	  Lindblom,	  1977).	  In	  comparison,	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  third	  sector	  of	  institutions	  built	  around	  new	  commons	  has	  received	   limited	   attention.	   While	   the	   older	   commons	   of	   village	   greens,	   common	   fields	   and	  woodlands	  served	  multiple	  purposes	  as	  common	  pool	  resources	  for	  largely	  agricultural	  people	  living	  in	  close	  proximity	  to	  one	  another,	  today	  multiple,	  separate	  organizations,	  association	  and	  assemblies	   stand	   ready	   to	   serve	   similar	   purposes	   for	   urban	   and	   suburban	   residents.	   This	  emergence	  is	  truly	  momentous	  but	  has	  been	  easy	  for	  theorists	  to	  overlook	  in	  part	  because	  it	  has	  been	  an	  ongoing	  gradual	  development	  over	  several	  centuries,	  yet	  so	  close	  to	  our	  daily	  lives	  as	  to	  be	  almost	  invisible.	  Over	  and	  beyond	  this,	  many	  of	  the	  volunteer	  and	  professional	  practitioners	  who	  have	  actually	  worked	  out	  the	  institutional	  details	  of	  new	  commons	  are	  often	  protective	  of	  their	   creations	   and	   suspicious	   or	   even	   antagonistic	   toward	   academics	   and	   theorists	   and	  uninterested	  in	  characterizing	  or	  explaining	  them.	  This	  is	  relatively	  easy	  to	  observe	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  for	   example,	   in	   the	   disciplines	   of	   nonprofit	   management,	   fundraising	   and	   foundation	  management,	  and	  many	  other	  fields	  where	  new	  commons	  are	  found.	  National	  and	  sub-­‐national	  legislatures	  and	  courts	   in	  many	  nations	  responded	  to	  the	  profound	  disruptions	  of	  society	  and	  culture	  occasioned	  by	   the	  enclosures	  of	  common	   lands	  with	   legislation	   to	  protect	  and	  benefit	  the	   poor,	   in	   particular,	   in	   other	  ways	   (e.g.,	   the	   Elizabethan	   Poor	   Laws	   of	   1601	   and	   1834)	   to	  protect	   collective	   pooled	   assets	   and	   their	   donors	   (e.g.,	   the	   British	   Statute	   of	   Charitable	  Uses,	  also	  of	  1601	  and	  Section	  501	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Internal	  Revenue	  Service	  code,	  adopted	  in	  1935),	  and	  to	  establish	  and	  protect	  freedoms	  of	  religion,	  speech,	  association	  and	  assembly	  (e.g.,	  the	  U.S.	  First	  Amendment	  adopted	  in	  1789	  and	  more	  recently	  the	  U.N	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights,	  in	  1948).	  These	   and	  many	  more	   national	   examples	  were	   enacted	   to	   enable	   and	   restore	   resources	   and	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functions	  disrupted	  by	  the	  enclosure	  of	  commons	  (see	  Emerson,	  1965;	  Fremont-­‐Smith,	  2004).	  That	  is	  to	  say,	  many	  new	  associations	  appear	  to	  have	  been	  motivated	  by	  enclosure,	  enacted,	  or	  intentionally	  created	  and	  not	  established	  by	  legislative	  act	  or	  formal	  ratification,	  but	  created	  on	  the	   basis	   of	   the	   voluntary	   association	   of	   autonomous,	   self-­‐governing	   persons	   (“individuals”)	  under	   existing	   law,	   customs,	   social	   conventions	   and	   other	   moeurs. Such	   new	   commons	   are	  grounded	   in	   what	   Tocqueville	   was	   the	   first	   to	   recognize:	   that	   19th	   century	   Americans,	   and	  subsequently	  citizens	  of	  democratic	  civil	  societies,	  and	  sometimes	  even	  those	  who	  only	  aspire	  to	   the	   democratic	   condition,	   possess	   enormous	   latent	   powers	   of	   association	   and	   self	  organization	  that	  may	  erupt	  at	  any	  time	   in	   the	   ‘spontaneous’	   formation	  of	  assemblies,	  groups	  and	   voluntary	   associations.	   Their	   enforcement	   by	   governments	   suspicious	   or	   envious	   of	   the	  protections	  provided,	  as	  noted	  by	  Cohen	  and	  Arato	  (1992)	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  has	  often	  resulted	  in	  a	  rather	  lax	  legal	  environment	  and	  loose,	  even	  baggy,	  enforcement	  on	  both	  sides:	  Outside	  critics	  note	   that	   new	   commons	   get	   by	   with	   too	   much	   questionable	   behavior,	   while	   other	   critics	  question	  the	  need	  for	  any	  legal	  strictures	  at	  all.	  From	  the	  very	  earliest	  onset,	   formation	  of	  a	  new	  sector	  or	   space	  was	   in	  no	  measure	  a	  deliberate	   act	   or	   trend;	   the	   entire	   development	   was	   entirely	   unforeseen	   and	   has	   been	  essentially	   a	   latent	   function	   or	   unintended	   consequence	   of	   other	   changes.	   No	   legislature	   or	  court	   ever	   set	   out,	   for	   example,	   to	   actually	   create	   or	   establish	   a	   third	   sector.	   At	  most,	   public	  officials	  may	  have	   sought	   to	   establish	   specific,	   individual	   new	   commons	   as	   entities	   like	   state	  mental	   hospitals,	   land-­‐grant	   universities,	   or	   the	   International	   Red	   Cross,	   or	   in	   some	   cases,	  merely	  to	  enable	  categories	  or	  types	  of	  entities,	  like	  tax-­‐exempt	  public	  charities	  or	  cooperatives.	  Developments	   like	   the	   recent	   embrace	   of	   the	   third	   sector	   and	   of	   nongovernmental	  organizations	  by	  various	  national	  governments	  and	   international	  bodies	   like	   the	  U.N.	  and	   the	  World	   Bank	   are	  more	   in	   the	   nature	   of	   faits	   accompli	   than	   constitutional	   acts.	  National	   third	  sectors	   as	   a	  whole	   are	   from	   a	   public	   policy	   perspective	  mostly	   statistical	   artifacts	   tabulating	  institutions	  arising	  as	  unintended	  consequences	  of	  public	  policy.	  Yet,	  looking	  back	  over	  recent	  centuries,	  it	  seems	  evident	  that,	  constitutional	  and	  statutory	  law	  and	  administrative	  regulation	  have	  supplanted	  and	  reinforced	  community	  traditions,	  local	  cultures	  and	  traditional	  customs	  as	  the	   basis	   for	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   common	   pool	   resources	   that	   enable	   voluntary	   action	   in	  communities.	  This	  shift	  from	  tradition	  to	  policy	  has,	  also	  largely	  without	  intent	  to	  do	  so,	  greatly	  expanded	  the	  contemporary	  range	  of	  possibilities	  for	  collective	  action.	  Along	  the	  way	  some	  very	  important	  gains	  were	  registered.	  In	  this	  distant	  past	  of	  “old”	  commons,	  groups	  and	  gatherings	  in	   communities	   could	   often	   engage	   only	   in	   those	   actions	   that	   escaped	   the	   notice	   of,	   were	  matters	  of	  indifference	  to,	  or	  had	  the	  tacit	  approval	  of	  authorities	  and	  the	  aristocratic	  “betters”.	  The	  British	   practice	   of	   royal	   and	   aristocratic	   patrons	   of	   diverse	   charitable	   and	   philanthropic	  endeavors,	  for	  example,	  survives	  as	  a	  remnant	  of	  what	  once	  was	  a	  universal	  essential	  for	  some	  endeavors.	  It	  would	  be	  interesting	  to	  know	  more	  of	  the	  differences	  between	  British	  associations	  with	  patrons	  and	   those	  without.	   In	   this	   context,	   old	   commons	  without	  patronage	  or	   sanction	  frequently	   could	   only	   resolve	   disputes	   over	   resource	   sharing	   through	   their	   own	   agreements,	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and	  operating	  rules,	  at	  times	  reinforced	  by	  the	  uncertain	  course	  of	  common	  law.	  The	  discussion	  of	   sergeants	   at	   arms	   as	   a	   type	   of	   association	   official,	   along	   with	   presidents,	   secretaries	   and	  treasurers,	   in	   earlier	   editions	   of	   Robert’s	   Rules	   of	   Order	   points	   to	   a	   time	   when	   associations,	  assemblies	   and	   other	   old	   commons	   sometimes	   had	   to	   look	   to	   their	   own	  devises,	   rather	   than	  civil	   authorities,	   to	   discipline	   truly	   unruly	   members.	   Robert’s	   Rules	   of	   Order	   is	   no	   longer	   a	  single	  publication,	  but	  rather	  a	  category	  of	  similar	  catalogs	  of	  meeting	  rules,	  available	  in	  many	  editions	  from	  numerous	  different	  publishers.	  Thus	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  speak	  definitively	  of	  what	  it	   (they)	   does	   (do)	   or	   do	   not	   contain.	   And	   given	   the	   original	   edition	   from	   the	   rather	  idiosyncratic	   and	   headstrong	   Gen.	   Roberts,	   whether	   sergeants	   at	   arms	   were	   ever	   actually	  necessary	   or	   a	   fabrication	   by	   the	   author	   remains	   a	   relatively	   unanswerable	   question.	   In	   this	  context,	  self-­‐governing	  might	  also	  mean	  self-­‐policing.	  Today,	  extensive	  constitutional,	  legal	  and	  administrative	   arrangements	  deeply	  grounded	   in	  past	   experience	  exist	   to	  protect,	   clarify	   and	  reinforce	  such	  action	  and	  initiatives	  in	  most	  countries.	  They	  indirectly	  give	  shape	  and	  form	  to	  the	  still	  evolving	  national	  third	  sectors	  of	  the	  world.	  
Universal	  Norms	  of	  Free	  Association	  Among	  the	  most	  remarkable	  legal	  and	  political	  developments	  of	  recent	  decades	  has	  been	  the	  nearly	  universal	  embrace	  of	  norms	  of	  free	  association	  and	  assembly	  in	  nations	  and	  societies	  around	   the	  globe,	   symbolized	  by	   the	  Universal	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights,	   first	  adopted	  by	  the	  United	  Nations	   in	  1948.	  This	   is	  not	   to	  suggest	   that	  adoption	  and	   implementation	  of	   these	  freedoms	   of	   speech,	   religion,	   association,	   and	   assembly	   have	   been	   completely	   smooth	   and	  unproblematic	  anywhere.	  However,	  it	  is	  indisputable	  that	  the	  norms	  are	  there	  and	  increasingly	  global	   in	   scope.	   This	   may	   be	   the	   single	   most	   important	   universal	   enabler	   of	   the	   global	  development	   that	   Lester	   Salamon	   (1993)	   termed	   “the	   association	   revolution.”	   In	   particular	  since	   the	   late	   1980s	   nonprofit	   corporations,	   informal	   and	   formally	   structured	   associations,	  foundations,	   mutual	   benefit	   societies	   and	   self-­‐help	   groups,	   nongovernmental	   organizations	  (both	  NGOs	  and	  INGOs),	  cooperatives,	  and	  a	  vast	  assortment	  of	  other	  civil	  society	  organizations	  (CSOs)	   have	   proliferated	   at	   unprecedented	   rates	   throughout	   so	  much	   of	   the	  world	   that	   they	  have	  become	  a	  factor	  in	  international	  relations	  (Allen	  1997;	  Boris	  2006).	  Basic	  descriptions	  of	  these	  developments	  are	  readily	  available,	  but	  theoretical	  and	  conceptual	  understandings	  have	  generally	  not	  kept	  pace.	  Prior	   Usonian,	   North	   American,	   British	   and	   Commonwealth	   experience	   with	   new	  commons	   over	   several	   centuries	   have	   been	   exemplary,	   even	   totemic	   in	   this	   international	  spread	   and	   references	   to	   Alexis	   de	   Tocqueville’s	   rudimentary	   remarks	   on	   political	   and	   civil	  associations	   in	  mid-­‐19th	   century	  America	   and	   the	   associated	  doctrines	   of	  mediation	   serve	   an	  important	  normative,	  theoretical	  role	  (Wagner,	  2012).	  While	  the	  extensive	  record	  of	  legislative	  innovation	  and	  “grassroots”	  voluntary	  action	   in	  Great	  Britain	  and	  the	   former	  British	  colonies,	  including	   the	  U.S.,	   Canada,	  New	  Zealand,	   Australia,	   South	  Africa	   and	   India	   are	   fundamentally	  important,	   there	   is	   also	   a	   very	   extensive	   history	   of	   comparable	   experience	   in	   Germany	   and	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continental	  Europe	  that	  has	  gone	  too	  much	  unnoticed	  in	  the	  English-­‐speaking	  world.	  The	  legal	  roots	   of	   this	   tradition	  were	   outlined	   in	   a	   4-­‐volume	   study	   of	   associations	   in	  German	   law,	  Das	  
deutsche	   Genossenschaftsrecht by	   Tocqueville’s	   near-­‐contemporary	   Otto	   von	   Gierke	   the	   first	  volume	  of	  which	  was	  published	   in	   1868	   (see	  Gierke	   and	  Heiman	  1977;	  Gierke,	   Troelsch	   and	  Barker	  2001;	  Gierke,	  2007;	  and	  numerous	  other	  publications).	  	  One	   reason	   for	   neglect	   of	   the	   implications	   of	   new	   commons	   may	   be	   that	   the	   narrow	  intellectual	  world	  of	  contemporary	  political	  and	  social	  theory	  has	  left	  little	  room	  for	  voluntary	  action.	  Di	  Zerega	  (2011)	  summarized	  a	  key	  aspect	  of	  this	  exclusion	  as	  a	  casualty	  of	  the	  changing	  fortunes	   of	   liberty,	   equality	   and	   fraternity	   in	   the	   generations	   after	   John	   Locke.	   These	   three	  values,	   he	   says,	   united	   and	   equally	   valued	   in	   Locke’s	   estimation	   became	   detached	   from	   one	  another.	  	  “For	  some	  ‘freedom’	  became	  the	  essence	  of	  liberal	  thought.	  Others	  gave	  the	  laurel	  to	  equality.	   Fraternity	   tended	   to	   disappear	   altogether”	   (De	   Zerega,	   2011:	   8).	   Fraternity	   in	   this	  statement	   is	   a	   good	   proxy	   for	   all	   of	   the	   values	   of	   voluntary	   action,	  which	  were	   already	  well	  known	  to	  the	  ancient	  and	  medieval	  sources.	  What	  was	  not	  available	  to	  them	  were	  the	  modern	  legal	   protections	   and	   the	   institutional	   order	   they	   enable.	   It	   has	   really	   only	   been	   in	   recent	  decades	  that	  voluntary	  action,	  which	  as	  we	  will	  see	  below	  frames	  a	  key	  institutional	  locale	  for	  fraternization	  (sometimes	  also	  called	  civic	  friendship)	  for	  all	  genders	  has	  become	  the	  focus	  of	  any	   appreciable	   amount	   of	   serious	   study	   and	   comment.	   Yet	   the	   major	   theoretical	   lacuna	  remains	  only	  partially	  filled	  by	  recent	  work	  on	  nonprofit	  organizations	  and	  civil	  society.	  In	   the	  past	  half-­‐century	   in	  particular,	   the	  norms	  of	   freedom	  of	  association	  and	  assembly	  have	   achieved	   nearly	   universal	   cultural	   acceptance	   in	   all	   major	   democracies	   of	   the	   world.	  Actual	  practice	  has	  followed	  suit,	  sometimes	  more	  slowly,	  and	  the	  resulting	  variances	  are	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  that	  the	  third	  sector	  may	  be	  increasingly	  studied.	  To	  say	  that	  elements	  of	  a	  wider	  third	  sector	  have	  recently	  emerged	  on	  the	  world	  stage,	  however,	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  saying	  that	  the	   actual	   practice	   of	   free,	   unfettered	   voluntary	   action	   has	   only	   recently	   arisen.	   Nor	   is	   free	  association	   a	   reality	   everywhere	   in	   the	   world	   today.	   Many	   fetters	   and	   limits	   remain,	   as	  examples	  make	  clear	  daily	  in	  North	  Korea,	  China,	  Burma,	  Syria,	  Egypt	  and	  even	  in	  parts	  of	  the	  U.S.,	   Britain	   and	   elsewhere.	   However,	   free	   association,	   and	   its	   corollaries	   of	   free	   speech	   and	  freedom	   of	   religion	   and	   associated	   rights	   of	   cultural	   self-­‐determination	   are	   universal	   global	  aspirations	  today	  to	  a	  greater	  extent	  than	  they	  have	  ever	  been	  before,	  due	  in	  particular	  to	  the	  global	   embrace	   of	   the	   principles	   of	   the	   1948	   Universal	   Declaration	   of	   Human	   Rights.	   This	  particular	   legal	   instrument	  may	   be	   best	   known	   and	   accepted	   outside	   the	   United	   States	   even	  though	   American	   actors	   (in	   particular,	   Eleanor	   Roosevelt)	   were	   in	   the	   front	   rank	   of	   its	  advocates.	  While	  many	  U.S.	  politicians	  continue	  not	  to	  take	  the	  U.N.	  Declaration	  seriously,	   the	  legal	  literature	  of	  Universal	  Declaration	  and	  First	  Amendment	  has	  undergone	  a	  comparatively	  recent	   emergence	   from	   a	   set	   of	   obscure	   principles	   to	   enforceable	   legal	   principles	   and	   it	   has	  become	  an	  active	  agent	   in	  social	  and	  political	  theory,	  often	  under	  the	  banner	  of	  human	  rights	  (Amar,	  1998;	  Murphy,	  1991).	  
  95 
A	   cognate	   international	   development	   has	   been	   the	   recent	   proliferation	   of	   international	  nongovernmental	   organizations	   (INGOs)	   in	   political,	   agricultural,	   charitable,	   religious,	  philanthropic,	   cultural	   and	   even	   foreign	   relations	   and	   international	   business	   contexts.	   The	  origins	  of	  such	  efforts	  may	  originally	  have	  involved	  the	  transfer	  of	  knowledge	  and	  practice	  from	  the	  developed	  world	  to	  under-­‐developed	  nations.	  Today,	  the	  situation	  is	  much	  more	  complex.	  An	   international	   nongovernmental	   organization	   like	   BRAC,	   founded	   and	   headquartered	   in	  Bangladesh	  can	  establish	  outreach	  efforts	  to	  countries	  in	  Asia,	  Africa,	  and	  even	  Europe	  and	  the	  United	  States	  (Mannan	  2009).	  As	  a	  result,	  what	  once	  were	  relatively	  exclusive	  concerns	  in	  the	  North	  Atlantic	  community	  and	  British	  Commonwealth	  countries	  are	  today	  a	  broad	  international	  chorus	  of	  local	  voices	  in	  a	  global	  choir.	  	  
A	  Very	  Old	  Idea	  	  Voluntary	   action	   outside	   of	   government,	   the	   price	   system	   and	   the	   intimate	   sphere	   of	  families	  figures	  importantly	  in	  human	  history	  at	  least	  from	  the	  first	  agricultural	  revolution	  and	  quite	  possibly	  from	  well	  before	  that.	  The	  origins	  of	  voluntary	  action	  in	  the	  human	  community	  may	   be	   traceable	   in	   part	   to	   religious	   ritual	   and	   gift	   giving	   practices	   that	   evolved	   before	   the	  agricultural	   revolution	   or,	   perhaps,	   to	   some	   archaic	   transition	   from	   societies	   organized	   by	  bands	  of	  hunter-­‐gatherers	  and	  composed	  principally	  of	  related	  family	  members	  and	  friends,	  to	  systems	   of	   voluntary	   cooperation	   within	   early	   tribal	   and	   village	   organizations.	   Story	   telling,	  myth	  making	  and	  retelling	   legends	  are	  all	  consummate	  examples	  of	  voluntary	  action,	  and	  the	  stories,	   myths	   and	   legends	   that	   are	   told,	   like	   the	   languages	   in	   which	   they	   are	   encoded,	  constitute	  important	  common	  pool	  resources	  of	  cultures.	  Peter	  Kropotkin	  (2006	  [1902])	  may	  have	  been	  essentially	  correct	  in	  his	  assessment	  of	  the	  possibility	  of	  mutual	  aid	  as	  a	  factor	  in	  human	  evolution,	  even	  though	  he	  treated	  mutual	  aid	  as	  an	  isolated,	  autonomous,	  practice	  while	  today	  we	  are	  more	  inclined	  to	   link	  it	   to	  other	  equally	  important	  aspects	  of	  voluntary	  action	  that	  were	  already	  becoming	  familiar	  in	  his	  time,	  including	  gift	   exchange,	   resource	   pooling,	   voluntary	   association,	   and	   assembly.	   The	   human	   capacity	   to	  voluntarily	   and	   peacefully	   form	   tribal	   and	   village	   associations	   for	   these	   and	   other	   purposes	  including	   agricultural	   and	   other	   old	   commons	   could	   be	   a	   hallmark	   in	   human	   cultural	  development,	   fully	  comparable	  to	  language,	  tool-­‐making,	  food	  preparation	  as	  positive	  steps	  in	  human	  advance.	  Even	  so,	  the	  voluntary	  nature	  of	  organized	  action	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  coercion	  or	  incentives	  other	   than	  the	  social	  pressures	  of	   living	   together	  and	  the	  necessity	  of	  dealing	  with	  village	  cultures	  other	  than	  one’s	  own	  is	  a	  complex	  issue	  and	  great	  care	  is	  required	  in	  offering	  coherent	  explanations	  of	  these	  developments.	  	  We	   can	   get	   tantalizing	   clues	   about	   this	   from	   Vico	   (1999	   [1725]),	   Gierke	   (1977;	   1990	  [1868-­‐1881]),	  Henry	  Sumner	  Maine	  (1876;	  1890)	  and	  others	  that	  suggest	   that	  at	   least	  by	  the	  time	  of	   the	  Roman	  Empire	   the	  Germanic	   tribes	  of	  northern	  Europe	  and	   the	  British	   Isles	  may	  already	   have	   developed	   a	   range	   of	   distinct,	   indigenous	   forms	   of	   association,	   assembly,	   gift-­‐giving	  and	  voluntary	  action	  even	  as	  they	  developed	  practices	  like	  common	  field	  agriculture.	  In	  addition,	  Wikipedia	  is	  not	  generally	  recognized	  as	  an	  adequate	  scholarly	  source.	  Nonetheless,	  a	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number	  of	  sufficiently	  plausible,	  sufficiently	  accurate	  and	  interesting	  articles	  on	  this	  subject	  are	  to	   be	   found	   there,	   as	  well	   as	   in	   a	   variety	   of	   very	   old	   and	   very	   arcane	   and	   difficult	   to	   locate	  sources	   now	   available	   through	   Google	   Books.	   Although	   compiled	   by	   anonymous	   authors,	  articles	  on	  this	  topic	  were	  either	  written	  by	  experts	  or	  by	  authors	  with	  an	  amazingly	  detailed	  sense	   of	   fiction,	   parody	   and	   myth.	   Entries	   on	   Things	   (Germanic	   and	   Scandinavian	   tribal	  assemblies)	   and	   the	   Old	   English	  Witenagemot,	   or	  meetings	   of	   wise	  men	   or	   tribal	   elders	   are	  good	  examples.	  It	   seems	   fairly	   clear	   that	   the	   ‘philosophical	   schools’	   of	   classical	   Athens,	   Baghdad,	  Alexandria,	   and	   the	   thousands	  of	   temples,	   shrines,	   and	  other	  architectural	  monuments	   in	   the	  Mediterranean	  region,	  and	  all	  across	  Asia	  were	  operated	  (as	  they	  often	  are	  today)	  by	  priestly	  and	  monastic	  associations	  and	  assemblies	  and	  were	  linked	  by	  ritual	  and	  other	  gift	  exchanges	  of	  various	   types.	   In	   this	   respect,	   the	   Pacific	   Island	   kula	   and	   other	   gift	   cycles	   discovered	   by	  Malinowski	   (1934)	  may	  be	  part	  of	   a	   genuinely	  global	   culture	   complex	  as	  universal	   as	  Mauss’	  (1905)	   musings	   on	   gift	   exchange.	   That	   such	   associations	   were	   seldom	   democratic	   or	  collaborative	  hardly	  needs	  to	  be	  said.	  Yet,	  in	  documents	  like	  the	  Rule	  of	  St.	  Augustine	  (Van	  Bavel,	  1984),	  dating	  at	  least	  to	  the	  8th	  or	  9th	  century	  C.E.,	  one	  can	  already	  see	  something	  of	  the	  tension	  between	  autocratic,	  democratic	  and	  laissez-­‐fair	  group	  relations	  between	  leaders	  and	  followers	  analyzed	   by	   Lippitt,	   et.	   al.,	   (1939)	   or	   the	   coercive,	   exchange	   and	   normative	   compliance	  characterized	  by	  Etzioni	  (1963).	  Framing	  these	  in	  the	  context	  of	  old	  and	  new	  commons	  at	  least	  offers	  a	  way	  to	  begin	  to	  think	  universally	  about	  such	  questions.	  Even	   so,	   sorting	   out	   how	   such	   ‘voluntary	   action’	   in	   the	  past	   resembles	   and	  differs	   from	  more	   familiar	   contemporary	   variants	   remains	   a	   complex	   and	   challenging	   task	   made	   more	  difficult	   by	   the	   occurrences	   of	   obscure	   forms	   of	   priestly,	   royal	   and	   aristocratic	   forms	   of	  patronage,	   resource	   control	   and	   other	   contextual	   factors	   that	   may	   or	   may	   not	   bear	   some	  similarity	   to	   contemporary	   philanthropy,	   and	   occurring	   within	   unfamiliar	   class	   and	  stratification	   systems,	   and	   a	   range	   of	   other	   intervening	   variables	   (Halpern,	   2012).	   The	  underlying	  point	  not	  to	  be	  lost	  here	  is	  that	  vast	  reserves	  of	  specialized	  knowledge	  are	  already	  available	   to	  us	   in	   the	   reports,	   articles	  and	  monographs	  of	   specialists	   in	   such	   fields	  as	  ancient	  and	  medieval	  history,	  archeology,	  anthropology	  and	  other	  fields.	  	  
What’s	  New	  About	  Commons?	  In	   seeking	   to	   describe	   and	   explore	   the	   long	   record	   of	   such	   developments,	   volunteers,	  donors,	  activists,	  practitioners,	  journalists,	  researchers,	  lawyers	  and	  others	  have	  developed	  an	  increasingly	   rich,	   complex	   and	   challenging	   vocabulary	   filled	   with	   terms	   like	   nonprofit,	   civil,	  social,	   eleemosynary,	   philanthropic,	   and	   voluntary	   and	   acronyms	   like	   NGO,	   CSO,	   INGO	   and	  QUANGO.	  The	  richness	  of	  this	  polyglot	  knowledge	  base	  is	  often	  hidden	  from	  nonspecialists.	  One	  challenge	   facing	   our	   field	   may	   be	   to	   transform	   all	   of	   this	   lexical	   richness	   into	   a	   genuine	  knowledge	   commons.	   For	   example,	   Michael	   McGinnis,	   a	   political	   scientist,	   observed	   at	   a	  colloquium	  at	   the	  University	   of	   Indiana	   in	  November,	   2012	   that	   there	   are	  many	   case	   studies	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among	  the	  papers	  of	  the	  Ostrom	  Center	  for	  Institutions,	  Population	  and	  Environmental	  Change	  (CIPEC)	   that	   involve	   groups,	   voluntary	   associations	   and	   nonprofit	   organizations	   managing	  common	  pool	  resources,	  few	  of	  which	  are	  known	  to	  third	  sector	  scholars.	  The	  same	  maybe	  said	  for	  numerous	  other	  fields.	  In	   order	   to	   explore	   further	   this	   focal	   idea	   of	   new	   commons	   and	   what	   it	   signals	   or	  connotes,	   we	   can	   next	   look	   a	   bit	   further	   at	   the	   distinction	   between	  what	   have	   already	   been	  termed	  old	  commons	  and	  new	  commons.	  	  Whether	  old	  or	  new,	  a	  commons	  will	  be	  defined	  as	  a	  pool	   of	   recognized	   resources,	   control	   of	   which	   is	   shared	   among	   a	   group	   of	   ‘allocators’	   or	  commoners	   acting	   on	   their	   own	   behalf	   or	   as	   agents	   for	   others,	   who	   are	   capable	   of	   drawing	  resources	   from	   the	   pool	   or	   adding	   to	   it	   for	   some	   recognizable	   and	   agreed	   upon	   reasons.	   In	  many	   contemporary	   forms	   of	   commons	   theory	   like	   those	   dealing	   with	   biological	   and	   life	  sciences,	  the	  human	  qualifier	  and	  the	  distinction	  of	  old	  and	  new	  commons	  are	  not	  included	  or	  necessary;	  the	  meaning	  is	  clear	  in	  context.	  These	  qualifiers	  are	  included	  here	  in	  light	  of	  the	  roles	  of	   language,	   culture,	   social	   interaction	   as	   human	   artifacts	   in	   voluntary	   action.	   Thus,	   the	  perspective	  outlined	  here	  has	  no	  applicability	  to	  the	  otherwise	  interesting	  topics	  of	  bee	  colonies	  or	   mold	   spores	   as	   commons,	   for	   example.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   it	   is	   fully	   applicable	   to	   the	  associations	  of	  scientists	  and	  investigators	  interested	  in	  such	  commons.	  
Old	  Commons	  Old	  commons	  are	  fascinating	  institutions	  in	  their	  own	  right.	  They	  include	  contemporary	  common	  irrigation	  practices	  existing	  for	  centuries	  in	  Indonesia,	  China	  and	  elsewhere	  whether	  used	  in	  connection	  with	  common	  field	  agriculture	  or	  independently	  (Chander,	  2004;	  Grantham,	  1980;	  Olai,	  2004;	  Olsson	  and	  Svensson,	  2009;	  Svensson,	  2008;	  Yu,	  2007A;	  Yu,	  2007B).	  	  Because	  of	   the	   extensive	  distribution	  of	   old	   commons	   throughout	  Eurasia,	   the	  English	  language	  term	  commons	  probably	  has	  cognate	   terms	   in	  numerous	  other	   languages,	  but	   those	  terms	  would	  also	  have	  accumulated	  diverse	  local	  connotations.	  No	  attempt	  is	  made	  to	  identify	  these	  terms	  or	  to	  deal	  with	  their	  nuances	  and	  connotations	  here.	  In	  fact,	  I	  have	  been	  unable	  to	  identify	   any	   source	   that	   has	   dealt	   with	  multi-­‐language	   commons	   terminology.	   Old	   commons	  also	  include	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  communal	  practices	  of	  monastic	  and	  other	  religious	  communities.	  In	  fact,	  it	  may	  have	  been	  the	  inherent	  tensions	  of	  communal	  living	  that	  gave	  rise	  to	  the	  various	  Rules	  of	  religious	  orders	  noted	  above.	  Thus,	  for	  example,	  at	  least	  part	  of	  that	  history	  is	  available	  in	   the	  more	   than	   500	   articles	   on	   irrigation	   practices	   in	   the	   Digital	   Library	   of	   the	   Commons	  (http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/).	   Among	   commentators,	   any	   connection	   between	   old	  commons	   and	   voluntary	   action	   appears	   to	   have	   suffered	   from	   the	   strangeness	   of	   the	  commonplace.	  Students	  of	  voluntary	  action	  in	  the	  U.S.	  have	  long	  used	  rural	  examples	  like	  ‘barn	  raisings’	   and	   collective	   activities	   like	   the	   threshing	   of	   grain	   as	   indicators	   of	   early	   voluntary	  association.	   Yet,	   no	   one	   appears	   to	   have	   drawn	   any	   connection	   between	   discussion	   of	   such	  cooperative	   action	   and	   the	   common	   resource	   pooling	   and	   collaboration	   of	   common	   field	  agriculture,	  wood	  gathering,	  fishing	  or	  irrigation.	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The	  most	  likely	  explanation	  for	  the	  apparent	  failure	  to	  draw	  this	  connection	  is	  not	  that	  it	  was	  unfamiliar	  or	  not	  understood,	  but	  rather	  that	  it	  was	  all	  too	  obvious	  and	  immediate	  in	  daily	  experience	  to	  remark	  upon;	  one	  of	  the	  most	  “natural”	  or	  taken	  for	  granted	  aspects	  of	  daily	  life.	  Like	  eating,	   it	  was	  simply	  too	  ordinary	  and	  commonplace	  to	  be	  worthy	  of	  special	  attention	  or	  comment.	   Ironically,	   in	   the	   hundreds	   of	   years	   during	   which	   old	   commons	   were	   widely	  distributed,	   they	   appear	   to	   have	   drawn	   little	   interest	   from	   the	   scholastics,	   Neo-­‐Platonists,	  Aristotelians,	  Confucians	  and	  other	  heritage	  associations	  of	  scholars	  who	  dominated	  medieval	  knowledge	  commons.	  Before	  anthropology	  and	  sociology	  and	  other	  social	  sciences	  interested	  in	  studying	  the	  daily	  lives	  or	  ordinary	  people	  were	  established	  in	  the	  19th	  and	  20th	  centuries,	  these	  ancient	   and	   archaic	   practices	   were	   already	   largely	   enclosed,	   literally	   too	   common	   to	   attract	  attention.	  Only	  as	  old,	  traditional	  commons	  were	  threatened	  with	  enclosure	  or	  simply	  vanished	  did	   these	   become	   topics	   for	   study	   and	  published	   comment	   and	   then	  mostly	   in	   property	   law.	  Extending	  the	  term	  commons	  beyond	  physical	  resources	   like	   land,	  woods,	  or	  water	  to	  human	  resources	  like	  pooled	  labor	  in	  barn	  raisings	  or	  threshing	  bees	  appears	  not	  to	  have	  happened.	  
	  	  
New	  Commons	  vs.	  Old	  	  The	   English	   language	   term	   commons	   has	   a	   long	   and	   rich	   history	   to	   support	   this	   and	  other	  usages.	   In	   the	   sense	  of	   systems	  of	   shared	  provision	  or	  expense,	   the	   term	  dates	  at	   least	  from	   1373.	   These	   dates	   are	   from	   the	   documented	   first	   usages	   noted	   in	   the	   Oxford	   English	  Dictionary.	   The	   connotation	   of	   eating	   or	   living	   together	   in	   common,	   for	   example,	   dates	   from	  1510	  and	  references	  to	  village-­‐based	  systems	  of	  common	  field	  agriculture	  can	  be	  traced	  at	  least	  from	  1539,	  where	   communities	  of	   farmers	   allocated	   crop	   fields	   and	  pastures	   and	  voluntarily	  divided	   up	   rights	   to	   gather	   wood,	   hunt	   and	   fish	   and	   assorted	   other	   resources	   among	  themselves.	   A	   host	   of	   other	   related	   connotations	   of	   the	   term	   common	   and	   its	   derivatives,	  including	  common	  bruit	  as	  a	  term	  for	  public	  talk,	  have	  comparably	  long	  histories.	  Although	   the	   exact	   origins	   of	   old	   commons	   will	   probably	   always	   remain	   unclear,	   it	  seems	   plausible	   that	   common	   resource	   pooling	   first	   arose	   as	   practical,	   common-­‐sense	  solutions,	   whether	   among	   the	   cultures	   of	   hunter-­‐gatherers	   and	   early	   agricultural	   peoples	   or	  later	   and	   given	   their	   widespread	   distribution	   perhaps	   even	   as	   part	   of	   the	   original	   African	  diaspora.	  At	  any	  rate,	  such	  ideas	  are	  more	  deeply	  embedded	  in	  many	  traditional	  cultures	  than	  any	   current	   notions	   of	   market	   exchange	   that	   seek	   to	   explain	   voluntary	   action	   as	   profitable	  exchange	  or	  the	  exercise	  of	  self-­‐interest.	  Voluntarily	  working	  together	  with	  one’s	  neighbors,	  gift	  exchanges	  and	  rural	  neighborhood	  assemblies	  or	  gatherings	  to	  reinforce	  social	  solidarity,	  and	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  such	  practices	  are	  so	  deeply	  woven	  into	  the	  fabric	  of	  daily	  life	  that	  few	  observers	  paused	  to	  take	  note	  of	  their	  profound	  significance	  for	  the	  human	  condition,	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  human.	  This	  particular	  phrase	   figures	   importantly	   in	   the	  definition	  of	  philanthropy,	  as	  we	  shall	  see	  below.	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The	  practices	  of	  fair	  distribution	  among	  equals,	  sharing	  of	  tasks,	  labor	  and	  products	  (as	  in	  collective	  gathering	  or	  grain	  threshing),	  and	  gift	  giving	  may	  well	  have	  been	  as	  much	  a	  part	  of	  the	   human	   record	   as	   command	   and	   control	   practices	   of	   kings	   and	   principalities	   or	   the	  profitable	  exchange	  of	  merchants.	  As	  we	  shall	  see	  further	  on,	  development	  of	  such	  norms	  and	  practice	  offer	  examples	  of	   the	  more	  general	  of	   formation	  of	  moeurs.	  They	  also	   should	  not	  be	  romanticized	  or	  glorified,	  for	  as	  Kropotkin	  (1902	  [2006])	  noted,	  such	  institutions	  of	  mutual	  aid	  were	   likely	  necessary	   to	   individual	  and	  group	  survival	   in	  a	  difficult	   and	  unpredictable	  world.	  Yet	  they	  may	  also	  have	  offered	  only	  weak	  or	  unreliable	  protection,	  particularly	  for	  ordinary	  folk	  who	  did	  not	  have	  the	  advantages	  and	  protections	  of	  aristocracy	  and	  nobility.	  One	  of	  the	  provocative	  implications	  of	  juxtaposing	  old	  and	  new	  commons	  in	  this	  way	  is	  to	  point	  up	  the	  role	  of	  both	  as	  countervailing	  (but	  often	  unremarked)	  forces	  against	  centralized	  power	   and	   authority.	   They	   are	   not	   only	   nonprofit	   (or	   nonmarket)	   relations.	   They	   are	   also	  nongovernmental,	  and	  indeed	  non-­‐central.	  They	  offer	  empowering	  relations	  (however	  limited)	  for	  the	  non-­‐powerful	  as	  well.	  We	  can	  infer	  this	  in	  part	  from	  the	  frequency	  with	  which	  autocrats	  throughout	  history	  have	  sought	  to	  limit	  or	  eliminate	  the	  rights	  and	  prerogatives	  associated	  with	  freedoms	  of	  assembly	  and	  association.	  Whether	  among	  a	  group	  of	  medieval	  peasants	  gathered	  on	  the	  village	  commons	  or	  contemporary	  crowds	  of	  Egyptian	  or	  Chinese	  dissidents	  gathered	  in	  a	  public	  square,	  there	  is	  an	  equalizing	  dimension	  of	  such	  associations	  and	  assemblies	  that	  puts	  the	  weak	  at	  least	  temporarily	  beyond	  the	  reach	  of	  the	  state	  and	  fully	  capable	  of	  generating	  their	  own	   independent	   social	   and	   political	   spaces,	   including	   public	   spheres	   that	   remain	   partly	   or	  completely	  beyond	  the	  reach	  of	  the	  state.	  There	  are	  many	  examples	  of	  this.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  far-­‐reaching	  and	  instructive	  in	  recent	  memory	  was	  the	  development	  of	  illicit	  networks	  of	  reading	  publics	  and	  samizdat	  literature	  beyond	  the	  reach	  of	  the	  Soviet	  state	  prior	  to	  its	  collapse	  in	  the	  early	  1990s.	  The	  fact	  that	  such	  associations	  and	  assemblies	  frequently	  end	  badly,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  short	   run,	   should	   not	   blind	   us	   to	   the	   very	   real	   common	   spaces	   they	   open	   even	  under	   highly	  adverse	  circumstances.	  	  Expressions	  of	  state	  power	  in	  early	  modern	  nation	  states,	  like	  Henry	  VIII’s	  dissolution	  of	  the	   English	   monasteries	   in	   1538,	   or	   the	   French	   Revolutionary	   ban	   on	   private	   associations	  which	  lasted	  officially	  until	  the	  early	  20th	  century,	  are	  sometimes	  associated	  with	  “modernist”	  movements	  to	  enclose	  old,	  traditional	  agricultural	  commons.	  Just	  as	  private	  property	  has	  been	  seen	   as	   a	   refuge	   from	   the	   state	   in	   Lockean	   liberal	   terms,	   commons	   and	   common	   resource	  pooling	  may	  have	  served	  a	  comparable	  role	  for	  ordinary	  people	  in	  earlier	  times.	  The	   most	   important	   difference	   for	   our	   purposes,	   however,	   is	   not	   in	   a	   categorical	  distinction	  between	  new	  and	  old	  property	  commons	  but	  in	  the	  options	  these	  terms	  suggest	  for	  the	  associations	  and	  assemblies	  that	  are	  the	  venues	  of	  collective	  action.	  Although	  studies	  of	  this	  historic	   transformation	   have	   focused	   largely	   on	   what	   Charles	   Tilly	   termed	   “repertories	   of	  contestation”	  the	  social	  and	  cultural	  processes	  Tilly	  discovered	  are	  broader	  and	  more	  general.	  Prior	   to	   the	   19th	   century,	   according	   to	   Sidney	   Tarrow	   (1993)	   the	   “tools”	   of	   protest	   and	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contestation	  were,	   like	   old	   commons,	   direct,	   narrow,	   parochial	   and	   institutionally	   ‘attached’.	  Later,	  protesters	  began	  to	  utilize	  newer,	  more	  generalized,	  cosmopolitan	  techniques	  like	  public	  meetings,	  strikes,	  demonstrations	  and	  boycotts	  that	  can	  be	  taught,	  learned,	  and	  applied	  across	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  differing	  situations.	  Much	  the	  same	  is	  true	  of	  non-­‐protest	  activities	  more	  recently	  added	   to	   the	   repertories	   of	   association	   like	   petitions	   and	   civil	   lawsuits,	   membership	   drives,	  fundraising	   campaigns,	   business	   meetings,	   educational	   and	   advertising	   strategies,	   annual	  meetings,	  federated	  fundraising	  and	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  additional	  generalized	  ‘methods’	  added	  to	  the	  generally-­‐available	  repertory	  of	  modern	  association	  and	  assembly.	  	  Finally,	   due	   in	   part	   to	   the	   neglect	   of	   both	   voluntary	   action	   and	   commons	   among	  scholarly	   disciplines	   until	   recently,	   legend,	  myth	   and	   history	   still	   blend	   easily	   in	   the	   general	  culture.	  The	  examples	  cited	  here	  are	  parts	  of	   the	  “common	  stock”	  of	  Anglophile	  culture.	  They	  were	  selected	  on	  the	  expectation	  that	  most	  readers	  would	  be	  familiar	  with	  them,	  but	  given	  the	  intent	  of	  the	  book	  such	  ethnocentrism	  is	  also	  a	  potential	  criticism.	  A	  future	  project	  might	  be	  to	  identify	   comparable	   examples	   from	   Spanish,	   Islamic,	   Germanic,	   and	   other	   sources	   and	   from	  traditional	   Indian,	   Buddhist,	   and	   other	   mythologies,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   histories	   and	   legends	   of	  many	  other	  “folk”	  (or	  local)	  cultures.	  
Commons	  in	  Mythology,	  History	  and	  Culture	  Garrett	   Hardin’s	   20th	   century	   fable	   of	   “the	   tragedy	   of	   the	   commons”	   first	   applied	   to	  environmental	   issues,	   for	  example,	  became	  the	  agent	   that	   first	  brought	   the	   issue	  of	  commons	  into	  focus	  in	  the	  early	  1970s.	  Prior	  to	  Hardin’s	  essay	  published	  in	  Science,	  the	  only	  discussions	  of	  commons	  were	  to	  be	   found	  in	  obscure,	  19th	  century	  historical	   legal	  discussions,	  notable	  by	  the	  esteemed	  Henry	  Sumner	  Maine	  and	  Otto	  von	  Gierke.	  Commons	  are	  not	  exclusively	  a	  matter	  of	   historical	   concern.	   Forms	   of	   new	   commons	   and	   voluntary	   action	   can	   be	   seen	   deeply	  embedded	   in	  mythology.	  The	  earliest	   origins	  of	  philanthropy,	   for	   example,	   are	   located	  not	   in	  practice	   but	   in	   the	   ancient	   Greek	   myth	   of	   Prometheus,	   which	   predates	   the	   Athenian	   polis	  (McCully	  2008).	  In	  the	  Arthuriad,	  the	  Knights	  of	  the	  Round	  Table	  formed	  what	  we	  might	  call	  a	  dominant	   protective	   association	   (as	   detailed	   by	  Nozick,	   1974)	   for	   Camelot	   around	   their	   king	  and	   patron,	   Arthur.	   In	   the	   legend,	   as	   in	   reality,	   this	   dominant	   protective	   association	   was	  precursor	  of	  the	  Arthurian	  state	  –	  of	  such	  a	  term	  may	  be	  used.	  In	  the	  conventional	  telling,	  that	  association	  and	  the	  protection	  it	  provides,	  akin	  perhaps	  to	  modern	  neighborhood	  associations	  or	  turf-­‐minded	  street	  gangs,	  is	  fundamental	  to	  the	  success	  of	  the	  community	  of	  Camelot,	  which	  is	  ultimately	  destroyed	  by	  an	  entirely	  different	  sort	  of	  tragedy	  of	  the	  commons.	  	  In	  an	  intersection	  of	  more	  conventional	  history	  and	  political	  mythology,	   it	  seems	  likely	  that	  when	   the	   English	   King	   John	   agreed	   to	   the	  Magna	   Carta	   in	   1215	   C.E.,	   he	  may	   have	   been	  responding	  less	  to	  the	  brute	  force	  of	  any	  individual	  baron	  than	  to	  the	  threat	  that	  all	  the	  nobles	  together	  could	  form	  an	  association	  or	  coalition	  to	  oppose	  or	  even	  depose	  him.	  Leading	  power	  brokers	   in	   the	   Holy	   Roman	   Empire	   in	   association	   were	   called	   Electors	   for	   a	   reason.	   The	  Mayflower	  Compact	  among	  the	  initial	  group	  of	  Puritans	  arriving	  in	  New	  England	  is	  often	  held	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up	  as	  an	  example	  of	  the	  earliest	  American	  association	  and	  an	  explicit	  voluntary	  social	  contract.	  McCully	  (2008;	  2011)	  has	  written	  in	  detail	  of	  the	  philanthropic	  contributions	  of	  the	  American	  founding	   fathers.	   Although	   he	   does	   not	   discuss	   them	   explicitly,	   political	   associations	   like	   the	  Sons	  of	  Liberty	  and	  Committees	  of	  Correspondence	  figured	  importantly	  in	  that	  collective	  act	  of	  philanthropy.	   Prometheus,	   Hardin’s	   tragedy,	   Maine,	   Camelot,	   King	   John,	   the	   Mayflower	  Compact	  and	  the	  organizations	  of	   the	  American	  Revolution	  are	  all	  pieces	  of	   the	  same	  cultural	  puzzle,	  although	  it	  may	  at	  first	  seem	  less	  than	  obvious	  that	  they	  are	  related.	  These	  and	  myriad	  other	   examples	   illustrate	   the	   range	   and	   power	   of	   the	   simple	   metaphor	   of	   the	   commons:	  voluntarily	   sharing	   resources	   for	   agreed-­‐upon	   shared	   purposes.	   Simple	   as	   it	   may	   be,	   the	  commons	  metaphor	  has	  also	  proved	  to	  be	  profound.	  As	  we	  will	  see	  below,	  the	  juxtaposition	  of	  the	   concepts	  of	   commons	  and	  voluntary	  action	   supply	  explanation	  of	  both	   the	   resources	  and	  the	  agentry	  involved.	  The	   reach	   of	   the	   commons	   idea	   is	   not	   limited	   to	   English	   speakers	   by	   any	  means.	  For	  example,	  khvost	   is	  a	  Russian	   term	  that	  might	  be	  used	  as	  a	  synonym	  for	  new	  commons.	   It	  has	  connotations	   somewhere	   between	   a	   group	   and	   a	   clique,	   with	   additional	   connotations	   of	   an	  entourage,	   when	   there	   is	   a	   clear,	   identified	   leader.	   Perhaps	   we	   might	   think	   of	   this	   as	   an	  association	  situated	  within	  a	  power	  structure.	  Josef	  Stalin,	  for	  example,	  was	  said	  to	  have	  risen	  to	  power	  as	  a	  member	  of	  a	  khvost	  of	  trusted	  confidants	  and	  colleagues	  from	  the	  same	  area	  in	  Georgia.	   (This	   insight	   is	   from	   the	   usually	   reliable	   historical	   novelist	   Alan	   Furst,	   in	  Dark	   Star	  (1991,	  6).)	  In	  The	  Commons	  (1992),	  I	  incorporated	  the	  Jewish	  term	  tzedekah,	  with	  its	  connotations	  of	   charity-­‐with-­‐justice,	   and	   the	   Islamic	   term	   zakat,	   one	   of	   the	   five	   pillars	   of	   Islam.	   Several	  indigenous	  concepts	  can	  be	  added	  to	  this	  as	  further	  insights	  into	  new	  commons	  and	  the	  wider	  third	  sector.	  In	  Arabic,	  the	  term	  hima	  means	  “inviolate	  place”	  and	  refers	  to	  a	  protected	  place,	  or	  reserved	  pasture,	  where	  trees	  and	  grazing	  lands	  are	  protected	  from	  indiscriminate	  harvest	  on	  a	  temporary	  or	  permanent	  basis	  (Gari,	  2006).	  In	  other	  words,	  a	  commons.	  Gari	  (2002;	  2006)	  and	  Kilani,	   Serhal	   and	   Llewlyn	   (2007)	   track	   the	   idea	   to	   similarly	   ancient	   origins	   and	   detail	   its	  transformation	   under	   the	   influence	   of	   the	   Prophet	   Mohammed	   from	   a	   preserve	   under	   the	  exclusive	  control	  of	  tribal	  chieftains	  to	  something	  like	  a	  medieval	  English	  commons.	  Himas	  were	  once	  found	  from	  South	  Africa	  to	  Indonesia	  and	  were	  culturally	  integral	  to	  a	  way	  of	  life	  like	  that	  surrounding	  the	  medieval	  European	  old	  commons	  (Kilani,	  Serhal	  and	  Llewlyn,	  2007).	  They	  also	  track	  the	  decline	  in	  recent	  decades	  of	  hima	  acreage	  in	  Saudi	  Arabia,	  but	  also	  note	  attempts	  to	  revive	   the	   idea,	  which	  parallel	   contemporary	   interest	   in	   commons	   in	   important	   respects	   and	  have	  been	  particularly	   successful	   in	   Lebanon.	  Another	   related	  Arabic	   term,	  haram,	   can	  mean	  either	   forbidden	   place	   or	   sacred	   place,	   referring	   in	   particular	   to	   a	   holy	   place	   of	   particular	  importance	  or	  significance.	  A	  third	  term	  from	  the	  same	  Arabic	  H-­‐R-­‐M	  root	   is	  the	  English	  term	  harem	   that	   shares	   connotations	   of	   restriction	   or	   prohibition.	  Haram	   has	   long	   been	   used	   in	  Islamic	   city	  planning,	   and	   finds	   contemporary	  applications	   in	   the	   restricted	  zones	   (places	   for	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Muslims	  only)	  around	  the	  sacred	  cities	  of	  Mecca	  and	  Medina	  (Al	  Jallad,	  2008).	  The	  Arabic	  term	  for	   the	   Temple	  Mount	   in	   Jerusalem,	   for	   example,	   is	   al-­‐haram	   al-­‐sharif	   (Friedland,	   1991;	   Luz,	  2009).	  Among	  the	  traditional	  uses	  of	  such	  restricted	  spaces	  were	  as	  zones	  for	  dispute	  or	  conflict	  resolution,	  a	  theme	  that	  resonates	  well	  with	  several	  of	  the	  themes	  identified	  here.	  
Enclosure	  and	  Substitution	  	  One	   insight	   arising	  with	   bringing	   common	   resources	   and	   associations	   together	   in	   this	  way	  is	  to	  highlight	  the	  historical	  coincidence	  that	  as	  old	  commons	  were	  increasingly	  enclosed,	  we	  begin	   to	   see	  positive	   action	  by	   the	  English	   state	   and	   local	   communities	   in	  many	  different	  settings	   establishing	   the	   legal	   conditions	   for	   new	   commons.	   This	   may	   be	   coincidence,	   or	   a	  reconfiguration	  of	   valued	   social	   functions	   transferred	   from	  one	   set	  of	   institutions	   to	  another.	  Although	   English	   enclosure	   movements	   are	   perhaps	   best	   known	   and	   most	   studied,	   the	  phenomenon	   can	   also	   be	   traced	   to	   France,	   Germany,	   Russia,	   Scandinavia	   and	   across	   Europe,	  with	  instances	  as	  far	  east	  as	  Japan,	  India	  and	  Malaysia	  Although	  it	  doesn’t,	  strictly	  speaking,	  fit	  the	   definition	   of	   old	   commons,	   in	   the	   United	   States	   the	   entire	   western	   frontier	   initially	  functioned,	   even	   though	   it	   was	   not	   referred	   to,	   as	   a	   commons,	   and	   the	   entire	   purpose	   of	  numerous	  federal	  land	  grant	  and	  homesteading	  programs	  can	  be	  summed	  u	  as	  enclosures.	  One	  bit	   of	   evidence	   to	   support	   this	   view	   is	   found	   in	   the	   famous	   announcement	   by	   the	  Superintendent	   of	   the	   Census	   that	   by	   1890	   the	   American	   frontier	   had	   been	   (en)‘closed’	   a	  change	   which	   American	   historians	   since	   Frederick	   Jackson	   Turner	   generally	   agree	   had	   a	  marked	  impact	  on	  American	  society	  and	  culture.	  This	  was	  followed	  three	  years	  later,	   in	  1893,	  by	  the	  more	  famous	  thesis	  of	  the	  historian	  Frederick	  Jackson	  Turner’s	  that	  it	  was	  the	  frontier	  –	  or,	   one	  might	   say,	   the	  American	   commons	   -­‐	   that	  had	  given	   the	  U.S.	   its	   special	   character.	  The	  implications	  of	  Turner’s	   claim,	   and	   the	  divide	   it	   suggests	   between	  Tocqueville’s	  America	   and	  our	  own	  contemporary	  world,	  for	  voluntary	  action	  has	  yet	  to	  be	  fully	  explored	  in	  these	  terms.	  In	  an	  interesting	  historical	  reversal,	  recent	  depopulation	  of	  parts	  of	  the	  Midwest	  may	  be	  causing	  some	  reversion	  back	  to	  that	  status	  (Anderson	  and	  Hill,	  1983;	  Turner	  and	  Faragher,	  1998).	  	  Historical	   enclosure	   of	   land	   in	   England	   and	   Europe	   created	   ongoing	   dislocations	   and	  problems	  in	  land	  use	  and	  comparable	  efforts	  at	  enclosure	  of	  intellectual	  property	  are	  creating	  similar	   problems	   at	   present	   (Boyle,	   2001).	   Most	   American	   intellectuals	   are	   aware	   of	   the	  implications	   for	   the	   common	  man	  of	   the	  massive	   land	   redistributions	  of	   the	  19th	   century	  not	  only	  for	  individual	  landowners	  but	  also	  for	  states	  through	  a	  series	  of	  federal	  land	  grants.	  	  The	   enclosure	   of	   common	   land	   was	   also	   an	   important	   factor	   in	   the	   development	   of	  modern	   public	   policy	   in	   the	   U.S.,	   e.g.,	   through	   the	   1854	   Peirce	   veto	   of	   land	   grants	   allowing	  creation	  of	  state	  hospitals	  for	  treatment	  of	  mental	  illness	  and	  the	  1863	  Morrill	  Act	  creating	  land	  grants	  for	  universities.	  As	  Piven	  and	  Cloward	  (1993	  [1971])	  and	  others	  have	  argued,	  enclosure	  of	  common	  lands	  in	  England,	  Ireland	  and	  Wales	  during	  the	  Tudor	  period	  likewise	  precipitated	  a	  crisis	  by	  displacing	  into	  poverty	  assorted	  landless	  persons	  who	  lost	  the	  only	  resources	  they	  had	  and	  were	  no	  longer	  able	  to	  sustain	  themselves	  as	  they	  had	  by	  grazing	  animals,	  fishing,	  collecting	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wood	  or	  gardening	  on	  what	  had	  been	  common	  lands.	  Instead,	  these	  suddenly	  poor	  “vagabonds”	  whose	   status	   was	   created	   by	   enclosures	   became	   a	   major	   social	   problem	   and	   the	   focus	   of	  decades	  of	  public	  legislative	  experiment	  and	  improvisation,	  not	  only	  in	  England,	  but	  also	  in	  the	  Netherlands,	  Germany	  and	  finally	  leading	  to	  the	  Elizabethan	  Poor	  Law	  of	  1601	  (See	  Crew,	  1998;	  Hannock,	   2007;	   Mau,	   2003).	   And	   along	   with	   enclosure	   of	   common	   lands,	   which	   undercut	  traditional	   mutual	   aid	   and	   self-­‐help,	   the	   dissolution	   of	   the	   monasteries	   eliminated	   another	  important	  source	  of	  sustenance	  for	  the	  poor.	  In	  the	  “new	  worlds”	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  Canada,	  Australia,	  New	  Zealand	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	   modern	   colonial	   world,	   European	   immigration	   brought	   even	   more	   complex	   patterns	   of	  enclosure	  as	  native,	  indigenous	  populations	  accustomed	  to	  Lockean	  “states	  of	  nature”	  and	  with	  little	  or	  no	  prior	  experience	  of	  private	  property	  were	  displaced	  from	  their	  traditional	  and	  often	  common	   lands	   (ranges	   or	   territories	   are	   perhaps	   more	   accurate	   terms),	   compounded	   on	  reservations	  and	  in	  the	  process	  too	  often	  dispossessed	  of	  their	  traditional	  cultures	  and	  ways	  of	  life	   as	  well.	   In	   the	   event,	   what	   Europeans	   saw	   as	   ‘native	   peoples’	   in	   China,	   India,	   Japan	   and	  elsewhere	  were	  –	  and	  are	  –	  far	  more	  able	  than	  others	  to	  resist	  the	  European	  cultural	  incursions	  and	  attempted	  enclosures.	  In	  either	  case,	  however,	  the	  sheer	  scale	  of	  physical,	  cultural	  and	  legal	  enclosures	  (“privatization”)	  over	  the	  past	  four	  centuries	  must	  be	  accounted	  among	  the	  reasons	  land	  and	  property-­‐based	  commons	  continue	  to	  be	  a	  rich	  and	  interesting	  topic,	  and	  the	  literature	  in	  commons	  research	  is	  large	  and	  continuing	  to	  grow.	  	  What	  this	  history	  shows	  is	  that	  no	  common	  pool	  resources	  can	  ever	  be	  completely	  free	  from	   threat	   of	   privatization.	   Enclosure	   in	   the	   legal	   sense	   of	   alienating	   common	   resources	   to	  individual,	  or	  private	  use	  or	  control	   is	  an	  existential	  possibility	   for	  all	   commons.	  Some	  of	   the	  reasons	  for	  this	  are	  outlined	  in	  the	  discussion	  of	  Mancur	  Olson’s	  provocative	  argument	  below. This	   lesson	  may	  also	  have	  been	  clear	   to	  our	   forebears.	  Thus	   the	  need	   to	  prevent,	   forestall	  or	  limit	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  possible	  consequences	  of	  enclosure	  and	  privatization	  of	  commonly	  held	  natural	  and	  cultural	  resource	  pools	  offers	  one	  possible	  set	  of	  explanations	  for	  the	  rise	  of	  legal	  rights	  of	  association,	  assembly,	  incorporation,	  tax	  exemption,	  foundations,	  trusts	  and	  nonprofit	  incorporations.	  It	  is	  hardly	  an	  accident	  that	  environmental	  groups	  like	  the	  Nature	  Conservancy,	  Ducks	  Unlimited	  and	  Greenpeace	  gravitate	  to	  the	  use	  of	  nonprofit	   incorporation	  and	  trusts	  to	  stave	  off	  enclosure.	  In	   recent	   decades	   increased	   understanding	   of	   a	   wide	   range	   of	   legally	   enabled	   new	  commons	   has	   emerged	   alongside	   older,	   traditional	   forms	   of	   common	   property	   in	   the	  comparatively	  new	  field	  of	  commons	  studies.	  It	  is	  increasingly	  clear	  that	  new	  commons	  offer	  a	  class	  of	  general	  solutions	  to	  several	  related	  problems	  in	  economics,	  politics,	  culture	  and	  society.	  Elinor	  Ostrom	  could	  easily	  have	  been	  speaking	  of	  voluntary	  action	  and	  the	   third	  sector	  when	  she	   wrote:	   “Although	   the	   theory	   of	   the	   firm	   and	   the	   theory	   of	   the	   state	   can	   resolve	   these	  problems,	  no	  equivalently	  well	  developed	  and	  generally	  accepted	   theory	  provides	  a	   coherent	  account	   of	   how	   a	   set	   of	   principals,	   faced	   with	   a	   collective	   action	   problem	   can	   solve	   (1)	   the	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problem	  of	  creating	  a	  new	  set	  of	  institutions;	  (2)	  the	  problem	  of	  making	  credible	  commitments	  and	  (3)	  the	  problem	  of	  mutual	  monitoring”	  of	  resources	  (Ostrom,	  1990:	  42).	  The	  reader	  should	  note	   that	   Ostrom	   frames	   the	   issue	   here	   in	   terms	   of	   collective	   action	   rather	   than	   collective	  choice.	   The	   importance	   of	   this	   distinction	   will	   become	   clear	   in	   the	   discussion	   below.	   When	  Ostrom	  says,	  “can	  resolve	  these	  [collective	  action]	  problems”	  this	  can	  be	  understood	  to	  mean	  as	  an	  intellectual	  or	  theoretical	  solution,	  but	  it	  also	  applies	  in	  a	  second	  sense	  to	  practical	  solutions.	  The	  actual	  practice	  of	  common	  pool	  solutions	  for	  new	  commons	  is	  somewhat	  less	  certain	  than	  the	  theory	  for	  those	  working	  in	  actual	  communities,	  but	  here	  too	  things	  have	  been	  happening.	  The	   three	   criteria	   noted	  by	  Ostrom	  outline	   a	   fundamental	   basis	   for	   the	  practice	   of	   voluntary	  action:	   creation	   of	   new	   institutions	   through	   pooling	   of	   resources,	   based	   on	   the	   credible	  commitments	   of	   voluntary	   participants	   and	   the	   establishment	   of	   suitable	   forms	   of	   mutual	  monitoring	   –	   public,	   contractual,	   and	   most	   important	   of	   all,	   voluntary	   interpersonal	  commitments	   –	   dimensions	   usually	   treated	   in	   the	   current	   third	   sector	   literature	   as	  accountability	  (Ebrahim,	  2003;	  Ebrahim	  and	  Weisband,	  2007;	  Steinberg,	  2008;).	  
The	  Commons	  in	  Your	  Backyard	  It	   is	   possible	   to	   illustrate	   a	  number	  of	   things	   about	  new	  commons	   and	   clarify	   the	   ties	  between	  voluntary	  action	  and	  common	  pool	  resources	  with	  a	  relatively	  simple	  example.	  One	  of	  the	   most	   valuable	   aspects	   of	   old	   commons	   for	   understanding	   voluntary	   action	   is	   the	  visualization	   of	   common	   space	   represented	   by	   visual	   images	   of	   common	   property,	   whether	  shared	   fields,	   irrigation	   ditches,	   fishing	   streams,	   woodlots	   or	   village	   greens.	   By	   designating	  particular	   physical	   spaces	   as	   private,	   public	   or	   common,	   we	   can	   physically	   locate	   the	   three	  sectors	  and	  find	  them,	  so	  to	  speak,	  in	  our	  own	  back	  yards.	  The	  massive	  growth	  of	  suburbs	  in	  the	  decades	  immediately	  after	  World	  War	  II	  carried	  with	  it	  a	  kind	  of	  enclosure	  movement.	  Simple,	  but	  major	  opportunities	  were	  missed	  for	  establishing	  common	  space	  in	  nearly	  every	  suburban	  neighborhood	  and	  in	  the	  everyday	  lives	  of	   large	  portions	  of	  the	  population.	   Instead,	  everyone	  who	  moved	  to	  the	  suburbs	  was	  part	  of	  one	  of	  the	  most	  massive	  and	  least	  recognized	  property	  enclosure	   movements	   of	   modern	   times.	   (C.f. http://sfbackyard.wordpress.com/tag/backyard-
commons/ or http://www.treehugger.com/culture/start-your-own-cul-de-sac-commune.html)	  Most	  of	  20th	  century	  suburban	  development	  was	  grounded	  in	  the	  exclusive	  dichotomy	  of	  public	   or	   private	   property.	   (For	   a	   unique	   slant	   on	   the	   origins	   of	   new	   meanings	   of	  private/intimate	  behavior	  see	  Faramerz	  Dabhoiwala,	  The	  Origin	  of	  Sex.	  (2012),	  which	  links	  the	  modern	  meaning	  of	  private	  to	  broader	  cultural	  changes	  during	  the	  English	  Enlightenment.)	  In	  the	  typical	  post-­‐Levittown	  suburb	  large	  tracts	  of	  land	  were	  routinely	  sub-­‐divided	  entirely	  into	  individual	   lots	   or	   parcels	   with	   only	   a	   few,	   odd	   scraps,	   often	   of	   the	   least	   commercial	   value,	  dedicated	  to	  common	  use	  usually	  for	  strictly	  utilitarian	  purposes	  like	  drainage,	  street	  signage,	  bus	  stops,	  and	  the	  like.	  This	  is	  seldom	  related	  to	  one	  of	  the	  many	  criticisms	  of	  suburbanization:	  the	   lack	   of	   community.	   Creating	   genuine	   community	   life	   requires	  more	   than	   just	   individual,	  private	   spaces	   (my	  property,	   your	   property	   and	  other	   individuals’	   properties)	   and	  universal,	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public	  (everyone’s)	  property.	  Physical	  community	  also	  demands	  common	  spaces	  that	  are	  ours	  together	  with	  our	  neighbors	  but	  yet	  no	  everyone’s.	  Such	  spaces	  are	  necessary	  for	  members	  of	  the	  community	   to	   interact	  with	  one	  another	  and	  share	  a	  common	   life.	  One	  evidence	  of	   this	   is	  that	  neighborhood	  associations	  are	  ubiquitous	  in	  suburbia	  (Dilger,	  1992;	  Fischel,	  2003;	  Nelson,	  2003;	  Nelson,	  2004;	  Nelson,	  2005)	  yet	  the	  typical	  neighborhood	  association	  must	  meet	   in	  the	  living	  rooms,	  basements,	  backyards	  or	  garages	  of	  members’	  homes	  because	  no	  dedicated	  space	  exists	   in	   the	   typical	   suburb	   for	   neighbors’	   to	   assemble	   and	   associate	   for	   any	   other	   common	  purpose.	  Suburbs	  that	  are	  planned	  and	  built	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  private/public	  dichotomy	  have	  no	  room	  for	  commons	  to	  facilitate	  community.	  One	   simple	   way	   that	   common	   spaces	   might	   have	   occurred	   routinely	   in	   suburban	  developments	  would	  be	   through	  dedication	   or	   reservation	   of	   such	   spaces	   in	   the	   original	   site	  plans.	  Yet,	  this	  did	  not	  occur.	  In	  recent	  decades	  and	  particularly	  in	  more	  upscale	  subdivisions,	  reservations	   of	   common	   land	   for	   playgrounds,	   tennis	   courts,	   swimming	   pools,	   community	  buildings,	  exercise	  facilities	  and	  other	  shared	  resources	  have	  become	  more	  frequent.	  Dedicated	  spaces	  for	  voluntary	  action	  were	  a	  customary	  feature	  of	  suburban	  plans	  like	  Greenbelt	  MD,	  and	  “new	  towns”	  like	  Columbia	  MD	  and	  Reston	  VA,	  and	  the	  visionary	  work	  of	  urban	  planners	  like	  Frank	   Lloyd	   Wright’s	   “Broadacre	   City”	   and	   the	   work	   of	   Ebenezer	   Howard.	   However,	   most	  contemporary	  suburban	  planning	  is	  the	  result	  of	  efforts	  by	  real	  estate	  development	  firms	  fully	  committed	   to	   the	   public/private	   dichotomy,	   where	   there	   is	   often	   no	   distinction	   between	  common	  and	  “waste”	  (or	  wilderness)	  space.	  Typically,	  this	  involves	  dedication	  of	  one	  or	  more	  lots	  to	  common	  use.	  In	  reality,	  the	  common	  spaces	  that	  exist	  are	  often	  designed	  to	  require	  lock	  and	   key,	   becoming	   just	   one	  more	   private	   space.	   Such	   reserved	   spaces,	   however,	   are	   not	   the	  most	  compelling	  or	  interesting	  examples	  of	  where	  commons	  might	  be	  developed	  in	  the	  existing	  physical	   space	   of	   the	   suburbs.	   By	   far,	   the	   more	   pervasive	   example	   involves	   the	   “natural”	  commons	   inherent	   in	   the	   flowing	  spaces	  of	   front,	   and	   in	  particular,	  back	  yards	   that	  naturally	  connect	   and	   flow	   from	   one	   property	   into	   one	   another	   (or	   once	   did).	   To	   see	   this,	   it	   is	   only	  necessary	  to	  look	  at	  (or	  fly	  over)	  a	  typical	  new	  suburb,	  with	  its	  sweeping	  curved	  streets	  and	  odd	  angle	  intersections,	  or	  the	  familiar	  rectangular	  grid	  (Figure	  5.1).	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Figure	  5.1	  
Plat	  Map	  of	  Hypothetical	  Subdivision	  	  
	  Looking	   at	   such	   plats	   for	   nearly	   any	   planned	   suburb	   it	   is	   easy	   to	   note	   the	   geometric	  inevitability	  of	  the	  commons	  that	  might	  have	  been	  in	  the	  spaces	  where	  individual	  lots	  connect;	  linking	   together	   individual	   houses	   into	   genuine	  physical	   communities	   through	   their	   common	  spaces.	   Every	   lot	   in	   the	   typical	   suburb	   or	   in	   newer,	   redeveloped	   (re-­‐plated)	   areas	   of	  contemporary	  cities	  and	  rural	  areas	  connects	  both	  with	   the	  public	  space	  of	   the	  street	  (and	   in	  older	  square	  city	  plats,	  with	  alleys	  behind	  or	  beside)	  and	  two	  or	  more	  other	  private	  properties.	  At	  all	  of	  these	  intersecting	  property	  lines	  are	  common	  spaces	  and	  possibilities	  exist	  to	  define	  or	  reclaim	  portions	  of	  the	  total	  land	  area	  dedicated	  as	  new	  commons	  for	  almost	  any	  combination	  of	  collective	  neighborhood	  use.	  However,	  the	  general	  tendency	  nearly	  everywhere	  has	  been	  to	  completely	  overlook	  those	  possibilities	  and	  enclose	  (privatize)	  everything	  instead.	  Shortly	  after	  a	  typical	  suburb	  is	  occupied	  the	  fences	  begin	  to	  go	  up,	  and	  for	  long	  afterward	  they	  remain	  up	  and	  are	  reinforced	  with	  strategic	  plantings,	  dividing	  the	  entire	  subdivision	  into	  a	  checkerboard	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   Yet,	   this	   situation	   is	   seldom	   irreversible.	   The	   possibility	   exists	   in	   the	   vast	  majority	   of	  these	  cases	  to	  create	  actual	  commons	  at	  any	  time	  simply	  by	  agreement	  of	  any	  combination	  of	  existing	   landowners	   (See	  Figure	  5.3)	  To	  get	   a	   clearer	  view	  of	   the	  possibilities,	  one	  need	  only	  step	  into	  the	  rear	  yard	  of	  a	  new	  home	  in	  any	  new	  suburban	  development	  anywhere.	  While	  the	  front	   yards	   facing	   the	   street	  may	   already	   be	   physically	   separated	   from	   nearby	   neighbors	   by	  driveways,	  the	  view	  across	  the	  rear	  yards	  is	  typically	  quite	  a	  different	  matter.	   	  Fences,	  hedges	  and	  other	  (removable)	  boundary	  markers	  often	  crop	  up	  in	  older	  suburbs.	  Yet	  what	  you	  will	  see	  out	  the	  back	  door	  of	  the	  typical	  new	  suburb	  (unless	  the	  view	  is	  blocked	  by	  trees	  that	  survived	  construction)	  is	  large,	  free-­‐flowing	  and	  unencumbered	  open	  spaces;	  commons	  terminated	  only	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  Often	   it	   is	  only	   through	   the	  behavior	  of	   small	   children	  and	  pets,	  by	  nature	  community	  members	  and	  commoners	  notoriously	   indifferent	   to	   invisible	  boundaries	   like	   lot	   lines,	  where	  the	  real	  possibilities	  of	  commons	  in	  suburban	  commons	  become	  apparent.	  Without	  the	  fences,	  hedges	   and	   other	   markers	   children	   and	   pets	   will	   treat	   neighboring	   backyards	   as	   a	   single,	  unified	   commons	   that	   they	   share	  with	  all	  who	  are	   there	   regularly.	  Yet,	   the	  physical	   reality	   is	  there	   for	  adults	  as	  well:	   any	  groups	  or	  associations	  of	   suburban	  neighbors	  whose	  back	  yards	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enclose	   such	   a	   nascent	   property	   commons	   could	   at	   any	   time	   choose	   to	   reverse	   their	   earlier	  enclosures	  and	  carve	  out	  as	  little	  or	  as	  much	  of	  their	  own	  neighborhood	  commons	  as	  they	  and	  their	  neighbors	  can	  agree	  upon.	  The	  means	  to	  do	  so	  begins	  with	  association.	  This	   is	  seldom	  a	  public	   issue	   in	  any	  meaningful	  sense;	   it	   is	  only	  a	  matter	  of	  voluntary	  agreement	  among	  those	  involved.	  (This	  is,	  of	  course,	  an	  oversimplification.	  In	  most	  instances,	  local	  municipal	  or	  county	  zoning	   officials	   would	   also	   be	   involved.) In	   the	   meantime,	   this	   physical	   example	   of	   the	  enclosure	   of	   suburban	   commons	   serves	   as	   a	   useful	   metaphor	   for	   the	   foundation	   of	   new	  commons	  in	  the	  social	  space	  of	  individual,	  private	  lives	  as	  well.	  As	  a	  mental	  exercise,	  it	  is	  a	  simple	  matter	  to	  divide	  each	  of	  such	  adjoining	  backyards	  into	  two	   parts:	   an	   enclosed,	   private	   space	   for	   the	   household	   only;	   and	   an	   individual	   household	  contribution	  to	  the	  common	  space	  open	  to	  all	  of	  the	  adjoining	  properties	  who	  choose	  to	  do	  the	  same.	  How	  much	  or	  how	  little	  of	  this	  common	  space	  each	  owner	  might	  dedicate	  to	  common	  use	  would	  be	  a	  matter	  of	   individual	  determination	  or	  group	  agreement.	  This	   idea	   is	  by	  no	  means	  limited	   to	  new	   suburbs	   or	   some	  gauzy	   future.	   The	   episode	   “Orpheus	   in	   the	  Undergrowth”	   in	  Series	   2	   (2004)	   of	   the	   British	   ITV	   mystery	   series	   “Rosemary	   and	   Thyme”	   is	   set	   in	   such	   a	  community	  commons	  in	  the	  Notting	  Hill	  section	  of	  London.	  Whether	  or	  not	  such	  an	  option	  for	  suburban	  commons	  has	  any	  appeal	  in	  particular	  suburban	  neighborhoods	  around	  the	  world,	  in	  a	   era	   of	   enclosure,	   privatization,	   “bowling	   alone”	   and	   the	   widespread	   decline	   of	   civic	  participation,	   it	   still	   serves	  as	  a	  homely	  but	  powerful	  metaphor	   for	   the	  principle	  of	   reversing	  enclosure	  and	  establishing	  commons,	  in	  this	  case,	  by	  deliberate	  “unenclosure”;	  carving	  common	  space	  out	  of	  private	  space	  through	  voluntary	  action.	  As	  several	  websites	  and	  Wikipedia	  entries	  on	   “backyard	   commons”	  demonstrate,	   this	   is	  not	   just	   a	   good	  hypothetical	   example	  or	  mental	  experiment.	  It	  is	  already	  a	  workable	  idea	  that	  has	  attracted	  a	  variety	  of	  advocates	  as	  part	  of	  the	  general	   renaissance	   of	   interest	   in	   commons	   (C.f.	   http://www.treehugger.com/culture/start-­‐your-­‐own-­‐cul-­‐de-­‐sac-­‐commune.html).	  
The	  Commons	  Renaissance	  As	   the	   backyard	   commons	   movement	   illustrates	   there	   has	   been	   a	   widespread	  renaissance	  of	   interest	   in	   the	   commons	   idea.	  One	  of	   the	  principal	   factors	   in	   the	  birth	  of	   new	  interest	   in	   the	   commons	   in	   recent	   decades	   has	   been	   the	   work	   of	   what	   Aligicia	   and	   Boettke	  (2009)	   call	  The	  Bloomington	  School	   of	   institutional	   theory	   in	   economics	   and	  public	  policy.	  A	  torrent	   of	   published	   literature	   from	   the	   Bloomington	   School,	   and	   its	   founders,	   Elinor	   and	  Vincent	   Ostrom	  makes	   heavy	   use	   of	   the	   terms	   commons	   (Ostrom	   1990;	   Ostrom	   2002)	   and	  more	  recently,	  new	  commons	  and	  knowledge	  commons	  (Ostrom	  and	  Hess,	  2007).	  One	  possible	  meaning	  of	  new	  commons	  for	  voluntary	  action	  is	  merely	  to	  distinguish	  by	  time	  periods	  between	  contemporary	   commons	   in	   the	  present	   and	  older,	   particularly	  medieval	   commons	  before	   the	  rise	   of	   the	   modern	   state.	   Thus,	   the	   old	   property	   commons	   of	   Henry	   VIII’s	   time	   can	   be	  distinguished	   from	   the	   intellectual	   property	   and	   information	   commons	   dealt	   with	   by	   Boyle	  (2003),	   Benkler	   (2004;	   2006)	   and	   Lessig	   (2001).	  Without	   necessarily	   dealing	  with	   issues	   of	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new	  and	  old	  commons,	  numerous	  commentators	  including	  Benkler	  and	  Lessig	  have	  identified	  “information”	   as	   an	   essential	   characteristic	   of	   new	   commons.	   This	   distinction	   is	   broached	  directly	   in	   the	   Hess	   &	   Ostrom	   concept	   of	   “knowledge	   commons”.	   Highlighting	   the	   role	   of	  information,	  rather	  than	  merely	  differences	   in	  time	  seems	  to	  characterize	  the	  use	  of	   the	  term	  new	   commons	   by	   Hess	   and	   Ostrom	   (2007).	   	   Such	   an	   approach	   is	   in	  marked	   contrast	   to	   the	  approach	   to	   sectors	   based	   on	   ownership	   critiqued	   elsewhere	   in	   these	   pages.	   Yet	   another	  possibility	   is	   to	   highlight	   the	   role	   of	   innovation	   and	   change	   along	   with	   information.	   This	  approach	   highlights	   the	   social,	   cultural	   and	   political	   role	   of	   information	   along	   lines	   first	  articulated	  by	  the	  political	  scientist,	  Murray	  Edelman	  (1964;	  1971;	  1974;	  1977).	  Information,	  in	  Edelman’s	  model	   is	   linked	   to	   novelty,	   innovation	   and	   change,	  while	   knowledge	   is	   associated	  with	  established	  institutions	  and	  practices,	  stability	  and	  order.	  While	  old	  commons	  relied	  upon	  traditional,	   customary	   and	   sedentary	   forms	   of	   association	   in	   the	   medieval	   village,	   tribe	   or	  manor,	   new	   commons	   rely	   more	   directly	   on	   forms	   of	   deliberate	   or	   voluntary	   association	   in	  which	   membership	   is	   clearly	   and	   explicitly	   delineated	   and	   on	   innovation	   and	   change.	   The	  approach	   to	   new	   commons	   taken	   here	   is	   instead	   to	   highlight	   the	   role	   of	   voluntary	   action	   in	  defining,	  establishing,	  operating	  and	  commons	  and	  in	  disseminating	  new	  institutional	  models.	  The	   theory	   of	   voluntary	   action	   set	   forth	   here	   also	   seeks	   to	  move	   beyond	   the	   rational	  individualism	   of	   collective	   choice	   characterized	   by	  Hardin	   (1968)	   and	   Albert	   Tucker,	  who	   is	  credited	   with	   formalizing	   and	   naming	   the	   ‘prisoners’	   dilemma	   paradox	   (Poundstone,	   1992),	  and	  the	  Bloomington	  School	  and	  economic	  and	  management	  scholars.	  The	  sought-­‐after	  move	  is	  toward	   a	   perspective	   of	   collective	   action	   based	   on	   a	   communication-­‐based	   rationality	   that	  seeks	   further	   to	   give	   greater,	   more	   explicit	   attention	   to	   the	   social	   and	   cultural	   dynamics	  involved,	  and	  not	  merely	  the	  formal	  organizations	  of	  voluntary	  action.	  This	  distinction	  may	  be	  unclear	  to	  readers	  not	  schooled	  in	  the	  subtleties	  of	  organization	  theory.	  Even	  so,	   it	  may	  make	  sense	  to	  anyone	  who	  has	  ever	  taken	  an	  introductory	  sociology	  course.	  For	  the	  time	  being,	  the	  reader	  may	  just	  wish	  to	  note	  that	  a	  membership	  association	  incorporated	  as	  a	  nonprofit	  with	  a	  501(c)3	   certificate	   and	   ratified	   by-­‐laws	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   both	   a	   formal	   and	   an	   informal	  organization	  simultaneously.	  An	  informal	  group	  of	  young	  men	  and	  women	  who	  meet	  regularly	  in	   a	   public	   library,	   community	   meeting	   room,	   or	   church	   basement	   for	   a	   similar	   recognized	  purpose	  may	  not	  be	  formal,	  but	  still	  constitutes	  a	  social	  organization.	  An	  informal	  assembly	  in	  front	   of	   a	   government	   building	   for	   purpose	   of	   spontaneous	   protest	   is	   definitely	   an	   informal	  organization.	   Voluntary	   action	   can	   encompass	   the	   full	   range	   of	   formal	   and	   informal	  possibilities.	  Thus,	  in	  the	  new	  commons	  theory	  of	  voluntary	  action	  the	  term	  new	  is	  not	  merely	  used	   to	   denote	   a	   second,	   more	   recent	   historic	   era	   in	   which	   common	   resource	   pools	   were	  created	   deliberately	   and	   lawfully	   following	   the	   various	   enclosure	   movements.	   It	   refers	   by	  implication	   also	   to	   situational	   factors,	   notably	   the	   legal	   infrastructure	   facilitating	   freedom	   of	  association	  and	  assembly	  and	  offering	  legal	  protections	  for	  the	  process	  of	  intentional	  resource	  pooling.	  Further,	  new	  commons	  theory	  is	   intended	  to	  recognize	  also	  that	  new	  commons	  are	  a	  largely	   urban	   phenomenon	   in	   marked	   contrast	   to	   the	   predominantly	   rural	   character	   of	   old	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commons.	   Formation	   of	   new	   commons,	   as	  with	  Habermas’	   public	   spheres	   typically	   began	   in	  internationally	   recognized	   urban	   centers	   and	   proliferated,	   or	   diffused,	   outward	   from	   there.	  Even	   what	   contemporary	   Americans	   think	   of	   as	   distinctly	   rural	   voluntary	   action	   may	   have	  identifiable	  urban	  roots	  or	  embrace	  urban	  forms	  of	  association	  organization	  and	  legal	  context.	  
New	  Commons	  First	  Appear	  New	   commons	   actually	   predate	   both	   the	   current	   commons	   renaissance	   and	   the	   new	  recognition	   of	   the	   third	   sector	   by	   several	   centuries.	   They	   date	   from	   17th	   century	   Europe.	  Association	  in	  Florence	  during	  the	  Italian	  Renaissance	  a	  century	  or	  more	  earlier	  than	  that,	  for	  example,	  was	  still	  largely	  an	  old	  world	  phenomenon,	  with	  associations	  (notably	  the	  guilds	  but	  also	  corporations	   like	   the	  Spedale	  degli	   Innocenti)	  controlled	  by	  the	  city’s	   traditional	  political,	  economic	   and	   religious	   elites,	   the	   best	   known	   of	   which	   today	   are	   the	  Medici	   family	   (Elmer,	  2000;	  Gilbert,	  1949).	  In	  the	  early	  17th	  century	  at	  several	  urban	  centers	  in	  Europe	  we	  begin	  to	  see	   the	   emergence	   of	   assorted	   legal	   mechanisms	   to	   protect	   donors	   and	   facilitate	   common	  resource	   pooling	   of	   fungible	   assets,	   to	   enable	   the	   formation	   of	   various	   organized	   forms	   of	  voluntary	  action	  for	  a	  recognizable	  range	  of	  purposes:	  public	  charity,	  philanthropy,	  education,	  religion,	  science,	  and	  social	  engagement	  and	  interaction.	  	  These	   developments	   occurred	   at	   approximately	   the	   same	   time	   as	   emerging	   rights	   of	  assembly	  and	  changes	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  protest	  (Armitage,	  2011;	  Tilly,	  1978;	  Tilly,	  1986;	  Tully,	  2009;	   Tully,	   2014)	   discussed	   below.	   The	   English	   Statute	   of	   Charitable	   Uses	   (1601);	   the	  Elizabethan	  Poor	  Law	  (1601)	  and	  the	  entire	  history	  of	  the	  law	  of	  public	  charities,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  histories	  of	  religion,	  education,	  science	  and	  other	   fields	  routinely	  note	  a	  broad	  range	  of	   these	  developments	  without	   tying	   them	  directly	   together	   as	   the	  development	   of	  modern	   voluntary	  action.	  This	  statement,	  like	  others	  that	  are	  part	  of	  the	  “new	  commons”	  framework	  has	  a	  strong	  conjectural	  component.	  Obviously,	  if	  this	  outlandish	  hypothesis	  is	  ever	  to	  be	  confirmed,	  a	  great	  deal	   of	   additional	   scholarly	   spadework	   drawing	   these	   connections	   remains	   to	   be	   done.	  Subsequently	  in	  this	  sequence	  of	  developments	  there	  was	  a	  flurry	  of	  voluntary	  organizational	  and	  political	  activity	   in	  the	  Netherlands	  (primarily	  Amsterdam,	  but	  to	  a	   lesser	  extent	   in	  other	  cities)	  during	  the	  17th	  century	  (Brandt,	  1993;	  Jonker,	  2000;	  Ketelaar,	  2014;	  Sievers,	  2010:	  46-­‐62)	   and	   something	   of	   a	   17th	   century	   “golden	   age”	   of	   science	   in	   London,	   Paris,	   Berlin	   and	  elsewhere	  was	  accompanied	  by	   formation	  of	   a	   large	  number	  of	   voluntary	  associations,	   social	  networks	   including	   the	   first	   modern	   scientific	   journals	   (Gross,	   2002;	   Merton,	   1968;	   Shapin,	  1998).	   Later,	   the	   18th	   century	   enlightenments	   and	   aufklärung	   of	   several	   nations	   were	  accompanied	  by	   formation	  of	  complex	  networks	  of	  new	  clubs,	  associations	  and	  assemblies	   in	  London,	  Paris,	  Berlin,	  Vienna	  and	  elsewhere	  as	  Habermas	  and	  others	  have	  shown.	  	  These	  were	   instrumental	   in	   the	   establishments	   of	   radically	   new	   dimensions	   of	   public	  space	   (Habermas,	   1989).	   The	   cumulative	   impact	   of	   these	   highly	   diverse	   developments	  continued	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  Britain	  and	  elsewhere	  throughout	  the	  19th	  century.	  All	  of	  this	  involved	  the	  formation	  of	  new	  (and	  enabled	  by	  law)	  associations,	  foundations	  and	  other	  organized	  voluntary	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action,	  and	  fundamental	  to	  all	  of	   it	  common	  resource	  pooling.	  I	  concur	  with	  and	  seek	  to	  build	  upon	   Habermas’	   (1989)	   thesis	   that	   the	   innovative	   public	   sphere	   formed	   in	   and	   around	   the	  coffeehouses,	   newspapers,	   novels,	   scientific	   societies	   and	   other	   new	   institutions	   of	   the	   18th	  century	   constituted	   a	   “structural	   transformation”	   in	   the	   public	   sphere	   –	   one	   of	   a	   number	   to	  occur	   since	   that	   time.	   Although	   Habermas	   doesn’t	   deal	   with	   it	   explicitly,	   other	   sources	   (e.g.,	  Sheehan,	   1989)	   support	   the	   view	   that	   this	   new	   public	   sphere	   replaced	   older	   doctrines	   of	  publicness	   in	  Germany	  and	  elsewhere	  supportive	  of	   the	   idea	  that	   the	  public	  will,	   interest	  and	  good	  (that	  is,	  the	  public	  sphere)	  must	  be	  kept	  secret;	  they	  were	  too	  important,	  vital	  and	  esoteric	  to	  expose	  to	  members	  of	  what	  we	  call	  the	  general	  public.	  This	  is	  a	  radically	  different	  notion	  of	  public	   than	   that	   animating	   Habermas’	   19th	   century	   bourgeois	   public	   sphere	   and	   other	  more	  recent	   versions	   of	   publicity.	   Those	   who	   find	   such	   a	   notion	   of	   a	   private	   public	   sphere	   too	  ridiculous	   by	   half	   would	   do	   well	   to	   pay	   closer	   attention	   to	   contemporary	   doctrines	   of	  governmental	   secrecy	   in	   cases	   of	   “national	   security”,	   which	   appear	   to	   be	   evolving	   in	   similar	  directions.	  
An	  Aside	  on	  Corporate	  Plurality	  and	  Autonomy	  Over	  this	  same	  period	  of	  several	  centuries,	  a	  variety	  of	  intermediate	  legal	  problems	  were	  worked	   through	   and	   resolved.	   One	   of	   these	   was	   the	   ‘corporate	   personality’	   solution	   to	   the	  problem	   of	   corporate	   or	   collective	   identity,	   noted	   by	   Gierke	   ([1880]	   2007)	   in	   Germany	   and	  subsequently	   ratified	   in	   an	   1886	   U.S.	   Supreme	   Court	   ruling.	   The	   problem	   involved	   how	   to	  reconcile	  and	  justify	  a	  single	  course	  of	  action	  arising	  from	  a	  plurality	  of	  actors.	  In	  the	  theory	  of	  the	  state,	  Rousseau	  had	  had	  to	  resort	  to	  the	  general	  will	  to	  do	  so,	  a	  complication	  which	  led	  in	  turn	   to	   the	   suspicion	   and	   even	   outright	   bans	   on	   sub-­‐national	   associations	   or	   what	   James	  Madison	   termed	   “factions”	   in	   Federalist	   Paper	   #10.	   By	   framing	   the	   unitary	   result	   of	   diverse	  individuals	  working	   together	   in	  association	  as	  a	   ‘legal	  personality’	   collective	  voluntary	  action	  became	   feasible	   even	   in	   an	   age	   of	   rugged	   individualism.	   Although	   the	   actual	   circumstances	  surrounding	  the	  judge’s	  ruling	  in	  Santa	  Clara	  County	  v.	  Southern	  Pacific	  Railroad	  (1886)	  appear	  to	  be	  somewhat	  muddled	  and	  in	  doubt,	  the	  case	  first	  made	  by	  Gierke	  and	  adopted	  by	  others	  for	  the	  somewhat	  idiosyncratic	  doctrine	  of	  corporations	  as	  “legal	  personalities”	  offered	  a	  coherent	  –	   if	  oddly	  named	  –	   legal	  doctrine	  and	  a	  seemingly	  durable	  solution	  (it	  has	   lasted,	  after	  all,	   for	  nearly	  130	  years)	  to	  the	  major	  problem	  of	  the	  unity-­‐in-­‐plurality	  of	  corporate	  collective	  action	  in	  a	   culture	   stressing	   the	   epistemological	   primacy	   of	   individuals.	   The	   difficulty	   came	   in	   with	  several	   recent	   court	   rulings,	   most	   notoriously	   in	   the	   Citizens	   United	   case	   (2010)	   when	   the	  Supreme	  Court	  majority	  went	  well	  beyond	  Gierke’s	  doctrine	  of	  corporate	  entity	  and	  unity	  and	  began	   the	   dubious	   practice	   of	   selectively	   attributing	   the	   personal	   characteristics	   of	   humans	  (e.g.,	  “speech”)	  to	  corporations.	  	  This	  solution	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  profound	  one.	  Yet,	  this	  durable	  solution	  seems	  to	  be	  coming	  apart	  at	  present.	  The	  ideal	  of	  incorporated	  associations	  as	  legal	  persons	  introduced	  in	  the	  Santa	  
Clara	  case	  (1886)	  was	  widely	  recognized	  as	  a	  useful	  metaphor,	  at	  least	  until	  the	  Roberts’	  court	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began	   taking	   corporate	   personhood	   literally	   and	   inventing	   out	   of	   whole	   cloth	   increasingly	  broad	  concessions	  of	  human	  characteristics	  and	  attendant	  rights	  and	  privileges	  to	  corporations	  –	   notably	   granting	   corporations	   freedom	   of	   speech	   through	   the	   infamous	   ‘money	   is	   speech’	  doctrine	   (Dworkin,	   2010).	   One	   of	   the	   things	   to	   keep	   in	   mind	   is	   the	   relative	   recency	   of	   the	  current	  active	  interpretations	  of	  these	  First	  Amendment	  freedoms	  in	  the	  U.S.	  Alan	  Dershowitz	  wrote	  in	  2013	  that	  while“[t]he	  freedom-­‐of-­‐expression	  guarantee	  of	  our	  First	  Amendment	  [was]	  ratified	  222	  years	  ago.	  .	  .	  for	  a	  century	  and	  a	  quarter	  those	  words	  were	  essentially	  dead	  letters	  —	   until	   1919,	   when	   Justice	   Oliver	   Wendell	   Holmes	   resuscitated	   them	   with	   a	   shocking	  dissenting	   opinion	   that	   ultimately	   became	   the	   theory	   of	   our	   Constitution	   and	   the	   law	   of	   the	  land”	   (Dershowitz,	   2013).	   Other	   First	   Amendment	   freedoms	   including	   association	   and	  assembly	  were	   similarly	  moribund	  until	   even	  more	   recently.	   	   Freedom	  of	  association	  did	  not	  take	  on	  its	  contemporary	  significance	  until	  N.A.A.C.P.	  v.	  Alabama	  (1958),	  ten	  years	  after	  the	  U.N.	  Declaration	   of	   Human	   Rights	  was	   adopted.	   Although	   freedom	   of	   assembly	   cases	   have	   a	   long	  history	  reaching	  well	  into	  the	  colonial	  era,	  the	  current	  doctrine	  only	  took	  its	  present	  form	  with	  the	   ruling	   in	  Boy	   Scouts	   of	   America	   v.	   Dale	   (2000)	   in	   which	   the	   Court	   extended	   coverage	   to	  explicitly	  include	  groups	  wishing	  to	  preserve	  traditional	  values.	  Each	  of	  these	  formative	  rulings	  has	  had	  an	  impact	  on	  defining	  the	  present	  configuration	  of	  the	  U.S.	  third	  sector.	  The	  lack	  of	  face	  validity	  of	  this	  position	  is	  many	  faceted	  and	  points	  toward	  the	  eventual	  need	  for	  a	  revision	  of	  this	  ancient	  metaphor:	  If	  we	  are	  to	  take	  corporations	  as	  genuine	  persons	  as	   literally	   as	   the	   5-­‐member	   majority	   on	   the	   Roberts	   court,	   then	   wouldn’t	   dissolving	   a	  corporation	   constitute	   murder,	   or	   at	   least	   manslaughter	   or	   corporate	   personslaughter?	  Shouldn’t	  the	  average	  life	  expectancy	  of	  corporations	  then	  be	  finite	  and	  at	  least	  approximately	  the	   same	   as	   that	   of	   living	   biological	   persons?	   Since	   the	   court	   has	   also	   applied	   the	   ‘equal	  protection’	  of	  the	  14th	  amendment	  to	  corporations,	  shouldn’t	  the	  13th	  (which	  set	  the	  context	  for	  the	  14th)	  apply	  also?	  If	  corporations	  are,	  as	  the	  Court	  insists,	  literally	  persons,	  how	  is	  it	  possible	  that	   they	   can	   be	   owned?	   Doesn’t	   the	   ownership	   of	   corporations	   constitute	   slavery	   or	  involuntary	  servitude?	  These	  are	  among	  the	  enormous	  number	  of	  questions	  and	  complications	  raised	  by	  this	  controversial	  doctrine	  that	  seem	  to	  signal	  the	  unraveling	  of	  Gierke’s	  “solution.”	  The	   implications	   of	   this	   reach	   directly	   into	   the	   third	   sector.	  We	   immediately	   saw	   the	  pernicious	  effects	  of	  this	  doctrine	  of	  literal	  corporate	  personhood	  in	  the	  avalanche	  of	  corporate	  ‘speech’	   (known	   to	   us	   non-­‐lawyers	   as	   anonymous	   political	   donations)	   funneled	   into	   the	  Presidential	   campaign	   of	   2012,	   but	   this	   also	   opened	   yet	   another	   avenue	   of	   mischief.	   The	  problem	   in	   2012	   proved	   to	   be	   less	   corporations	   per	   se	   than	   rogue	   individual	   billionaires	  apparently	   masking	   their	   actions	   through	   anonymous	   donations	   to	   freely	   speaking	  corporations.	  Indeed,	  this	  problem	  for	  one	  U.S.	  political	  party	  has	  become	  so	  pervasive	  that	  it	  is	  less	  a	  political	  association	  in	  Tocqueville’s	  original	  sense	  of	  like-­‐minded	  people	  than	  the	  retinue	  of	   attendants	   of	   the	   rich	   and	   those	   who	   can	   pass	   their	   numerous	   ideological	   litmus	   tests.	  Equally	  troublesome,	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  voluntary	  action,	  was	  the	  apparent	  spoilage	  of	  a	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previously	   legitimate	   category	   of	   tax	   exempt	   (but	   not	   deductible)	   501(c)4	   corporations	  designated	  by	  the	  IRS	  as	  “social	  welfare”	  (i.e.,	  common	  good)	  organizations.	  This	  phrase,	  which	  has	   been	   in	   the	   language	   of	   the	   IRS	   code	   for	   more	   than	   50	   years,	   has	   been	   rendered	  anachronistic	   by	   the	   changing	   meaning	   of	   the	   phrase	   “social	   welfare”	   as	   Americans	   have	  increasingly	  come	  to	  adopt	  the	  European	  meanings	  of	  the	  phrase	  worked	  out	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  post	  WWII	  welfare	  state.	  The	  language	  of	  common	  goods	  adopted	  here	  offers	  one	  way	  out	  of	  this	  morass.	  In	  its	  original	  statutory	  meaning,	  social	  welfare	  referred	  to	  those	  organizations	  that	  were	  not	  public	  charities,	  by	  virtue	  of	  their	  charitable,	  educational,	  religious,	  etc.	  purposes,	  but	  were,	  nonetheless	  engaged	  in	  pursuits	  for	  what	  were	  then	  called	  social	  welfare,	  and	  are	  herein	  called	   common	   goods.	   Civic	   organizations	   like	   local	   Chambers	   of	   Commerce	   and	   other	   civic	  organizations	  were	  in	  the	  category.	  Gradual	  expansion	  of	  the	  range	  of	  activities	  allowed	  under	  the	  501(c)3	  “public	  charities”	  umbrella	  placed	   increasing	   limits	  on	  501(c)4’s,	  but	   it	   remained	  on	  the	  civic	  side	  of	  Tocqueville’s	  distinction.	  Events	  in	  2012,	  temporarily	  at	  least,	  have	  moved	  this	   civic	   category	   directly	   into	   the	   political	   category.	   This	   amounted	   to	   nothing	   less	   than	  blurring	   (if	  not	  erasing)	   the	  150	  year	  old	   line	  established	  by	  Tocqueville	  between	   “civic”	  and	  “political”	   association;	   the	   former	   represented	   by	   the	   incorporated	   voluntary	   or	   civic	  associations	  of	  the	  501(c)	  group,	  the	  largest	  of	  which	  is	  501(c)	  3	  “public	  charities”	  and	  the	  latter	  confined	  largely	  to	  the	  528	  political	  corporations.	  	  For	   social	   scientists	   and	   citizens	   although	  perhaps	   not	   for	   lawyers	   the	  way	   out	   of	   the	  morass	  in	  which	  the	  Court	  has	  seemingly	  ensnared	  itself	  (and	  us)	  is	  relatively	  straightforward.	  The	   theoretical	   challenge	   consists	   of	   finding	   a	   more	   modern	   alternative	   to	   Gierke’s	   now-­‐obsolete	  “legal	  personality”	  metaphor.	  This	  would	  involve	  finding	  better,	  more	  timely	  answers	  to	  three	  questions:	  How	  to	  define	  corporations	  as	  autonomous	  collective	  actors,	  how	  to	  assign	  corporate	   responsibility	   and	   how	   to	   assure	   the	   autonomy	   of	   collective	   acts	  while	   protecting	  corporations	   and	   their	   assets	   and	   actions	   from	   hostile	   assaults	   harmful	   to	   their	   interests?	  Although	   these	   problems	   are	   general	   to	   all	   corporations,	   their	   implications	   for	   exempt	  corporations	  are	  basic	   to	   the	   future	  of	  voluntary	  action	   in	   the	  U.S.	  Gierke’s	   solution	  seems	   to	  have	  worked	  well	  in	  an	  age	  of	  liberal	  individualism	  seeking	  to	  escape	  the	  penumbra	  of	  medieval	  and	  socialist	  collectivisms,	  but	  the	  doctrine	  of	  corporate	  personhood	  was	  set	  forth	  before	  nearly	  a	  century	  of	  work	  in	  social	  theory	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  collective	  action,	  and	  for	  the	  current	  Court	  to	  ignore	   virtually	   the	   entire	   history	   of	   modern	   social	   science	   and	   revert	   back	   to	   this	   archaic	  individualist	   idea,	   while	   also	   ignoring	   something	   as	   fundamental	   to	   American	   political	  philosophy	  as	  Tocqueville’s	  distinction	  between	  civil	  and	  political	  associations	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  undo	  the	  legal	  handiwork	  of	  several	  centuries.	  
The	  Role	  of	  Britain	  and	  North	  America	  Although	   evidence	   of	   earlier	   associations	   can	   be	   found	   in	   many	   different	   locales	   in	  Europe	  and	  beyond,	  the	  preponderance	  of	  activity	  until	  recent	  decades	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  in	  the	   English-­‐speaking	   world.	   Since	   the	   17th	   century	   the	   incubators	   of	   voluntary	   action	   –	   the	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supportive	   legal	   environments	   and	   formation	   of	   completely	   new	   types	   of	   new	   commons	   has	  been	  most	   evident	   at	   least	   to	  English	   speakers	   in	  Great	  Britain	   and	  her	   colonies.	  Tocqueville	  was	  wrong	   in	   this,	  or	  at	   least	   incomplete	   in	  his	  understanding:	  While	  voluntary	  action	   in	   the	  new	  American	  republic	  made	  a	  profound	  impression	  on	  him,	  he	  apparently	  did	  not	  know	  that	  similar	   formations	   of	   associations	   –	   albeit	   with	   some	   of	   the	   trappings	   of	   the	   old	   order,	   like	  official	  patrons	  –	  were	  also	  commonplace	   in	  other	  English	  colonies	  and	  in	  Great	  Britain	   itself.	  One	   major	   difference	   he	   did	   note	   was	   his	   correlation	   of	   association	   in	   France	   with	   state	  auspices,	   and	   in	   Britain	   with	   the	   patronage	   of	   the	   aristocracy	   (a	   practice	   nominally	   still	  prevalent	   there).	   Ordinary	   people	   undertook	   voluntary	   action	   in	   the	   U.S.	   on	   their	   own	  recognizance,	   or	   as	   guarantors	   of	   their	   own	   authenticity	   and	   legitimacy.	   For	   a	   different	  traditional	   approach	   to	   this	   problem,	   note	   the	   rule	   of	   Ten	   Good	  Men	   necessary	   to	   form	   and	  maintain	  a	  Jewish	  synagogue.	  	  In	   addition	   to	   the	   examples	   noted	   above,	   ethnic	   mutual	   aid,	   self-­‐help	   and	   charitable	  societies,	  beginning	  with	  the	  Scots	  Charitable	  Society	  in	  Boston	  in	  1657,	  established	  a	  trend	  in	  the	   United	   States	   that	   continues	   through	   the	   many	   German,	   Irish,	   Polish,	   Italian	   and	   more	  recently	  Cambodian,	  Vietnamese,	  Indian,	  Chinese	  and	  other	  ethnic	  societies	  in	  existence	  today	  (Bai,	  1992;	  Heidhues,	  2006;	  Ming-­‐huan,	  1998	  Ming-­‐huan,	  1999;	  Rauch,	  1999;	  Nelson	  &	  Unger,	  2009;	   Unger	   &	   Norris,	   2011;	   Welzel,	   Englehart	   and	   Deutsch,	   2006).	   The	   many	   American	  voluntary	   associations	   observed	   in	   the	  mid-­‐19th	   century	   by	   Tocqueville	   and	   Beaumont	  were	  only	   a	   small	   part	   of	   the	   picture	   that	   also	   included	   numerous	   social	  movements	   and	   utopian	  communities	  of	  the	  same	  period,	  numerous	  state	  militias,	  the	  national	  fraternal	  societies	  of	  the	  late	  19th	  century,	  national	  associations	  like	  the	  U.S.	  Sanitary	  Commission,	  and	  a	  great	  deal	  more.	  Modern,	  mediated	  volunteering	  seems	  to	  have	  been	  born	  during	  and	  immediately	  after	  World	  War	  I	  (Zunz,	  2012:	  51-­‐80).	  Other	  social	  inventions	  have	  included	  the	  use	  of	  membership	  dues	  for	   charitable	   purposes,	   settlement	   and	   neighborhood	   houses,	   “friendly	   visiting”	   of	   the	   poor,	  voluntary	   “social	   agencies”	   organized	   for	   “scientific	   charity”,	   modern	   charitable	   hospitals,	  organized	   fundraising	   campaigns,	   multi-­‐tier	   fundraising	   (e.g.,	   “big”	   and	   “small”	   donors),	   and	  federated	  financing	  (e.g.	  United	  Way	  and	  the	  Combined	  Federal	  Campaign).	  These	  are	  just	  some	  of	   the	  numerous	  examples	  of	  entirely	  new	  social	   institutions	   that	   came	   into	  being	  during	   the	  late	   19th	   and	   early	   20th	   centuries	   and	   grounded	   in	   common	   resource	   pooling	   practices.	  Most	  recently,	   international	   nongovernmental	   organizations	   (INGOs)	   operating	   across	   national	  boundaries	   in	   the	   international	   arena	   and	   several	   diverse	   forms	   of	   “social	   enterprise”	   are	  continuing	  the	  tradition	  of	  North	  Atlantic	  innovation.	  	  The	   legal	   framework	   served	   to	   enable	   such	   institution	   building	   providing	   a	   toolkit	   of	  useable	   resources.	   In	   its	   first	   half-­‐dozen	   years	   of	   operation,	   for	   example,	   Jane	   Addams’	   Hull	  House	   had	   no	   need	   to	   incorporate,	   but	  when	   a	   donor	   gave	   the	   institution	   a	   gift	   of	   property,	  incorporation	  became	  a	  necessary	  step.	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Third	  Sector	  As	  A	  Third	  Way	  It	  was	  really	  only	   in	   the	  wake	  of	   the	   intellectual	  and	   ideological	  demise	  of	   the	   ideal	  of	  state	  socialism,	  after	  a	  century	  and	  a	  half	  of	  prominence	  and	  controversy	  that	  the	  model	  of	  the	  new	   commons	   as	   organized	   collective	   action	   distinct	   from	   the	   state	   and	   the	   business	  corporation	   began	   to	   emerge	   in	   popular	   culture	   as	   a	   legitimate	   “third	   way”	   of	   institution	  building	   without	   the	   need	   for	   invoking	   the	   coercive	   powers	   of	   government	   or	   the	   incentive	  structures	  of	   the	  price	  system.	  To	  truly	  rugged	   individualists	   these	  often	  appear	  as	  “socialist”	  dynamics.	  They	  are	  so	  only	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  are	  social	  or	  collective	  solutions	  rather	  than	  purely	   singular,	   individual	   ones.	   Economic	   markets	   are	   an	   effective	   way	   of	   coordinating	  voluntary	   action	   that	   involves	   mutually	   profitable	   exchange	   and	   contracting,	   most	  fundamentally	  the	  employment	  from	  the	  labor	  market	  of	  agents	  whose	  loyalty	  to	  the	  mission	  is	  assured	   contractually,	   while	   government	   as	   a	   way	   of	   coordinating	   voluntary	   action	   involves	  supplementary	   coercive	   compliance	   as	   in	   the	   all-­‐volunteer	   military,	   taxation	   or	   the	   party	  discipline	  of	  state	  socialism.	  An	  independent	  sector	  of	  voluntary	  action	  as	  a	  third	  way	  emerging	  from	  the	  experience	  noted	  above	   is	   the	  way	  of	  voluntary	  (non-­‐contractual,	  or	  unconstrained)	  cooperation	   and	   collaboration	   for	   social	   production,	   in	   which	   the	   participants	   identify	   their	  shared	   mission,	   establish	   and	   build	   shared	   resources	   pools	   and	   subsequent	   recruits	   either	  embrace	  or	  modify	   the	  mission	  while	  continuing	   to	  add	   to	  and	  utilize	   their	  pooled	  resources.	  The	  third	  way	  of	  independent	  voluntary	  action	  is	  something	  quite	  different	  from	  assorted	  “third	  ways”	   of	   governance	   and	  macro-­‐economic	   steering	   a	   course	   between	   19th	   century	   liberalism	  and	   socialism.	   It	   has	   been	   bubbling	   up	   from	   its	   grassroots	   origins,	   attracting	   interest	   and	  attention,	  and	  provoking	   legislative	  and	  other	  adaptations	  now	  for	  several	  centuries.	   It	  was	  a	  key	  aspect	  of	  what	  Tocqueville	  observed	  and	  puzzled	  over	  nearly	  two	  centuries	  ago.	  Although	  Tocqueville’s	  comments	  on	  association	  are	  very	  important,	  they	  also	  only	  form	  a	  small	  part	  of	  his	   work	   and	   subsequent	   analysts	   of	   American	   culture	   outside	   the	   third	   sector	   research	  community	  often	  pay	  little	  attention	  to	  the	  full	  range	  of	  Tocqueville’s	  writings.	  New	  commons	  are	  agents	  of	   innovation,	  pluralism	  and	  sometimes	  disorderly	  change	  operating	   in	  a	  sector	  or	  space	  defined	  by	  numerous	  cooperating,	  competing,	  and	  conflicting	  entities	  each	  capable,	  under	  the	  right	  circumstances,	  of	  genuinely	  transformational	  change.	  It	   is	   due	   to	   the	   tumultuous	   creativity	   of	   this	   third	   way	   that	   what	   had	   been	   merely	  utopian	   expressions	   of	   things	   like	   universal	   freedom	   of	   association	   in	   the	   world	   (Guttman,	  1998)	  have	  become	  a	  nearly	  universal	  normative	  standard	  for	  the	  world	  today	  (Glendon,	  2001;	  Korey,	  2001).	  Even	  in	  those	  places	  where	  freedom	  of	  association	  does	  not	  exist,	  authorities	  are	  under	   pressure	   to	   claim	   that	   it	   does	   and	   to	   justify	   or	   explain	   breeches	   in	   the	   court	   of	  world	  public	  opinion.	  None	  of	  this	  is	  to	  suggest	  that	  in	  the	  future	  state	  socialism	  in	  any	  of	  its	  various	  guises	   will	   be	   of	   no	   further	   importance.	   This	   is	   primarily	   a	   question	   of	   ideology	   and	   not	   a	  central	  part	  of	  this	  investigation.	  Indeed,	  if	  current	  trends	  toward	  income	  inequality	  in	  the	  U.S.	  and	  elsewhere	  continue,	  serious	  proposals	  for	  new	  indigenous	  forms	  of	  statist	  intervention	  and	  socialist	  redistribution	  are	  all	  but	  inevitable.	  We	  have	  already	  seen	  some	  of	  this	  in	  expressions	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of	  the	  Tea	  Party	  and	  Occupy	  movements.	  But	  the	  role	  of	  government	  is	  not	  the	  issue	  here,	  and	  the	  events	  following	  1989	  opened	  a	  historic	  moment	  of	  great	  interest	  in	  an	  independent	  sector	  characterized	  by	  the	  third	  way.	  At	  this	  moment	  in	  history,	  rigid	  control	  of	  society	  and	  culture	  by	  the	  state	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  be	  a	  plausible	  alternative	  for	  much	  of	  the	  world’s	  population,	  while	  markets	   are	   increasingly	   also	   revealing	   their	   limits	   to	   all	   but	   the	  most	   die-­‐hard	   enthusiasts.	  However,	  it	  no	  longer	  seems	  plausible	  that	  rigid	  control	  of	  society	  and	  culture	  by	  a	  political	  elite	  –	  the	  party	  (whether	  Communist,	  Nazi,	  or	  some	  future	  Islamist	  variant)	  –	  acting	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	   people	   through	   the	   state	   constitutes	   any	   form	  of	   plausible	   democratic	   society	   or	   culture.	  Even	  the	  Chinese	  state	  has	  yielded	  a	  bit	  of	  ground	  on	  this	  point.	  North	  Korea	  may	  be	  the	  single	  most	  distant	  outlier	  on	  this	  characteristic	  in	  the	  contemporary	  world.	  Whatever	  statist	  societies	  and	  cultures	  are,	   it	   is	   abundantly	   clear	   they	  are	  not	  democratic.	  All	   varieties	  of	   such	  monism	  have,	  at	  the	  moment,	  been	  replaced	  in	  contemporary	  thought	  and	  practice	  by	  a	  thoroughgoing	  institutional	  pluralism	  in	  which	  the	  state	   is	  seen	  as	   limited	  and	  merely	  one	  institutional	  actor	  among	  many.	  Regardless	   of	   the	   system	   of	   government	   that	  may	   be	   adopted	   by	   a	   regime,	   the	   near-­‐universal	   norm	   today	   is	   for	   some	   type	   of	   democratic	   society	   and	   culture	   –	  what	   some	   have	  called	  an	  ‘open	  society’	  –	  in	  which	  as	  many	  people	  as	  possible	  can	  establish	  their	  own	  life	  plans,	  either	  individually	  or	  collectively,	  and	  live	  the	  lives	  they	  wish	  to	  live	  with	  those	  they	  choose	  or	  who	  choose	  them.	  Some	  of	  the	  most	  challenging	  and	  dynamic	  aspects	  of	  thinking	  in	  the	  Islamic	  world	  involve	  how	  to	  square	  this	  dynamic	  with	  Islamic	  thought	  and	  belief	  without	  yielding	  to	  “Western	  materialism”.	  Major	  aspects	  of	  this	  intellectual	  challenge	  revolve	  around	  the	  relation	  between	  the	  state	  and	  the	  commons:	  Religious	  (Sharia)	  law	  and	  public	  law	  and	  the	  place	  of	  the	  “five	  pillars”	  of	  Islam	  including	  zakat	  (interpreted	  variously	  as	  donations	  for	  the	  poor,	  and	  the	  “poor	   tax”),	   Hajj,	   the	   Muslim	   pilgrimage	   to	   Mecca,	   etc.	   It	   is	   in	   that	   sense	   that	   both	   the	  democratization	   of	   society	   and	   culture	   and	   the	   new	   commons	   are	   capable	   of	   thriving.	   The	  foremost	  challenge	  presented	  by	  such	  societies	  and	  cultures	  is	  a	  pluralist	  one:	  How	  to	  enable	  all	  individuals	   and	   groups	   to	   pursue	   their	   own	   dreams,	   and	   prevent	   particular	   individuals	   and	  groups	  from	  imposing	  their	  vision	  involuntarily	  upon	  others.	  I	  am	  not	  naïve	  enough	  to	  believe	  that	  everyone	  has	  already	  attained	  this	  goal	  in	  the	  U.S.	  or	  in	  the	  world.	  The	  point	  here	  is	  that	  in	  the	   Arab	   Spring	   of	   2011,	   the	   Tea	   Party	   and	   Occupy	  Wall	   Street	   movements	   in	   the	   U.S.	   and	  similar	  prior	  events,	  relatively	  novel	  forms	  of	  democratic	  ideals	  (or,	  democracy	  in	  society)	  were	  in	   effect.	   States,	   with	   inherent	   tendencies	   toward	   seeking	   and	   enforcing	   a	   uniform	   public	  interest	  and	  will,	  and	  markets	  with	  inherent	  tendencies	  toward	  average	  prices	  are	  both	  unable	  to	   deal	   with	   this	   problem.	   It	   was	   precisely	   the	   inability	   of	   markets	   to	   deal	   with	   adverse	  economic	  conditions	   that	   leads	   to	   interventionism	  by	  states,	  and	   it	   is	   the	  repeated	   failures	  of	  states	  at	   least	   since	   the	  Stalinism	  of	   the	  1930s	   that	  has	  brought	  state	  socialism	   to	   its	   current	  state	  of	  disrepute.	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New	  Commons	  Are	  Associations	  As	   organized	   efforts,	   new	   commons	   engaged	   in	   voluntary	   action	   are	   not	   necessarily	  formal	  organizations	  or	  corporations,	  although	  they	  may	  be	  such	  in	  whole	  or	  in	  part.	  The	  modal	  or	  normative	  form	  of	  new	  commons	  in	  voluntary	  action	  is	  the	  voluntary	  association.	  As	  a	  larger	  class,	  we	  might	  see	  the	  full	  set	  of	  such	  commons	  as	  what	  Aristotle	  termed	  koinonia	  politike,	  an	  idea	   that	   connotes	   both	   civil	   and	   community	   dimensions.	   These	   commons	   were	   identified	  previously	   as	   enacted,	   created	   or	   deliberately	   constituted	   establishments,	   rather	   than	  traditional	   or	   customary	   institutions,	   those	   ‘natural’	   social	   arrangements	   whose	   origins	   are	  unknown	   and	   whose	   continuity	   is	   purely	   a	   matter	   of	   established	   practice.	   Making	   this	  connection	  between	  new	  commons	  and	  koinonia	  provides	  an	  opportunity	  for	  further	  clarifying	  the	  constitution	  of	  new	  commons.	  The	  ancient	  historian,	  Moses	  Finley	  (1999)	  offers	  a	  definition	  of	  koinonia	   politike	   that	   can	   be	   adapted	   to	   use	   as	   a	   definition	   of	   the	   constitution,	   or	   original	  condition,	  of	  new	  commons.	  They	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  (1)	  groups	  of	  human	  actors	  characterized	  by	   (2)	   voluntary	   participation;	   (3)	   shared	   purposes;	   and	   (4)	   collective	   control	   over	   what	   is	  understood	  to	  be	  a	  pool	  of	  shared	  resources.	  Finley’s	  (1999)	  definition	  of	  koinonia	  politike	  also	  contains	  two	  additional	  elements	  that	  will	  be	  discussed	  below.	  Both	  are	  not	  ordinarily	  part	  of	  the	   original	   condition	   of	   a	   new	   commons,	   but	   tend	   to	   emerge	   over	   time	   as	   the	   commons	  develops.	  The	  emergence	  of	   these	  two	  additional	   features	   in	  new	  commons	  together	  with	  the	  results	  of	  collective	  action	   that	   in	   the	   following	  chapter	  are	   termed	  common	  goods,	  go	  a	   long	  way	  toward	  explaining	  the	  unique	  capabilities	  of	  new	  commons.	  	  These	   four	   original	   elements	   are	   sufficient	   to	   uniquely	   define	   and	   identify	   a	   new	  common	  as	  an	  association.	  A	  natural	  commons,	  whether	   forms	  of	   tree	  mold	  or	  various	   insect	  colonies	   do	   not	   qualify	   for	   our	   purposes,	   although	   the	   associations	   and	   social	   institutions	   of	  scientists	   who	   study	   and	   understand	   such	   phenomena	   do.	   The	   phenomena	   themselves	   may	  include	   common	   pool	   resources	   and	   natural	   agents	   capable	   of	   allocating	   those	   resources.	  However,	  such	  agents	  generally	  lack	  agency,	  or	  the	  ability	  to	  voluntarily	  participate	  or	  to	  act	  in	  the	  identification	  and	  pursuit	  of	  a	  shared	  mission.	  We	  can	  also	  use	  the	  term	  social	  commons	  for	  such	   new	   commons	   or	   associations.	   Examples	   of	   such	   social	   commons	   include	   clubs	   and	  membership	   associations,	   mutual	   aid	   organizations,	   self-­‐help	   networks,	   plus	   all	   of	   the	  “knowledge	  commons”	  identified	  by	  Hess	  and	  Ostrom	  (2007),	  churches,	  congregations,	  temples	  and	   most	   other	   religious	   associations,	   and	   all	   of	   the	   other	   non-­‐state,	   non-­‐market	   entities	  mentioned	  previously.	  	  
Conclusion	  Although	  ‘old’	  commons	  of	  property,	  customary	  use	  and	  primary	  resources	  harvested	  by	  wood	  cutting,	  hunting	  and	  fishing,	  and	  irrigation	  practices	  were	  around	  for	  eons,	  they	  proved	  highly	  vulnerable	  to	  modern	  property	  systems	  that	  have	   ‘enclosed’,	  privatized	  and	  eliminated	  many	   of	   them	   in	   favor	   of	   ‘private’	   property.	   As	   legal	   arrangements	   of	   incorporation,	   tax	  exemption,	  protected	  association	  and	  assembly	  and	  various	   types	  of	  pooled	  asset	  protections	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have	   made	   possible	   the	   establishment	   of	   diverse	   ‘new’	   commons.	   These	   deliberately	  constructed	   new	   social	   institutions	   and	   inventions	   enabling	   the	   voluntary	   pursuit	   of	   shared	  purposes	   and	   the	  pooling	   of	   shared	   resources.	  As	   part	   of	   this	   general	   development,	   assorted	  freedoms	   of	   association,	   assembly	   and	   privacy	   have	   dramatically	   expanded	   the	   range	   of	  permissible	  purposes	  that	  such	  institutions	  can	  engage	  in.
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If	  what’s	  yours	  is	  yours,	  and	  what’s	  mine	  is	  mine,	  then	  whose	  is	  what	  is	  ours?	  
6.	  Common	  Resource	  Pools	  We	   have	   seen	   in	   the	   previous	   discussion	   that	   old	   commons	   in	   agriculture	   and	   rural	  communities	  were	  widely	  deployed	  in	  much	  of	  the	  world	  until	  the	  early	  modern	  period	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  practical	  problems	  of	  commonly	  held	  property,	  but	  largely	  done	  away	  with	  in	  the	  most	  developed	  countries	  in	  successive	  waves	  of	  enclosure	  and	  privatization	  that	  characterized	  early	  modernity.	  Similar	  commons	  remain	  in	  less	  developed	  parts	  of	  the	  world	  through	  the	  present.	  However,	  a	  long-­‐term	  legal	  transformation	  began	  in	  the	  seventeenth	  century	  and	  by	  the	  second	  half	   of	   the	   twentieth	   century	   had	   extended	   to	   most	   of	   the	   world’s	   nation-­‐states	   legal	  arrangements	  and	  procedures,	  including	  protection	  of	  donations,	  incorporation,	  tax	  exemption,	  and	   assorted	   other	   arrangements.	   Together,	   these	   legal	   arrangements	   enable	   and	   facilitate	  entirely	   new	   ways	   of	   pooling	   resources	   to	   facilitate	   collective	   voluntary	   action.	   As	   noted	  previously	  the	  new,	  or	  crescive,	  institutions	  labeled	  as	  new	  commons	  are	  defined	  by	  voluntary	  involvement,	  shared	  purposes	  and	  shared	  resources.	  This	  long-­‐term	  legal	  transition	  adds	  up	  to	  nothing	   less	   than	   the	   emergence	   and	   increasing	   articulation	   of	   a	   nomos,	   as	   we	   shall	   see	   in	  Chapter	  6.	  	  
What	  Are	  Common	  Pool	  Resources?	  In	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  full	  significance	  of	  these	  claims,	  some	  further	  clarification	  of	  the	  term	  common	  pool	  resources	  is	   in	  order.	  That	   is	  the	  principal	  subject	  of	  this	  chapter.	  The	  first	  task	  is	  to	  establish	  a	  clearer	  sense	  of	  what,	  in	  voluntary	  action,	  resources	  may	  be.	  This	  is	  a	  very	   general	   term,	   ultimately	   grounded	   in	   economics	   and	   refers	   generally	   to	   the	   means	  necessary	  to	  attain	  an	  end.	  In	  a	  widely	  accepted	  definition,	  Lionel	  Robbins	  defined	  economics	  as	  the	   science	   that	   “studies	   human	   behavior	   as	   a	   relationship	   between	   ends	   and	   scarce	  means	  which	  have	  alternative	  uses.”	  This	  offers	  a	  good	  starting	  point.	  Scarce,	  or	  limited,	  means	  is	  thus	  the	  definition	  of	  resources	  used	  here.	  Scarcity	  for	  our	  purposes	  has	  two	  related	  meanings	  here.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  there	  is	  the	  common-­‐sense	  meaning	  of	  necessary	  things	  that	  require	  effort	  to	  acquire.	  The	  second,	  economic	  sense	  of	   the	  term	  is	  more	  philosophical:	   in	  essence,	  scarcity	   is	  the	  opportunity	   cost	  notion	  of	   things	   that	  we	  must	   choose	  with	   the	   implication	   that	   this	  will	  involve	   loss	   of	   other	   things.	   Since	   our	   life	   spans,	   attention	   spans	   and	   energy	   are	   all	   limited,	  scarcity	   implies	  choice,	  and	   in	   the	  economic	  view	  of	   things,	  choice	   is	  elevated	  above	  all	  other	  forms	  of	  human	  behavior.	  (The	  focus	  on	  choice	  will	  be	  extended,	  but	  not	  completely	  overturned	  below.)	   For	   these	   purposes,	   the	   Bloomington	   School	   approach	   tells	   us	   that	   common	   pool	  resources	   can	   include	   any	   stocks,	   supplies	   or	   existing	   capabilities	   available	   to	   support	  production	  of	   a	   common	  good,	   another	   key	   term	   that	  will	   be	   elaborated	   in	   the	  next	   chapter.	  What,	  we	  might	   ask	   from	   the	  perspective	   of	   either	  definition,	   are	   the	   resources	  necessary	   to	  produce	  voluntary	  action?	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The	   simplest	   place	   to	   begin	   answering	   this	   question	   is	   from	   nonprofit	   financial	  accounting.	  Resources	  in	  voluntary	  action	  are,	  in	  the	  first	  instance,	  those	  assets	  that	  are	  owned	  or	  controlled	  by	  any	  voluntary	  association	  of	  people	  with	  some	  shared	  purpose	  in	  mind:	  money,	  property,	  accounts	  receivable	  (if	  there	  are	  any),	  investments	  and	  the	  like	  (Anthony	  and	  Young,	  2005;	  Finkler,	  2001;	  Young,	  2007;	  Zietlow,	  2007).	  This	  is	  a	  simple	  and	  straightforward	  notion	  that	  most	  people	  having	  some	  experience	  with	  voluntary	  associations	  can	  understand.	  We	  will	  call	   such	   assets	   the	   treasury,	   for	   the	   simplest	   of	   reasons:	   In	  most	   associations,	   the	   officer	   or	  elected	  representative	  whose	  principal	  concern	  are	  these	  resources	  is	  known	  as	  the	  treasurer	  and	  the	  resources	  over	  which	  s/he	  is	  to	  keep	  watch	  is	  the	  treasury.	  A	  defining	  characteristic	  of	  the	  resources	   in	   the	   treasuries	  of	  voluntary	  action	   is	   that	   they	  can	  be	  measured;	   the	   flows	   in	  and	   out	   of	   the	   treasury	   can	   be	   metered,	   usually	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   relevant	   national	   currency.	  Accountants,	   economists	   and	   those	   in	   management	   would	   like	   to	   believe	   that	   all	   essential	  resources	  of	  voluntary	  action	  could	  be	  measured	  in	  the	  accepted,	  standard	  ways	  they	  recognize.	  Yet,	   one	   of	   the	   most	   important	   but	   confounding	   characteristics	   of	   voluntary	   action	   is	   that	  several	   categories	   of	   resources	   that	   seem	   otherwise	   important	   cannot	   be	  measured	   in	   these	  conventional	  ways.	  In	  the	  theory,	  we	  will	  deal	  with	  two	  classes	  of	  such	  unmeasured	  resources:	  those	  that	  are	  priceless,	  which	  means	  quite	  literally	  without	  prices	  in	  that	  they	  are	  outside	  the	  price	  system,	  and	  those	  that	  are	  primarily	  matters	  of	  symbolic	  (social	  or	  cultural)	  interaction	  or	  meaningful	   behavior.	  We	  will	   refer	   to	   the	   former	   as	   collections	   and	   the	   latter	  will	   be	   termed	  
repertories.	  Together	  with	  the	  time	  and	  efforts	  of	  individuals	  devoted	  to	  the	  mission	  or	  common	  purposes	   that	   are	   usually	   referred	   to	   by	   nonprofit	   economists	   as	   volunteer	   labor,	   these	  constitute	   the	  principal	  resources	  of	  voluntary	  action.	  Additional	  emergent	  resources,	   termed	  
moeurs,	   are	   identified	   below	   that	   can	   be	   brought	   to	   the	   common	   resource	   pool	   of	   voluntary	  action,	  but	  that	  also	  emerge	  directly	  from	  collective	  action	  and	  thus	  constitute	  value	  added.	  Thus,	  having	  an	  experienced	  leader	  or	  group	  of	  leaders	  can	  represent	  a	  real	  resource	  for	  a	  group	  engaged	  in	  voluntary	  action	  even	  though	  there	  is	  no	  way	  to	  establish	  a	  measurement,	  or	   “book	   value”	   or	   price	   of	   the	   exact	   contribution	   of	   such	   leadership.	   Likewise,	   in	   problem	  solving	  contexts	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  situation	  can	  represent	  an	  important	  resource	  that	  is	  often	  key	  to	  effective	  solution	  of	  the	  problem	  –	  a	  vital	  means	  to	  the	  end	  that	  the	  solution	  represents.	  The	  definition	  or	  sense	  of	   the	  problem	  held	  by	  a	  new	  commons	  may,	   in	   fact,	  be	  a	  resource	  of	  inestimable	  value	  –	  another	  of	   several	   connotations	  of	   the	   term	  priceless	  used	  here.	  Problem	  definitions	   that	   straightforwardly	   lead	   to	   solutions	   are	   not	   only	   the	   basis	   for	   important	  scientific	  and	  technological	  advances;	  they	  can	  also	  be	  keys	  to	  success	  for	  new	  commons.	  	  This	  set	  of	  terms	  is	  well	  illustrated	  by	  reference	  to	  the	  shared	  mental	  constructs	  we	  call	  social	   problems	   following	   standard	   contemporary	   constructivist	   ideas.	   In	   addressing	   social	  problem	   settings,	   it	   is	   often	   possible	   to	   locate	   or	   isolate	   the	   origination	   of	   key	   problem	  definitions,	   and	   different	   problem	   definitions	   can	   be	   associated	   with	   different	   contexts	   and	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operations.	   In	   voluntary	   action,	   definitions	   of	   social	   problems	   often	   related	   to	   the	   relation	  between	  the	  problem	  and	  the	  voluntary	  action	  involved.	  For	   example,	   the	   March	   of	   Dimes	   (a	   nonprofit	   fundraising	   corporation)	   pioneered	   a	  rather	   simple	   and	   emotional	   definition	   of	   polio	   (a.k.a.	   infantile	   paralysis)	   as	   a	   public	   health	  hazard	  in	  formulating	  plans	  to	  raise	  funds	  from	  a	  public	  any	  one	  of	  whom	  might	  be	  affected	  by	  the	  disease.	  Meanwhile,	  the	  Sister	  Kenny	  Institute	  (a	  nonprofit	  research	  and	  treatment	  center)	  pioneered	   a	   differing	   definition	   definitions	   of	   polio	   as	   a	   chronic	   disease	   for	   which	   it	   was	  necessary	   to	   develop	  methods	   of	   “rehabilitation”	   and	   physical	   therapy	   treatments	   while	   the	  Salk	  Institute	  (a	  nonprofit	  research	  institute)	  used	  yet	  another,	  definition	  of	  polio	  as	  a	  virus	  in	  formulating	  an	  effective	  vaccine	  (Blume,	  2000;	  Grazman,	  1996;	  Oshinsky,	  2010;	  Rogers,	  2008;	  Rose,	  2003;	  Sabin,	  1985;	  Sills,	  1959;	  1980;)	  All	  three	  of	  these	  definitions	  or	  conceptions	  of	  the	  problem	   of	   polio	   proved	   to	   be	   important	   assets	   in	   devising	   the	   respective	   institutional	  approaches	   of	   these	   establishments,	   and	   initially	   served	   as	  major	   resources	   over	  which	   each	  held	  effective	  degrees	  of	  monopoly	  control.	  	  All	  three	  definitions	  or	  conceptions	  –	  of	  polio	  as	  a	  communicable	  viral	  disease	  with	  long-­‐term	  implications	  for	  mobility	  and	  independence	  –	  has	  a	  distinct	  body	  of	  knowledge	  associated	  with	  it	  that	  quickly	  entered	  the	  public	  domain	  even	  as	  they	  remained	  important	  resources	  for	  their	  respective	  institutions.	  Full	  understanding	  of	  polio	  as	  a	  social	  problem	  requires	  reference	  to	  all	  three.	  Understanding	  this	  division	  of	  knowledge	  and	  dissemination	  process	  is	  key	  to	  one	  of	  the	  characteristics	  of	  many	  of	  the	  most	  important	  resources	  of	  voluntary	  action:	  they	  are	  not	  scarce	   in	   any	   sense	   of	   asymmetric	   possession,	   only	   in	   the	   economic	   sense	   noted	   above:	   It	  requires	  effort	  for	  which	  there	  are	  opportunity	  costs	  to	  acquire	  any	  of	  these	  coordinated	  bodies	  of	   knowledge.	   If	   the	   Sister	   Kenny	   Institute	   (later	   the	   American	   Rehabilitation	   Foundation)	  teaches	  its	  techniques	  of	  rehabilitation	  to	  others,	  they	  don’t	  in	  the	  process	  lose	  that	  particular	  knowledge	   as	   a	   resource;	   both	   teacher	   and	   student	   now	   possess	   it.	   	   Information	   has	   this	  characteristic,	  but	  this	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  that	  it	  is	  meaningful	  or	  sensible	  to	  reduce	  all	  such	  resources	  to	  their	  information	  value.	  It	  is	  simpler	  and	  more	  appropriate	  to	  conclude	  that	  information	   along	  with	   practical	   and	   theoretical	   knowledge	   is	   a	  member	   of	   a	   larger	   class	   of	  moeurs	  that	  are	  not	  scarce	  in	  this	  sense.	  We	  will	  deal	  with	  further	  implications	  of	  some	  of	  these	  in	  voluntary	  action	  in	  Chapter	  8	  under	  the	  discussion	  of	  knowledge	  commons.	  For	   the	   time	   being	   it	   is	   sufficient	   to	   note	   that	   any	   bit	   (or	   meme)	   of	   information,	  knowledge,	  or	  established	  practices	  found	  in	  a	  group	  may	  function	  as	  a	  resource.	  Thus,	  money,	  credit,	   mineral	   reserves,	   a	   working	   knowledge	   of	   accounting,	   law,	   calculus	   or	   curatorial	  practices,	   familiarity	  with	  the	  methods	  for	  organizing	  a	  community,	  or	  performance	  details	  of	  specific	  dramatic	  or	  musical	  works,	   religious	   rituals,	  volunteer	   labor	  or	   the	  names,	  addresses	  and	   phone	   numbers	   of	   residents	   of	   a	   neighborhood	   could	   all	   function	   as	   common	   pool	  resources	  under	  appropriate	  circumstances.	  Appropriate,	  in	  this	  case,	  refers	  to	  a	  fit	  between	  the	  mission	  of	   the	   commons	  and	   the	   resources	  necessary	   for	   the	   task.	  The	   following	   section	  will	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elaborate	  some	  of	  the	  other	  types	  of	  resources	  that	  are	  most	  important	  in	  voluntary	  action,	  and	  in	  what	  sense	  they	  are	  commonly	  held.	  
Resources	  for	  Voluntary	  Action	  	  The	  phrase	  “goods	  and	  services”	  is	  often	  used	  to	  describe	  the	  output	  of	  voluntary	  action	  without	   clear	   definition	   or	   further	   clarification.	   The	   focus	   of	   this	   discussion	   is	   on	   attaching	  some	   tissue	   and	   sinew	   to	   that	   particular	   skeleton.	   First,	   voluntary	   action	   can	   ordinarily	   take	  place	   only	   within	   the	   broad	   confines	   of	   the	   leisure	   time	   of	   participants.	   In	   order	   to	   fully	  understand	   the	  meaning	  of	   that	   statement,	   it	   is	  necessary	   to	   look	   closely	   at	  Hannah	  Arendt’s	  distinction	  in	  The	  Human	  Condition	  (1950),	  between	  labor,	  work	  and	  action,	  a	  task	  reserved	  for	  Chapter	  4	  below.	  At	  the	  moment,	  it	  is	  sufficient	  to	  observe	  that	  people	  whose	  time	  and	  tasks	  are	  rigidly	   controlled;	   e.g.,	   soldiers,	   prisoners,	   subjects	   of	   police	   states,	   students	   in	   residential	  schools,	   or	   workers	   fully	   engaged	   in	   paid	   employment,	   such	   as	   those	   American	   workers	  working	  2-­‐3	  low-­‐wage	  jobs	  in	  order	  to	  get	  by,	  cannot	  be	  expected	  to	  have	  the	  time	  available	  to	  meet	  the	  first	  condition	  of	  commons,	  voluntary	  participation.	  If	  your	  time	  is	  not	  your	  own,	  you	  are	  not	  positioned	  to	  decide	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  voluntarily	  participate	  in	  anything.	  The	  same	  is	  true,	  although	  for	  different	  reasons,	  for	  “workaholic”	  professionals	  whose	  every	  waking	  hour	  is	  devoted	  to	  professional	  and	  career	  concerns.	  Over	  his	  long	  and	  creative	  career,	  for	  example,	  the	  architect	   Frank	   Lloyd	   Wright	   was	   never	   a	   good	   candidate	   for	   this	   kind	   of	   voluntary	  participation.	   Any	   philanthropic	   contribution	   attributable	   to	   Wright	   (and	   his	   contributions	  there	  are	  large)	  arises	  strictly	  in	  the	  context	  of	  his	  professional	  contributions	  as	  an	  architect.	  	  In	  general,	  the	  value	  of	  voluntary	  action	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  strict	  “opportunity	  cost”	  terms:	  value	   can	   be	   measured	   in	   terms	   of	   what	   “second	   best”	   alternatives	   the	   actors	   involved	   are	  willing	   or	   able	   to	   give	   up	   in	   order	   to	   engage	   in	   voluntary	   action.	   So	   far	   as	  we	   know,	  Wright	  never	   formed	  or	   sang	   in	  a	   church	  choir,	   conducted	   scientific	   experiments,	  or	  wrote	  a	   sonnet.	  Thus,	   his	   masterpieces	   like	   Fallingwater	   can	   be	   reckoned	   the	   opportunity	   costs	   of	   his	   not	  having	   done	   so.	   Was	   it	   worth	   it?	   Most	   would	   answer	   definitely,	   yes.	   	   By	   using	   a	   similar	  approach,	   we	   can	   make	   inferences	   about	   what	   is	   most	   important	   to	   people	   engaged	   in	  voluntary	  action	  and	  about	  the	  value	  of	  their	  activities	  even	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  treasury	  or	  price	  data.	  This	  is	  the	  case	  because	  action,	  or	  time	  spent	  in	  pursuit	  of	  commonly	  held	  missions,	  is	  in	  nearly	  all	  instances,	  the	  most	  fundamental	  resource	  for	  voluntary	  action.	  	  Commons	   in	   voluntary	   action	   are	   concerned	   with	   two	   distinct	   categories	   of	   physical	  resources:	   Those	   that	   are	   similar	   to	   the	   tangible	   resources	   of	   market	   production	   –	   physical	  plant,	   land,	   equipment,	   transport,	   and	   such,	   and	   those	   that	   are	   not.	   The	   first	   group	   are	  resources	  in	  the	  traditional	  economic	  sense	  that	  they	  are	  in	  some	  sense	  consumed	  (or	  undergo	  physical	  state	  transformations)	  in	  the	  production	  process.	  The	  collections	  of	  new	  commons	  are	  a	   quite	   different	   second	   type	   of	   physical	   in	   that	   they	   are	   often	   tangible	   objects	   of	   unique	  importance	  and	  the	  forms	  of	  common	  goods	  production	  they	  are	  associated	  with	  often	  involve	  their	   display	   or	   presentation.	   Equally	   important	   is	   that	   collections	   typically	   fall	   outside	   and	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have	  been	  deliberately	  removed	  from	  the	  market	  economy.	  The	  term	  priceless	  often	  carries	  the	  meaning	  of	  extreme	  rarity,	  unique	  or	   irreplaceable	  status	  and	  paradoxically	  high	  purchase	  or	  sales	  price:	  Gutenberg	  Bibles,	  Rembrandt	  or	  Warhol	  paintings,	  Ming	  vases	  are	  all	  said	  to	  fall	  in	  this	   category	   when	   they	   are	   offered	   for	   sale.	   It	   is	   more	   useful	   for	   understanding	   voluntary	  action	  to	  use	  the	  term	  priceless	  in	  a	  narrower	  and	  more	  precise	  literal	  meaning	  that	  connotes	  objects	  without	  a	  price,	  that	  is,	  not	  available	  for	  sale	  in	  the	  market	  regardless	  of	  the	  reason	  and	  regardless	  of	  offers	  to	  purchase.	  The	  Mona	  Lisa	  and	  Rodin’s	  The	  Thinker	  are	  not	  for	  sale	  at	  any	  price.	   They	   are	   in	   that	   sense,	   priceless.	   	   From	   the	   standpoint	   of	   new	   commons,	   this	   is	   not	   a	  judgment	   limited	   to	   extreme	   rarities	   in	   the	   art	  world.	   The	   same	   is	   true	   in	   a	   farm	  equipment	  museum	  where	  a	  battered	  old	  19th	  century	  horse	  drawn	  plow	  with	  a	  wooden	  mold	  board	  may	  be	  a	  priceless	  object	   in	  the	  sense	  that	  no	  one	  wants	  to	  buy	  it	  because	  it	  has	  no	  contemporary	  use	   value.	   More	   likely,	   however,	   a	   rural	   or	   agricultural	   museum	   possessing	   such	   an	   object	  considers	  it	  a	  priceless	  part	  of	  their	  collection	  to	  the	  same	  degree	  as	  the	  Impressionist	  paintings	  of	  the	  Barnes	  Collection	  in	  Philadelphia	  or	  the	  Chicago	  Art	  Institute,	  or	  other	  art	  works	  in	  the	  Tate	  Gallery	  or	  the	  Louvre:	  Because	  sale	  of	  such	  objects	  would	  change	  the	  meaning	  and	  value	  of	  the	  institutions	  themselves.	  Such	  objects	  are	  usually	  said	  to	  be	  in	  the	  permanent	  collection	  and	  not	  available	  for	  sale	  at	  any	  price.	  Museums,	  churches,	  libraries,	  colleges,	  research	  hospitals	  and	  numerous	   other	   cultural	   institutions	   all	   stand	   outside	   the	  market	   and	   possess	   collections	   of	  priceless	   objects	   in	   this	   sense.	   They	  may,	   periodically,	   make	   strategic	   decisions	   to	   enter	   the	  market	  to	  acquire	  additions	  to	  their	  collections,	  and	  less	  often	  to	  sell	  or	  trade	  objects	   in	  their	  possession,	  but	  in	  such	  cases	  it	  is	  the	  implication	  for	  the	  mission,	  and	  not	  the	  ordinary	  terms	  of	  profitable	  exchange	  that	  is	  –	  or	  should	  be	  –	  the	  foremost	  consideration.	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  this	  is	  necessarily	  a	  vague	  and	  imprecise	  category,	  and	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  conflict	  can	  be	  generated	  in	  cultural	  institutions	  over	  its	  meaning	  and	  implications.	  	  The	   idiosyncratic	   curatorial	   preferences	   of	  Albert	  Barnes	   as	   displayed	   in	   the	  priceless	  Barnes	   collection	  has	   been	   central	   to	   protracted	   conflict	   (that	  may	   finally	   have	  been	   settled)	  among	   cultural	   leaders	   in	   the	   Philadelphia	   area	   for	   decades	   (sources).	   In	   sum,	   the	   value	   of	  collections	  is	  not	  to	  be	  found	  in	  their	  purchase	  or	  sales	  value,	  but	  in	  the	  meaning	  inherent	  in	  the	  objects	  themselves.	  They	  are	  and	  remain,	  literally,	  priceless	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  are	  without	  price.	  	   Another	   general	   category	  of	   resources	   frequently	   found	   in	   voluntary	   action	   is	   termed,	  after	  Tocqueville,	  moeurs.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  important	  categories	  of	  moeurs	  in	  the	  production	  of	  common	   goods	   are	   the	   repertories	   of	   knowledge	   or	   skill	   	   sometimes	   called	   know-­‐how	   or	  technology.	   Repertories	   can	   be	   thought	   of	   as	   scripts	   or	   designs	   for	   action.	   They	   include	   the	  ability	  to	  perform	  various	  ceremonies	  and	  rituals,	  certainly,	  but	  also	  a	  great	  deal	  more	  ‘scripted’	  everyday	   behavior.	   As	   such,	   repertories	   are	   often	   part	   of	   the	   working	   knowledge	   that	   new	  commons	   utilize	   in	   the	   distinct	   form	   discussed	   in	   Chapter	   8	   as	   knowledge	   commons.	  Repertories	  may	  be	   the	  know-­‐how	  of	  spiritual	   leaders	  of	  a	   religious	  commons	  who	  know	  the	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appropriate,	  expected	  protocols	  for	  particular	  prayers,	  masses,	  or	  services,	  or	  the	  repertories	  of	  members	  of	  a	  club	  or	  membership	  association	  who	  know	  how	  to	  conduct	  a	   “proper	  business	  meeting”.	   The	   latter	   may	   include,	   e.g.,	   agendas	   and	   Robert’s	   Rules	   of	   Order.	   Repertories	   are	  acquired	  either	  through	  trial	  and	  error	  or	  more	  organized	  learning	  methods,	  and	  can	  usually	  be	  passed	   on	   from	  one	  member	   cohort	   to	   the	   next	   and	   translated	   from	  one	   context	   to	   another.	  Thus,	  groups	  of	  mothers	  of	  older	  children	  seeking	  an	  outlet	   for	   the	  skills	  required	  to	  care	   for	  infants	   and	   small	   children	  may	   choose	   to	   open	   and	   run	  day	   care	   centers,	   or	   have	   classes	   for	  younger	   parents.	   Groups	   of	   docents	   who	   have	   learned	   the	   nuances	   of	   conducting	   arts	  conversations	   with	   strangers	   can	   also	   be	   guest	   lecturers	   in	   schools.	   Orchestras,	   ensembles,	  quartets,	   trios	   and	   other	   groups	   of	   musicians	   who	   have	   mastered	   particular	   scores,	   and	  companies	  of	  actors	  who	  know	  the	  words	  and	  associated	  physical	  movements	  associated	  with	  a	  dramatic	   script	   are	   among	   the	   countless	   examples	   of	   repertories.	   Explicitly	   included	   in	   this	  category	  of	  repertories	  are	  the	  many	  behaviors,	  rituals,	  and	  institutions	  arising	  in	  the	  context	  of	  social	  problems	  and	  social	  movements.	  Thus,	  being	  arrested	  by	  police	  can	  be	  a	  rite	  of	  passage	  for	   civil	   rights	   activists	   and	   finding	   new	   ways	   of	   denouncing	   the	   alleged	   bias	   of	   “the	   lame	  stream	  media”	  is	  a	  badge	  of	  honor	  for	  conservative	  activists.	  Voluntary	  action	  can	  be	  characterized	   in	  terms	  of	   the	  resources	  required:	   time,	  money	  and	   credit,	   collections	   of	   objects	   and	   particular	   sets	   of	   skills	   and	   abilities.	   One	   thing	   that	  characterizes	  all	  of	  the	  resources	  of	  voluntary	  action	  is	  what	  we	  might	  call	  bounded	  or	  limited	  
fungibility,	   or	   the	   real	  but	   limited	  potential	   for	   substituting	  one	   type	  of	   resource	   for	   another.	  Thus,	  a	  person	  may	  wish	  to	  donate	  time	  but	  have	  only	  limited	  skills	  and	  abilities	  needed	  by	  a	  new	  commons	  and	  end	  up	  giving	  money	  instead.	  Or,	  a	  particular	  painting	  or	  other	  object	  d’art	  with	   a	   potentially	   high	   resale	   value	  may	   be	   accepted	   by	   a	  museum	  only	   on	   condition	   that	   it	  doesn’t	   fit	  with	   the	  mission	  of	   the	   collection	  and	  will	   be	   resold	   at	   some	   future	  date.	   In	  other	  cases,	  the	  display	  of	  collections	  priceless	  in	  themselves,	  or	  the	  presentation	  of	  repertories	  can	  be	  used	   to	   generate	   revenue	   for	   the	   common	  pool	   treasury	   through	  donations	   or	   the	   sale	   of	  tickets.	  However,	  new	  commons	   in	  voluntary	  action	  differ	   from	  ordinary	  market	   transactions	  even	  in	  these	  instances	  because	  of	  certain,	  defined	  limits	  on	  fungibility.	  No	  museum	  worthy	  of	  the	  name,	  for	  example,	  would	  sell	  off	  its	  most	  valuable	  pieces	  just	  to	  balance	  its	  annual	  budget.	  That	  is	  typically	  seen	  as	  a	  form	  of	  institutional	  suicide	  and	  blurs	  the	  normal	  distinction	  between	  museum	   and	   gallery.	   Likewise,	   few	   common	   resource	   pools	   will	   willingly	   expend	   its	  endowment	  for	  normal	  operating	  expenditures.	  Thus,	  while	  the	  resources	  of	  new	  commons	  are,	  to	   some	   degree,	   fungible	   there	   are	   also	   severe	   limits	   on	   fungibility	   that	   tend	   to	   be	   closely	  related	  to	  the	  central	  mission	  of	  the	  institution.	  It	  is	  impossible	  to	  say	  whether	  these	  four	  forms	  of	  common	  pool	  resources	  exhaustively	  define	  voluntary	  action,	  or	  whether	  they	  have	  always,	  in	  the	  past,	  done	  so	  in	  precisely	  the	  ways	  they	   do	   today.	   There	   have	   probably	   been	   some	   shifts	   within	   these	   categories	   over	   the	   long	  term,	  notably	  with	  respect	  to	  voluntary	  effort	  and	  repertories.	  The	  value	  of	  voluntary	  time,	  for	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example,	  is	  in	  part	  dependent	  upon	  the	  over	  all	  state	  of	  the	  general	  economy.	  Greater	  and	  more	  widespread	   affluence	  may	   increase	   available	   leisure	   time	   and	   thus	   increase	   the	   potential	   for	  voluntary	  action.	  However,	  other	  uses	  of	   leisure	   time	   like	  watching	   television,	  attending	  rock	  concerts,	  or	  guarding	  one’s	  property	  (all	  discussed	  in	  the	  final	  chapter)	  constitute	  some	  of	  the	  opportunity	  costs	  of	  voluntary	  action	  in	  new	  commons.	  	  The	   greatest	   changes	   over	   time	   are	   likely	   to	   have	   been	   among	   repertories	   that	   are	  known	   to	   vary	   considerably,	   as	   new	  ways	   of	   living	   in	   community	   are	   tried	   out,	   learned	   and	  adopted.	  Few	  protest	  movements	  in	  the	  11th	  century	  involved	  picket	  signs	  and	  protests,	  due	  in	  part	   to	   the	   unavailability	   of	  materials	   like	   cheap	  marking	   pencils	   and	   poster	   board,	   and	   low	  rates	   of	   literacy.	   Charles	   Tilly	   (1993)	   has	   tracked	   important	   shifts	   in	   “repertories	   of	  contestation”	   between	   the	   16th	   and	   18th	   centuries	   in	   France.	   See	   also	   Chapter	   Seven	   of	  Della	  Porta	  and	  Piano	  (1999)	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  repertories	  in	  social	  movements.	  	  
Roles	  as	  Resources	  There	   is	   also	   another	   species	   or	   type	   of	   common	   good	   suitable	   for	   serving	   as	   a	  productive	   resource	   in	   new	   commons.	   Participants	   in	   the	   most	   rudimentary	   associations	  engaged	   in	   voluntary	   action	   are	   also	   likely	   over	   time	   to	   engage	   the	   various	   interactions	  sociologists	  and	  social	  psychologists	  have	   identified	  under	  the	  heading	  of	  role	   theory	   in	  ways	  that	  make	  of	  social	  roles	  an	  additional	  category	  of	  basic	  resources.	  There	   are	   numerous	   approaches	   to	   social	   roles	   in	   social	   science	   and	   each	   outlines	  potential	   resources	   in	   new	   commons.	   For	   example,	   in	   functionalist	   sociology	   role	   has	   been	  handled	  as	  something	  of	  an	  ideal	  type	  of	  the	  characteristic	  or	  expected	  behavior	  associated	  with	  a	   social	  position	  or	   status.	   In	   interactionist	   sociology	  and	   social	  psychology,	   roles	  are	  usually	  thought	   of	   as	   less	   fixed,	   prescribed	   and	   unchanging	   and	   more	   dynamic	   and	   enacted,	  expectations	  that	  are	  realized	  in	  the	  actual	  performance	  of	  the	  role	  and	  constantly	  negotiated	  between	  the	  role	  incumbent	  and	  others	  in	  the	  social	  environment	  in	  tentative,	  creative	  ways.	  In	  addition,	  there	  have	  been	  several	  other	  different	  perspectives	  on	  roles.	  Each	  of	  these	  provides	  valuable	  and	  useful	  perspectives	  on	  roles	  in	  voluntary	  action	  (Biddle,	  1986).	  From	  any	  of	  these	  perspectives,	   it	   is	   relatively	   easy	   to	   see	   how	   roles	   can	   serve	   as	   resources	   in	   some	   types	   of	  voluntary	  action.	  To	  take	  a	  simple	  example,	  consider	  a	  local	  volunteer	  (one	  role)	  who	  also	  does	  double	  duty	  with	  assorted	  community	  groups	  as	  a	  master	  of	  ceremonies	  (another	  role)	  and	  an	  entertainer	   (a	   third	   role)	   at	   annual	  meetings,	   fundraisers	   and	   other	   special	   events.	   	   Each	   of	  these	  roles	  constitutes	  a	  resource	  contribution	   for	  voluntary	  action	  as	   surely	  as	  money	  or	   in-­‐kind	  materials	  donations.	  We	  will	  look	  further	  at	  the	  contribution	  of	  roles	  below.	  	  
The	  Basic	  Situation	  Once	   we	   move	   past	   the	   fundamental	   misunderstanding	   that	   dealing	   with	   the	   pooled	  resources	   of	   voluntary	   action	   –	   some	   of	  which	   are	   derived	   from	   the	  market	   and	   some	   from	  governments	   –	   requires	   that	  we	   continue	   treating	   them	   as	   public	   or	   commercial	   goods,	   new	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possibilities	  begin	  to	  come	  into	  view.	  In	  voluntary	  action	  we	  are	  concerned	  with	  direct,	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  interactions	  between	  socially	  engaged	  persons	  as	  individuals	  and	  in	  groups.	  In	  their	  role	  as	  participants	  in	  voluntary	  action,	  they	  are	  not,	  in	  any	  meaningful	  sense,	  interested	  exclusively	  in	  “quasi-­‐public”	  or	   “semi-­‐commercial”	   transactions.	  This	   is,	  of	  course,	  an	   ideal	   type;	  we	  are	  not	  seeking	   to	   account	   for	   all	   the	   possible	   variations	   in	   behavior	   by	   all	   of	   the	   actual	   persons	  involved	   in	   voluntary	   action.	   Real	   businessmen	   and	   government	   officials	   engaged	   with	  voluntary	  action,	  may	  in	  fact	  bring	  a	  public	  goods	  or	  a	  profit-­‐oriented	  outlook	  to	  the	  voluntary	  action	  table;	  this	  alone	  proves	  nothing	  beyond	  their	  individual	  understanding	  of	  the	  situation,	  derived	   as	   such	   things	   so	   often	   are,	   by	   comparison	   of	   the	   new	   situation	   with	   older,	   more	  familiar	   experiences.	   Others	   will	   bring	   their	   own	   different,	   but	   equally	   legitimate,	  understandings.	   Religious	   participants,	   for	   example,	   are	   likely	   to	   bring	   their	   own	   religious	  meanings	   and	   may	   be	   very	   uncomfortable	   with	   the	   public	   goods	   or	   profit	   oriented	  understandings	   of	   business	   or	   government	   types.	   However,	   there	   is	   no	   particular	   reason	   to	  treat	   any	   of	   these	   as	   fundamental.	  We	  will	   call	   this	   the	   original	   situation,	   and	   define	   it	   thus:	  Those	   in	   the	   original	   situation	  will	   be	   aware	   not	   only	   of	   their	   own	   perspectives	   but	   also	   of	  others	   engaged	   with	   them	   in	   face-­‐to-­‐face	   conversation	   and	   will	   together	   work	   out	   a	   joint,	  agreed	   upon	   definition	   of	   the	   situation,	   that	   takes	   into	   account	   individual	   and	   sub-­‐group	  differences	  and	  idiosyncrasies	  like	  these.	  Thus,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  a	  member	  of	  a	  board	  might	  ask:	  “Do	  we	  expect	  to	  have	  enough	  money	  to	  complete	  this	  project,	  even	  perhaps	  a	  bit	  of	  money	  left	  over	  –	  what	  Bob	  calls	  our	   ‘profit’?”	  There	   is	  no	  real	  basis	   to	  conclude	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  some	  participants	  in	  voluntary	  action	  in	  some	  contexts,	  cultures	  or	  periods	  that	  their	  view	  must	  be	  binding	  on	   everyone.	   Stepping	  back	   from	   this,	  we	   can	   see	   that	   the	  perspective	  of	   rational	  individualism	   is,	   like	   the	   perspective	   laid	   out	   here,	   just	   one	   such	   view	   and	   that	   the	   really	  important	   question	   to	   ask	   is	   what	   definition	   of	   the	   situation	   the	   participants	   in	   any	   given	  voluntary	  action	  themselves	  have	  adopted?	  
Reason	  and	  Communicative	  Action	  These	  considerations	  become	  most	  important	  in	  the	  presumed	  necessity	  of	  reliance	  on	  the	  Cartesian	  decision	  model	  of	  the	  mathematically	  precise	  individual	  rational	  calculator	  as	  the	  only	   valid	   form	   of	   human	   reason.	   One	   basic	   problem	   is	   that	   in	   the	   interest	   of	   ‘reason’	   (or,	  rationality)	  explanation	  of	  actual	  affairs	  suffers	  and	  the	  role	  of	  self-­‐interest	  in	  voluntary	  action	  is	  not	  properly	  understood.	  An	  even	  more	   fundamental	  concern	   is	   that	  collective	  choice	   is	  by	  definition	  not	  a	  matter	  of	  individual	  rational	  consciousness	  or	  calculation.	  Thus,	  how	  are	  we	  to	  assure	  that	  pluralities	  of	  deciders	  are	  all	  capable	  of	  acting	  in	  the	  prescribed	  rational	  manner?	  Fortunately,	   there	   are	   other,	   equally	   interesting	  ways	   to	   treat	   the	  matter	   of	   reason	   in	  collective	   choice.	   One	   of	   the	   more	   interesting	   is	   an	   outgrowth	   of	   the	   20th	   century	  communications	   revolution.	   In	   recent	   decades,	   a	   number	   of	   important	   philosophers	   and	  theorists	   have	   explored	   aspects	   of	   the	   relation	   between	   traditional	   conceptions	   of	   reason,	   as	  that	   idea	   is	   handled	   in	   philosophy,	   economics,	   psychology	   and	   other	   fields	   concerned	   with	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“rational”	  action	  (Bernstein,	  1971;	  Bernstein,	  1981;	  Habermas,	  1984;	  Habermas,	  1999;	  Heath,	  2001;	  Rawls,	  2005	  [1971]).	   It	  serves	  no	  particular	  purpose	  to	  review	  those	  arguments	   in	  any	  detail	   here.	   They	   form	   a	   knowledge	   commons	   in	  which	  many	   participants	   have	  well	   argued,	  deeply	   considered	   and	   strongly	   held	   views,	   and	   the	   likelihood	   is	   slight	   at	   best	   that	   any	  additional	  argument	  offered	  would	  add	  significantly	  to	  this	  literature	  or	  change	  many	  minds.	  It	  is	   sufficient	   for	  our	  purposes	   to	  note	   the	  use	  of	   a	   communicative	   standard	  of	   rationality	   that	  more	   closely	   parallels	   the	   actual,	   observable	   behavior	   of	   groups	   of	   persons	   engaged	   in	  voluntary	  action.	  	  Rational	   behavior,	   for	   purposes	   of	   the	   new	   commons	   theory	   of	   voluntary	   action,	   is	   in	  some	   very	   fundamental	   sense	   a	   form	  of	   philanthropic	   or	   gift	   contracting	   concerned	  with	   the	  offering	  and	  acceptance	  of	  reasons	  and	  discussion	  weighing	  the	  relative	  acceptability	  of	  those	  reasons	   by	   members	   of	   a	   commons.	   Decades	   of	   observation	   reinforce	   the	   conclusion	   that	  whether	   or	   not	   this	   social	   process	   of	   offering	   and	   acceptance	   of	   participants’	   reasons,	   or	  explanations	  for	  choices,	  is	  a	  self-­‐sufficient	  process.	  Whether	  or	  not	  it	  conforms	  to	  the	  logic	  of	  Aristotelian	   syllogisms,	   Cartesian	   deductions,	   the	   steps	   of	   Deweyian	   problem	   solving	   or	   any	  other	  philosopher’s	   standard	  of	   reason	   is	   a	  matter	  of	   indifference	   to	   the	  makers	  of	   collective	  choices	  in	  new	  commons.	  What	  does	  seem	  to	  be	  most	  important	  are	  the	  explanations	  participants	  
give	  to	  one	  another	  for	  why,	  how,	  and	  under	  what	  circumstances	  and	  conditions	  something	  is	  the	  
case	   or	   some	   alternative	   is	   preferred.	   While	   this	   approach	   is	   grounded	   ultimately	   in	   several	  rather	  elegant	  philosophical	  arguments,	  whether	  or	  not	  such	  a	  “weak”	  conception	  of	  rationality	  is	  convincing	  to	  philosophers,	  economists,	  political	  theorists	  and	  others	  who	  write	  on	  this	  topic	  is	  relatively	  unimportant	  to	  functioning	  democracy	  for	  reasons	  outlined	  by	  Barber	  (1988).	  This	  standard	  of	  rationality	  is	  employed	  here	  only	  as	  a	  device;	  a	  contrivance	  grounded	  in	  two	  related	  points:	   1)	   The	   standard	   of	   plausibility	   corresponds	   closely	   to	   the	   kind	   of	   behavior	   one	   can	  observe	   in	   organized	   voluntary	   action,	   for	   reasons	   which	   the	   theory	   outlines;	   and	   2)	   It	   is	  consistent	  with,	  and	  supports	  the	  principle	  of	  hermony	  and	  the	  autonomy	  and	  authenticity	  of	  such	  groups,	  as	  discussed	  elsewhere	  in	  this	  text.	  Consequently,	  any	  commons	  –	  say,	  a	  group	  of	  philosophers	   –	   that	   choose	   to	   embrace	   a	  more	   rigorous	   standard	   for	   themselves	   are	   entirely	  free	  to	  do	  so.	  This	  book	   is,	   at	   its	   core,	   simply	  one	  additional	   set	  of	   such	  explanations,	  based	  on	   long	  and	  varied	  engagement	  with	  voluntary	  action,	  part	  of	  which	  is	  reviewed	  in	  the	  preface.	  In	  their	  own	   particular	   knowledge	   commons,	   philosophers,	   political	   philosophers,	   natural,	   economic	  and	   social	   scientists,	   belletrists,	   those	   practicing	   hermeneutics	   and	   others	   may	   adopt	   more	  rigorous	   standards	  of	   rationality,	  but	   from	  a	   theoretical	   standpoint	   that	   is	   their	  option,	  not	   a	  necessary	  existential	  condition	  of	  collective	  choice	  or	  behavior.	  By	  adoption	  of	   this	   communicative	  standard	  of	   rationality,	   those	  engaged	   in	  voluntary	  action	  may	  begin	   to	   find	  avenues	  of	   escape	   from	   the	   control	   of	  philosophers	   and	  economists	  that	  have	  dominated	   third	   sector	   theory	   in	   recent	  decades	   (Barber,	   1988).	  Thus,	   the	  original	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situation	  of	  voluntary	  action	  need	  assume	  nothing	  about	  efficiency,	  effectiveness,	  or	  the	  proper	  or	   logically	  correct	  relation	  of	  means	  to	  previously	  selected	  ends,	  much	  less	  about	  the	  proper	  selection	   of	   ends	   in	   light	   of	   available	   means.	   This	   has	   implications	   not	   only	   for	   the	   proper	  understanding	  of	  self	   interest	   in	  voluntary	  action,	  but	  also	  for	  new,	  more	  refined	  meanings	  of	  terms	  like	  altruism,	  caritas	  and	  humanitas.	  These	  are	  all	  equally	  plausible	  positions	  regarding	  the	  relation	  of	  means	  and	  ends	  to	  be	  embraced	  by	  persons	  and	  groups	  in	  the	  original	  situation	  of	  voluntary	  action.	  	  Thus,	   a	   group	   of	   21st	   century	   American	   businessmen	   or	   corporate	   philanthropists	  forming	  a	  charitable	  agency	  may	  find	  it	  entirely	  reasonable	  to	  adopt	  a	  narrowly	  self-­‐interested	  and	  competitive	  strategy	  with	  a	  heavy	  emphasis	  on	  price	  competition	  and	  marketing	  –	  and	  tell	  one	  another	  and	  others	  so.	  Others	  outside	  the	  group	  will	  be	  equally	  at	  liberty	  to	  express	  doubt	  or	   concern	   about	   that	   standard.	   They	   should	   not	   think	   themselves	   positioned,	   however,	   to	  restrict	  or	  coerce	  this	  group	  into	  adopting	  another	  view	  more	  consistent	  with	  their	  (outsider)	  view.	  For	  example,	  a	  new	  commons	  of	  past	  or	  current	  religious	  leaders	  may	  have	  found	  such	  an	  attitude	   utterly	   abhorrent	   and	   chosen	   to	   embrace	   another,	   theologically	   informed	   posture,	  emphasizing	   love	   of	   humanity	   with	   an	   accent	   on	   humility,	   self-­‐abasement	   and	   prayer.	   An	  adequate	  standard	  of	  rationality	  in	  collective	  choice	  in	  new	  commons	  must	  be	  able	  to	  allow	  for	  a	   plurality	   of	   choices,	   differential	   outcomes	   and	   at	   least	   the	   possibility	   that	   no	   resolution	   of	  differences	   between	   new	   commons	   other	   than	   acceptance	   of	   difference	   may	   be	   possible	   in	  some	  circumstances.	  	  	  It	  is	  consistent	  with	  this	  conception	  of	  the	  communicative	  standard	  of	  reason	  endorsed	  here	  that	  any	  new	  commons	  must	  be	  free	  to	  reject	  existing	  standards	  of	  reason	  (including	  this	  one)	  and	  adopt	  their	  own.	  In	  one	  sense,	  this	  statement	  is	  not	  a	  theoretical	  “standard”	  at	  all	  but	  simply	  a	  statement	  of	  existing	  conditions	  under	  freedom	  of	  association.	  The	  alternative	  –	  that	  some	   knowledge	   commons,	   whether	   philosophers,	   economists,	   theologians,	   or	   some	   other	  group,	   is	   to	   be	   granted	   the	   final	   say	   on	   the	   definition	   of	   reason	   –	   is	   simply	   untenable.	  Communicative	  rationality	  is,	  in	  that	  sense,	  a	  part	  of	  the	  original	  condition	  of	  new	  commons.	  	  Likewise,	   at	   least	   one	   of	   the	   three	   previously	   outlined	   defining	   characteristics	   of	   new	  commons	  –	  an	  agreed-­‐upon	  purpose	  or	  mission	  –	  may	  also	  be	  negotiable	   in	   this	  respect.	   It	   is	  entirely	  plausible,	   for	   example,	   that	   an	   association	  of	   anarchists	  might	   form	  a	  new	   commons	  through	  their	  voluntary	  behavior	  and	  pool	  at	  least	  some	  resources	  without	  ever	  agreeing	  upon	  a	   group	   purpose	   or	   mission.	   Thus,	   mission	   or	   purpose	   must	   be	   accorded	   a	   historically	  contingent	  condition.	  
Language,	  Culture	  and	  Solidarity	  The	  original	  position	  as	  detailed	  above	  suggests	   the	  need	  to	  recognize	  not	  only	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  possible	  missions,	  but	  also	  multiple	  layers	  of	  language	  and	  culture	  without	  seeking	  to	  reduce	  everything	  to	  simple	  logical	  and	  mathematical	  metrics.	  Thus,	  a	  group	  of	  farmers	  forming	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a	   new	   commons	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   sharing	  water	   for	   irrigation	   of	   their	   fields	   or	   a	   group	   of	  scientific	   researchers	   forming	   an	   association	   in	   a	   new	   field	   of	   knowledge,	   or	   any	   other	   new	  commons	  may	  initially	  be	  cautious	  of	  one	  another,	  or	  even	  conspicuously	   lacking	  in	  trust	  and	  fellow-­‐feeling,	  or	  what	  have	  come	  to	  be	  known	  by	  the	  quasi-­‐technical	  terms	  of	  social	  capital	  and	  solidarity.	  	  It	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that	   not	   all	   studies	   of	   social	   capital	   uniformly	   emphasize	   the	  importance	  of	   trust,	   fellow	  feeling,	  cooperation,	  network	   formation	  and	  harmony.	  Some	   focus	  on	   the	   role	   of	   conflict	   in	   social	   capital	   formation.	   In	   a	   major	   departure	   from	   the	   trust	   and	  networks	   approach,	  Welzel,	   Inglehart	   and	  Deutsch	   (2005)	   claim	   that	   the	   conceptual	   basis	   of	  most	   studies	   of	   social	   capital	   across	   several	   theoretical	   traditions	   “are	   surprisingly	   similar”,	  treating	   voluntary	   association	   membership	   as	   the	   principal	   indicator	   of	   community	  involvement	   and	   neglecting	   what	   they	   see	   as	   another	   form	   of	   community	   involvement:	  “participation	  in	  elite-­‐challenging	  actions.”	  Such	  elite-­‐challenging	  actions	  are	  but	  one	  prominent	  form	  of	  what	  is	  often	  termed	  advocacy,	  and	  in	  some	  fields,	  a	  type	  of	  community	  organizing	  as	  reflected	   in	   the	  efforts	  of	  Miles	  Horton	  (1989),	  Franz	  Fanon	  (1963),	  Saul	  Alinsky	  (1989),	  Eric	  Hoffer	   (2002)	   and	   others.	  Most	   studies,	  Welzel,	   Inglehart	   and	  Deutsch	   say,	   “readily	   attribute	  manifold	  civic	  benefits	  to	  associational	   life,	  while	  hesitating	  to	  attribute	  such	  benefits	  to	  elite-­‐challenging	   activity”.	   Whether	   or	   not	   that	   claim	   is	   justified,	   their	   underlying	   claim	   appears	  warranted;	  that	  elite-­‐challenging	  voluntary	  action	  also	  reflects	  a	  specific	  emancipatory	  form	  of	  social	   capital	   that	   is	   typically	   found	   in	   “self-­‐assertive	   publics”.	   Further,	   they	   seek	   to	  demonstrate	   that	   such	   elite-­‐challenging	   actions	   are	   linked	  with	   enhanced	   civic	   value.	   On	   the	  basis	   of	   their	   formulation	   of	   a	   model	   of	   human	   development,	   they	   suggest	   that	   mass	   self-­‐expression	   nurtures	   emancipative	   social	   capital,	   which,	   in	   turn,	   serves	   to	   foster	   elite-­‐challenging	  action.	  From	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  theory	  this	  approach	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  exploring	   yet	   another	   dimension	   of	   social	   capital	   building	   as	   trust	   and	   network	   within	   the	  challenging	   association	   utilizing	   the	   resources	   of	   both	   internal	   solidarity	   and	   a	   shared	  perception	  of	  a	   common	  external	  adversary.	  The	  emancipatory	  aspects	  of	   their	  argument	  are	  quite	  provocative,	  and	  appear	  to	  square	  theoretically	  with,	  for	  example,	  the	  sense	  of	  the	  social	  construction	   of	   Britain	   as	   the	   common	   enemy	   in	   the	   diverse	   colonies	   building	   up	   to	   the	  American	  Revolution	  (Bailyn,	  1967;	  Wood,	  2003)	  	  Awareness	  of	  something	  very	  much	  like	  what	  we	  now	  call	  social	  capital	   is	  hundreds	  of	  years	   old.	   Ibn	   Khaldun	   (1332-­‐1406),	   an	   Arab	   philosopher	   of	   the	   Islamic	   florescence	   with	  particular	   interest	   in	  what	  we	  might	  term	  civics	  or	  politics,	  seems	  to	  have	  understood	  clearly	  the	   role	  of	   solidarity	   in	  groups	   in	   terms	   remarkably	   similar	   to	   those	  of	  Welzel,	   Inglehart	   and	  Deutsch.	  He	  wrote	  sympathetically	  of	  what	  he	  termed	  asabiya,	  which,	  he	  said,	  “is	  obtained	  only	  through…	  mutual	  affection	  and	  willingness	  to	  fight	  and	  die	  for	  each	  other”.	  Note	  that	  there	  is,	  at	  least	  implicitly,	  both	  a	  conflict	  dimension	  and	  a	  common	  adversary	  in	  this	  statement.	  Khaldun	  made	  clear	   that	   the	  all-­‐for-­‐one-­‐and-­‐one-­‐for-­‐all	   loyalty	  of	  asabiya	  extends	   far	  beyond	   life-­‐and-­‐
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death	  situations	   into	  ordinary	  everyday	   lifeworlds	  as	  well.	  This	   is	  an	   important	  dimension	  of	  voluntary	  action,	  but	  reducing	  all	  such	  situations	  to	  “reciprocity”	  (a	  quid	   for	  a	  quo)	  in	  rational	  choice	   terms	   easily	   loses	   the	   solidarity	   aspects	   of	   Khaldun’s	   and	   many	   other,	   more	   recent,	  similar	  observations.	  At	  some	  stages	  of	  development,	  group	  members	  may	  be	  highly	  suspicious	  of	  the	  threat	  of	  potential	   conflict	  with	   fellows	  or	   colleagues	   they	  don’t	   know	  and	  have	  never	   interacted	  with	  before,	  and	  this	  will	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  their	  behavior.	  The	  term	  fellow	  and	  the	  accompanying	  term	  fellowship,	  mirroring	  recent	  changes	  that	  have	  taken	  place	  in	  the	  American	  usage	  of	  ‘guys’	  (as	  in	  gender-­‐neutral	  usages	  of	  ‘you	  guys’),	  is	  used	  in	  this	  work	  in	  an	  explicitly	  gender-­‐neutral	  sense.	   Such	   usage	   is	   already	   well	   established	   in	   certain	   religious	   settings.	   E.g.,	   when	   during	  “fellowship”	   the	  minister	   in	   a	   church	   instructs	   congregants,	   regardless	   of	   gender,	   to	   turn	   to	  their	   neighbors	   and	   greet	   them,	   she	   is	   not	   usually	   speaking	   only	   to	   the	   men	   present.	   One	  developmental	  facet	  of	  this	  may	  be	  the	  initial	  lack	  of	  agreement	  among	  participants	  about	  what	  rules	   (in	   the	   broad	   Bloomington	   School/IAD	   sense)	   may	   prevail	   in	   these	   circumstances.	  However,	   if	   any	   commons	   is	   to	   succeed	   in	   the	   longer	   term,	   something	   very	  much	   like	  Elinor	  Ostrom’s	  (2007)	  eight	  “design	  principles”	  that	  are	  said	  to	  be	  grounded	  in	  the	  research	  suggest	  procedures	   to	  enable	  effective	  collective	  choice	  (Principle	  #3)	  are	  necessary.	   	  Also,	   it	   is	   likely	  that	  the	  larger	  political	  and	  cultural	  setting	  would,	  in	  most	  cases	  allow	  for	  minimal	  recognition	  of	  the	  right	  to	  organize	  and	  assemble	  (Principle	  #7).	  If	  they	  wish	  to	  avoid	  becoming	  a	  de	  facto	  public	   good,	   participants	  would	   also	  need	   to	   establish	   and	  maintain	  membership	  boundaries	  (Principle	  #1).	  They	  would	  also	  have	   to	  establish	  among	   themselves	  governance,	   fundraising,	  voting	   (Principle	   #8)	   and	   perhaps	   even	   more	   advanced	   conflict	   resolution	   procedures	  (Principle	  #6)	  and	  assorted	  other	  necessary	  norms	  of	  “fair	  play”	  or	  justice	  (Rawls,	  2005).	  Unlike	  public	  goods	  producers,	  new	  commons	  in	  voluntary	  action	  also	  often	  include	  among	  their	  rules	  specific	   conditions	   and	  procedures	   for	   expulsion	  of	   non-­‐conforming	  members	   (Principle	  #2),	  sometimes	  only	  as	  a	   last	  resort	  to	  the	  extent	  that	   fair-­‐play	  for	  participants	  dictates	  graduated	  sanctions	  (Principle	  #5).	  The	  need	  for	  monitoring	  and	  auditing	  appropriate	  conduct	  (Principle	  #4)	   may	   not	   be	   immediately	   evident	   to	   founders	   of	   all	   new	   commons	   (contemporary	   and	  historical	   communes	   and	   social	  movements	   like	  Occupy	  Wall	   Street	   come	   to	  mind)	   but	   such	  eventualities	  may	  also	  become	  necessary.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note,	  however,	  that	  Ostrom’s	  design	  principles	   should	   be	   seen	   as	   inferences	   from	   existing	   practice	   as	   she	   intended	   them	   and	  not	  ironclad	  rules	  for	  future	  conduct.	  As	  an	  equally	  general	  rule,	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  any	  such	  rules	  are	   deemed	   necessary	   for	   new	   commons	   is	   a	   matter	   to	   be	   determined	   by	   the	   voluntary	  participants	  who	   control	   the	   collective	   resources	   themselves,	   under	   rules	  of	   rational	   conduct	  discussed	   in	   the	  preceding	   section.	   In	   this	   sense,	   practice	   theory	  of	   new	  commons	   should	  be	  more	   a	  matter	   of	   generalizing	   from	   the	   history	   of	   past	   performance	   than	   seeking	   to	   deduce	  future	  action	  from	  abstract,	  first	  principles.	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The	  Proposition	  of	  Abundance	  One	  of	  the	  fundamental	  assumptions	  of	  the	  original	  commons	  theory	  of	  voluntary	  action	  is	   what	   I	   termed	   the	   assumption	   of	   affluence	   (Lohmann,	   1992,	   p?).	   This	   is,	   upon	   further	  reflection,	   not	   an	   assumption	   at	   all	   but	   an	   important	   (and	   testable)	   proposition.	   The	  proposition	   is,	   that	   action	   in	   a	   new	   commons,	   including	   the	   possibility	   of	   acting	   in	   the	   best	  
interests	  of	  others,	  is	  morally	  defensible	  only	  in	  those	  cases	  where	  the	  actor’s	  basic	  self-­‐interest	  is	  
not	   at	   risk.	   As	   with	   conception	   of	   philanthropy	   below,	   the	   term	   affluence	   is	   not	   a	   covert	  reference	   only	   to	   those	  with	   great	  wealth	   as	   some	   have	   suspected.	   It	   is,	   instead,	   primarily	   a	  moral	  qualifier.	  And,	  when	  that	  qualifier	  is	  applicable	  the	  threshold	  for	  philanthropic	  or	  other	  voluntary	   acts	   in	   the	   commons	   may	   actually	   be	   quite	   low.	   In	   any	   event,	   it	   is	   not	   morally	  defensible	  that	  persons	  whose	  own	  self	  interest	  is	  immanently	  at	  risk	  or	  will	  be	  threatened	  in	  some	   fundamental	   sense,	   whether	   through	   prolonged	   hunger,	   or	   risk	   of	   exposure	   to	   fatal	  disease	   face	   expectation	   of	   rising	   above	   self-­‐interested	   behavior.	   This	   is	   the	   basis	   of	  Hannah	  Arendt’s	   distinction	   between	   labor,	   work	   and	   action	   (Arendt,	   1950).	   This	   premise,	   which	  explicitly	   states	   a	  widely	  held	  norm,	   says	   that	   such	  persons	  may	  not	   be	  morally	   obligated	   to	  volunteer	   or	   participate	   in	   charitable	   or	   other	   philanthropic	   activity	   in	   a	   new	   commons.	  Instead,	  we	  must	  assume	   that	   rational	  action	   in	  a	   commons	  can	  only	  be	  expected	   from	  those	  who	   are	   affluent	   in	   this	   important	   sense.	   That	   is,	   those	  whose	  basic	   survival	   or	   fundamental	  way	  of	   living	   is	  not	   currently	   at	   risk,	   and	  would	  not	  be	  put	   at	   risk	  by	   their	  participation.	  We	  simply	   cannot	   ask	   anyone	   to	   be	   concerned	  with	   the	   interests	   of	   others	   to	   the	   extent	   of	   their	  participation	  in	  collective	  choice	  under	  conditions	  where	  their	  own	  fundamental	  self-­‐interest	  is	  at	  risk.	  Altruistic	  behavior	  can	  never	  be	  mandated	  without	  ceasing	  to	  be	  altruistic.	  Nowhere	  is	  this	   as	   true	   as	   in	   circumstances	   where	   a	   person’s	   own	   basic	   self	   interest	   in	   life,	   liberty	   or	  security	  is	  at	  significant	  risk.	  This	   proposition	   is,	   in	   fact,	   readily	   testable:	   In	   looking	   at	   the	   range	   of	   philanthropic	  activity,	   for	   example,	   do	   we	   find	   starving	   people	   routinely	   being	   asked	   to	   donate	   to	   hunger	  campaigns	  designed	  to	  benefit	  others?	  Are	  seriously	  ill	  persons	  routinely	  asked	  or	  expected	  to	  provide	   care	   for	   others	   less	   seriously	   ill?	   Does	   general	   public	   opinion	   in	   any	   sense	   condone	  such	  requests?	  Are	  there	  moral	  arguments	  that	  have	  been	  (or	  even	  can	  be)	  mounted	  in	  defense	  of	  such	  requests?	  	  
Social	  and	  Moral	  Capital	  	  We	  can	  hypothesize	  further	  that	  in	  a	  commons	  consisting	  of	  the	  interactions	  of	  those	  not	  currently	   in	   need	   or	   in	   jeopardy,	   the	   conditions	   of	   philia	   and	   diaconia	   identified	   by	   Finley	  (1999),	   and	   termed	   here	   social	   and	   moral	   capital,	   will	   seldom	   be	   present	   in	   any	   great	  abundance	   at	   the	   startup	   of	   a	   new	   commons.	   They	   can,	   however,	   be	   expected	   to	   begin	   to	  emerge	  over	   time	   in	  most	   if	  not	  all	  new	  commons.	  Those	   social	   commons	  which	  successfully	  solve	   a	   three-­‐part	   existential	   dilemma	   by	  moving	   from	   the	   original	   situation,	   resolving	   their	  design	   issues	  and	   finding	  a	   stable	   institutional	   solution	  outside	   the	   incentive	   structure	  of	   the	  market	   and	   the	   command	   and	   control	   apparatus	   of	   government	  will	   in	   the	   course	   of	   events	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almost	   certainly	   develop	   at	   least	   some	   social	   capital,	   not	   only	   voluntary	   membership,	   trust	  building	   and	   social	   networks,	   but	   also	   the	   capacity	   for	   elite	   challenging	   and	   constructive	  conflict,	   if	   necessary	   and	   moral	   capital,	   evolving	   their	   own	   distinctive	   moeurs	   along	   the	  suggestive	   lines	   of	   Ostrom’s	   design	   principles.	   This	   statement	   should	   not	   be	   read	   as	   a	  suggestion	  that	  the	  design	  principles	  identified	  by	  Elinor	  Ostrom	  are	  in	  some	  sense	  normative	  for	  new	  commons.	  Her	  presentation	  of	  the	  principles	  makes	  clear	  that	  these	  are	  distilled	  from	  prior	   experience.	   The	   priority	   of	   freedom	   of	   association	  makes	   clear	   that	   new	   commons	   are	  entirely	   free	   to	   choose	   or	   neglect	   any	   such	   guidance	   or	   ‘practice	   principles’	   at	   will.	   And	   the	  probabilistic	  nature	  of	  the	  statements	  also	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  some	  outlier	  new	  commons	  that	  ignore	  one	  or	  more	  of	  them	  may	  succeed	  anyway.	  	  
Philia,	  Diaconia	  and	  Identity	  	  In	  so	  doing,	   the	  participants	  will	   also	  begin	   to	   form	  their	  own	   identity.	  New	  commons	  formed	  by	  voluntary	  participants	  all	  bringing	   their	  own,	   individual	   stocks	  of	   resources	   to	   the	  task	   at	   hand,	   and	   possessing	   a	   shared	   mission,	   or	   sense	   of	   purpose,	   may	   function	   quite	  effectively	   with	   little	   in	   the	   way	   of	   additional	   resources	   in	   light	   of	   the	   time	   they	   devote	   to	  working	  together	  with	  one	  another.	  In	  some	  cases,	  commons	  (whether	  new	  or	  old)	  can	  function	  successfully	  for	  long	  periods	  of	  time	  solely	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  time	  commitments	  and	  dedication	  of	  the	  volunteer	  participants	  and	  the	  cognitive,	  social,	  political,	  economic	  and	  cultural	  resources	  they	   bring	   to	   the	   task.	   The	   situation	   of	   such	   associations	   is	   seldom	   static,	   however,	   simply	  because	   –	   in	   marked	   contrast	   to	   the	   assumptions	   of	   rational	   individualism	   –	   none	   of	   the	  individual	  actors	  coming	  to	  associate	  in	  a	  commons	  is	  likely	  to	  have	  been	  a	  pure	  isolate	  with	  a	  mental	  clean	  slate	  and	  no	  agenda	  except	  as	  defined	  by	  the	  collective	  purpose.	  Everyone	  brings	  prior	  experience,	  and	  their	  own	  ideas	  about	  what	  must	  be	  done	  and	  how	  to	  do	  it.	  Thus	  most	  will	  have	  something	  to	  offer.	  Whatever	  they	  bring,	  aside	  from	  money	  and	  collections,	  can	  be	  termed	  their	  human	  capital.	  For	  example,	  most	  will	  bring	  pre-­‐existing	  networks	  of	  social	  relationships	  –	  friends,	  kinfolk,	  neighbors,	   acquaintances,	  past	  associates,	   colleagues	  and	   the	   like.	  Even	  more	  important	  is	  the	  learned	  capacity	  to	  establish	  new	  relationships	  and	  form	  new	  networks,	  and	  an	  openness	   to	   new	   experience,	   including	   the	   ability	   to	   learn	   new	   skills	   and	   expand	   one’s	  repertory	  by	  trying	  and	  doing.	  Such	  human	  capacities	  are	  among	  the	  most	  fundamental	  source	  of	  additional	  resources	  for	  a	  vast	  array	  of	  new	  commons.	  	  In	   this	   context,	   something	   very	   interesting	   frequently	   begins	   to	   happen	   from	   the	   very	  origin	   of	   a	   new	   commons:	   In	   a	   process	   Valdis	   Krebs	   terms	   “network	   weaving”	   participants	  begin	   to	   (1)	   Call	   upon	   their	   existing	   stocks	   of	   individual	   human	   capital,	   particularly	   the	  knowledge,	  social	  skills	  and	  personal	  values	  needed	  to	  solve	  problems	  faced	  by	  the	  association	  and	  to	  work	  together	  to	  build	  the	  association;	  (2)	  Call	  upon	  their	  existing	  social	  networks	  to	  aid	  in	   this	   process;	   (3)	   Establish	   and	  build	   new	   relations	   of	   trust	   among	  one	   another	  within	   the	  commons;	  and	  (4)	  Attempt	  to	  leverage	  existing	  and	  social	  networks	  for	  the	  common	  good	  of	  the	  association	  (Krebs	  &	  Holly,	  2002-­‐2006).	  Note	  that	  it	  is	  part	  of	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  situation	  in	  which	  resource	  and	  mission	  sharing	  takes	  place	  that	  all	  of	  these	  processes	  are	  dependent	  upon	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the	  prior	  constitution	  of	  a	  commons,	  and	  that	  none	  can	  be	  actualized	  until	   that	  formation	  has	  occurred.	  It	  is	  in	  this	  sense	  that	  we	  can	  speak	  of	  social	  capital	  as	  an	  emergent	  characteristic	  of	  new	  commons.	  	  
Philia,	  or	  Solidarity	  As	  noted	  by	  Finley	  above,	  something	  very	  much	  like	  the	  dynamics	  of	  network	  weaving	  were	  already	  known	  to	  the	  ancient	  Athenian	  aristocrats	  who	  called	  the	  phenomenon	  philia,	  or	  civic	   friendship	   (Adams,	   1986;	   Badewar,	   1993;	   Badewar,	   2008;	   Gunebaum,	   2003;	  Schwarzenbach,	   2009;	   Scorza,	   2004).	   Civic	   friendship	   is	   often	   seen	   as	   a	   static	   thing	   –	   a	  structure.	   It	   is	   also	   a	   process	   of	   growing,	   evolving	   and	   changing	   social	   relations,	   philia	   in	  proximity	  to	  one’s	  civic	  friends.	  Those	  invested	  in	  the	  central	  role	  of	  self-­‐interest	  have	  largely	  rejected	  the	  political	  or	  civil	  drift	  of	  Aristotle’s	  well-­‐known	  argument	  that	  friendship	  serves	  as	  a	  model	   for	   citizenship	   (Scorza,	  2004).	  The	  analysis	  above,	  which	  suggests	  a	  new	  and	  different	  understanding	   of	   Tocqueville’s	   self-­‐interest	   properly	   understood,	   also	   suggests	   that	   such	   a	  rejection	  might	  be	   ill	  advised.	  Terms	  like	  bonding	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  used	  for	  the	  resulting	  sense	  of	  mutual	  interest	  or	  fellowship	  that	  arises.	  Yet,	  a	  dynamic	  view	  of	  the	  Tocqueville’s	  sense	  of	  self	  interest,	  properly	  understood,	  would	  seem	  to	  lean	  toward	  Aristotle’s	  view	  and	  a	  sense	  of	  self-­‐interest	   as	   a	   dynamic	   process	   evolving	   through	   practice.	   We	   may	   go	   to	   club	   meetings,	  conferences,	   community	   committees	   and	   boards	   for	   a	   wide	   variety	   of	   reasons,	   including	  narrowly	  constructed	  self-­‐interest,	  but	  when	  we	  do,	  we	   the	  possibility	  opens	  of	  being	  able	   to	  enjoy	  being	  in	  the	  company	  of	  particular	  others	  and	  looking	  forward	  to	  seeing	  the	  friends	  we	  meet	   there.	   This	   issue	   bears	   directly	   on	   states	   as	   political	   associations	   and	   the	   finding	   that	  democracies	  don’t	  war	  against	  one	  another	  discussed	  above.	  See	  Heiman,	  2012	  on	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  states	  can	  be	  friends.	  And	  when	  we	  do	  not	  find	  such	  associations	  and	  interactions	  pleasurable,	   the	   temptation	   to	   quit,	   withdraw	   or	   protest	   may	   also	   arise	   (Hirschman,	   1981;	  Lohmann,	  1992:	  58-­‐64)	  	  Charles	   Taylor	   is	   one	   of	   the	   philosophers	  who	   has	   been	   “…	   concerned	   in	  much	   of	   his	  work	  to	  argue	  against	  the	  claims	  of	  liberal	  political	  philosophers	  such	  as	  John	  Rawls	  and	  Ronald	  Dworkin,	  on	  behalf	  of	  a	  conception	  of	  political	   life	  more	  attuned	  to	  human	  beings’	  communal	  nature	   that	   flow	  from	  practices	  of	  collective	  self	  rule”	  (Taylor,	  Tully,	  and	  Weinstock,	  172;	  See	  also	  Weinstock,	  1997).	  Closer	  examination	  of	  Taylor’s	  work	  can	  give	  us	  deeper	  insight	  into	  the	  problem	  of	  solidarity.	  The	  problem	  can	  be	  stated	  quite	  simply:	  What	  is	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  bonds	  that	   emerge	   among	   participants	   in	   voluntary	   action	   and	   how	  do	   these	   affect	   the	   behavior	   of	  actors	  in	  new	  commons?	  Closely	  associated	  with	  this	  is	  another,	  more	  normative	  question:	  How	  do	   such	   bonds	   temper	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   societies	   should	   be	   organized	   and	   governed	   to	  promote	  the	  growth	  of	  human	  freedom	  and	  opportunity?	  Solidarity	  offers	  a	  rubric	  within	  which	  to	  consider	  a	  host	  of	  interesting	  theoretical	  and	  practical	  problems.	  It	  appears,	  for	  example,	  that	  solidarity	  is	  not	  a	  determinant	  property,	  but	  only	  emerges	  under	  selective	  conditions.	  Likewise,	  solidarity	  cannot	  be	  willed,	   legislated	  or	  demanded	  by	  external	  authorities,	  although	  it	  can	  be	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anticipated	   or	   expected.	   It	   must	   be,	   as	   it	   were,	   ‘earned’	   by	   the	   engagement,	   effort	   and	  interaction	  of	  participants,	  much	  like	  trust	  and	  other	  conditions	  to	  which	  it	  is	  related.	  Tocqueville’s	   intermediate	   institutions	   as	   reframed	   by	   Richard	   Neuhaus	   (1984)	   and	  Berger,	   Neuhaus	   and	   Novak	   (1996)	   also	   implies	   something	   very	   much	   like	   a	   concept	   of	  solidarity.	  They	  argued	  that	  voluntary	  association	  (we	  can	  see	  here	  that	  the	  relevant	  category	  is	  actually	  broader	  than	  just	  associations)	  can	  insulate	  and	  protect	  individuals	  from	  the	  corrosive	  personal	  effect	  of	  at	  least	  mild	  forms	  of	  state	  coercion,	  but	  they	  did	  not	  offer	  an	  explanation	  of	  what	   it	   is	  about	  such	  association	  that	  has	  this	  effect.	   It	   is	  worth	  noting	  that	  Tocqueville	  never	  actually	   used	   the	   term	   “intermediate	   institutions”	   in	   his	   discussion	   of	   associations	   (in	   part,	  because	   he	   wrote	   in	   French	   and	   the	   term	   is	   an	   English	   language	   term).	   This	   phrase	   can	   be	  attributed	  to	  Berger	  and	  Neuhaus	  who	  together	  wove	  several	  strands	  of	  Tocqueville’s	  work	  into	  their	   own	   perspective.	   	   The	   explanation	   is	   actually	   multi-­‐part.	   First,	   no	   philosopher-­‐king,	  dictator	   or	   government	   bureau,	   can	   successfully	   mandate	   that	   participants	   must	   enjoy	   one	  another’s	  company,	  or	  draw	  strength,	  guidance	  and	  mutual	  support	  from	  the	  sheer	  sociability	  of	  being	  with	  one	  another.	  The	  best	  they	  can	  do	  (and	  the	  20th	  century	  offers	  many	  instances	  of	  this)	   is	   mandate	   the	   appearance	   of	   such	   conviviality	   and	   solidarity.	   Solidarity	   is	   thus	   a	  preexisting	  condition	  based	  in	  an	  implicit	  social	  compact	  and	  an	  emergent	  condition	  arising	  out	  of	   the	   circumstances	   of	   togetherness.	   There	   is	   quite	   literally	   “safety	   in	   numbers”	   as	   both	   the	  Puritans	  who	  embraced	  the	  Mayflower	  Compact	  in	  1620	  and	  the	  occupants	  of	  Tahrir	  Square	  in	  2011	  were	  aware.	  Sadly,	  one	  of	  the	  lessons	  of	  20th	  century	  totalitarianism	  is	  that	  the	  security	  of	  solidarity	  is	  not	  unlimited;	  It	  can	  be	  pierced,	  shattered	  and	  destroyed.	  Solidarity	  in	  this	  sense,	  involves	   not	   only	   philia	   in	   the	   classic	   sense.	   It	   also	   embraces	   what	   people	   often	   mean	   by	  
communitas,	   as	   well	   as	   an	   essential	   quality	   of	   what	   Tönnies	   meant	   by	   gemeinschaft.	  Unfortunately,	   these	   sources	   also,	   like	   Neuhaus	   and	   Berger,	   identify	   different	   facets	   of	   the	  condition	  skillfully,	  without	  offering	  deeper	  explanation	  for	  wherein	  the	  protections	  arise	  and	  what	  the	  limits	  are.	  Only	  a	  partial	  explanation	  is	  offered	  here;	  it	  remains	  one	  of	  the	  most	  basic	  challenges	  facing	  the	  new	  commons	  theory	  of	  voluntary	  action.	  
Solidarity	  and	  Third	  Sector	  Theory	  	  Solidarity	  and	  civic	  friendship	  are	  relations	  that	  co-­‐participants	  develop	  jointly	  with	  one	  another	  and	  that	  function	  as	  the	  source	  of	  the	  security	  and	  protective	  power	  of	  association.	  It	  is	  thus	  that	  solidarity	  provides	  primary	  protection	  of	  the	  individual	  from	  the	  state	  in	  a	  dual	  sense:	  For	   the	   group,	   there	   is	   a	   kind	   of	   Three	   Musketeers,	   “all	   for	   one	   and	   one	   for	   all”	   defensive	  perimeter:	   An	   assault	   on	   any	   of	   us	  will	   be	   seen	   as	   an	   assault	   on	   all	   of	   us.	   For	   the	   individual	  member,	   there	   is	   the	  security	  of	  knowing	  that	  her	   interests	  and	  wellbeing	  are	  not	  exclusively	  hers	   alone,	   but	   to	   some	   extent	   connected	   with	   the	   interests	   and	   wellbeing	   of	   others.	  Unfortunately,	  in	  the	  recent	  past	  solidarity	  and	  the	  practice	  of	  mutualism	  have	  had	  little	  impact	  on	   policy	   in	   many	   countries,	   which	   has	   been	   guided	   by	   the	   rational	   individualism	   of	   legal,	  management	  and	  economic	  thinking.	  The	  role	  of	  “austerity	  policies”	  in	  the	  contrast	  between	  U.S.	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and	  European	  Union	  economic	  recovery	  from	  the	  Great	  Recession	  ought	  to	  be	  very	  instructive	  in	   that	   regard.	   In	   the	   previous	   century,	   it	   was	   primarily	   a	   variety	   of	   (mostly	   European)	  immigrant	   groups,	   including	   academics	   who	   have	   had	   a	   larger	   impact	   on	   practice. Burial	  societies,	   now	   largely	   extinct	   (no	   pun	   intended)	   and	   replaced	   by	   life	   insurance,	   including	  mutual	  insurance	  companies	  (i.e.,	  giants	  like	  State	  Farm	  Mutual,	  which	  has	  shortened	  its	  brand	  name	   to	   State	   Farm),	   Liberty	   Mutual	   and	   Massachusetts	   Mutual	   are	   important	   historical,	  prominent	  if	  unacknowledged,	  examples	  of	  mutualism	  in	  American	  culture.	  	  Legal	  and	  political	  thought	  has	   generally	   been	   in	   thrall	   to	   an	   individualism	   that	   views	   citizens	   in	   largely	   asocial	  terms	  and	  reduces	   institutions	  and	  organization	   to	   the	  status	  of	  awkward	  metaphors	   like	   the	  previously	  mentioned	  “legal	  personality”	  of	  corporations.	  And	  in	  the	  American	  context	  various	  forms	  of	  nativism	  and	  rugged	  individualism	  have	  at	  times	  worked	  overtime	  to	  strengthen	  such	  ideas.	  It	  is	  this	  individualistic	  tradition	  that	  produced	  the	  legal	  doctrine	  in	  the	  Santa	  Clara	  case,	  Citizens	   United	   v.	   Federal	   Election	   Commission	   and	   other	   rulings	   between	   these	   two	   that	  corporations	   are	   legal	   persons.	   The	   Citizens	   United	   (2010)	   case	   cannot	   be	   seen	   just	   in	   legal	  terms.	   It	  also	  has	   important	  philosophical,	  political,	   linguistic,	   social	  and	  cultural	   implications	  (Dworkin,	  2010).	  In	  it,	  the	  U.S.	  Supreme	  Court	  applied	  a	  logic	  very	  similar	  –	  but	  inverse	  –	  to	  that	  of	  the	  infamous	  Dred	  Scott	  decision	  (1857)	  where	  the	  Court	  defined	  a	  class	  of	  human	  beings	  as	  property.	  In	  the	  Citizens	  United	  case,	  the	  Court	  reversed	  the	  logic	  of	  Dred	  Scott	  and	  attributed	  to	  a	   class	   of	   property	   human	   characteristics	   (Leach,	   2013).	   More	   extreme	   elements	   of	   such	  individualism	  have	  sometimes	  even	  viewed	  cooperation	  and	  association	  as	  threats	  to	  personal	  liberty,	  paradoxically	  organizing	   into	  political	   associations	   to	  prevent	  or	   limit	   this	  possibility.	  But	  such	  blanket	  suspicion	  of	  “the	  social”	  and	  equating	  association	  and	  community	  with	  statism	  leaves	   certain	   gaps	   in	   thought	   and	   theory	   regarding	   third	   sector	   possibilities.	   Bergstrom,	  (1999)	  dealt	  with	   some	  of	   these	   gaps	   and	   anomalies	   in	   the	  parable	   of	   the	   anarchists’	   annual	  meeting.	  	  
Diaconia,	  or	  Moral	  Capital	  There	   is	   another	   emergent	   condition	   that	   is	   equally	   important.	   Over	   time	   and	   with	  varying	  degrees	  of	  significance,	  new	  commons	  formed	  will	  often	  find	  that	  over	  time	  the	  capacity	  that	   the	   ancient	  Greeks	   called	  diaconia	  begins	   to	   emerge	   and	   is	   exercised,.	   Following	  Etzioni	  (1988;	   1997)	   we	   can	   term	   this	   condition	   moral	   capital.	   It	   is	   in	   some	   respects	   the	   most	  interesting,	   and	   over	   the	   long	   run,	   powerful	   characteristic	   of	   voluntary	   action.	   Following	  Tocqueville,	  we	  can	  speak	  of	   the	  units	  or	  memes	  of	  moral	  capital	  as	  moeurs.	   It	   is	  also	  closely	  related	  to	  the	  capacity	  to	  form	  new	  social	  institutions	  from	  common	  resource	  pools.	  Diaconia	  or	  moral	   capital	   may	   be,	   more	   than	   any	   thing	   else,	   what	   tyrants	   fear	   most	   about	   voluntary	  association	   and	  why	   they	   so	   frequently	  move	   to	   limit	   freedoms	   of	   assembly	   and	   association.	  Loss	  of	  power	  is	  one	  thing,	  but	  the	  loss	  of	  legitimacy,	  respect,	  the	  judgment	  of	  history	  and	  other	  conditions	  tied	  up	  with	  diaconia	  is	  far	  more	  threatening.	  
  137 
In	   the	   contemporary	  world	   of	   the	   association	   revolution,	  we	   often	   see	   this	   dimension	  first	   and	  most	   obviously	   in	   the	   expectation	   and	   legal	   requirement	   that	   incorporated	   “public	  charities”	  have	  by-­‐laws	  or	  a	  set	  of	  operating	  rules	  necessary	  to	  regulate	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  association,	   group	   or	   organization.	   Well	   before	   contemporary	   association	   law,	   medieval	  monastic	   associations	   imposed	   this	   expectation	  on	   themselves	  with	   sets	   of	   rules	   such	   as	  The	  
Rule	  of	  St.	  Augustine	  (Van	  Bavel,	  1984),	  The	  Rule	  of	  St.	  Benedict,	  (Fry,	  1980)	  and	  others.	  Whether	  self-­‐imposed	  or	  legally	  mandated,	  such	  sets	  of	  operating	  rules	  establish	  a	  minimal	  moral	  order	  within	  self-­‐governing	  institutions.	  Contemporary	  legal	  requirements	  for	  articles	  and	  bylaws	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  expectations	  for	  establishing	  basic	  moral	  order:	  If	  you	  would	  be	  a	  self-­‐governing	  new	  
commons,	  you	  must	  establish	  an	  internal	  moral	  order.	  It	  is	  primarily	  up	  to	  you	  what	  that	  order	  is,	  
but	  you	  must	  have	  one	  if	  you	  wish	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  law.	  It	  is	  an	  interesting	  and	  enlightening	  exercise	  to	  compare	  such	  rules	  with	  the	  design	  principles	  discussed	  above	  that	  Elinor	  Ostrom	  abstracted	   for	   the	   successful	   operation	   of	   commons	   successful	   in	   avoiding	   a	   tragedy	   of	   the	  commons.	  There	  are,	   in	   fact,	   two	  sets	  of	  rules	   that	  seem	  most	   fundamental	   in	  common	  goods	  associations:	   rules	   preventing	   exhaustion	   of	   the	   resource	   (whether	   through	   overgrazing	   its	  pasture,	  draining	  its	   irrigation	  canals,	  driving	  away	  members	  or	  destroying	  group	  fundraising	  capacity)	   and	   rules	   preventing	   enclosure,	   e.g.,	   “capture”	   of	   a	   United	   Way	   or	   community	  foundation	  by	  a	   single	  donor	  or	   small	   group	  of	  donors	  or	  agencies.	  This	  dynamic	   reveals	   the	  capacity	  of	  new	  commons	  to	  formulate	  moral	  standards	  (or	  moeurs)	  in	  much	  the	  same	  way	  that	  rules	   governing	   attendance	   or	   membership	   are	   derived.	   Organizations,	   as	   in	   nonprofit	  organizations	  or	  civil	  society	  organizations,	  can	  be	  defined	  from	  this	  standpoint	  as	  distinctive	  sets	   of	   rules	   to	   prevent	   or	   delay	   exhaustion	   of	   resources,	   protect	   against	   enclosure.	   Some	   of	  those	  rules	  will	  enable	  otherwise	  naturally	  occurring	  social	  capital	  formation	  and	  a	  facilitative	  environment	  for	  formulating	  the	  moeurs	  of	  self-­‐governance.	  	  
Identity	  	  There	  is	  one	  more	  important	  dynamic	  that	  also	  emerges	  over	  time	  in	  new	  commons	  and	  that	  is	  individual	  and	  collective	  identity	  formation.	  The	  list	  of	  examples	  of	  the	  capacity	  of	  social	  commons	  to	  form	  new	  identities	  is	  almost	  endless,	  as	  indicated	  by	  labels	  such	  as	  Lion,	  Rotarian,	  Senior	   Citizen,	   Methodist,	   Buddhist,	   lawyer,	   physician,	   social	   worker,	   engineer	   or	   any	  combination	  of	  Greek	   letters	   connoting	   fraternal	  or	   sorority	  membership.	   In	   come	  cases,	   e.g.,	  millions	  of	  AARP	  members,	  common	  identities	  are	  of	  secondary,	  or	  even	  incidental	  importance	  while	  in	  other	  cases,	  e.g.,	  Muslim,	  Christian,	  or	  Jew,	  they	  may	  go	  to	  the	  very	  core	  of	  someone’s	  identity	  and	  shape	  or	  affect	  all	  aspects	  of	  someone’s	  way	  of	  life.	  Identity	  also	  links	  with	  another	  form	   of	   emergent	   resource	   already	  mentioned:	   social	   roles.	   As	  with	   social	   capital	   and	  moral	  order,	   the	   capacity	   of	   new	   commons	   to	   shape	   and	   form	   identity	   would	   appear	   to	   be	   an	  emergent	  characteristic	  of	  participation,	  resource	  sharing	  and	  acceptance	  of	  shared	  purposes.	  	  These	  emergent	  conditions	  of	  social	  capital,	  moral	  order	  and	  collective	  identity	  may	  all	  erupt	   as	   part	   of	   the	   normal	   development	   of	   common	   goods	   associations:	   before	   joining	   a	  
  138 
chapter	  of	  the	  large	  membership	  association	  of	  that	  name,	  it	  would	  not	  be	  reasonable	  to	  think	  of	   oneself	   as,	   for	   example,	   a	   Rotarian;	   only	   as	   an	   interested	   person	   or	   potential	   member. Something	  of	  the	  flavor	  of	  these	  dimensions	  of	  social	  and	  moral	  capital,	   identities	  and	  roles	  is	  suggested	  in	  the	  lyrics	  of	  the	  song	  “When	  You’re	  a	  Jet”	  from	  the	  Leonard	  Bernstein	  Broadway	  musical	  West	  Side	  Story:	  “When	  you’re	  a	  jet/	  You’re	  a	  Jet	  all	  the	  way/	  From	  your	  first	  cigarette/	  To	  your	   last	  dyin’	  day.”	  Collegiate	   fraternities	  and	  sororities	  and	  other	   types	  of	  organizations	  often	  claim	  membership	  and	  identity	  as	  a	  member	  is	  for	  a	  lifetime	  and	  irreversible	  and	  act	  on	  that	  claim.	  Even	  though	  I	  quit	  such	  a	  fraternity	  as	  an	  undergraduate	  more	  than	  50	  years	  ago,	  I	  continue	   to	   get	   mailings	   from	   them	   every	   year.	   Thus,	   it	   is	   not	   necessary	   to	   possess	   these	  characteristics	   in	   order	   to	   successfully	   found	   or	   constitute	   a	   new	   commons;	   they	   are	   more	  likely	  to	  develop	  over	  time.	  Indeed,	  the	  very	  absence	  of	  these	  characteristics	  may	  be	  a	  reason	  for	  formation	  of	  the	  association,	  as	  with	  Alcoholics	  Anonymous.	  Likewise,	  there	  may	  initially	  be	  little	   or	   no	   agreement	   about	   what	   moeurs	   may	   be	   necessary.	   All	   of	   these	   characteristics	  together	  serve	  also	  to	  define	  the	  parameters	  of	  the	  social	  space	  that	  new	  commons	  are	  able	  to	  carve	   out	   for	   themselves	   and	   that	   no	   one	   can	   establish	   for	   them.	   Those	   commons	   that	  successfully	  solve	  their	  “existential	  dilemmas”	  of	  staking	  their	  claim	  to	  a	  stable	  space	  apart	  from	  the	   incentives	  of	   the	  market	  and	  the	  command	  and	  control	  of	   the	  state	  will	  probably	  develop	  these	  conditions	  while	  those	  that	  fail	  will	  not.	  	  
Constructing	  Moral	  Orders	  A	   simple	  model	   of	   deliberate	   construction	   of	  moral	   order	   is	   prescribed	   in	   traditional	  models	   of	   voluntary	   association	   and	   carried	   forward	   into	   legal	   models	   of	   nonprofit	  corporations.	  This	  is	  to	  be	  found,	  for	  example,	  in	  the	  expectation	  of	  the	  enumerated	  powers	  of	  boards	  to	  formulate	  their	  own	  operating	  rules,	  and	  in	  the	  normal	  expectation	  of	  boards	  to	  set	  policy	  (that	  is,	  elaborate	  and	  clarify	  the	  mission)	  and	  create	  programs	  (specify	  certain	  actions)	  consistent	  with	  their	  agreed-­‐upon	  mission.	  All	  of	  this	  is	  generally	  characterized	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  self-­‐governing	  quality	  of	  new	  commons.	  The	  rather	  effortless	  conceptual	  leap	  from	  the	  capacity	  to	  formulate	  a	  moral	  order	  to	  generating	  policy,	  procedures	  and	  programs	  may	  offer	  one	  of	  the	  explanations	  for	  the	  preponderance	  of	  bureaus	  and	  firms	  in	  the	  contemporary	  nonprofit	  world.	  While	   it	   is	   always	   possible	   to	   build	   moral	   order	   in	   a	   commons	   without	   rules	   and	   policy,	  developing	   the	   necessary	   understandings	   and	   agreements	   is	   ordinarily	   a	   much	   longer-­‐term,	  complex	   and	   difficult	   process.	   In	   cases	   of	   real	   social	   change,	   however,	   the	   normal	   powers	   of	  new	   commons	   to	   establish	   their	   own	   moral	   order	   can	   take	   on	   much	   broader	   and	   even	  transformational	   dynamics.	   In	   such	   cases,	   the	   exercise	   of	   these	   same	   powers	   triggers	   the	  perceived	   necessity	   of	   new	   moral	   codes	   and	   moral	   orders	   as	   the	   Lutheran	   and	   Calvinist	  movements	   did	   in	   the	   Protestant	   Reformation,	   and	   Pentecostalism,	  Mormonism,	   Scientology,	  Randism,	   Communism	   and	   other	   movements	   have	   done	   in	   the	   past	   century.	   Or	   these	   same	  processes	  may	  define	  new	  sciences	  or	  fields	  of	  knowledge	  as	  the	  various	  new	  commons	  named	  royal	   and	  national	   scientific	   societies	   did	   in	   the	  17th	   and	  18th	   centuries	   and	   the	   abolitionists,	  suffragettes,	  labor	  and	  other	  reform	  movements	  did	  in	  the	  later	  decades	  of	  the	  19th	  century.	  The	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process	  is	  certainly	  not	  automatic	  or	  given,	  as	  the	  innumerable	  failed	  social	  movements	  of	  the	  past	  150	  years	  make	  clear,	  but	  remarkable	  things	  can	  arise	  from	  new	  commons	  when	  the	  social	  capital	  of	  loose	  networks	  such	  as	  the	  colonial	  Committees	  of	  Correspondence	  and	  other	  groups	  in	   18th	   century	   American	   colonies	   enable	   a	   philanthropic	   gift	   to	   the	  world	   in	   the	   form	   of	   an	  entirely	  new	  system	  and	  philosophy	  of	  government.	  Such	  a	  philanthropic	  interpretation	  of	  the	  American	  Revolution	  as	  a	  gift	  to	  the	  world	  is	  based	  on	  McCully	  (2008,	  pp.	  31-­‐42).	  	  
Moeurs,	  Rules	  and	  Repertories	  
 The	  terms	  moeurs,	  rules	  and	  repertories	  have	  already	  been	  used	  above	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	   introduction	   of	   emergent	   moral	   orders.	   It	   is	   now	   appropriate	   to	   offer	   a	   few	   additional	  comments	  clarifying	  the	  use	  of	  these	  terms	  in	  the	  new	  commons	  theory	  of	  voluntary	  action.	  	  In	  the	  “Translators	  Forward”	  of	  The	  Old	  Regime	  and	  the	  Revolution	  (Tocqueville,	  1998)	  Alan	  Kahan	  discusses	  the	  difficulties	  of	  adequate	  translation	  of	  Tocqueville’s	  term	  moeurs,	  which	  he	  says	  is	  often	  translated	  into	  English	  social	  science	  after	  Durkheim,	  as	  mores	  (e.g.,	   the	  stock	  sociology	  textbook	  phrase	  folkways	  and	  mores).	  To	  retain	  this	  important	  distinction,	  the	  following	  middle	  American	  pronunciation	  guide	  may	  be	  helpful.	  The	  conventional	   social	   science	   term	  mores	   is	  usually	   pronounced	  much	   like	   the	   eels,	   “morays”,	   a	   term	  which	   has	   narrowed	   into	  meaning	  something	   like	   “morals”	   or	   what	   Tocqueville	   terms	   “habits	   of	   the	   heart”.	   Tocqueville’s	  suggested	  meaning	   of	  moeurs	   is	   taken	   from	   a	   Latin	  meaning	   that	   is	   considerably	   broader.	   I	  propose	  to	  signal	  this	  broader	  usage	  with	  the	  alternate	  spelling	  (moeurs)	  and	  either	  the	  original	  French/Latin	   pronunciation,	   or	   something	  more	   like	   “moors”.	   	   Kahan	   notes	   that	   Tocqueville	  uses	   the	   term	  moeurs	   frequently	  and	  always	  more	  broadly	   than	  the	  current	  understanding	  of	  mores.	   In	   Tocqueville’s	   sense,	   the	   term	   has	   connotations	   including	   practices,	   ideals,	   morals,	  customs,	  feelings	  and	  habits:	  He	  quotes	  Tocqueville	  as	  stating	  “I	  here	  intend	  the	  term	  moeurs	  to	  have	  its	  original	  Latin	  meaning.	  I	  use	  it	  not	  only	  for	  moeurs	  in	  the	  strict	  sense,	  what	  one	  might	  call	  habits	  of	  the	  heart,	  but	  also	  for	  the	  different	  notions	  men	  possess,	  the	  opinions	  that	  hold	  sway	  
among	   them,	   and	   the	   sum	   of	   ideas	   that	   form	   their	  mental	   habits.”	   (Kahan,	   1996,	   x;	   emphasis	  added)	  	  
 As	  interpreted	  by	  Kahan	  Tocqueville’s	  broader	  use	  of	  the	  term	  moeurs	  can	  easily	  extend	  to	  what	  we	  have	  been	   calling	   repertories	   to	   actually	   refers	   to	   repertories	   of	   practices,	   ideals,	  morals,	   customs,	   feelings	   and	  habits.	   From	   there,	   it	   is	   only	   a	   small	   step	   to	   bring	  moeurs	   into	  alignment	  with	  the	  rationalistic	  use	  of	  ‘rules’	  in	  the	  Bloomington	  model	  of	  commons	  to	  produce	  a	  very	  robust	  notion	  of	  rules	  that	  begins	  to	  spell	  out	  the	  potential	  repertory	  of	  rules	  in	  terms	  of	  practices,	  ideals,	  customs,	  morals,	  feelings	  and	  habits.	  Such	  usage	  can	  explicitly	  also	  build	  upon	  Charles	  Tilly’s	  provocative	  analysis	  of	  repertories	  of	  
contestation,	  or	  political	  protest	  (Tilly,	  1978;	  1986;	  1993	  and	  other	  works).	  Tilly	  (who	  prefers	  the	  French	  spelling	   i.e.	   to	   the	  Anglicized	  y)	  defines	  repertories	  as	   	   "the	  whole	  set	  of	  means	   [a	  group	  or	  collective	  effort]	  has	   for	  making	  claims	  of	  different	  kinds	  on	  different	   individuals	  or	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groups"	  (Tilly,	  1986,	  2).	  Tarrow	  (1993,	  71)	  adds:	  "A	  central	  claim	  of	  Tilly's	  work	  is	  that	  the	  new	  
repertorie	   was	   linked	   historically	   to	   the	   invention	   of	   the	   modern	   social	   movement,	   which	  occurred	  about	  the	  same	  time	  as	  contention	  modernized".	   	  
 Tilly	  studied	  European	  riots,	  demonstrations	  and	  “contentious	  gatherings”	  (all	  examples	  of	   what	   are	   here	   classified	   as	   assemblies).	   He	   gives	   us	   both	   a	   set	   of	   propositions	   about	   the	  historical	  importance	  or	  repertories	  and	  a	  research	  agenda:	  	   "Pressed	   into	   service,	   the	   metaphor	   of	   repertoire	   seems	   useful.	   But	   is	   it	   more	  than	  a	  convenient	  evocation,	  something	  besides	  a	  name	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  groups	  differ	  in	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  they	  act	  together?	  	  In	  order	  to	  bear	  much	  analytic	  weight,	  the	  notion	  of	  repertoire	  must	  represent	  a	  detectable	  tendency	  for	  existing	  groups	  to	  rely	  repeatedly	  
on	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  well-­‐defined	  forms	  of	  collective	  action.	  [emphasis	  added]	  We	  ought	  to	  find	  groups	  modifying	  and	  replacing	  those	  forms	  incrementally	  in	  the	  light	  of	  success	  and	  failure	  in	  achieving	  their	  ends.	  Abrupt	  shifts	  and	  sudden	  inventions	  should	  be	  rare.	  .	  .	   .	   The	   agenda	   for	   the	   study	   of	   repertoires	   therefore	   consists,	   first,	   of	   determining	  whether	  repertoires,	  in	  some	  strong	  sense	  of	  the	  word,	  actually	  exist	  [in	  specific	  cases]	  and	  second,	  of	  examining	  how	  and	  why	  the	  particular	  forms	  of	  collective	  action	  vary	  and	  change. 
 Tilly	   uses	   this	   spelling,	  while	   I	   prefer	   the	   simpler	   Y	   ending	   for	  what	   is	   otherwise	   the	  same	   term.	   Most	   conventional	   dictionaries	   will	   confirm	   that	   these	   are	   both	   considered	  acceptable	  spellings.	  Either	  way,	  an	  insightful	  example	  of	  Tilly’s	  use	  of	  repertories	  is	  evident	  in	  his	  contrast	  of	  18th	  and	  19th	  century	  collective	  behavior,	  and	  his	  singling	  out	  the	  third	  decade	  of	  the	  19th	  century	  (1820-­‐1830)	  as	  a	  key	  period	  of	  social	  change	  centered	  on	  repertories:	  	  "The	  Britain	  of	  1830	  was	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  a	  major,	  and	  relatively	  rapid,	  shift	  from	  one	  sort	  of	  repertoire	  to	  another.	  .	  .	  In	  the	  18th	  Century	  repertorie,	  the	  anti-­‐tax	  rebellion,	  the	  food	  riot,	   and	   the	  concerted	   invasion	  of	   fields	  or	   forests	  were	   the	  most	  distinctive	   forms	  of	  revolt.	   But	   a	   great	   deal	   of	   relatively	   peaceful	   collective	   action	   went	   on,	   first,	   through	  deliberate	   (although	   sometimes	   unauthorized)	   assemblies	   of	   corporate	   groups	   that	  eventuated	   in	   declarations,	   demands,	   petitions,	   or	   lawsuits,	   or,	   second,	   via	   authorized	  festivals	   and	   ceremonies	   in	   the	   course	   of	   which	   ordinary	   people	   symbolized	   their	  grievances.	  According	  to	  Tilly,	  these	  18th	  century	  assemblies	  and	  performances	  had	  several	  special	  characteristics.	   Crowds	   of	   aggrieved	   persons	   tended	   to	   gather	   outside	   the	   residences	   of	  supposed	  wrong-­‐doers	  (like	  vigilantes	  outside	  the	  banker’s	  house	  in	  a	  western	  movie)	  instead	  of	  the	  official	  “seats	  of	  power”,	  although	  he	  notes	  sometimes	  the	  two	  coincided.	  Complains	  were	  also	   frequently	   voiced	   at	   “authorized	   public	   ceremonials	   and	   community	   celebrations,	   and	  occasionally	   were	   organized	   around	   a	   special	   interest	   rather	   than	   the	   whole	   community	   or	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“constituted	  corporate	  groups”.	  Street	  theater,	  visual	  imagery,	  effigies	  and	  symbolic	  expressions	  were	   common,	   and	   the	   “normal	   forms	   of	   action”	   of	   authorities	   (e.g.,	   a	   judge	   pronouncing	  someone	  guilty)	  might	  be	  borrowed,	  explicitly	  or	   in	  parody	  to	  “almost	   literally	  taking	  the	   law	  into	  its	  own	  hands.”	  Tilly	  contrasts	  such	  actions	  with	  the	  newer	  repertories	  of	  the	  19th	  century:	  	   "The	  newer	   repertoire	   that	  was	  becoming	  dominant	   in	   the	  Britain	  of	  1830	  was	  essentially	   the	  one	  with	  which	  we	  work	   today;	   featuring	   special-­‐purpose	   associations,	  directed	  especially	  at	  the	  seats	  of	  power,	  frequently	  involving	  the	  explicit	  announcement	  of	   programs	   and	   organizational	   (161)	   affiliations,	   relying	   relatively	   little	   on	   routine	  public	   gatherings,	   festivities,	   and	   ceremonies.	   The	   strike,	   the	   demonstration,	   the	  electoral	  rally,	  and	  the	  formal	  meeting	  are	  obvious	  examples.	  Employed	  in	  the	  service	  of	  a	  sustained	  challenge	  to	  the	  existing	  structure	  or	  use	  of	  power	  and	  in	  the	  name	  of	  some	  defined	   interest,	   this	   array	   of	   actions	   constitutes	  what	  we	  have	   known	   since	   the	   19th	  Century	  as	  a	  social	  movement.	  The	  point	  of	  calling	  these	  well-­‐known	  changes	  alterations	  of	   repertoires	   is	   to	   stress	   that	   the	   available	   means	   of	   action	   were	   (and	   are)	   learned,	  historically	   specific,	   routed	   in	   the	   existing	   social	   structure,	   and	   seriously	   constraining.	  The	   theoretical	   advantage	   of	   doing	   so	   is	   to	   focus	   explanations	   of	   collective	   action	   on	  group	  choices	  among	  limited	  sets	  of	  slowly	  changing	  alternatives."	  	  (161-­‐162)	  
 Tilly’s	  specific,	  historically	  grounded	  notion	  of	  repertories	  of	  contention	  as	  one	  form	  of	  
moeurs	   of	   voluntary	   action	   is	   directly	   related	   to	   the	   cruder,	   and	   more	   general	   notion	   of	  repertories	  as	  a	  common	  resource	  articulated	  in	  my	  earlier	  book	  on	  commons	  (1992)	  although	  I	  was	  unaware	  of	  his	  work	  at	  that	  time.	  The	  connection	  to	  modern	  social	  movements	  made	  by	  Tilly	  gives	  it	  a	  particular	  currency	  for	  contemporary	  voluntary	  action,	  especially	  social	  problem	  advocacy,	   conflict	   resolution	   and	   sustained	   dialogue	   (Lohmann	   and	   Van	   Til,	   2011),	   social	  movements	   and	   several	   other	   forms	   of	   voluntary	   action.	   It	   also	   forges	   direct,	   concrete,	  historical	   links	   between	   collective	   behavior	   (Blumer,	   1951)	   and	   voluntary	   action.	   Tilly’s	  distinctive	  usage	  of	   the	  phrase	   “repertories	  of.	   .	   .”	   can	  be	  generalized	  and	  added	   to	   the	   list	  of	  
moeurs	  extracted	  from	  Tocqueville.	  We	  may	  speak	  not	  only	  of	  repertories	  of	  contestation,	  but	  also	   repertories	   of	   practice,	   of	   ideals,	   of	   morals,	   customs,	   feelings	   and	   habits.	   These	   diverse	  conceptions	   of	   repertories	   can,	   in	   turn,	   also	   be	   linked	   to	   the	   loosened	   form	   of	   the	   IAD	  conception	  of	  rules	  noted	  above,	  and	  as	  we	  shall	  see	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  knowledge	  commons.	  In	  combination,	   all	   of	   this	  brings	  moeurs	   and	   repertories	  of	   all	   types	   into	   the	  very	   center	  of	   the	  new	  commons	  theory	  of	  voluntary	  action.	  
 The	   principle	   evident	   difference	   between	   rules	   and	   customs,	   for	   example,	   is	   in	   their	  degree	   of	   formality	   and	   overt	   explicitness.	   Both	   play	   important	   roles.	   Thus,	   members	   of	  contemporary	   associations	   frequently	   embrace	   the	   formal	   Robert’s	   Rules	   of	   Order	   while	  retaining	  traditional	  and	  customary	  ways	  of	  conducting	  meetings	  with	  their	  own	  bowdlerized	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versions	   of	   those	   rules.	  Robert’s	   Rules,	   for	   example,	   lays	   out	   procedures	   for	  meeting	  minutes	  quite	   different	   from	   the	   detailed	   reporting	   of	   conversations	   that	   many	   groups	   engage	   in.	  Practitioners	   of	   rationalistic	   models	   often	   assume	   that	   reasonable,	   principled,	   goal-­‐directed	  behavior	   can	  only	  occur	  by	  promulgating	   (and	   strictly	   following)	   formal,	   explicit	   rules,	  while	  close	   study	   of	   actual	   behavior	   in	   associations	   suggests	   that	   sensible,	   tacit	   guidelines,	   that	   is,	  conventional	   practices,	   ideals,	   morals,	   customs,	   feelings	   and	   habits;	   in	   short,	   moeurs	   serve	  equally	  well.	  	   Even	  more	  importantly,	  recognizing	  this	  broadened	  conception	  of	  Tocqueville’s	  moeurs	  is	  fundamental	  to	  recognizing	  one	  of	  the	  most	  powerful	  features	  of	  voluntary	  action:	  The	  ability	  of	   voluntary	   participants	   sharing	   common	   purposes	   to	   utilize	   common	   resource	   pools	   to	  generate	   fundamental	   change	   in	   an	   almost	   limitless	   variety	   of	   ways	   -­‐	   by	   promulgating	   new	  rules	  and	  a	  vast	  range	  of	  other	  new	  repertories:	  practices,	  ideals,	  morals,	  customs,	  feelings	  and,	  through	  repetition,	  even	  new	  habits.	  	  
Conclusion	  In	   this	   chapter,	   we	   have	   examined	   the	   fundamental	   structure	   of	   an	   entirely	   new	   set	   of	  institutions	  in	  the	  modern	  world	  that	  share	  the	  characteristics	  of	  legal	  enactment	  and	  common	  resource	   pooling;	   the	   shared	   resources	   necessary	   for	   the	   production	   of	   commons	   goods.	  	  Several	   additional	   conditions	   and	   characteristics	   were	   linked	   with	   this	   commonality,	   and	   a	  several	  more	  will	   be	   introduced	   in	   the	   chapters	   that	   follow.	   New,	   or	   social	   commons,	   in	   the	  modern	   world	   have	   been	   enabled	   by	   national,	   sub-­‐national	   and	   international	   legal	  infrastructures	  that	  have	  created	  protected	  spaces	  for	  freedom	  of	  assembly	  and	  association	  for	  an	  almost	  infinite	  variety	  of	  different	  purposes.	  Several	  categories	  of	  resources	  important	  in	  the	  production	  of	  common	  goods	  include:	  treasuries	  of	  money,	  and	  economically	  recognized	  goods	  and	   services,	   collections	   of	   valued	   and	   invaluable	   objects,	   and	   repertories	   of	   skills	   and	  knowledge.	   These	   latter	   will	   be	   of	   particular	   interest	   in	   Chapter	   8	   on	   knowledge	   commons	  below.	   In	   addition,	   engagement	   in	   voluntary	   action	   has	   the	   capacity	   to	   produce	   a	   number	   of	  additional,	  emergent	  resources,	  notably	  the	  particular	  form	  of	  social	  capital	  termed	  philia	  and	  also	   referred	   to	   as	   solidarity	   arising	   from	   the	   interaction	   and	   existing	   social	   networks	   of	  participants.	  Also	  of	   interest	   is	   the	  process	  of	   forming	  and	   instituting	  moeurs	   that	   the	  ancient	  Greeks	  called	  diaconia,	  a.k.a.	  the	  creation	  of	  moral	  capital.	  In	  the	  next	  chapter,	  we	  will	  explore	  a	  moral	   vocabulary	   for	   drawing	   distinctions	   between	   various	   new	   commons	   based	   on	   their	  authenticity,	  their	  own	  determinations	  of	  what	  is	  good,	  right,	  and	  just	  and	  the	  judgment	  of	  the	  larger	  society.	  In	  addition,	  the	  formation	  and	  operation	  of	  new	  commons	  also	  tends	  to	  produce	  one	  final	  form	  of	  emergent	  resource	  closely	  connected	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  moral	  capital:	  identities.
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I	  want	  to	  work	  for	  the	  common	  good.	  	  
~	  Emeritus	  Pope	  Benedict	  	  
7.	  Common	  Goods	  Based	   on	   the	   various	   connections	   outlined	   above	   between	   voluntary	   action,	   new	  commons	  and	  common	  pool	  resources	  as	  well	  as	  the	  connections	  to	  democracy	  in	  society	  and	  culture	  noted	   in	  Chapter	  2,	  we	  can	  ask	   further:	  What	   is	   it	   that	   those	  who	  voluntarily	  engage	  in	  association	  with	  others,	  utilizing	  shared	  or	  pooled	  resources	  for	  shared	  purposes	  do	   or	   seek?	   In	   particular,	   can	   the	   diverse	   shared	   purposes	   of	   all	   these	   divergent	  associations	   be	   used	   to	   locate	   some	   commonalities	   that	   all	   voluntary	   action	   and	   new	  commons	  share?	  Can	  these	  purposes	  be	  used	  to	  identify	  the	  diverse	  institutional	  nature	  of	  the	   third	   sector	   in	   some	   fundamental	   sense?	   Finally,	   is	   there	   a	   general	   answer	   to	   those	  questions,	  or	  must	  we	  be	  content	  with	  catalogues	  of	  the	  various	  missions	  and	  purposes	  of	  present-­‐day	  organizations?	  These	  questions	  are	  the	  origin	  of	  this	  chapter.	  	  Previous	  attempts	  by	  third	  sector	  scholars	  have	  sought	  to	  frame	  answers	  in	  terms	  of	  public	   goods,	   semi-­‐public,	   or	   quasi-­‐public	   goods	   and	   in	   taxonomies	   of	   various	   types.	   In	  several	   instances	   this	   approach	   has	   yielded	   answers	   framed	   in	   terms	   of	   goods	  characteristic	   of	   and	   shared	  with	  government	   and	   the	  public	   sector	   in	   some	  basic	   sense.	  That	  is	  almost	  certainly	  part	  of	  the	  answer.	  Yet,	  some	  sizeable	  portion	  of	  voluntary	  action	  is	  not	  concerned	  with	  producing	  public	  goods	  in	  this	  sense,	  nor	  is	  it,	  strictly	  speaking,	  private	  goods	   producing.	   In	   this	   chapter,	   we	   will	   examine	   a	   distinctive	   new	   ideal	   type,	   termed	  common	   goods	   (plural),	   that	   are	   uniquely	   characteristic	   of	   the	   new	   third	   sector	   and,	   in	  particular,	  new	  commons.	  New	  commons	  are	  capable	  of	  producing	  a	  full	  range	  of	  goods	  including	  both	  public	  goods	  –	  those	  primarily	  produced	  by	  the	  public	  sector,	  not	  divisible	  and	  good	  for	  everyone	  –	  and	  private	  goods	  –	  those	  produced	  by	  private	  markets	  and	  benefiting	  individual	  persons,	  families	  or	  entities.	  One	  way	  to	  show	  that	  there	  is	  indeed	  a	  distinct	  modern	  third	  sector	  is	  to	   show	   that	   new	   commons	   are	   also	   uniquely	   capable	   of	   producing	   common	   goods	   that	  benefit	  some	  identifiable	  collectivity	  but	  not	  everyone.	  This	  criterion	  of	  benefit	  to	  some	  but	  not	  all	  also	   introduces	  a	  possibility	  that	   is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  argument.	  That	   is	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  not	  all	  government	  production	  under	  modern	  conditions,	   in	  fact,	   involves	  production	   of	   public	   goods	   of	   benefit	   to	   everyone.	   Many	   government	   benefits,	   in	   fact,	  involve	  common	  goods	  in	  the	  sense	  introduced	  here	  –	  for	  the	  good	  of	  some	  but	  not	  all,	  and	  at	   times	   even	   production	   of	   private	   benefits	   to	   particular	   individuals	   or	   institutions.	  	  Explanations	   of	   public	   and	   private	   goods,	   of	   course,	   are	   typically	   associated	   with	  government	  and	  market	  sectors	  and	  outlined	  in	  terms	  of	  ideal	  types.	  As	  we	  will	  see	  later	  in	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the	  discussion	  of	  modularity	  in	  Chapter	  Seven,	  actual	  reality	  involves	  a	  good	  deal	  of	  mixing	  and	  matching	  of	  ideal	  types	  –	  an	  important	  facet	  of	  what	  Billis,	  et.	  al.	  (2010)	  call	  hybridity.	  However,	  as	  we	  shall	  see,	   if	  we	  are	   to	   take	   into	  account	   the	  new	  third	  sector,	   this	   is	  best	  accounted	  a	  hybridity	  of	   three	  possible	   types	  of	  goods	  (private,	  public	  and	  common)	  and	  not	  just	  the	  first	  two.	  It	  should	  already	  be	  clear	  that	  new	  commons	  can	  utilize	  pooled	  resources	  in	  a	  nearly	  infinite	  variety	  of	  tasks	  from	  getting	  together	  socially	  to	  play	  games	  or	  for	  conversation,	  to	  providing	   social	   services,	   producing	   dramatic	   or	  musical	   presentations,	   raising	   funds,	   or	  organizing	   and	   conducting	   community	   festivals	   or	   parades	   or	   many	   other	   purposes.	  Taxonomies	  modeled	  on	  the	  National	  Taxonomy	  of	  Exempt	  Entities	  (NTEE)	  has	  sought	  to	  categorize	  nonprofit	  corporations	  or	  organizations	  by	   the	  single	  most	  dominant	  missions	  of	  these	  sometimes	  large,	  complex	  entities.	  	  This	  approach	  is	  unnecessarily	  monotonic	  and	  objectivist,	  based	  solely	  on	  a	  single,	  enduring,	  objective	  classification	  of	  the	  inclusions	  and	  exclusions	  of	  the	  U.S.	   tax	  code	  (Hodgkinson	  and	  Toppe,	  1991;	  Independent	  Sector,	  1987).	  Truly,	   in	   such	   cases,	   participants	  may	   have	   no	   say	   in	   defining	   the	   purposes	   –	   especially	  complex	  or	  multiple	  purposes	  –	  of	  such	  entities.	  It	  grants	  no	  recognition	  to	  unincorporated	  entities,	   rapidly	   changing	   or	   temporary	   associations	   and	   the	   self-­‐determination	   of	   vast	  categories	   of	   new	   commons	   including	   social	   problems,	   social	   movements,	   forms	   of	  collective	  behavior,	  and	  the	  types	  of	  repertories	  studied	  by	  Tilly	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter.	  	  Is	  it	  possible	  that	  there	  is	  there	  some	  other	  general	  way	  we	  might	  characterize	  all	  of	  the	  diverse,	  multiple	  purposes,	  missions	  and	  objectives	  on	  display	  in	  the	  third	  sector?	  I	  am	  mindful	  of	   course	   that	  McCully	   (2008)	  has	  evolved	  a	   “classical”	   typology	  of	  philanthropy	  based	   on	   the	   distinction	   of	   nature,	   culture	   and	   people;	   an	   approach	   with	   which	   I	   fully	  concur.	   However,	   the	   focus	   of	   the	   entire	   third	   sector	   is	   broader	   than	   just	   philanthropy.	  Some	  way	  to	  approach	  this	  broader	  question	  other	  than	  a	  detailed	  cataloging	  of	  instances?	  It	  turns	  out	  that	  there	  is	  a	  way	  to	  do	  this	  across	  the	  entire	  class	  of	  new	  commons,	  perhaps	  even	   across	   the	   entire	   third	   sector.	   Borrowing	   from	   the	   approach	   of	   the	   longstanding	  dichotomy	  of	  public	  and	  private	  goods,	  we	  can	  use	  the	  concept	  of	  goods	  to	  characterize	  all	  of	   the	  missions	   and	   purposes	   of	   new	   commons	   as	   instances	   of	   a	   single	   type.	   Moreover,	  upon	  close	  examination,	  we	  can	  see	  that,	  just	  as	  previous	  studies	  have	  suggested,	  some	  of	  the	  goods	  produced	  by	  new	  commons	  can	  be	  categorized	  as	  either	  public	  or	  private	  goods,	  with	  the	  classical	  distinction	  of	  the	  good	  of	  all	  verses	  the	  good	  of	  one	  individual	  (or	  entity)	  providing	  the	  key	  difference.	  However,	  there	  are	  also	  a	  range	  of	  goods	  pursued	  in	  commons	  that	  differ	   in	   important	  ways	  from	  both	  the	  private	  goods	  that	  can	  be	  priced,	  bought	  and	  sold	   in	   markets,	   and	   the	   genuine	   public	   goods,	   from	   domestic	   tranquility	   or	   peace	   to	  highways,	  produced	  by	  government.	  
Types	  of	  Common	  Goods	  
 Based	  on	  the	  characterization	  of	  associations	  for	  voluntary	  action	  as	  commons,	  we	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can	   suggest	   that	  what	   distinguishes	   the	   three	   sectors	   as	   ideal	   types	   is	   the	   production	   of	  distinct	  types	  of	  goods.	  We	  can	  then	  characterize	  the	  goods	  distinct	  to	  the	  third	  sector	  as	  an	  ideal	  type	  termed	  common	  goods,	  and	  suggest	  that	  common	  goods	  can	  be	  further	  divided	  into	  two	  distinct	  types	  we	  will	  call	  (internally	  focused)	  club	  goods	  and	  (externally	  focused)	  community	   goods.	   To	   understand	   these	   usages,	  we	  must	   begin	   by	   noting	   that,	   in	   liberal	  democratic	  political	  theory	  from	  which	  the	  public-­‐private	  dichotomy	  arises	  the	  concept	  of	  common	  good	  has	  long	  been	  used	  in	  different	  ways	  that	  expose	  the	  linguistic	  limits	  of	  that	  dichotomy.	  Many	  sources	  use	  the	  common	  good	  as	  a	  synonym	  for	  the	  undivided	  or	  general	  public	  good	  (c.f.,	  articles	  in	  the	  special	  issue	  of	  Daedalus	  on	  the	  common	  good,	  published	  in	  Summer,	  2013).	  This	   is	  a	  usage	   that,	  while	  dealing	  with	  some	  obvious	  realities,	   seriously	  confounds	  and	  complicates	  efforts	  to	  distinguish	  government	  and	  the	  public	  sector	  as	  ideal	  types	   from	   the	   third	   sector,	   and	   in	   particular	   those	   portions	   of	   the	   third	   sector	   not	  interwoven	  with	  the	  state	  and	  explicitly	  engaged	  in	  conducting	  public	  business	  for	  the	  good	  of	  all.	  The	  most	  obvious	  complications	  stemming	   from	  this	  usage	  are	  associated	  with	   the	  term	   philanthropy.	   The	   resulting	   muddle	   is	   summed	   up	   clearly,	   if	   ironically,	   in	   the	  anomalous	  phrase	  “private	  production	  of	  public	  goods”	  (Payton,	  1988).	  This	  appears	  to	  fit	  with	  two	  other	  sectors	  thusly:	  Some	  portions	  of	  the	  public	  sector	  (e.g.,	  welfare	  and	  health	  services)	  and	  the	  entire	  market	  sectors	  of	  both	  publicly	  traded	  joint	  and	  closely	  held	  stock	  corporations	   involve	   public	   production	   of	   private	   goods	   in	   different	   senses	   of	   the	   term	  public.	  	  Another	   somewhat	  more	  amorphous	  usage	  of	   common	  good	  has	  been	   to	   speak	  of	  those	   goods	   that	   are	   common	   to	   any	   of	   a	   number	   of	   collectivities	   from	  a	   small	   group	   of	  three	  members	   up	   to	   and	   including	   the	   general	   public.	   	  Many	   of	   the	   anomalies	   of	   these	  usages	  can	  be	  overcome	  if	  we	  follow	  the	  lead	  of	  the	  more	  exacting	  definitions	  of	  private	  and	  public	  goods,	  and	  utilize	  the	  treatment	  of	  resources	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter.	  In	  this	  way,	  we	  can	   also	   categorize	   the	   respective	   intentions	   and	   outputs	   of	   government,	   business	   and	  commons	  institutions	  as	  public,	  private	  and	  common	  goods.	  	  	  	   In	  a	  careful	  and	  extensive	  analysis	  of	  common	  goods,	  Udoidem	  (1988)	  says	  “a	  good	  is	   common	   when	   it	   is	   available,	   accessible	   and	   desirable	   by	   all”	   (90).	   This	   establishes	  availability,	  access	  and	  preference	  as	  the	  essential	   features	  for	  defining	  goods.	  But	  such	  a	  definition	  is	  not	  sufficient	  unto	  itself;	  it	  fails	  to	  answer	  the	  questions	  all	  who?	  	  and	  all	  what?	  Udoidem’s	  definition	  is	  subject	  to	  multiple	  readings	  on	  all	  three	  dimensions	  depending	  on	  the	  meaning	  assigned	  to	  that	  final	  word	  all.	  If	  we	  mean	  only	  everyone,	  everywhere,	  and	  all	  the	   time	   then	   the	   concept	  of	   common	  good	   is	   for	   all	   intents	   and	  purposes	   identical	  with	  public	   good.	   That	   is	   the	   meaning	   that	   is	   often	   used	   in	   political	   theory	   and	   in	   assorted	  definitions	  of	  philanthropy,	  where	  usages	  of	  public	  good	  and	  common	  good	  are	  essentially	  interchangeable	  (see	  e.g.,	  Sievers,	  2009).	  Acts	  for	  the	  good	  of	  humanity	  and	  for	  the	  love	  of	  human	  kind	  sum	  up	  the	  classical	  meaning	  of	  philanthropy	  (McCully,	  2008).	  But	  that	  hardly	  implies	  that	  such	  acts	  must	  touch	  the	  entire	  human	  population	  or	  even	  an	  entire	  national	  population.	  Nor	  does	  it	  mean	  that	  any	  lesser	  effect	  means	  that	  the	  result	  is	  a	  private	  good.	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Thus,	  it	  becomes	  prudent	  to	  attempt	  to	  tease	  some	  additional	  implications	  from	  the	  notion	  of	  common	  goods.	  	   “All”	   in	   Udoidem’s	   definition,	   for	   example,	   can	   also	   refer	   to	   all	   members	   of	   a	  particular	  reference	  group	  and	  still	   serve	  a	  useful	  purpose.	  Thus,	   for	  example,	   “all”	   could	  refer	  to	  a	  common	  good	  that	  is	  available,	  accessible	  and	  appealing	  only	  to	  all	  members	  of	  an	  association,	  assembly	  or	  other	  new	  commons.	  	  This	  would	  correspond	  with	  an	  ordinary	  connotation	  of	  club	  goods.	  Such	  uses	  of	  common	  good	  in	  voluntary	  action	  are	  multiple	  and	  sometimes	  even	  conflicting,	  in	  different	  instances	  involving	  the	  full	  range	  of	  types	  shown	  in	  Figure	  7.1	  below. 	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Figure 7.1. Typology of Common Goods 
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 Udoidem	  says	  also	  that	  a	  common	  good	  combines	  two	  facets:	  it	  is	  ordinary,	  simple	  and	  ‘natural’,	  as	  opposed	  to	  extraordinary	  and	  complex,	  and	  it	  is	  available	  and	  accessible	  as	  opposed	   to	   being	   scarce	   and	   difficult	   to	   obtain.	  His	   categorization	   (in	   Figure	   7.1)	   begins	  with	   a	   distinction	   of	   two	   types	   of	   common	   goods,	   particular	   goods	   and	   general	   goods.	  Particular	  goods	  have	  two	  sub-­‐types.	  Private	  common	  goods	  (which	  are	  treated	  by	  others	  as	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the	  same	  as	  private	  goods)	  are	  goods	  of	  the	  self	  and	  members	  of	  that	  self’s	  primary	  group.	  These	  are,	  in	  other	  words,	  the	  common	  goods	  of	  the	  intimate	  sphere	  or	  household	  sector.	  For	  the	  shoemaker	  (or	   lawyer)	  who	  becomes	  a	  congressman	  whose	  self-­‐interest	   includes	  covert	  support	  for	  a	  mistress	  or	  an	  illegitimate	  child,	  keeping	  the	  private	  common	  good	  of	  his	  personal	  relations	  separate	  from	  the	  general	  common	  good	  can	  be	  a	  very	  complex	  issue	  indeed.	  What	  Udoidem	  calls	  common	  special	  goods	  are	  also	  divided	  into	  natural	  goods	  that	  require	  no	  human	  effort,	  like	  the	  weather	  or	  climate	  in	  a	  particular	  place,	  and	  conventional	  
goods,	  which	  include	  “language,	   law,	  community,	  state,	  peace,	  etc.”	  (Udoidem,	  1988,	  101).	  Many	   of	   these	   conventional	   common	   goods	   are	  matters	   of	   great	   interest	   in	   third	   sector	  considerations,	  particularly	  in	  philanthropy.	  
 The	  reference-­‐other	  conception	  of	   “all”	  noted	  above	  becomes	  especially	   important	  in	  consideration	  of	  various	  types	  of	  general	  goods.	  Thus,	  for	  example,	  a	  particular	  relative	  general	  good	  may	  be	  important	  in	  urban	  areas	  but	  not	  in	  rural	  ones,	  or	  in	  summer	  but	  not	  in	  winter,	  or	  in	  Western	  culture	  but	  not	  in	  the	  Islamic	  world	  or	  China.	  By	  contrast,	  universal	  
common	  goods	   in	  Udoidem’s	  schema	  are	  identical	  with	  ordinary	  concepts	  of	  public	  good	  -­‐	  the	   good	   of	   everyone,	   and	   also	   with	   the	   notation	   of	   universal	   commons	   introduced	  previously.	  Thus,	  for	  example,	  the	  atmosphere,	  the	  weather	  or	  the	  world	  ocean	  and	  all	  the	  named	   oceanic	   regions	   (e.g.,	   Atlantic,	   Pacific	   or	   Indian	   Oceans,	   the	   Grand	   Banks	   ,	   the	  Sargasso	  Sea,	  and	  the	  Gulf	  Stream)	  are	  universal	  natural	  common	  goods.	  	  The	  concept	  of	  universal	  common	  good	  (which	  is	  also	  construed	  in	  political	  theory	  as	  public	  good)	  has	  a	  special	  place	  in	  voluntary	  action	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  worldwide	  spread	  of	  associations.	  As	  recently	  as	  a	  century	  ago,	  during	  the	  age	  of	  imperial	  states,	  the	  very	  idea	  of	   any	   universal	   common	   or	   public	   good	   of	   interest	   or	   importance	   for	   voluntary	   action	  beyond	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  state	  was	  virtually	  an	  oxymoron.	  However,	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  Article	  20	   of	   the	   United	   Nations	   Universal	   Declaration	   of	   Human	   Rights	   adopted	   in	   1948,	   and	  particularly	  with	   the	   growth	   of	   international	   nongovernmental	   organizations	   (INGOs)	   as	  part	   of	   the	   association	   revolution,	   this	   concept	   of	   universal	   common	   good	   has	   attained	  great	  importance	  today.	  In	  this	  context,	  a	  development	  like	  China’s	  Document	  9	  represents	  something	  of	  a	  global	  anomaly	  and	  perhaps	  an	  outright	  anachronism	  (Buckley,	  2013).	  	  The	  global	   reach	   of	   INGOs	   in	   the	   fields	   of	   health,	   education,	   and	   assorted	   campaigns	   like	   the	  universal	  eradication	  of	  smallpox,	  polio,	  and	  similar	  campaigns	  currently	  underway	  against	  poverty	  and	  a	  variety	  of	  additional	  diseases,	  universal	  common	  goods	  have	  assumed	  major	  importance	  in	  the	  world	  of	  the	  21st	  century.	  This	  point	  was	  subordinated	  in	  my	  1992	  The	  
Commons	   to	   the	   assumption	   of	   near	   universality.	   (Lohmann,	   1992,	   pp.	   52-­‐53)	   As	   the	  example	  suggests,	   the	  premise	  that	  some,	  but	  not	  all,	  common	  goods	  are	  universal,	  while	  others	  are	  nearly	  so	  is	  an	  empirical,	  and	  testable	  one.	  For	  example,	  although	  there	  are	  vast	  differences	  in	  systems	  of	  medicine	  and	  cultural	  meanings	  of	  illness,	  the	  value	  of	  health	  as	  the	  absence	  of	  disease	  may	  be	  universal	  or	  nearly	  so	  in	  our	  world.	  	   The	   philosopher	   Jacques	  Maritain	   (1972)	   also	   highlights	   additional	   aspects	   of	   the	  difference	  between	  public	   good	  and	  more	  narrowly	   construed	   common	  goods	  within	  his	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own	  hierarchy	  of	  common	  goods:	  	  That	  which	  constitutes	  the	  common	  [or	  public]	  good	  of	  political	  society	  is	  not	  only	  the	  collection	  of	  public	  commodities	  and	  services	  -­‐	  the	  roads,	  ports,	  schools,	  and	  so	  forth,	  which	  the	  organization	  of	  common	  life	  presupposes;	  a	  sound	  fiscal	  condition	  of	  national	  military	  power;	  a	  body	  of	  just	  laws;	  good	  customs	  and	  wise	  institutions,	  which	   provide	   the	   nation	   with	   structure;	   the	   heritage	   of	   its	   great	   historical	  remembrances,	  its	  symbols	  and	  its	  glories,	  in	  living	  traditions	  and	  cultural	  treasures.	  The	   common	   good	   includes	   all	   of	   these	   and	   something	  more	   besides	   -­‐	   something	  more	  profound,	  more	  concrete,	  more	  human	   .	   .	   .	   It	   incudes	   the	  sum	  of	  sociological	  integration	  of	  all	  the	  civic	  conscience,	  political	  virtues	  and	  sense	  of	  right	  and	  liberty,	  of	  all	  the	  acuity,	  material	  prosperity	  and	  spiritual	  riches,	  or	  moral	  rectitude,	  justice,	  friendship,	  happiness,	  virtue	  and	  heroism	  in	  the	  individual	  lives	  of	  its	  members.	  For	  these	  things	  are,	  in	  a	  certain	  measure,	  communicable	  and	  so	  revert	  to	  each	  member,	  helping	   him	   to	   perfect	   his	   life	   and	   liberty	   of	   person.	   They	   all	   constitute	   the	   good	  human	  life	  of	  the	  multitude.	  	  	   One	   of	   the	   must	   fundamental	   insights	   of	   the	   new	   commons	   theory	   of	   voluntary	  action	   is	   that	   the	   universal	   common	   good	   that	   Maritain	   describes	   is	   not	   a	   uniform,	  homogenous	   thing;	   it	  may	  not	  even	  be	  a	   real	  entity.	   It	   consists	  of	  many	   tasks,	   challenges	  and	  opportunities,	  and	  all	  of	  these	  are	  divisible	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  economic	  concept	  of	  public	  good	  explicitly	  disallows.	  In	  societies	  that	  place	  a	  high	  premium	  on	  individualism	  in	  particular,	  liberty,	  justice,	  friendship,	  happiness,	  virtue	  and	  heroic	  recognition,	  for	  example,	  can	   be	   available	   to	   some	   without	   being	   accessible	   to	   all	   and	   still	   be	   considered	   good	   –	  particularly	   by	   those	   who	   have	   it.	   This	   may	   be	   sad,	   but	   it	   is	   so.	   Indeed,	   it	   is	   precisely	  because	  it	  is	  so	  that	  there	  is	  such	  traffic	  in	  expressions	  of	  universal	  common	  goods:	  Liberty	  
and	  justice	  for	  all	  would,	  indeed,	  be	  a	  good	  thing,	  but	  until	  then,	  liberty	  and	  justice	  for	  most	  is	   still	   a	   good	   thing	   rather	   than	   a	   bad	   thing.	   Some	   idealists	   might	   say	   that	   without	  happiness	  for	  all,	  happiness	  for	  anyone	  is	  meaningless,	  but	  few	  appear	  to	  believe	  or	  accept	  such	   a	   statement,	   precisely	   because	   happiness	   is	   progressively	   additive:	   happiness	   for	  some	   is	   preferable	   to	   happiness	   for	   no	   one,	   and	   as	   the	   colloquial	   expression	   has	   it,	   “the	  more	  the	  merrier.”	  	   Such	   concepts	   of	   common	   good,	   in	   effect,	   bring	   together	   a	   continuum	   from	   pure	  private	  goods	  to	  pure	  public	  goods	  with	  a	  number	  of	  important	  common	  goods	  options	  and	  possibilities	   in	   between.	   The	   conceptual	   challenge	   in	   examining	   particular	   instances	   of	  voluntary	  action	  is	  to	  analyze	  the	  mission	  or	  purpose	  of	  the	  effort	  to	  determine	  what	  level	  of	  common	  goods	  may	  be	  operating	  in	  a	  particular	  instance,	  and	  where	  it	  fits	  on	  the	  larger	  scheme.	  	  
 The	  typology	  of	  goods	  first	  offered	  up	  by	  Elinor	  and	  Vincent	  Ostrom	  in	  1977	  takes	  a	  different	  approach,	  using	  the	  two	  dimensions	  of	  “subtractability”	  and	  exclusion	  (1977).	  These	  correspond	  closely	  to	  the	  conventional	  economic	  definition	  of	  public	  goods	  as	  non-­‐exclusive	  and	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non-­‐rivalrous.	  The	  adaptation	  shown	  in	  Figure	  7.2	  below	  differentiates	  two	  intermediate	  (high-­‐easy	  and	  low-­‐difficult)	  possibilities,	  one	  labeled	  as	  “goods”	  and	  one	  labeled	  as	  “resources”	  (an	  input-­‐only	  category?).	  In	  addition,	  the	  use	  of	  “Easy”	  and	  “Difficult”	  exclusion	  in	  this	  table	  seems	  counter-­‐intuitive.	  The	  usage	  seems	  to	  imply	  that	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  include	  everyone	  in	  a	  public	  good,	  when	  the	  category	  is	  labeled	  exclusion.	  Thus,	  in	  Figure	  7.3,	  these	  terms	  are	  reversed	  with	  the	  intended	  meaning	  of	  easy	  to	  exclude	  and	  difficult	  to	  exclude	  respectively.	  	  
Figure 7.2. Ostroms’ Typology of Goods 
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 Types of Goods. From Ostrom & Hess, 2007. (Adapted from V. Ostrom and E. Ostrom, 1977.) 	  This	  basic	  design	  would	  seem	  to	  survive	  a	  few	  rather	  simple	  transformations,	  as	  in	  Figure	  7.3	  to	  7.7	  below,	  to	  describe	  common	  goods	  found	  in	  new	  commons.	  First,	  the	  terms	  for	  ease	  of	  use	  are	  reversed	  to	  fit	  with	  the	  statements	  easy	  to	  exclude	  and	  difficult	  to	  exclude.	  Second,	  those	  broadly-­‐focused	  goods	  with	  low	  rivalry	  but	  from	  which	  exclusion	  is	  difficult,	  are	  here	  labeled	  
community	  goods,	  More	  narrowly	  focused	  goods	  which	  are	  highly	  rivalrous	  and	  from	  which	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exclusion	  is	  easier	  are	  labeled	  club	  goods.	  Finally,	  new	  examples	  taken	  from	  associations,	  assemblies,	  social	  movements	  and	  social	  problems	  are	  substituted	  in	  Figure	  7.3.	  	  
Figure 7.3. An Adapted Typology of Common Goods 
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 Types of Goods. From Ostrom & Hess, 2007, p. ?. (Adapted from V. Ostrom and E. Ostrom, 1977.) 
 Thus,	  for	  example,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  exclude	  anyone	  from	  archetypal	  public	  health	  as	  a	  good,	  whether	  it	  is	  produced	  by	  a	  governmental	  or	  a	  nonprofit	  or	  nongovernmental	  organization.	  By	  contrast,	  it	  is	  relatively	  easy	  to	  exclude	  non-­‐members	  of	  an	  ideal-­‐typical	  association	  from	  explicit	  member	  benefits,	  like	  access	  to	  the	  club	  pool	  or	  tennis	  courts.	  In	  contrast,	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  exclude	  non-­‐residents	  of	  a	  gated	  community	  from	  facilities	  inside	  the	  gates,	  like	  picnic	  areas	  and	  hiking	  trails,	  and	  use	  of	  such	  facilities	  does	  not	  subtract	  from	  their	  availability	  to	  other	  community	  members.	  However,	  the	  dichotomized	  (high/low	  and	  easy/hard)	  approach	  of	  this	  contingency	  table	  may	  not	  be	  sufficiently	  discriminating	  in	  its	  results.	  A	  small	  move	  up	  from	  this	  would	  be	  to	  insert	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Figure 7.4. Revised Typology of Goods 
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Production	  of	  Common	  Goods…	  
 The	  particular	  collective	  actions	   that	  arise	  when	  a	  group	  of	  voluntary	  participants	  get	   together	  and	  use	  their	  collective	  pooled	  resources	   for	  some	  agreed-­‐upon	  purposes	  or	  mission	  usually	   result	   in	   the	  production	  of	   some	  common	  good.	  Thus,	   commons	   that	  are	  engaged	  in	  voluntary	  action	  are	  a	  distinct	  form	  of	  economic	  production	  quite	  distinct	  from	  both	   the	   production	   of	   public	   goods	   by	   governmental	   institutions	   and	   the	   production	   of	  private	   goods	   for	   the	   market.	   When	   the	   collective	   efforts	   of	   an	   association	   of	   people	  includes	   the	   selection	   of	   an	   overriding	   purpose	   or	   mission	   (ends)	   and	   the	   pooling	   of	  common	  resources	  (scarce	  means),	  we	  have	   the	  condition	   that	  matches	  what	  economists	  mean	  by	  the	  term	  production.	  As	  the	  definition	  of	  Lionel	  Robbins	  previously	  quoted	  noted,	  we	   have	   scarce	   means	   applied	   to	   the	   achievement	   of	   fixed,	   or	   determined,	   ends.	   Yet,	   a	  convincing	   and	   widely	   agreed	   upon	   account	   of	   the	   production	   of	   common	   goods	   as	   an	  economic	   process	   has	   remained	   an	   elusive	   goal,	   although	   there	   have	   been	   a	   number	   of	  interesting	   starts	   in	   that	   direction.	   Significant	   strides	   have	   been	   made	   by	   a	   group	   of	  nonprofit	   economists	   to	   set	  out	  plausible	   economic	   explanations	  of	   the	  economics	  of	   the	  class	  of	  tax-­‐deductible	  nonprofit	  bureaucratic	  firms,	  but	  very	  little	  attention	  has	  been	  paid	  to	   most	   of	   the	   rest	   of	   voluntary	   action.	   Current	   independent	   sector	   studies	   includes	   no	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economic	  profiles	  of	  the	  production	  of	  pilgrimages,	  protest	  marches,	  parades	  or	  community	  festivals,	   for	   example,	   and	   few	   studies	   of	   community	   theaters,	   museums,	   membership	  associations,	  mutual	  aid	  or	  other	  forms	  of	  voluntary	  action.	  
…	  Is	  Also	  Coproduction	  of	  Common	  Goods	  As	  numerous	   sources	  have	  noted,	   production	  of	   voluntary	   action	   is	  nearly	   always	  also	  a	   form	  of	  coproduction,	   in	  at	   least	  one	  sense,	   since	   it	   is	  always	  a	  collective	  or	  group	  effort.	  Recent	  work	  like	  that	  of	  Brandsen	  &	  Pestoff	  (2006)	  and	  Pestoff,	  Osborn	  &	  Brandsen	  (2006)	   tend	   to	   limit	   the	   case	   of	   co-­‐production	   to	   cooperation	   between	   different	  institutions;	  e.g.,	   in	  the	  co-­‐production	  arising	  between	  nonprofit	  establishments	  and	  units	  of	   government.	   The	   term	   is	   used	   more	   expansively	   here	   to	   mean	   literally	   “cooperative	  production”.	   Because	   the	   term	   cooperative	   production	   has	   an	   altogether	   different,	   but	  allied	  meaning	  (i.e.,	  production	  by	  cooperatives),	  the	  term	  co-­‐production	  is	  used.	  	  The	  idea	  of	  coproduction	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  voluntary	  action	  in	  at	  least	  two	  distinct	  ways:	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  commoners	  collaborating	  in	  a	  joint	  effort,	  whether	  they	  are	  a	  group	  of	  Hardin’s	  shepherds	  grazing	  a	  pasture,	  board	  members	  governing	  a	  trust	  or	  foundation	  or	  the	  members	  of	  a	  social	  club,	  must	  work	  together	  as	  collaborators	   to	  produce	  a	  common	  good	  (i.e.,	   for	  Hardin’s	  herders,	  not	  overgrazing	  the	  fields	  and	  provoking	  the	  tragedy).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  co-­‐production	  of	  common	  goods	  may	  involve	  cooperative	  efforts	  of	  two	  or	  more	   distinct	   economic	   institutions.	   At	   an	   institutional	   level,	   there	   are	   a	   vast	   number	   of	  cases	   involving	  co-­‐production,	  whether	   it	   is	   the	  collaboration	  of	  a	  grantor	  and	  grantee,	   a	  group	  of	  nonprofit	  or	  civil	  society	  organizations	  working	  together	  within	  a	  community,	  or	  a	  more	   formal	   arrangement	   such	   as	   groups	   of	   religious	   congregations	   bound	   together	   in	  “districts”	  or	  “synods”	  for	  example.	  Likewise,	  museums	  frequently	  loan	  paintings	  to	  other	  museums	  in	  a	  process	  of	  co-­‐production	  of	  an	  exhibition	  on	  a	  particular	  subject,	   theme	  or	  artist	  and	  police	  and	  other	  public	  officials	  and	  organizers	  must	  cooperate	  to	  co-­‐produce	  a	  parade.	   	   Parades	   are	   of	   the	  most	   obvious	   examples	   of	   coproduction	   in	   voluntary	   action.	  Most	   of	   the	  units	   that	  make	  up	   a	  parade	   are	   themselves	   associations,	   groups,	   and	  bands	  none	  of	  them	  capable	  of	  producing	  the	  parade	  on	  their	  own.	  It	  is	  only	  when	  they	  agree	  to	  coproduce	   an	   actual	   parade	   jointly	   with	   others	   –	   including	   the	   group	   or	   association	  initiating,	  planning	  and	  managing	  the	  parade	  -­‐	  that	  an	  actual	  parade	  will	  result.	  	  In	  much	  the	  same	  vein,	  Nyberg	  (1997)	  examines	  another	  example,	  the	  coproduction	  of	  policy.	  	  In	  the	  ideal	  type,	  coproduction	  of	  voluntary	  action	  can	  occur	  entirely	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	   social	   capital	   involved	   –	   previously	   established	   trust	   and	   social	   networks	   of	  relationships	  between	  individuals	  and	  organizations.	  No	  other	  resources	  may	  be	  necessary.	  However,	  where	  such	  resources	  may	  be	  lacking	  or	  insufficient,	  formal	  contracts,	  payments,	  and	  other	  resources	  may	  also	  be	  necessary	  to	  facilitate	  production	  of	  common	  goods.	  	  But,	  what	  is	  it	  that	  new	  commons	  in	  voluntary	  action	  co-­‐produce?	  We	  have	  already	  introduced	   the	   idea	  of	   common	  goods	  as	   the	  general	   answer	   to	   that	  question,	   and	  noted	  two	  types	  of	  common	  goods,	  club	  goods	  and	  community	  goods.	  Club	  goods	  are	  those	  where	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the	  production	  of	   common	  good	  occurs	  within	  a	   single	   association	  or	   group.	  Community	  goods	   are	   those	   where	   the	   effects	   of	   coproduction	   are	   more	   widespread,	   but	   still	   not	  universal.	  Thus,	  co-­‐production	  where	  the	  co-­‐producers	  are	  two	  or	  more	  organizations	  are	  far	  more	  likely	  to	  involve	  co-­‐production	  of	  community	  goods,	  but	  this	  is	  not	  a	  hard	  and	  fast	  generalization.	  	  This	   point	   was	   first	   made	   by	   Elinor	   and	   Vincent	   Ostrom	   (1977)	   with	   the	  contingency	   table	   shown	   in	   Figure	   7.2.	   Charlotte	   Hess	   (2010)	   summarized	   the	   point	   as	  follows:	   “A	   groundbreaking	   contribution	   to	   the	   study	   of	   the	   commons	   was	   their	   1977	  publication	  “Public	  Goods	  and	  Public	  Choices”	  where	   they	  outlined	   their	   typology	  of	   four	  types	  of	  goods—rather	  than	  Samuelson’s	  two—	  based	  on	  the	  degree	  of	  jointness	  of	  use	  and	  difficulty	  of	  exclusion.	  (As	  Lin	  has	  often	  pointed	  out,	  these	  are	  not	  discreet	  units	  but	  rather	  continuums	   or	   even	   “continents.”)	   The	   expanded	   typology	   provided	   a	   much-­‐needed	  distinction	   between	   the	   simplistic	   public-­‐private	   dichotomy,	   adding	   an	   important	   new	  element	   to	   the	   language	  and	  understanding	  of	  commons	  scholarship	  as	  well	  as	  providing	  greater	  clarity	  to	  important	  differences	  between	  common	  property	  regimes	  and	  common-­‐pool	  resources	  as	  types	  of	  economic	  goods.”	  Figure	  7.3	  above	  modifies	  Hess’	  version	  of	  the	  original	  Ostrom	  table	  in	  two	  respects:	  The	  listed	  examples	  are	  changed	  and	  one	  cell	  is	  renamed	  from	  “common	  goods	  resources”	  to	  “community	  goods.”	  Additional	  use	  of	  this	  distinction	  is	  discussed	  below.	  	  We	  might	   ask	   further	  whether	   coproduction	  of	   common	  goods	  has	   any	   impact	  on	  the	   varieties	   of	   organizational	   form	   that	   collective	   voluntary	   action,	   or	   commons,	   adopt?	  Most	  of	   the	  attention	  to	  date	  among	  organization	  researchers	   looking	  at	  voluntary	  action	  has	   concentrated	   on	   a	   single	   type	   of	   organization,	   usually	   termed	   the	   “nonprofit	  organization”.	   This	   is,	   in	   fact,	   a	   hybrid	   form	   characterized	   by	   a	   mixture	   of	   market-­‐like	  incentives	   and	   bureaucratic	   rules.	   This	   type	   of	   organization	   might	   more	   accurately	   be	  termed	  a	  bureaucratic	  firm.	  However,	  to	  suggest	  that	  it	  alone	  is	  characteristic	  of	  voluntary	  action,	   whether	   co-­‐production	   or	   any	   other	   characteristic,	   is	   simplistic	   and	   overlooks	   a	  number	  of	  other	  interesting	  possibilities.	  
 
Four	  Types	  of	  Organized	  Commons	  One	  of	  the	  unfortunate	  aspects	  of	  much	  of	  the	  current	  third	  sector	  literature	  is	  the	  characterization	   of	   nonprofit	   organization	   that	   suggests	   a	   peculiar	   combination	   of	   rule-­‐based	  bureaux	  and	  incentive-­‐driven	  firms	  staffed	  by	  paid	  employees,	   legally	  incorporated	  and	  holding	  tax	  exempt	  certificates.	  These	  are	  frequently	  presented	  as	  the	  major,	  or	  even	  the	   only,	   form	   of	   organized	   social	   relations	   to	   consider	   when	   seeking	   to	   understand	  organized	  efforts	  beyond	  the	  market	  and	  government.	  As	  we	  saw	  in	  Chapter	  3	  above,	  there	  is	  much	  more	  to	  the	  third	  sector	  than	  that.	  Some	  sources	  actually	  go	  so	  far	  as	  to	  link	  such	  entities	   to	   democracy	   and	   civic	   engagement	   although	   exactly	   how	   or	   why	   such	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professionally	  staffed,	  bureaucratic	  firms	  are	  thought	  to	  play	  a	  distinctive	  role	  in	  promoting	  democracy	  is	  seldom	  explained	  and,	  in	  fact,	  quite	  difficult	  to	  fathom.	  	  Not	  all	  voluntary	  action	  is	  formally	  organized	  or	  incorporated,	  and	  thus	  produced	  by	  such	  bureaucratic	  firms.	  Not	  all	  organizations,	  and	  certainly	  not	  all	  social	  common	  resource	  pools	   are	   formally	   organized,	   much	   less	   incorporated	   and	   tax	   exempt.	   Further,	   this	  distinction	   is	   important	   to	   grasp	   if	   voluntary	   action	   is	   to	   play	   a	   role	   in	   the	   advance	   of	  democracy	  in	  society	  and	  culture.	  This	  tendency	  to	  conflate	  the	  entire	  range	  of	  organized	  voluntary	   action	   into	   a	   single	   major	   category	   like	   service	   delivery	   has	   previously	   been	  explained	  and	  even	  given	  the	  rather	  awkward	  label	  of	  institutional	  isomorphism.	  
	  Institutional	  Isomorphism2	  Paul	  DiMaggio	  and	  W.W.	  Powell	  in	  their	  1983	  article	  developed	  an	  elegant,	  if	  slightly	  forbidding	   for	   non-­‐sociologists,	   further	   elaboration	   of	   Weber’s	   iron	   cage	   argument	  (Mitzman,	   1985).	   Although	   DiMaggio	   and	   Powell’s	   argument	   has	   been	   widely	   read	   and	  cited	   often	   in	   the	   nonprofit	   organizations	   literature,	   students	   of	   commons,	   social	  institutions	  and	  voluntary	  action	  whose	  inoculations	  for	  sociological	  jargon	  may	  not	  up	  to	  date	  might	  fail	  to	  recognize	  the	  genuine	  importance,	  and	  even	  chilling	  implications,	  of	  the	  case	   they	  make	   which	   admittedly	   is	   obscured	   behind	   the	   rather	   opaque	   terminology	   of	  “institutional	   isomorphism”.	   This	  may	   be	   one	   of	   the	   reasons	   that	   this	   argument	   has	   had	  minimal	   impact	   on	   the	  practice	   of	   voluntary	   action,	   even	   though	   a	   significant	   number	  of	  independent	  sector	  practitioners	  probably	  concur	  with	  its	  basic	  argument.	  Nonprofit,	  public	  and	  commercial	  organizations,	  according	  to	  DiMaggio	  and	  Powell,	  are	   all	   characterized	   by	   tendencies	   toward	   "institutional	   isomorphism".	   This	   is	   one	  possible	   basis	   for	   contemporary	   “convergence”	   arguments	   by	   others	   that	   different	  organizations	  in	  “the	  three	  sectors”	  are	  becoming	  more	  alike,	  although	  the	  principal	  thrust	  of	  their	  argument	  is	  behavioral,	  not	  institutional.	  	  Leaders	   in	   organizations,	   they	   argued,	   adopt	   (often	   without	   adaptation	   or	  modification)	   successful	   practices	   observed	   in	   other	   organizations,	   not	   because	   they	   are	  appropriate	   or	   genuinely	   preferable	   (“best	   practices”	   in	   the	   current	   argot),	   but	   because	  they	   furnish	   low-­‐cost,	   easy	   pathways	   to	   legitimacy	   in	   the	   eyes	   of	   outside	   stakeholders.	  Anyone	   who	   has	   ever	   been	   in	   public	   or	   nonprofit	   organizations	   that	   weathered	   MBO,	  “TQM”,	  measurable	   objectives,	   or	   any	   of	   dozens	   of	   other	  management	   fads,	   for	   example,	  will	   instantly	   recognize	   the	   kernel	   of	   truth	   in	  what	   they	   are	   saying,	   even	   if	   they	   are	   not	  completely	   clear	   on	   the	   precise	   dynamics	   involved.	   	   As	   social	   scientists	   and	   not	  practitioners,	  DiMaggio	  and	  Powell	  appear	  to	  have	  been	  more	  concerned	  with	  documenting	  the	  phenomenon,	  as	   they	  clearly	  did,	   than	   in	  exploring	  possible	  alternatives,	  antidotes	  or	  corrections.	  They	  assert	   that	   the	  need	   to	  maintain	   the	  confidence	  of	  poorly	   informed	  but	  
                                                
2 This section was presented, in an earlier form, at the First Annual Summer Institute at the 
University of Colorado School of Public Affairs, in June 2010. 
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critically	   important	   outsiders	   in	   an	   organization’s	   environment	   means	   that	   the	  organizations	  will	  be	   less	  creative	  and	   innovative	   in	   their	  practices	   than	  might	  otherwise	  be	   anticipated.	   A	   key	   aspect	   of	   such	   isomorphism	   for	   nonprofit	   leaders	   and	   government	  agencies	  is	  that	  it	  encourages	  uncritical	  imitation	  of	  the	  language	  and	  styles	  of	  actors	  in	  the	  market	  economy	  who	  claim	  to	  be	  “more	  efficient”	  and	  “more	  businesslike”	  and	  allegedly	  to	  proclaim	  with	  certainty	  positive	  “outcomes”.	  The	  net	  result	  is	  that	  over	  time	  organizations	  in	   government,	   business	   and	   the	   independent	   sector	   tend	   to	   become	   more	   like	   one	  another;	  even,	  one	  might	  speculate,	  when	  they	  were	  originally	  very	  dissimilar.	  Ironically,	   as	   with	   numerous	   previous	   findings	   in	   organization	   studies	   perhaps	  beginning	  with	  studies	  of	  goal	  displacement	  and	  “mission	  creep”	  more	  than	  half	  a	  century	  ago	   (Gusfield,	   1955;	   Gusfield,	   1979;	   Selznick,	   1966	   [1949];	   Scott,	   1967;	   Sills,	   1957),	   the	  lesson	  that	  has	  too	  often	  been	  learned	  from	  this	   is	   that	  such	  isomorphism	  is	  rational	  and	  inevitable	   and	   consequently	   that	   resistance	   is	   foolhardy.	   In	   this	   way,	   a	   useful	   empirical	  observation	  is	  transformed	  into	  a	  norm,	  through	  the	  naturalistic	  fallacy	  that	  is	  equals	  ought:	  Because	   something	   is	   observed,	   it	  must	  be	  proper,	   natural	   or	   inevitable.	   Social	   scientists	  observing	   human	   behavior	   appear	   at	   times	   to	   be	   particularly	   succeptible	   to	   such	  conclusions.	   Examples	   of	   this	   fallacy	   in	   organizational	   practice	   are	   widespread:	  Machiavelli’s	   The	   Prince	   (2003	   [1513])	   is	   sometimes	   used	   to	   justify	   the	   view	   that	   all	  politicians	   and	   public	   officials	   are	   expected	   to	   behave	   as	   unscrupulous	   opportunists	   in	  order	  to	  be	  effective.	  Robert	  Michels’	  similarly	  acute	  analysis	  of	  oligarchy	  (1999	  [1915])	  in	  political	  parties	  can	  also	  be	   interpreted	  by	  self-­‐serving	  organizational	  elites	   to	   justify	   the	  inevitability	  of	  their	  own	  rule.	  	  It	  is	  particularly	  ironic	  that	  the	  primary	  contribution	  of	  institutional	  isomorphism	  to	  voluntary	   action	   may	   have	   been	   to	   facilitate	   yet	   one	   more	   naturalistic	   fallacy.	   I	   do	   not	  suggest	   here	   that	   DiMaggio	   and	   Powell	   (1983),	   for	   example,	   committed	   the	   fallacy;	   they	  didn’t,	  but	  it	  appears	  that	  some	  interpreters	  of	  the	  article	  do	  so.	  Thus,	  while	  the	  article	  itself	  provides	  an	  insightful	  analysis	  of	  this	  tendency,	  the	  application	  of	  this	  analysis	  to	  what	  are	  called	  “nonprofit	  organizations”	  appears	  to	  have	  had	  a	  number	  of	  unfortunate	  dampening	  effects:	  	   •	  It	  enforces	  a	  descriptive	  model	  of	  voluntary	  action	  as	  normative.	  •	  It	  encourages	  “one-­‐size	  fits	  all”	  approaches.	  •	   It	   reinforces	   opposition	   to	   innovative	   thinking	   and	   practice	   directed	   at	  dampening	  the	  negative	  effects	  of	  bureaucratization.	  •	   It	   downplays	   the	   significance	   of	   organizational	   innovations	   that	   do	   not	   fall	  within	  the	  narrow	  confines	  of	  “being	  more	  business-­‐like”.	  •	   It	   also	   leads	   researchers,	   theorists	   and	   students	   to	  prematurely	   abandon	   the	  search	  for	  alternative	  forms	  of	  organization	  to	  the	  nonprofit	  firm	  and	  to	  discount	  legitimate	  alternatives	  when	  they	  arise.	  	  Rather	   than	  highlighting	   important	   but	   troublesome	  organizational	   dynamics	   that	  must	   be	   encountered	   and	   dealt	   with,	   institutional	   isomorphism	   is	   too	   often	   used	   as	   a	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doctrine	   of	   homogeneity	   and	   the	   inevitability	   of	   sameness.	   This	   is	   a	   theme	   that	   is	   of	  fundamental	  importance	  for	  understanding	  the	  organization	  of	  voluntary	  action	  and	  will	  be	  taken	  up	  at	  several	  additional	  points	  below.	  
Benefactories:	  Performatory,	  Moeuratorium	  &	  Celebratorium	  Further	  understanding	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  voluntary	  action	  in	  democratic	  society	  is	  well	  served	  by	  simply	  setting	  bracketing	  and	  aside	  the	  model	  of	  the	  bureaucratic	  firm	  as	  a	   unique	   historical	   product	   of	   government-­‐voluntary	   sector	   collaboration	   in	   the	   past	  several	  decades.	  Let	  us	  concentrate	   instead	  on	   identifying	  and	  describing	  additional	  and	  alternative	  models	  of	  organized	  voluntary	  action.	  	  Recent	  decades	  have	  been	  characterized	  by	  great	  variety	  in	  form,	  styles	  and	  projects.	  Probably,	  the	  last	  thing	  in	  the	  world	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  movement	  of	  the	  1960s,	  the	  Occupy	  Wall	  Street	  movement,	  the	  annual	  Mardi	  Gras	  committee,	  community	  responses	  to	  HIV-­‐AIDS,	  the	  annual	  hajj,	  or	  pilgrimage	  to	  Mecca,	  or	  the	  women’s	  movement	  or	  innumerable	  other	  examples	  needed	  was	  to	  become	  more	  like	  a	  Fortune	  500	  company	  or	  the	  Social	  Security	  Administration.	  	   At	   least	   since	   Tocqueville,	   voluntary	   action	   has	   been	   the	   domain	   of	   not	   only	   the	  civil	   and	   political	   associations	   described	   in	   Democracy	   in	   America,	   but	   also	   numerous	  other	   permutations	   of	   association	   and	   assembly	   that	   raise	   doubts	   about	   the	   continued	  reliance	  on	  the	  supposedly	  iconic	  nature	  of	  the	  nonprofit	  organization,	  cum	  bureaucratic	  firm.	  But	   if	  we	  are	   to	   identify	  and	  classify	  alternative	   forms	  of	   third	  sector	  organization,	  we	  need	   to	  begin	  with	   some	  adjustments	   in	   terminology.	  The	   rich	   resources	   of	   popular	  culture	   and	   English	   vocabulary	   can	   be	   tapped	   to	   coin	   new	   terms	   for	   characterizing	  additional	   types	   of	   organized	   voluntary	   action.	   In	   particular,	   the	   portmanteau	   is	   a	  well-­‐used	  way	  of	  approaching	   the	  problem	  of	  new	  terms,	  and	  we	  will	   rely	  heavily	  on	   it	  here.	  Portmanteau	  terms	  are	  ‘created	  words’	  composed	  by	  bringing	  together	  parts,	  or	  syllables,	  and	   their	   connotations	   from	   existing	   terms.	   Two	   examples:	   Smog	   is	   a	   portmanteau	  derived	   from	   smoke	   and	   fog.	   Wikipedia	   is	   a	   brand	   name	   portmanteau	   composed	   by	  combining	   wiki	   and	   encyclopedia.	   In	   the	   recession	   of	   2008,	   the	   term	   bankster	   first	  appeared	  as	  a	  portmanteau	  of	  banker	  and	  gangster	  or	  mobster,	  both	  of	  which	  were	  also	  originally	  portmanteau	  terms. One	  major	  portmanteau	   term	   that	   can	  be	   generated	   in	   this	  way	   is	   benefactories;	  formal	  and	  social	  organizations	  which	  employ	   factors	  of	  production	  (especially	  common	  pool	   resources)	   to	   produce	   benefits	   for	   specific,	   identified	   beneficiaries.	   This	   category	  includes	  some	  bureaucratic	  firms,	  but	  it	  also	  includes	  non-­‐incentive	  driven	  and	  non-­‐rules-­‐based	   examples.	  Beyond	   the	  bureaucratic	   firm,	  most	   benefactories	   can	  be	   thought	   of	   as	  organized	   voluntary	   action	   to	   produce	   two	   distinct	   forms	   of	   benefits	   as	   outputs	   of	  production:	  transfer	  payments	  and	  services.	  Such	  benefactories	  are	  an	  important	  form	  of	  voluntary	   action.	   Examples	   would	   include	   many	   of	   the	   small,	   nonprofits	   staffed	   by	  volunteers	   and	   paraprofessionals,	   and	   funded	   primarily	   by	   donations.	   Also	   included	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would	   be	   the	   many	   volunteer-­‐based	   charities	   and	   other	   nonprofit	   corporations	   and	  voluntary	   associations	   whose	   mission	   includes	   dispensing	   benefits,	   like	   the	   Salvation	  Army,	  and	   the	  numerous	  charity	  organizations	  originating	   in	   the	  19th	   century	   that	  were	  rationalized	  and	  professionalized	   in	   the	  Charity	  Organization	  Society	  movement	  and	   the	  development	  of	  professional	  social	  work.	  Also	  included	  here	  would	  be	  other	  benefactories	  like	   neighborhood	   associations	   and	   mutual	   aid	   and	   self-­‐help	   networks,	   professional	  associations	  and	  many	  other	  cases.	  	  Figure	   7.5	   shows	   examples	   of	   beneficiaries	   for	   each	   of	   the	   four	   types	   of	   goods	  discussed	  above.	  	  
Figure 7.5. Four Types of Goods Produced by Benefactories   
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  Benefactories	  may	   at	   first	   appear	   to	   be	   a	   fully	   exhaustive	   category	   explaining	   all	  voluntary	   action	   but	   this	   is	   not	   the	   case.	   In	   addition,	   as	   the	   parade	   example	   above	  suggests,	   other	   instances	   of	   organized	   voluntary	   action	   are	   not	   primarily	   intended	   to	  produce	   benefits	   for	   members	   or	   anyone	   else,	   although	   in	   some	   hands	   the	   notions	   of	  benefit	   and	   self-­‐interest	   are	   sufficiently	   elastic	   to	  make	   it	   appear	   so.	  One	   group	  of	   non-­‐beneficent	   entities	   is	   specifically	   devoted	   to	   producing	   performances,	   or	   enactments,	   of	  one	  kind	  or	  another.	  In	  this	  group,	  large	  and	  small,	  formal	  and	  informal,	  we	  not	  only	  have	  theaters	  and	  concerts,	  but	  also	  lectures,	  paper	  presentations	  at	  scientific	  and	  professional	  conferences,	   protests,	   demonstrations,	   marches,	   parades,	   and	   many	   more	   similar	  examples,	  that	  also	  include	  rehearsals,	  jam	  sessions,	  “be-­‐ins”,	  flashmobs,	  promenades,	  and	  all	  manner	  of	  performance-­‐oriented	  assemblies.	  A	  portmanteau	  term	  for	  organized	  efforts	  to	  produce	  such	  intentional	  performances	  is	  performatories,	  meaning	  organized	  efforts	  to	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use	  common	  pool	  resources	  to	  produce	  or	  enact	  an	  event	  of	  some	  sort.	  This	  term	  is	  similar	  to	  a	  number	  of	  other	  already	  well-­‐established	  terms	  such	  as	  oratories	  and	  conservatories.	  Performatories	  are	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  claim	  that	  some	  commons	  produce	  common	  goods	  in	  both	  an	  economic	  and	  a	  dramatic	  sense,	  and	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  performance	  is	  always	  at	  the	   heart	   of	   their	   evaluation.	   Evaluating	   performance	   quality,	   however,	   is	   not	   some	  objective	  standard	  uniformly	  subject	   to	  “best	  practices”,	  but	  must	  be	  established	   in	  each	  enactment	  by	   reference	   to	   the	  mission	  and	  values	  of	   the	  particular	   commons.	  Thus,	  not	  only	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  script	  and	  the	  acting,	  but	  also	  the	  directing,	  scenic	  design,	  lighting,	  staging	   and	   a	   host	   of	   other	   factors	   are	   all	   fundamental	   to	   the	   critique	   of	   a	   theatrical	  presentation.	  Note:	  many	  of	  these	  may	  also	  be	  important	  in	  the	  performance	  of	  a	  scientific	  or	  humanistic	   lecture,	  or	  other	  types	  of	  performance.	  In	  general,	   the	  design	  principles	  of	  performatories	  (or	  any	  of	  the	  other	  types	  of	  common	  goods,	  for	  that	  matter)	  have	  yet	  to	  be	  identified	  even	  in	  the	  most	  general	  terms.	  
Figure 7.6. Four Types of Goods Produced by Performatories 
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 While	  the	  performance	  or	  enactment	  of	  values	  may	  enter	  into	  many	  different	  types	  of	   productions	   of	   common	   goods,	   in	   one	   case,	   the	   production,	   or	   creation	   and	  establishment,	  of	  new	  values	  or	  other	  moeurs	   in	  Tocqueville’s	   full	  original	   sense	  of	   that	  term	  is	   foremost	   in	   importance.	  Tocqueville	  used	  the	   term	  to	   include	  not	  only	  mores,	   in	  the	   current	   sociological	   sense	   of	   that	   term,	   but	   also	   practices,	   ideals,	   morals,	   customs,	  feelings	  and	  habits	  (Kahan,	  1996,	  x).	  	  One	  of	  the	  insights	  stemming	  from	  the	  new	  commons	  theory	   of	   voluntary	   action	   is	   that	   some	   types	   of	   commons	   excel	   at	   not	   only	   enacting	   or	  dramatizing	   such	   moeurs,	   but	   also	   in	   generating,	   reinforcing	   and	   modifying	   them.	  Democratic	  governments	  can	  seldom	  afford	  to	  get	  very	  far	  ahead	  of	  their	  constituencies,	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and	  with	  only	  a	   few	  notable	  exceptions	  market	   firms	  are	   typically	   far	  more	  comfortable	  identifying	   and	   currying	   demand	   than	   they	   are	   in	   establishing	   and	   stimulating	   it	   by	  introducing	   entirely	   new	  moeurs.	   The	   term	   social	   movement	   is	   usually	   used	   to	   denote	  those	  forms	  of	  voluntary	  action	  that	  excel	  in	  introducing	  new	  moeurs,	  whether	  practices,	  values	  or	  some	  other	  form. Taking	   all	   of	   that	   into	   account,	   the	   portmanteau	   term	  moeuratorium,	   or	   in	   the	  plural,	  moeuratoria	  (using	  the	  same	  Greek	  roots	  and	  plural	  forms	  as	  auditorium	  stadium,	  and	   gymnasium)	   describes	   the	   organized	   efforts	   to	   create,	   reinforce	   or	   change	  moeurs,	  that	  is	  practices,	  ideals,	  morals,	  customs,	  feelings	  or	  habits.	  In	  broad,	  Midwestern	  English	  like	   the	   author’s	  native	   speech,	   the	   term	  moeuratorium	   is,	   for	  better	   or	  worse,	   nearly	   a	  homonym	   of	   moratorium.	   In	   this	   respect,	   all	   of	   the	   assorted	   associations,	   assemblies,	  marches,	   conferences,	   protests,	   meetings,	   and	   other	   social	   organizations	   of	   a	   social	  movement	   like	  the	  diverse	  civil	  rights	  movements	  of	   the	  1950s	  and	  1960s,	   the	  women’s	  movement	   and	   the	   environmental	   movement	   are	   in	   their	   organizational	   aspects	  moeuratoria.	  Sometimes	  a	  moeuratorium	  will	  have	  a	  dedicated	  name	  or	  identifier,	  like	  the	  March	   on	   Washington	   or	   Million	   Man	   March,	   and	   sometimes	   they	   do	   not.	   Many	  moeuratoria	  have	  generic	  names	  that	  include	  pilgrimage,	  protest,	  march,	  sit-­‐in,	  lay-­‐in	  and	  teach-­‐in,	   sermon,	   lecture,	   or	   demonstration	   project.	   Examples	   refer	   to	   associations	   and	  common	  resource	  pools	  for	  the	  production,	  display	  or	  enactment	  of	  moeurs.	  Other	  more	  institutionalized	   examples	   include	   Sunday	   Schools,	   Jewish	   shuls	   and	   Muslim	  madrasas.	  Following	   major	   waves	   of	   immigration	   in	   the	   late	   19th	   century,	   settlement	   houses	   and	  later	   public	   schools	   in	   the	  U.S.	   took	   on	   a	   role	   of	   values	   education	   and	   indoctrination	   in	  citizenship	  and	   ‘Americanization’	  and	  to	  that	  extent	  became	  moeuratoria.	  Including	  such	  moeurs	   in	   the	   overall	   curriculum	   offers	   an	   example	   of	   the	   modular	   approach	   noted	  previously.	  Such	  values	  education	  is	  one	  module	  of	  an	  overall	  curriculum	  that	  is	  primarily	  a	   public	   good	   and	   not	   fundamentally	   committed	   to	   indoctrination.	   A	   great	   many	  introductory	   and	   orientation	   courses	   in	   contemporary	   colleges	   and	   universities	   serve	  partly	   as	   moeuratoria,	   introducing	   students	   to	   the	   values	   and	   worldview	   or	  
weltanschauung	   of	   the	  discipline	  or	   field.	  As	   these	   educational	   examples	   suggest,	   values	  are	  critical	  in	  many	  cases	  and	  the	  proper	  balance	  of	  education	  and	  indoctrination	  can	  be	  major	   issues	   in	   moeuratoria.	   Social	   movements	   and	   social	   problems	   as	   organized,	  collective	   voluntary	   action	   both	   typically	   involve	   important	   agencies	   and	   organized	  moeuratoria.	   Advocacy	   organizations	   are	   also	   a	   major	   type	   of	   moeuratorium:	   Thus,	  according	   to	   its	   website,	   the	   Home	   School	   Legal	   Defense	   Association	   “is	   a	   nonprofit	  advocacy	   organization	   established	   to	   defend	   and	   advance	   the	   constitutional	   right	   of	  parents	  to	  direct	  the	  education	  of	  their	  children	  and	  to	  protect	  family	  freedoms.”	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Figure 7.7. Four Types of Goods Produced by Moratoria 
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 Yet	   another	   distinct	   type	   of	   organized	   voluntary	   action	   might	   be	   termed	   the	  celebratorium;	   organized	   action	   for	   a	   range	   of	   purposes	   of	   celebration	   of	   existing	   or	  established	   values.	   Thus,	   commemorations	   like	   President’s	   Day,	   national	   holidays	   like	  Memorial	  Day,	  state	  holidays	  like	  Patriot’s	  Day	  in	  Massachusetts	  and	  West	  Virginia	  Day,	  as	  well	   as	  Mardi	  Gras,	   Carnival,	   and	  a	   large	  number	  of	   other	   local	   community	   celebrations	  and	   institutionally-­‐specific	   events	   like	   founder’s	   days	   and	   (some)	   annual	   meetings	   are	  celebrations.	  Such	  events,	  when	  they	  occur,	  do	  not	  occur	  spontaneously,	  but	  through	  the	  efforts	   of	   assorted	   “behind	   the	   scenes”	   organizing	   committees	   that	   are	   typically	   new	  commons	  and	  associations.	  	  
Figure 7.8. Four Types of Goods Produced by Celebratoria   
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Unlike	  the	  government	  bureau,	  the	  market-­‐oriented	  firm	  and	  the	  hybrid	  nonprofit	  bureaucratic	   firm,	   the	   organizational	   characteristics	   of	   benefactories,	   performatories,	  moeuratoria	   and	   celebratoria	   in	   voluntary	   action	   have	   not	   been	   extensively	   studied	   or	  documented.	   Hence,	   it	   can	   be	   very	   easy	   to	   make	   the	   claim	   that	   all	   forms	   of	   voluntary	  action	  are	  nonprofit	  organizations	  “just	  like”	  bureaucratic	  firms.	  It	  becomes	  very	  difficult	  to	   refute	   that	   claim,	   especially	   with	   the	   strategic	   use	   of	   a	   kind	   of	   exceptionalism.	   Each	  counterinstance	  cited	  can	  be	  dismissed	  as	  “one	  small	  exception”	  thereby	  allowing	  the	  false	  conclusion	   of	   isomorphism	   to	   remain	   safely	   in	   place.	   From	   the	   purely	   technological	  perspectives	   of	   organization	   theory,	   whether	   or	   not	   all	   third	   sector	   organizations	   look	  alike	  appears	  to	  be	  but	  a	  minor	  tempest	  in	  a	  very	  small	  teapot.	  With	  respect	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  advancement	  of	  democratic	  society	  and	  culture	  raised	  in	  Chapters	  1	  and	  2,	  however,	  the	   voracity	   of	   such	   claims	   are	   less	   important	   than	   the	   corrosive	   effects	   of	   such	  institutional	  isomorphism	  and	  the	  naturalistic	  fallacy	  that	  all	  forms	  of	  voluntary	  action	  are	  merely	   nascent	   or	   underdeveloped	   forms	   of	  mature,	   policy-­‐driven,	   professional	   staffed,	  bureaucratic	   firms.	  We	  will	   take	   up	   some	   implications	   of	   this	   issue	   further	   in	   the	   final	  chapter	  below.	  At	  this	  point,	  however,	  we	  can	  explore	  briefly	  an	  additional	  dimension	  of	  moeurs	  by	  contrasting	  good	  commons	  and	  bad:	  the	  relation	  of	  moeurs	  and	  what	  political	  theorists	  have	  called	  the	  nomos. 
The	  Nomos	  of	  Common	  Goods	  Whatever	   else	   they	  may	   be,	   new	   commons	   and	   the	   third	   sector	   are	   a	   recognized	  part	  of	  the	  contemporary	  nomos	  (Van	  Til	  2012;	  Wagner	  2012).	  This	  is	  anything	  but	  a	  new	  development,	  however.	  Within	  the	  scientific	  community,	  philanthropy	  and	  charity,	  and	   in	  daily	  life	  in	  democratic	  society	  and	  culture,	  a	  general	  nomos	  of	  common	  goods,	  and	  how	  to	  discover	   and	   develop	   them	   as	   resources	   and	   utilize	   them	   further	   in	   common	   goods	  production	   has	   been	   emerging	   legally,	   culturally	   and	   in	   practice	   since	   at	   least	   the	  seventeenth	  century,	  as	  noted	  above.	  That	  these	  legal	  and	  cultural	  developments	  occurred	  should	   no	   longer	   be	   at	   issue.	   That	   they	   constitute	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   distinct	   nomos	   of	  common	  goods	   fundamental	   to	   the	   importance	  of	   the	   third	  sector	  as	   it	  has	  emerged	  may	  still	  require	  some	  clarification.	  That	  may	  be	  all	  well	  and	  good,	  a	  reader	  may	  be	  thinking,	  but	  what	  is	  a	  nomos?	  As	   Robert	   Cover	   (1983)	   summarized	   the	   perspective	   of	   Peter	   Berger,	   et.	   al.,	   “We	  inhabit	  a	  nomos	  –	  a	  normative	  universe.	  We	  constantly	  create	  and	  maintain	  a	  world	  of	  right	  and	  wrong,	  of	   lawful	   and	  unlawful,	   of	   valid	  and	  void”	   (See	  also	  Berger	  1967;	  Berger	  and	  Luckmann	   1967;).	   Political	   scientists,	   law	   school	   faculty	   and	   others	   have	   long	   tied	   the	  
nomos	  to	  relations	  between	  governments	  and	  laws	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  authority	  (e.g.,	  Cover,	  1983;	  Ostwald,	  1979;	  Schmitt,	  2006).	  It	  also	  has	  a	  number	  of	  implications	  for	  the	  legality,	  authority,	  and	  legitimacy	  of	  voluntary	  action	  and	  the	  third	  sector.	  A	  nomos	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  democratically	   defined	   third	   sector	   of	   society	   and	   culture	   is	   part	   of	   a	   constructed	   social	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world	  and	  initially	  one	  of	  the	  important	  elements	  of	  its	  social	  imaginary	  (Taylor,	  2006).	  Ask	  any	  scientist,	  philanthropist,	  humanist,	  or	  religious	  believer	  why	  they	  do	  what	  they	  do	  and	  their	  answer	  will	  almost	  inevitably	  refer	  to	  their	  own	  particular	  nomoi;	  their	  construction	  of	  what	  for	  them	  and	  their	  reference	  others	  are	  important,	  right,	  lawful	  or	  valid.	  One	  such	  example	  important	  in	  social	  scientific	  knowledge	  commons,	  for	  example,	  is	  the	  canons	  of	  validity	  and	  reliability	  (c.f.,	  Campbell	  and	  Stanley,	  1963).	  Those	  involved	  play	  roles	  not	  only	  in	  behaving	  in	  accord	  with	  the	  rules,	  norms	  and	  other	  moeurs	  that	  define	  and	  characterize	   the	   nomos,	   but	   also	   in	   creating,	   sustaining	   and	  modifying	   them.	   One	   of	   the	  most	  important	  implications	  of	  the	  voluntary	  nature	  of	  third	  sector	  activity	  is	  the	  ability	  of	  members	  of	  a	  commons	  to	  define	  for	  themselves	  a	  nomos	  that	  includes	  binding	  values	  and	  norms.	   	   This	   is	   truly	   one	   of	   the	   most	   portentous	   implications	   inherent	   in	   the	   ideas	   of	  voluntary	  association	  and	  self-­‐governance.	  As	   Cover	   (1983)	   notes	   law	   and	   legislation	   are	   certainly	   important	   forces	   in	   the	  shaping	   of	   any	   nomos.	   As	   noted	   in	   Chapter	   Four	   above,	   the	   evolving	   legal	   nomos	  originating	  in	  the	  early	  seventeenth	  century	  has	  been	  a	  (perhaps	  even	  the)	  key	  factor	  in	  the	  emergence	  of	  new	  commons	  as	  an	  institutional	  type	  and	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  third	  sectors	  worldwide.	   Under	   democratic	   conditions	   government	   and	   law	   may	   ratify	   existing	   and	  emergent	   societal	   consensus	  over	   specific	   issues	   and	  questions	   as	  often	  as	   it	   shapes	   and	  forms	   them.	   With	   few	   exceptions,	   for	   example,	   civil	   rights,	   health	   care	   and	   even	   the	  meaning	  of	   family	  and	  definition	  of	  marriage	  have	  only	  become	  settled	  matters	  of	  public	  policy	  after	  genuinely	  supportive	  majority	  consensus	  perspectives	  have	  formed.	  And	  many	  of	   the	  key	  battlegrounds	   in	  which	  such	  a	  consensus	  can	  be	  hammered	  out	  under	  modern	  conditions	   are	   found	   in	   the	   associations,	   assemblies,	   conferences,	   publications	   and	   other	  new	  commons	  of	  the	  third	  sector.	  	  Much	  the	  same	  might	  be	  said	  also	  about	  the	  role	  of	  new	  commons	  in	  defining	  nomoi	  for	  product	  development	  and	  placement	   in	  certain	  markets	  –	  particularly	   those	   involving	  information	  and	  intangible	  resources.	  Not	  only	  are	  there	  the	  numerous	  “free	  information”	  and	   open	   software	   movements,	   and	   developments	   like	   Apache,	   Linux,	   Open	   Office,	  Wikipedia,	   and	   others.	   Coordinating	   committees,	   voluntary	   associations	   or	   nonprofit	  organizations	  have	  facilitated	  and	  eased	  the	  development	  of	  nearly	  every	  completely	  new	  category	   of	   software	   or	   computer	   language.	   They	   do	   so	   by	   functioning	   as	   commons	   of	  major	  vendors	   to	   facilitate	  and	  coordinate	   the	  market	  emergence	  and	  sort	  out	  which	  are	  common	  pool	  resources	  and	  what	  may	  be	  proprietary	  information.	  Perhaps	  the	  only	  major	  exceptions	  to	  this	  are	  the	  cases	  in	  which	  the	  U.S.	  or	  other	  governments	  performed	  this	  role,	  as	  with	   the	   standardization	  of	   the	  ADA	   language	  by	   the	  U.S.	  Defense	  Department.	   	  Home	  health	  care,	  exercise	  and	  fitness	  industries	  and	  numerous	  other	  examples,	  likewise,	  did	  not	  become	  marketable	  commodities	  until	  after	  a	  relatively	  strong	  consensus	  had	  emerged	  and	  in	  each	  case	  new	  commons	  were	  among	  the	  first	  to	  “identify	  the	  need”	  and	  demonstrate	  the	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viability	   of	   the	   potential	  markets.	   Even	   before	   they	   become	   public	   goods	   –	   the	   goods	   of	  everyone	   –	   values,	   preferences,	   wishes,	   aspirations	   and	   all	   of	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   normative	  elements	   that	  make	   up	   additions	   and	   changes	   in	   the	   nomos	   are	   likely	   to	   be	   shaped	   and	  formed	  and	  become	  some	  group’s	  common	  goods.	  The	   normative	   dimension	   of	   this	   or	   any	  model	   of	   common	   good	   are	   the	   basis	   to	  establish	  a	  useful	  link	  at	  the	  most	  general	  level	  to	  a	  set	  of	  practical	  issues	  usually	  labeled	  by	  third	   sector	   theorists	   as	   “accountability”.	   We	   can	   explore	   this	   idea	   more	   fully	   through	  reference	   to	   an	   important	   normative	   concept	   of	   good	   commons	   whose	   mission	   can	  generally	  be	  described	  or	  accepted	  as	  production	  of	  common	  goods:	  matters	  that	  have	  been	  deemed	  by	  some	  group	  or	  association	  as	  right	  rather	  than	  wrong,	  lawful	  rather	  than	  illegal,	  valid	  rather	  than	  invalid	  or	  just	  rather	  than	  unjust.	  In	  large	  part	  due	  to	  the	  economic	  basis	  of	   nonprofit	   sector	   theory	   and	  more	   generally	   the	   important	   role	   of	   ‘positive’	   empirical	  social	  sciences,	  the	  idea	  of	  good	  is	  often	  treated	  as	  a	  purely	  technical,	  instrumental	  notion	  in	   current	   third	   sector	   theory.	   Such	   usage	   tend	   to	   overlook	   or	   downplay	   one	   of	   the	  fundamentally	  important	  dimensions	  of	  third	  sector	  activity:	  the	  important	  ethical	  role	  of	  associations	  and	  assemblies	  in	  defining	  and	  operationalizing	  normative	  notions	  of	  common	  good.	  Hardin’s	  original	  (1968)	  re-­‐introduction	  of	  the	  commons	  was	  also	  instrumental	  in	  a	  larger	  normative	  project	  of	  protecting	  the	  environment.	  Likewise,	  close	  examination	  of	  the	  project	   of	   the	   Bloomington	   School	   will	   show	   that	   there	   are	   important	   normative	  dimensions	  to	  the	  work	  of	  both	  Vincent	  and	  Elinor	  Ostrom.	  In	  the	  most	  prosaic	  sense,	  good	  commons	   produce	   common	   goods.	   In	   a	   more	   complex	   sense,	   they	   could	   also	   be	  distinguished	  from	  their	  antithesis,	  bad	  commons.	  	  In	   order	   to	   avoid	   the	   more	   obvious	   perceptions	   of	   moral	   prudery	   in	   talking	   of	  “good”	   and	   “bad”	   or	   even	  Manichaeism	   –	   that	   is,	   viewing	   the	  world	   in	   starkly	   black	   and	  white	  appositional	   terms	  –	  we	  can	  employ	   the	   terms	  good	  and	  bad	  only	   to	  describe	  new	  commons	  and	  voluntary	  action	  and	  not	  to	  judge	  or	  evaluate	  them.	  To	  avoid	  the	  problems	  involved	   some	   analysts,	   particularly	   those	   inclined	   toward	   rationalistic	   or	   technocratic	  uses	  of	  the	  term	  goods,	  go	  to	  great	  lengths	  to	  use	  the	  term	  good	  as	  a	  plural,	  goods,	  without	  explicit	   reference	   to	   any	   differentiation,	   opposition	   or	   morality.	   (E.g.,	   economists	   often	  appear	  to	  get	  around	  this	  problem	  with	  talk	  of	  “goods”	  and	  “disutilities”	  or	  “externalities”	  –	  both	  of	  which	  can	  in	  moral	  terms	  be	  framed	  as	  species	  of	  bads.	  What	  this	  discussion	  suggests	  is	  that	  introduction	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  nomos	  –	  a	  kind	  of	  moral	   universe	   –	   sooner	   or	   later	   comes	   around	   to	   the	   necessity	   of	  moral	   distinctions	  couched	  in	  many	  different	  terminologies:	  legal	  and	  illegal,	  right	  and	  wrong,	  productive	  and	  counter-­‐productive,	   good	   and	   bad.	   This	   concept	   of	   the	   nomos	   and	   its	   relation	   to	   the	  production	  of	  common	  goods	  generally	  has	  few	  great	  moral	  insights	  to	  offer	  at	  present.	  As	  such,	  it	  points	  only	  to	  an	  existing	  problem	  area	  in	  need	  of	  further	  investigation.	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  third	  sector	  nomos,	  we	  can	  suggest	  another	  distinction	  as	  a	  way	  to	  look	  more	  closely	  at	  the	  formation	  of	  third	  sector	  morality	  with	  a	  provisional	  hypothesis	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–	  that	  is,	  subjecting	  to	  testing	  and	  evidence.	  Authentic	  new	  commons	  engaged	  in	  voluntary	  action	  seek	  to	  pursue	  what	  they	  construe	  are	  good	  ends,	  or	  common	  goods.	  Some	  of	  these	  we	  can	  define	  simply	  as	  good	  commons.	  Yet,	  at	  some	  level,	  a	  measure	  of	  external	  or	  societal	  judgment,	  whether	   cultural	   norms	  or	   laws	  or	   other	   elements	   of	   the	   larger	  nomos	   enters	  into	   this	  determination	  of	  goodness	  as	  well.	  The	  result	   is	   typically	  a	   range	  of	   identifiable	  
bad	   commons,	   as	  well	   as	   those	   about	  which	   society	   at	   large	   is	   indifferent,	   ambivalent	   or	  uncertain.	  If	  the	  20th	  century	  history	  has	  given	  us	  any	  lessons,	   it	  has	  shown	  that	  we	  must	  also	  make	  provision	   for	  a	   small	  but	  extremely	  challenging	  category	  of	  very	  bad	  or	  as	  we	  might	  call	  them,	  vicious	  commons;	  a	  list	  that	  would	  include	  the	  Nazi	  Party,	  a	  not	  altogether	  voluntary	   association	   with	   its	   policies	   of	   deliberate	   human	   extermination;	   assorted	  Stalinist	  and	  Maoist	  parties	  which	  have	  destroyed	  nature	  and	  culture	  and	  killed	  masses	  of	  people;	   “pro-­‐slavery”	   factions	   which	   opposed	   the	   abolition	   of	   slavery	   purely	   for	   selfish	  gain;	   the	  Ku	  Klux	  Klan;	   and	   assorted	   criminal	   syndicates	   and	   crime	   “families”,	   and	  other	  syndicates,	   associations	   and	  networks.	  Others	   are,	   of	   course,	   free	   to	   construct	   their	   own	  lists	   of	   bad,	   evil	   and	  vicious	   commons.	  This	   list	   is	   not	   to	  parade	  or	  hold	  up	  my	  personal	  values,	   but	   to	   illustrate	   examples	   in	  which	   there	   are	   known	   associations	   and	   knowledge	  commons	  that	  have	  branded	  these	  examples	  as	  bad,	  vicious	  or	  evil.	  Neither	  the	  economic	  distinction	  between	  goods	  and	  externalities	  nor	  Tocqueville’s	  original	  distinction	  between	  political	   and	   (voluntary)	   associations	   are	   particularly	   useful	   in	   supporting	   this	   moral	  distinction,	  in	  part	  because	  not	  all	  political	  associations	  in	  this	  respect	  are	  judged	  uniformly	  bad.	  	   There	   are	   also	   a	   number	   of	   larger	   but	   less	   lethal	   types	   of	   “bad”	   commons:	   For	  example,	  there	  is	  a	  category	  we	  might	  call	  dubious	  commons,	  like	  the	  original	  socialist	  and	  communist	  parties	  of	  Europe	  and	  the	  segregationist	  parties	  of	  the	  United	  States	  and	  South	  Africa,	  whose	  missions	  and	  policies	  are	  viewed	  as	  good	  and	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  some	  but	  seen	  as	   seriously	   bad	   by	   others.	   Indeed,	   in	   democratic	   societies,	   whatever	   one’s	   view,	   the	  opposition	  party	  is	  frequently	  at	  least	  somewhat	  dubious.	  In	  such	  cases,	  any	  resolution	  of	  what	   is	   a	   good	   and	   bad	   commons	   is	   often	   not	   subject	   to	   universally	   recognized	   ethical	  norms,	  but	  becomes	  a	  political	  matter	  of	  existing	  differences	  that	  must	  be	  resolved	  in	  the	  courts	  of	  public	  opinion,	  inter-­‐group	  conflict	  and	  history.	  	  The	  most	  visible	  example	  of	  this	  in	   recent	   memory	   may	   be	   found	   in	   the	   religious	   and	   cultural	   differences	   in	   Northern	  Ireland;	  Israel	  and	  Palestine;	  the	  widespread	  reaction	  to	  Muslims	  in	  many	  communities	  in	  the	   U.S.	   in	   the	   wake	   of	   	   “9/11”	   and	   other	   easily	   identified	   examples.	   For	   some,	   any	  difference	   between	   horrible	   and	   dubious	   commons	   will	   seem	   to	   be	   a	   matter	   of	   mere	  opinion.	  However,	  in	  the	  past	  century,	  an	  international	  legal	  and	  ethical	  infrastructure	  and	  universal	   norms	   like	   the	   Geneva	   Convention	   with	   its	   rules	   of	   warfare,	   and	   the	   post-­‐Nuremberg	   international	   trials	   for	   crimes	   against	   humanity	   and	  more	   recently	   problems	  like	   human	   trafficking	   have	   been	   put	   in	   place	   to	   enforce	   precisely	   this	   difference.	   The	  genuine	  power	  of	  this	  nomos	  was	  evident,	  for	  example,	  in	  the	  insupportable	  position	  of	  the	  Syrian	  government	  toward	  its	  chemical	  weapons	  program	  in	  light	  of	  earlier	  incidents	  from	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World	  War	  I	  to	  Saddam	  Hussein’s	  use	  of	  such	  weapons	  against	  the	  Kurds.	  Perhaps	   the	   largest	   category	   of	   bad	   commons	   may	   be	   inauthentic	   or	   deceptive	  
commons	  whose	  missions	  are	  covertly	  ethically	  dubious	  but	  are	  masked	  by	  false	  patinas	  of	  common	  good.	  The	  examples	  are	   legion:	   fundraising	  boiler	   rooms;	   “false	   front”	   charities;	  bogus	   philanthropies;	   institutions	   designed	   primarily	   or	   exclusively	   for	   purposes	   of	   tax	  avoidance	  or	  fraud	  to	  mask	  personal	  gain;	  and	  other	  similar	  examples.	  The	  usual	  marker	  of	  deceptive	  commons	  is	  financial	  injury	  or	  loss.	  There	  is	  one	  additional	  form	  of	  arguably	  bad	  commons	  that	  must	  be	  noted	  and	  that	  is	  the	  commons	  in	  which	  natural,	  cultural	  or	  human	  service	  philanthropic	  activity	  is	  falsely	  or	  inappropriately,	  subjected	  to	  the	  standards	  of	  the	  economic	  marketplace.	  Occurrences	  of	  this	   phenomenon	   can	   often	   –	   but	   not	   always	   –	   be	   recognized	   by	   preoccupation	   with	  unsuccessful	  or	  external	  attempts	  to	  measure	  efficiency	  and	  effectiveness.	  The	  reason	  this	  signals	  a	  type	  of	  bad	  commons	  is	  quite	  simple:	  The	  process	  of	  attempting	  to	  apply	  utility,	  efficiency,	   effectiveness,	   or	   any	   other	   universal	   standard	   as	   an	   evaluative	   criterion	   in	   a	  commons	  is	  a	  type	  of	  ethical	  breech.	  It	  seeks	  to	  substitute,	  on	  insufficient	  grounds	  without	  a	  supportive	  nomos	  some	  type	  of	  universal	  or	  external	  criterion	  for	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  group	  to	   define	   its	   own	  moeurs. The	   case	   of	   the	   association	   that	   voluntarily	   elects	   to	  measure	  itself	  by	   the	  universal	   standards	  of	  utility,	   efficiency	  and	  effectiveness	  will	   initially	   strike	  some	   as	   a	   counter-­‐instance	   defeating	   or	   refuting	   this	   observation.	   This	   is	   not	   the	   case.	  Under	   the	   principle	   noted	   here,	   a	   group	   is	   free	   to	   establish	  any	   standard	   it	   chooses	   for	  whatever	   uses	   it	   chooses.	   A	   problem	   only	   arises	   when	   funders,	   academic	   disciplines,	  professional	  groups,	  resource	  providers	  or	  others	  external	  to	  the	  commons	  seek	  to	  impose	  such	  standards.	  	  This	   type	   of	   bad	   commons	  does	   not	   include	   those	   situations	   in	  which	   a	   nonprofit	  corporation,	   foundation,	   group	   or	   other	   entity	   has	   willingly	   entered	   into	   a	   grant	   or	  contractual	  agreement	  in	  which	  participants	  knew	  in	  advance	  that	  such	  criteria	  would	  be	  applied	  and	  they	  agreed	  anyway.	  It	  is	  only	  efforts	  by	  authorities	  or	  experts	  external	  to	  the	  commons	   to	   impose	   such	   criteria	   as	   appropriate,	   necessary	   or	   sufficient	   without	   the	  consent	   of	   the	   participants	   that	   constitutes	   such	   a	   bad	   commons,	   because	   it	   forces	  participants	   in	   the	   commons	   to	  abandon	   their	   autonomy.	  Like	  many	  others	   interested	   in	  voluntary	  action	  as	  a	   civic	   and	   communal	   activity,	   I	  have	   repeatedly	  voiced	  my	  concerns	  over	  this	  issue	  in	  the	  past,	  both	  over	  the	  question	  of	  attempts	  to	  impose	  ‘accountability’	  on	  all	  nonprofit	  activities	  and	  the	  more	  subtle	  process	  of	  enforcing	  economic	  notions	  of	  self-­‐interest	  (Lohmann,	  1989;	  Lohmann,	  1992;	  Lohmann,	  1999).	  	  In	   general,	   all	   forms	   of	   bad	   commons	   pervert	   or	   disrupt	   the	   ordinary	   common	  interest	  or	  shared	  mission	  that	  holds	  together	  a	  philanthropod	  of	  donors,	  beneficiaries	  and	  intermediaries	  to	  the	  advantage	  of	  only	  some.	  The	  term	  philanthropod	  to	  describe	  a	  group	  or	  network	  of	  donors,	  beneficiaries	  and	  intermediaries	  with	  a	  mutual	  interest	  is	  explored	  further	  in	  Chapter	  Twelve	  below.	  Deceptive	  commons	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  the	  most	  frequent	  form	  of	   bad	   commons,	   but	   they	   seem	   to	  have	  drawn	  most	   of	   the	   attention	   of	   regulatory	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agencies	  and	  accountability	  researchers	  (Campbell,	  2002;	  Sloan,	  2009;	  Young,	  2002).	  The	  principal	  failing	  of	  bad	  commons	  –	  the	  thing	  that	  makes	  them	  bad	  –	  is	  bad	  faith	  grounded	  in	  their	  inauthenticity.	  This	  is	  not	  a	  matter	  of	  failed	  or	  too	  lofty	  expectations.	  They	  are	  simply	  not	   what	   they	   appear	   or	   claim	   to	   be,	   and	   key	   publics	   know	   it.	   In	   the	   category	   of	  philanthropy	  defined	  as	  human	  service	  and	  in	  terms	  of	  resort	  to	  ethics,	  inauthenticity	  is	  a	  fatal	   flaw	   subject	   to	   both	   legal	   and	   political	   recriminations.	   The	   family	   foundation,	   for	  example,	  with	  the	  best	  of	  intentions	  that	  makes	  a	  kerfuffle	  of	  its	  mission	  is	  not,	  necessarily	  a	   bad	   commons,	   although	   if	   family-­‐trustees	   knowingly	   continue	   doing	   so	   for	   their	   own	  financial	   advantage	   and	  after	  being	   informed	  of	   the	   error	  of	   their	  ways,	  we	  may	  have	   to	  amend	  that	  judgment.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  family	  foundation	  established	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	   fraudulently	   sheltering	   wealth	   from	   estate	   or	   other	   taxation	   while	   reserving	   it	   for	  exclusive	   family	   use	   under	   the	   guise	   of	   some	   purported	   philanthropic	   good	   is	   a	   bad	  commons	  that	  may	  be	  subject	  to	  professional,	  journalistic	  or	  legislative	  “exposure”	  or	  legal	  and	  financial	  penalties,	  or	  both.	  It	  must	  be	  noted	  also	  that	  the	  present	  institutional	  system	  is	  far	  from	  perfect,	  and	  as	  every	  philanthropist	  realizes,	  there	  is	  at	  least	  a	  chance	  that	  such	  an	  arrangement	  may	  exist,	  even	  for	   long	  periods	  of	  time,	  without	  ever	  being	  subjected	  to	  publicity	  or	  adverse	  legal	  action.	  	  	  There	  are	  multiple	  roles	  for	  new	  commons	  as	  common	  goods	  producing	  institutions	  in	  sorting	  out	  such	  questions:	  service,	  education,	  advocacy,	  group	  or	  collective	  self-­‐defense,	  research	   or	   scholarship,	   to	   name	   just	   a	   few.	   There	   are	   also	   multiple	   levels	   involved	   in	  sorting	   out	   or	   differentiating	   determinations	   of	   good	   and	   bad	   commons.	   Some	   of	   these	  necessarily	   involve	   actions	   by	   government.	   However,	   it	   is	   a	   testament	   to	   the	   capacity	   of	  commons	  to	  generate	  new	  moeurs	  and	  moral	  order	  that	  a	  substantial	  portion	  of	  the	  efforts	  to	   encourage	  good	  commons	  and	  discourage	  bad	  ones	   is	  handled	  by	   collective	  voluntary	  action	   within	   the	   independent	   sector.	   Thus,	   a	   remarkable	   array	   of	   credentialing,	  accreditation,	  certification,	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  evaluation	  and	  accountability	  are	  built	  into	  modern	  life.	  	  Distinguishing	  good	  and	  bad	  commons,	  in	  particular	  deceptive	  commons,	  is	  always	  both	   complex	   and	   difficult.	   Such	   judgments	   may	   be	   contingent,	   time-­‐limited,	   and	   even	  subject	   to	   periodic	   reversal.	   The	   Ku	   Klux	   Klan	   may	   not	   have	   been	   a	   uniformly	   bad	  commons,	   for	   example,	   at	   all	   times	   and	   in	   all	   places,	   and	   some	   other	   generally	   good	  commons	  may,	  at	  times,	  engage	  in	  clearly	  negative	  activities.	  There	  seems	  little	  doubt	  that	  both	  the	  United	  Way	  of	  America	  and	  the	  American	  Red	  Cross	  stood	  convicted	  of	  being	  bad	  commons	  at	   times	   in	  recent	  decades,	  even	   though	   the	  general	  demeanor	  of	  both	  as	  good	  commons	   over	   long	   periods	   of	   time	   has	   been	   very	   commendable.	   Complexity,	   difficulty,	  variation	  and	  uncertainty,	  however,	  are	  not	  sufficient	  reasons	  to	  completely	  avoid	  the	  basic	  distinction,	  which	  is	  built	  into	  the	  very	  idea	  of	  philanthropy	  and	  the	  use	  of	  the	  term	  goods.	  Action	  for	  the	  love	  of	  humanity	  is	  not,	  and	  cannot	  be,	  a	  morally	  neutral,	  purely	  technical,	  or	  value-­‐free	   ideal.	   It	   is	   inherent	   in	   the	   frame	   of	   reference	   of	   new	   commons	   theory.	  Consequently,	   at	   some	   level,	   judgments	   of	  which	   commons	   are	   good	   and	  which	   are	   bad	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must	  be	  addressed.	  This	  is	  not	  an	  issue	  for	  which	  we	  should	  ever	  expect	  to	  derive	  uniform	  or	  universal	  “objective”	  standards.	  It	   is	  consistent	  with	  the	  perspective	  outlined	  here	  that	  matters	  of	  goodness	  and	  badness	  should	  be	  left	  to	  those	  involved.	  	  The	   commons	   theory	   of	   voluntary	   action	   is	   normative	   and	  not	   concerned,	   for	   the	  most	  part,	  with	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  bad	  commons,	  except	  as	  failures	  or	  negative	  examples	  of	   voluntary	   action.	   Clearly	   more	   work	   on	   this	   subject	   is	   needed	   if	   moral	   distinctions	  between	   good	   and	   not-­‐good	   commons	   are	   to	   be	   sustained	   as	   theoretical	   categories.	  Generally,	  the	  outlines	  of	  that	  work	  are	  suggested	  here:	  Actors,	  engaged	  in	  communication	  and	   interaction	   with	   one	   another	   over	   the	   definition	   of	   common	   purposes	   and	   the	  collection	  and	  use	  of	  common	  resource	  pools	  will,	  of	  necessity,	   face	  a	  variety	  of	  practical,	  theoretical	  and	  principled	  choices	  that	  in	  effect	  allow	  them	  to	  solve	  questions	  of	  goodness	  for	  themselves.	  Those	  decisions	  will	  always	  be	  made	  within	  the	  larger	  frame	  of	  reference	  of	  a	   focused	   public	   or	   community.	   It	   remains	   then	   to	   establish	   the	   proper	   terms	   for	   the	  inclusion	   of	   these	   various	   reference	   others,	   such	   as	   potential	   members,	   scientific	  communities,	   disciplines,	   focused	  publics,	   contractors,	   denominations,	   the	   communion	  of	  saints,	  general	  public,	  and	  others	  in	  such	  determinations.	  	  
Conclusion	  The	   concept	   of	   common	   good	   lies	   at	   the	   crossroads	   of	   a	   number	   of	   important	  considerations	   of	   self-­‐organization	   and	   ethics	   and	   morality.	   The	   concept	   provides	  important	   definitional	   and	   normative	   dimensions	   to	   efforts	   to	   distinguish	   independent	  voluntary	   action	   from	   commercial	   market	   and	   governmental	   activity	   and	   with	   the	  associated	   idea	   of	   sectors.	   There	   is	   a	   fundamental	   incoherence	   in	   many	   present	  conceptions	  of	  a	  nonprofit	  corporate	  third	  sector	  composed	  exclusively	  of	  professionalized	  and	  bureaucratic	  “nonprofit	  organizations”	  that	  function	  as	  bureaucratic	  firms,	  taking	  their	  essential	  characteristics	  from	  public	  sector	  and	  market	  order.	  	  	  The	   concept	   of	   common	   good	   resolves	   this	   incoherence	   nicely	   by	   setting	   up	   a	  distinction	   among	   three	   ideal	   types:	   public	   goods,	   private	   goods	   and	   common	   goods.	   If	  there	  are,	   indeed,	   three	  distinct	  sectors	  and	  not	  merely	  two	  and	  an	  unstable	  hybrid,	   then	  one	  way	  to	  clearly	  distinguish	  them	  is	  by	  the	  types	  of	  goods	  each	  ideally	  produces:	  Public	  sectors	  produce	  public	  goods,	  private	  (market)	  sectors	  produce	  private	  (priced,	  or	  market)	  goods,	  and	  independent	  sectors,	  composed	  of	  new	  commons,	  produce	  common	  goods.	  	  This	   is,	   in	   part,	   a	   pragmatic	   issue.	   On	   the	  whole,	   the	   term	   common	   goods	  works	  better	  and	  more	  smoothly	  than	  any	  of	  the	  suggested	  alternatives:	  One	  is	  hard	  pressed,	  for	  example,	   to	   make	   a	   plausible	   case	   for	   “independent	   goods”,	   or,	   as	   some	   (particularly	  Europeans)	   have	   suggested	   “civil	   society	   goods”,	   or	   any	   other	   such	   term.	   “Social	   goods”	  may	  sound	  initially	   like	  a	  good	  alternative,	  but	   it	  embraces	  an	  inherent	  ambiguity.	  Do	  we	  mean	  by	  the	  term	  social	  goods,	  those	  that	  are	  the	  products	  of	  social	   interaction	  (which	  is	  found	   in	  all	  sectors),	  of	  cooperation	  or	  coproduction	  or	  those	  that	  are	  deeply	   interwoven	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with	   social	   action,	   or,	   as	   traditions	   such	   as	   social	   democracy,	   have	   often	   in	   the	   past	  suggested,	   a	   subset	   of	   goods	   produced	   for	   everyone	   (society,	   i.e.,	   a	   type	   of	   public	   good),	  such	  as	  welfare	  payments	  or	  social	  or	  medical	  insurance?	  On	  the	  whole,	  the	  history	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  common	  good	  makes	  it	  the	  most	  plausible	  candidate	  to	  describe	  the	  products	  of	  the	  particular	  types	  of	  coproduction	  occurring	  in	  independent	  voluntary	  action.	  Using	  the	  previously	   outlined	   conceptions	   of	   new	   or	   social	   commons	   that	   utilize	   common	   pool	  resources	  to	  produce	  public	  goods,	  we	  can	  now	  look	  more	  closely	  in	  the	  next	  two	  chapters	  at	  the	  fundamental	  terms	  association	  and	  assembly.
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If	  you	  wish	  to	  be	  held	  in	  esteem,	  you	  must	  associate	  only	  with	  those	  who	  are	  estimable.	  
~	  Jean	  de	  la	  Bruyere	  
We	  are	  far	  more	  liable	  to	  catch	  the	  vices	  of	  our	  associates	  than	  their	  virtues.	  
~	  Denis	  Diderot	  
8.	  Association	  	   In	  new	  commons	  major	   factors	  of	  production	  and	  the	  major	  outputs	  of	  production	  are	  both	  communicatively	  based	  social	  behaviors:	  roles,	  relationships,	  networks,	  meanings,	  norms,	  practices	  and	  other	  moeurs.	  A	  recent	  important	  collection	  of	  essays	  by	  Hess	  and	  Ostrom	  (2007)	  on	  common	  knowledge	  production	  and	  the	  interesting	  work	  of	  Benkler	  on	  “social	  production”	  strive	  to	  move	  significantly	  toward	  a	  more	  social	  view,	  while	  remaining	  within	  the	  confines	  of	  the	   “disembodied”	   perspective	   of	   rational	   individualism.	   That	   approach	   is	   ultimately	  unsuccessful	   theoretically,	   however,	   in	   accounting	   for	   voluntary	   action	   because	   of	   failure	   to	  follow	   the	   pathways	   laid	   out	   by	   Levine	   and	  Bollier	   below.	   These	   identities,	   rituals	   and	   other	  moeurs	  may	  be,	  by	   turns,	   either	   resources	   for	  action	   in	   the	  commons,	  or	  outcomes	  of	  action.	  The	   linking	   of	   social	   action	   and	   collective	   behavior	   in	   new	   commons	   to	   other	   domains	   of	  commons	   theory	   is	   not	   a	   great	   stretch;	   the	   key	   link	   is	   in	   the	   Ostroms’	   construct	   of	   rules	  discussed	  above.	  The	  principal	  challenge	  comes	  in	  when	  we	  seek	  to	  move	  beyond	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  underlying	  rationalistic	  and	  individualistic	  model	  of	  “rational	  choice”	  without	  succumbing	  to	  the	  well-­‐known	  limits	  of	  collective	  consciousness	  or	  some	  form	  of	  solipsism.	  A	  key	  to	  this	  is	  to	  be	  found	  in	  the	  social	  concept	  of	  association.	  
Association	  The	   term	   association	   has	   many	   denotations,	   connotations	   and	   usages.	   Most	   tend	   to	  suggest	  types	  of	  connection	  or	  linkage,	  whether	  the	  connection	  is	  between	  ideas,	  events,	  people	  or	   something	   else.	   It	   is	   used	   here	   (I	   hope)	   exclusively)	   to	   connote	   connections,	   networks,	   or	  social	  relations	  between	  people.	  Association	  is	  often	  accompanied	  in	  this	  context	  by	  modifiers	  like	  voluntary	  or	  membership.	  The	  phrase	  “common	  interest	  association”	  is	  useful,	  according	  to	  Smith,	   Stebbins	   and	   Dover	   (2006,	   p.	   23)	   to	   emphasize	   that	   associations	   often	   form	   around	  shared	  or	  mutual	  interests	  like	  those	  that	  have	  been	  identified	  above	  as	  missions,	  or,	  in	  the	  case	  of	   some	   associations,	   for	   the	   mutual	   benefit	   of	   their	   members.	   The	   term	   common	   goods	  association	  is	  used	  in	  that	  sense.	  The	  broader	  usage	  of	  association	  as	  a	  synonym	  for	  all	  social	  interaction	  is	  left	  aside.	  For	  our	  present	  purposes,	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  see	  markets,	  governments	  and	  new	  commons	  as	  distinct	  forms	  of	  association.	  Thus,	  the	  three	  sectors,	  however	  else	  they	  may	   be	   characterized,	   are	   also	   differentiated	   by	   their	   association	   (or	   what	   Etzioni	   [1963]	  termed	   their	   compliance	   relations):	   coercive,	   utilitarian	   or	   normative.	   Likewise,	   the	   ordinary	  sociological	   usage	   of	   the	   primary	   associations	   of	   the	   intimate	   sphere	   from	   the	   secondary	  associations	  of	  market	  and	  state	  makes	  association	  the	  bridge	  to	  bring	  in	  this	  fourth	  sphere.	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Usage	   of	   the	   term	   association	   here	   is	   a	   direct	   outgrowth	   of	   the	   conception	   of	   a	   new	  commons	  as	  pluralities	  of	  people	  organized	  for	  shared	  purposes	  and	  sharing	  common	  pools	  of	  resources.	  (Gifis,	  1991:	  83.	  Lohmann,	  1992:	  27).	   	  Associationism	  is	  a	  related	  term	  connoting	  a	  particular	  set	  of	  co-­‐productive	  relations	  between	  secondary	  associations	  and	  the	  institutions	  of	  government.	   It	   is	   an	   idea	   long	   associated	   with	   political	   pluralism	   and	   linked	   to	   ongoing	  concerns	   for	   future	   advancement	   of	   democracy	   (Hirst,	   1994;	   Elstub	   2008;	   von	  Gierke,	   1966;	  Zunz,	  2010).	  G.D.H.	  Cole,	  a	  British	  adherent	  of	  associationism,	  defined	  association	  as:	  	  Any	   group	   of	   persons	   pursuing	   a	   common	   purpose	   or	   aggregation	   of	   purposes	   by	   a	  course	  of	  cooperative	  action	  extending	  beyond	  a	  single	  act,	  and	  for	  this	  purpose	  agreeing	  together	   upon	   certain	   methods	   and	   procedures	   and	   laying	   down,	   in	   however	  rudimentary	   a	   form,	   rules	   for	   common	  action.	  At	   least	   two	   things	   are	  necessary	   to	   an	  association:	  a	  common	  purpose	  and,	   to	  a	  certain	  extent	  rules	  of	  common	  action.	   (Cole,	  1920,	  as	  quoted	  by	  Elstub	  2008:	  101)	  Elstub	   (2008:	   101)	   finds	   Cole’s	   definition	   overly	   broad	   and	   adds	   three	   additional	  qualifications:	   members	   of	   an	   association	   must	   participate	   voluntarily,	   and,	   he	   says,	  associations	   are	   secondary	   organizations	   operating	   “in”	   civil	   society.	   The	   first	   of	   these	   is	  consistent	  with	   the	  discussion	  of	  new	  commons	  noted	  above.	  The	   connection	   to	   civil	   society,	  was	  noted	  previously	  and	  will	  be	  discussed	  further	  below,	  but	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  here	  that	  the	  concept	   of	   associations	   operating	   within	   civil	   society	   is	   incompatible	   with	   the	   view	   often	  expressed	   by	   third	   sector	   scholars	   that	   associations	   (or	   nonprofit	   organizations)	   define	   civil	  society.	   	  The	  third	  point	  requires	  further	  comment.	  Like	  Cole,	  Elstub	  is	  primarily	  interested	  in	  association	  and	  the	  state:	  larger	  political	  issues	  and	  the	  role	  of	  government.	  There	  is	  no	  inkling	  of	   a	   third	   sector	   in	   his	   discussion.	   His	   conception	   of	   secondary	   organization	   emphasizes	   the	  primacy	  of	  the	  state	  as	  a	  form	  of	  association.	  This	  contrasts	  with	  democracy	  as	  a	  collective	  way	  of	   living	   and	   uses	   the	   same	   terms	   in	   a	   different	   way	   as	   explained	   in	   the	   following	   section.	  Associations	   characterized	   by	   voluntary	   participation	   and	   collective	   resource	   pooling	   for	  common	  interests	  and	  purposes	  in	  civil	  society	  are	  deemed	  to	  be	  “unavoidable	  political	   facts”	  (Cohen	  and	  Rogers	  1995:	  26;	  quoted	  in	  Elstub	  2008:	  214;	  Mansbridge	  1992;	  Hendricks	  2002)	  although	   the	   issue	   of	   pooled	   resources	   is	   often	   implied	   and	   seldom	  mentioned	   explicitly	   in	  social	  and	  political	  theories.	  
Voluntary	  Action	  As	  Collective	  Behavior	  The	  understanding	  of	  association	  in	  voluntary	  action	  has	  suffered	  in	  important	  respects	  by	  the	  seemingly	  random	  patterns	  of	  interest	  and	  specialization	  in	  the	  social	  science	  disciplines.	  Thus,	   for	   example,	   the	   number	   of	   economists	   and	   management	   scholars	   working	   from	   a	  rationalist/individualist	   frame	   of	   reference	   has,	   to	   the	   present,	   far	   exceeded	   the	   number	  working	   in	   behavioral	   communications	   and	   interactional	   paradigms.	   Thus,	   we	   have	   had	  numerous	  seemingly	  paradoxical	  attempts	  to	  explain	  association	  and	  the	  collective	  behavior	  of	  charity,	   philanthropy,	   ‘nonprofit	   organization’	   and	   even	   social	   movements	   from	   completely	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non-­‐collective,	  and	  sometimes	  antagonistic,	  points	  of	  view.	  Such	  perspectives	  overstate	  the	  role	  of	  decisions,	  or	  choice,	  as	  the	  principle	  form	  of	  behavior.	  They	  also	  over	  emphasize	  the	  role	  of	  “the”	   Cartesian	   individual	   or	   decider,	   overstate	   the	   importance	   of	   self	   (and	   self-­‐interest)	   and	  generally	  fail	  to	  provide	  convincing	  accounts	  of	  voluntary	  action.	  One	  widely	  shared	  evidence	  of	  this	   is	   the	  widespread	  public	   skepticism	   that	   erupted	   following	   the	  2010	  U.S.	   Supreme	  Court	  ruling	   in	   the	  Citizens	  United	  case	  with	   the	   court’s	   conclusion	   that	   corporations	  were	  persons.	  Numerous	  resources	  from	  the	  communications	  based	  and	  interactive	  perspectives	  in	  the	  social	  sciences	  are	  available	  to	  remedy	  the	  distorted	  perspectives	  that	  result,	  but	  constitutional	   law,	  economics	   and	   management	   sciences	   have	   been	   equally	   enthusiastic	   in	   ignoring	   these	  resources.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  obvious	  necessary	  correctives	  becomes	  clear	  with	  a	  simple	  proposition:	  
Collective	   choice	   is	   only	   one	   aspect	   of	   collective	   behavior.	   Collective	   behavior	   is	   an	  interdisciplinary	  branch	  of	  social	  psychology	  and	  sociology	  that	  has	  been	  around	  for	  most	  of	  the	  past	  century.	  The	  term	  was	  coined	  by	  the	  sociologist	  Robert	  Park	  and	  received	  one	  of	  its	  fullest	  conceptualizations	  by	  Herbert	  Blumer	  (1946).	  Generally,	  the	  term	  refers	  to	  spontaneous	  social	  processes	  and	  behavior	  occurring	  “outside”	  existing	   institutions	  or	  social	  structures	  –	  an	   idea	  that	   dovetails	   nicely	   with	   the	   conception	   of	   the	   independent	   sector	   existing	   outside	  governments,	  markets	  and	  families.	  Thus,	  to	  march	  in	  a	  public	  protest	  is	  to	  engage	  in	  collective	  behavior,	   to	   buy	   hamburger	   at	   the	   grocery	   store	   or	   renew	   your	   driving	   license	   is	   not.	   The	  conceptions	  of	   social	  movements,	   social	  problems	  and	  news	  discussed	  below	   in	  Chapter	  8	  all	  reflect	   forms	  of	   voluntary	  action	  as	   collective	  behavior,	   albeit	  not	   always	   recognized	  as	   such.	  Many	   early	   studies	   of	   social	   movements,	   for	   example,	   were	   conducted	   within	   the	   particular	  collective	  behavior	  frameworks	  of	  Chicago	  School	  sociologists	  termed	  social	  disorganization;	  a	  view	  that	  has	  been	  recently	  resuscitated	  by	  Kubrin	  and	  Weitzer	  (2003)	  Connections	  between	  this	  and	  other	  theories	  of	  collective	  behavior	  and	  voluntary	  action	  are	  particularly	  important	  in	  light	  of	  the	  discussion	  below	  of	  the	  emergent	  characteristics	  of	  new	  commons	  and	  in	  particular	  their	  ability	  to	  generate	  new	  moeurs	  and	  trust	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  moral	  capital.	  Little	  more	  can	  be	  done	  here	  other	  than	  to	  point	  out	  the	  connection	  and	  hope	  that	  future	  scholars	  will	  follow	  up	  on	  these	  connections.	  Perhaps	  our	  future	  understanding	  of	  these	  dynamics	  in	  commons	  can	  also	  be	  enhanced	  by	   closer	   examination	   of	   Nikolas	   Luhmann’s	   social	   systems	   concepts	   of	   autopoiesis	   and	  
allopoiesis,	  Frederick	  Hayek’s	   spontaneous	  order	  and,	  perhaps,	  Paulo	  Friere’s	  conscientization.	  These	  latter	  two	  are	  often	  treated	  as	  the	  particular	  political	  capital	  of	  rightist	  or	  leftist	  political	  theories	  while	  Luhmann’s	  work	  falls	  within	  the	  largely	  apolitical	  precincts	  of	  social	  theory.	  Yet	  it	  is	  not	  difficult	  to	  see,	  in	  broad	  outline,	  certain	  important	  connections	  between	  them.	  Seldom,	  in	  fact,	  do	  representatives	  of	  the	  theoretical	  “left”	  and	  “right”	  appear	  in	  such	  agreement	  as	  over	  these	   four	   concepts.	   Autopoiesis	   can	   be	   seen	   in	   the	   third	   sector	   as	   typically	   a	   process	   of	  spontaneous	  order	   (a	  key	   term	  of	  Frederick	  Hayek)	   that	   refers	   to	   self-­‐creation	  as	  dialectic	  of	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structure	   and	   function.	   Allopoiesis	   (at	   least	   of	   a	   type	  we	   are	   calling	   production	   here)	   is	   the	  companion	   process	   (also	   typically	   a	   spontaneous	   ordering)	   through	   which	   a	   system	   creates	  something	   other	   than	   it	   self.	   By	   conscientization,	   Frieire	   refers	   to	   processes	   of	   critical	  consciousness	   and	   learning	   or	   forming	   new	   awareness	   of	   social	   reality	   through	   thought	   and	  action	   and	   by	  which	   new	   understandings	   arise.	   Such	   critical	   consciousness	   and	   learning	   are	  observed	  often	  in	  the	  context	  of	  both	  social	  movements	  and	  social	  problem	  definition	  processes	  (in	   everyday	   society,	   and	   equally	   in	   the	   social	   scientific	   literature!)	   It	   would	   not	   be	   a	  major	  stretch	   to	   suggest	   that	   Hayek’s	   spontaneous	   order	   and	   Frieire’s	   conscientization	   bear	   some	  remarkable	   similarities.	   As	  we	   shall	   see	   in	   Chapter	   9,	   all	   of	   these	   dimensions	   are	   important	  aspects	   of	   knowledge	   commons,	   as	   illustrated	   by	   collective	   behavior	   and	   social	   problem	  awareness.	  In	  the	  classic	   formulation	  by	  Blumer	  (1946,	  1951;	  Shibutani	  1973),	  collective	  behavior	  was	   focused	   on	   four	   principal	   types	   of	   collectivities,	   or	   social	   organizations:	   crowds,	   mass	  audiences,	   publics	   and	   social	   movements.	   In	   a	   later	   essay,	   Blumer	   (1971)	   also	   connected	  collective	  behavior	  to	  social	  problems	  (see,	  Lofland	  1985).	  We	  recognize	  that	  crowds,	  sharing	  a	  common	   emotion	   according	   to	   Park,	   are	   one	   of	   the	   classic	   forms	   in	   which	   repertories	   of	  protestation	  can	  arise	  more	  or	  less	  spontaneously,	  and	  that	  mass	  audiences	  are	  defined	  by	  the	  communications	   media	   that	   supply	   them.	   Park	   and	   Blumer	   both	   use	   publics,	   defined	   by	  common	  interests,	  in	  the	  same	  sense	  as	  Dewey	  and	  Follett	  as	  noted	  above	  in	  Chapter	  2.	  Social	  movements	  from	  the	  Park-­‐Blumer	  perspective	  have,	  over	  the	  long	  run,	  been	  the	  most	  difficult	  and	  contentious	  item	  in	  the	  collective	  behavior	  frame,	  with	  competing	  frameworks	  put	  forth	  by	  Smelzer	  and	  others.	  However,	  the	  occurrence	  of	  alternative	  explanations	  should	  not	  distract	  us	  from	   the	   enduring	   connections	   between	   collective	   behavior	   as	   a	   theoretical	   discipline	   and	  voluntary	  action.	  Thus,	  we	  can	  add	  Blumer’s	  types	  to	  the	  list	  of	  types	  of	  voluntary	  action	  at	  this	  point	  and	  suggest	  that	  organized	  voluntary	  action	  involves	  not	  only	  groups,	  associations,	  formal	  organizations	   and	   assemblies,	   but	   also	   crowds,	   audiences,	   publics	   and	   movements.	   Butsch	  (2010),	   for	   example,	   distinguishes	   audiences,	   crowds,	   publics	   and	   consumers	   in	   a	   historical	  comparison	   of	   theater	   assembly	   in	   London	   that	   demonstrates	   implicit	   rudiments	   of	   a	  multi-­‐sector	  analysis.	  
 Maturana	   and	   Varela	   (1980)	   wrote	   that	   autopoiesis	   as	   self-­‐organization	   is	   logically	  impossible	   because	   when	   the	   organization	   of	   a	   thing	   changes;	   the	   thing	   itself	   becomes	  something	  else.	  	  This	  is	  an	  idea	  with	  strong	  implications:	  The	  insight	  of	  constant	  change,	  rather	  than	  dismissing	  autopoiesis	   as	   a	   relevant	   idea,	   suggests	   it	   as	   a	   fundamental	   corrective	   to	   the	  view	  of	   the	  third	  sector	  as	  stable	  and	  unchanging,	  particularly	   in	   its	  collective	  behavior.	   	  This	  supports	   Luhmann’s	   claims	   of	   the	   dialectical	   nature	   of	   the	   process.	   At	   any	   rate	   things	   have	  changed	   since	  Maturana’s	   claim	  was	   first	  made,	   and	   the	   opening	  made	   by	   the	   constructivist	  theory	   of	   social	   problems	   offers	   another	   entre-­‐pôt	   into	   the	   third	   sector.	   Spector	   and	   Kitsuse	  (1983),	  Nichols	  (2003A,	  2003B,	  2008)	  and	  others	  have	  detailed	  the	  processes	  by	  which	  social	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problems	  are	  socially	  constructed.	  Their	  perspectives	  combine	  Blumer’s	  collective	  behavior	  and	  the	  “constructivism”	  of	  Berger	  and	  Luckmann	  (1967)	  to	  advance	  the	  model	  of	  social	  problems	  as	   socially	   constructs.	   This,	   in	   effect,	   spells	   out	   aspects	   of	   Blumer’s	   “process	   of	   collective	  definition”,	  and	  has	  led	  to	  recognition	  of	  whole	  new	  categories	  of	  social	  problems.	  What	  is	  still	  only	   implicit	   in	   this	   view,	   however,	   is	   that	   social	   problems	   so	   construed	   originate	   as	   the	  constructs	  –	  the	  social	  imaginaries	  –	  of	  particular	  groups	  and	  publics	  and	  are	  disseminated	  and	  frequently	  maintained	  by	  particular	  associations.	  	   Blumer	   and	   those	   who	   followed	   this	   path	   are	   right	   in	   two	   key	   premises	   that	   have	  additional	  implications	  for	  the	  social	  organization	  of	  social	  problems:	  “Sociologists	  have	  erred	  in	  locating	  social	  problems	  in	  objective	  conditions.	  Instead,	  social	  problems	  have	  their	  being	  in	  a	   process	   of	   collective	   definition.”	   And	   the	   focus	   of	   the	   theory	   is	   on	   the	   associations	   and	  organizations	  of	  those	  engaged	  in	  such	  defining.	  There	  are	  still	  important	  remaining	  qualities	  of	  objectification	   in	   this	   approach	   however.	   As	   Blumer	   claimed,	   “social	   problems	   are	  fundamentally	  products	  of	  a	  process	  of	  collective	  definition	  instead	  of	  existing	  independently	  as	  a	   set	   of	   objective	   social	   arrangements	  with	   an	   intrinsic	  makeup.”	   But,	   like	   other	   autopoeitic	  products	  in	  commons,	  they	  appear	  to	  be	  subject	  to	  a	  certain	  measure	  of	  commodification	  and	  objectification,	  particularly	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  professionals.	  	  	   After	   laying	   this	   impressive	   groundwork,	   Blumer	   reverted	   back	   into	   a	   kind	   of	   (then)	  familiar	   idealism	   rather	   than	   pushing	   the	   analysis	   in	   the	   direction	   of	   answering	   seemingly	  obvious	   questions	   like	  who	   is	   doing	   the	   collective	   defining,	   legitimation	   and	   other	   processes	  mentioned	   and	   how	   are	   they	   doing	   it?	   	   Is	   this	   a	  matter	   of	   crowds,	   publics,	  masses	   or	   social	  movements?	  This	  may	  be	  part	  of	  the	  general	  and	  well-­‐discussed	  inability	  of	  Blumerian	  symbolic	  interactionism	   to	   deal	   adequately	   with	   political	   matters	   (Harvey	   &	   Katovich	   1992;	   Hinkle	  1992).	  The	  work	  of	  Murray	  Edelman,	  while	  not	  typically	  included	  in	  the	  symbolic	  interactionist	  corpus,	   represents	   a	  major	   exception	   to	   this	   apoliticism	   (See	  Edelman	  1964;	  Edelman,	   1971;	  Edelman	  1977	  and	  Edelman,	  1988	  in	  particular).	   
 
Association	  and	  Organizations	  One	   of	   the	   major	   unresolved	   issues	   in	   Tocqueville’s	   treatment	   of	   associations	   in	  Chapters	  4	  through	  8	  of	  Volume	  Two,	  Part	  2	  of	  Democracy	   in	  America	   is	  the	  relation	  between	  associations	   as	   that	   idea	   is	   generally	   known	   (aka	   voluntary	   associations)	   and	   political	  associations	   or	   what	   James	   Madison	   in	   Federalist	   Paper	   #10	   termed	   factions	   (Hamilton,	  Madison,	   Jay,	   Beeman,	   2012).	   Since	   the	   2010	   Supreme	   Court	   ruling	   in	   the	   Citizens	   United	   v.	  
Federal	   Election	   Commission	   case,	   the	   latter	   include	   political	   action	   committees	   (PACs).	   For	  some	  third	  sector	  scholars	  in	  the	  U.S.,	   this	   issue	  is	  resolved	  by	  exclusive	  attention	  to	  501(c)	  3	  corporations,	  labeled	  by	  the	  IRS	  as	  public	  charities,	  that	  are	  tax	  exempt	  and	  donations	  to	  which	  are	   tax-­‐deductible.	   Using	   that	   as	   a	   research	   frame	   has	   proven	   very	   workable	   as	   noted	   in	  Chapter	  3.	  One	  must	  keep	   in	  mind,	  however,	  not	  only	   that	   this	   is	  a	  peculiarly	  U.S.	   conception	  which	  links	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  third	  sector	  to	  tax	  policy.	  Also	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  Chapter	  3,	  such	  a	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view	  can	  also	  account	  for	  only	  a	  portion	  of	  all	  voluntary	  action	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  and	  may	  also	  focus	  attention	   only	   on	   the	   governing	   instruments	   of	   larger	   organized	   voluntary	   actions.	   Political	  associations	   of	   several	   types,	   cooperatives,	   self-­‐help	   and	  mutual	   aid,	   trusts,	   and	  many	   social	  movements	   and	   social	   problems	   are	   among	   the	   many	   organized,	   voluntary	   collective	   action	  associations	  easily	  excluded	  by	  this	  conception.	  Further,	  the	  usefulness	  of	  that	  particular	  frame	  requires	  multiple	  additions	  and	  extensions	  in	  order	  to	  link	  it	  to	  democratic	  society	  and	  culture,	  except	   perhaps	   for	   those	   who	   believe	   that	   tax-­‐exempt	   corporations	   are	   somehow	   the	  quintessence	  of	  democracy	  in	  society	  and	  culture,	  or	  that	  donations	  to	  such	  entities	  are	  the	  sine	  
quo	   non	   of	   democratic	   behavior.	   Once	   501(c)	   4	   organizations,	   a	   category	   known	   as	   “social	  welfare	  organizations”	  became	  a	  key	  type	  of	  political	  associations	  through	  the	  politics	  following	  the	   Citizens’	   United	   ruling	   in	   2010	   the	   very	   distinction	   between	   political	   associations	  (traditionally,	   relegated	   to	   IRS	   Section	   528)	   and	   the	   civil	   associations	   of	   Section	   501(c)	  was	  nullified.	  Three	   propositions	   are	   particularly	   important	   to	   sorting	   out	   questions	   of	   the	   relation	  between	  nonprofit	  organizations	  and	  democracy.	  These	  propositions	  are	  modifications	  of	   the	  “spanning	  and	  mediating”	  propositions	  identified	  in	  Van	  Til,	  1988.	  The	  first	  is	  that	  this	  is	  not	  a	  stable	   or	   fixed	   relation;	   organized	   associations,	   regardless	   of	   their	   level	   of	   formality,	  may	   be	  either	   supportive	   or	   destructive	   of	   democracy.	   Whether	   associations	   support	   or	   undermine	  democracy	   offers	   a	   clear	   standard	   for	   determination	   of	   whether	   commons	   are	   good	   or	   not.	  Secondly,	  attention	  must	  be	  paid	  to	  the	  relation	  between	  corporations	  and	  voluntary	  action.	  Is	  incorporation	  merely	   a	   legal	   technicality,	   as	   it	   has	   traditionally	   been	   treated	   in	   third	   sector	  theory?	  Or	  does	  it	  change	  the	  fundamental	  character	  of	  voluntary	  action,	  requiring	  distinction	  and	   different	   treatment?	   In	   particular,	   does	   incorporation,	   which	   is	   a	   form	   of	   governmental	  recognition,	   automatically	  make	   political	   associations	   out	   of	  what	  were	   previously	   voluntary	  associations?	  There	  are	  many	  (28	  at	  last	  count)	  categories	  of	  nonprofit	  corporation	  recognized	  in	  Sections	  501	  and	  528	  of	   the	  U.S.	   tax	  code,	  all	  of	   them	  entitled	   to	  be	  called	  “nonprofit”,	  and	  that	  only	  applies	  in	  the	  U.S.	  Every	  other	  country	  where	  voluntary	  action	  is	  a	  factor	  in	  civic	  life	  and	  nonprofit	   is	  a	   legal	  category	  has	   its	  own	  definitions	  and	  categories,	  not	   to	  mention	   those	  nations	  that	  use	  other	  concepts	  or	  approaches	  to	  incorporation.	  Finally,	  as	  already	  noted,	  much	  of	   voluntary	  action,	   including	   contestation,	  protest,	   social	  problems	  and	   social	  movements,	   is	  not	  susceptible	  to	  any	  easy	  or	  precise	  distinctions	  between	  civil	  and	  political	  nor	  to	  notions	  of	  easily	   identifiable,	   fixed	  and	  unchanging	  organizations.	  The	  dizzying	  efforts	  of	   trying	   to	   track	  political	  action	  committees	  associated	  with	  Karl	  Rove	  alone	  from	  one	  campaign	  to	  another,	  or	  those	   supportive	   and	   opposing	   a	   controversial	   social	   movements	   for	   and	   against	   legalized	  abortion	   or	   immigration	   illustrate	   this	   point	   clearly:	   	   They	   come	   and	   go	   as	   necessity	   allows.	  People	  engaged	  in	  voluntary	  action	  can	  easily	  move	  in	  and	  out	  of	  organizations,	  some	  of	  which	  are	   real	  while	   others	   are	  mere	   “shells”,	   fronts	   or	  devices	   very	  pragmatically,	   using	   them	  and	  shedding	  them	  as	  suits	  their	  purposes,	  and	  nowhere	  is	  this	  more	  in	  evidence	  than	  in	  the	  areas	  of	  political	  associations	  generally	  and	  political	  movements	  specifically.	  Much	  the	  same	  point	  can	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be	  made	   in	   the	  completely	  different	  contexts	  of	  modern	  art	  and	   jazz,	  where	  movements	  with	  names	   like	   “unmonumental”	   sculpture,	   pop	   art,	   hip	   hop,	   and	   “fusion”	   jazz	   point	   to	   diverse,	  interesting	   and	   difficult	   to	   track	   shifts	   in	   allegiances,	   loyalties,	   and	   most	   fundamentally,	  associations.	   A	   final	   point	   to	   be	   noted	   here	   is	   that	   all	   organized	   association	   in	   democratic	  society	   and	   culture	   is,	   to	   some	   degree,	   voluntary.	   This	   leads	   to	   a	   very	   important	   insight	  regarding	  the	  modular	  nature	  of	  voluntary	  action.	  As	  a	  result,	  modules	  of	  voluntary	  action	  are	  not	  limited	  to	  a	  formal,	  logically	  coherent	  independent	  sector,	  but	  may	  be	  found	  anywhere.	  
Modularity,	  Not	  Convergence	  	   One	   of	   the	   cardinal	   points	   of	   association	   as	   it	   relates	   to	   the	   contemporary	   notion	   of	  sectors	  has	  been	  a	  principle	  we	  might	   call	   institutional	  homogeneity.	   It	   is	   assumed	   in	   current	  theory	  and	   in	   classification	   systems	   like	   the	  National	  Taxonomy	  of	  Exempt	  Entities	   that	   if	   an	  organization	  is	  “nonprofit”	  of	  a	  certain	  type	  all	  of	  it	  is	  uniformly	  nonprofit	  and	  of	  that	  type;	  that	  is,	  a	  corporation	  holding	  a	  tax	  exemption	  ruling	  from	  the	  IRS,	  that	  all	  parts	  of	  the	  organization	  are	  uniformly	  charitable,	  tax-­‐exempt,	  and	  reliant	  on	  donations;	  if	  its	  mission	  is	  classifiable	  with	  the	  NTEE,	  that	  characterization	  applies	  to	  the	  whole	  establishment.	  As	  a	  working	  reality	  and	  in	  the	  UBIT	  (unrelated	  business	  income	  tax)	  provisions	  of	  the	  tax	  code	  applying	  to	  exempt	  entities	  anyone	  familiar	  with	  nonprofits	  will	  recognize	  that	  there	  are	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  provisions	  and	  real	  examples	  of	  “for-­‐profit	  subsidiaries”,	  surplus-­‐generating	  cash	  cows	  and	  unrelated	  business	  income	  (UBIT)	  activities	  and	  yet	  theoretically	  homogeneity	  is	  often	  treated	  as	  a	  first	  principle	  of	  organization	  in	  voluntary	  action	  (Fishman,	  2010).	  	  There	  is	  no	  provision	  in	  any	  of	  the	  existing	  classification	  systems	  for	  recognizing	  as	  an	  entity	   a	   third	   sector	   institution	   (like	   a	   modern	   university	   or	   college)	   consisting	   of	   multiple	  distinct	  common,	  public,	  household	  and	   for-­‐profit	  units	   like	  revenue	  centers	   like	  dormitories,	  cafeterias	   or	   coffee	   shops	   and	   bookstores,	   nor	   all	   manner	   of	   organized,	   semi-­‐organized	  programs	   and	   centers	   and	   unorganized	   clubs,	   associations,	   student	   political	   parties,	   study	  groups	   and	   other	   mutual	   aid	   and	   self-­‐help	   networks	   along	   with	   almost	   endless	   other	  possibilities.	  And	  what	  is	  true	  of	  contemporary	  colleges	  and	  universities	  is	  also	  true	  to	  greater	  or	  lesser	  degrees	  of	  other	  new	  commons	  like	  religious	  congregations,	  social	  clubs,	  membership	  associations,	  museums,	  theaters,	  cooperatives,	  and	  perhaps	  all	  other	  forms	  of	  voluntary	  action.	  While	  the	  notion	  of	  institutional	  homogeneity	  introduces	  discipline,	  coherence	  and	  consistency	  into	   the	   published	   literature,	   it	   fails	   completely	   to	   reflect	   the	   complex	   realities	   of	   the	   third	  sector.	  An	   enterprise	   governed	   by	   a	   single	   governing	   board	   or	   group	   and	   recognized	   in	   the	  community	   as	   a	   single	   institution	   may	   consist	   of	   any	   number	   of	   distinct	   corporate	   and	  organizational	   entities.	   A	   church,	   synagogue	   or	   temple	   for	   example	  may	   include	   groups	   and	  assemblies	   for	   prayer	   or	   worship,	   choirs,	   ensembles,	   orchestras,	   and	   other	   performatories,	  senior	  citizens,	  youth	  and	  children’s	  groups,	  religious	  schools,	  prayer	  and	  study	  groups,	  and	  any	  number	   of	   peer	   groups,	   friendship	   groups	   and	   social	   networks.	   And,	   among	   tax-­‐exempt	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institutions,	   any	  number	  of	   these	  distinct	  entities	  may	   include	  bookstores,	   gift	   shops,	   tuition-­‐based	   educational	   or	   day	   care	   programs,	   advocacy	   and	   lobbying	   programs,	   and	   may	   also	  include	  governmental	  or	  quasi-­‐public	  programs,	  such	  as	  contracts	  with	  state	  agencies	  for	  child	  protective	  services,	  some	  of	  which	  may	  even	  invoke	  quasi-­‐state	  powers.	  	  Contemporary	  scholars	  often	  see	  this	  as	  “convergence”	  among	  the	  sectors	  (Brody,	  1994;	  Button	  &	  Pentacost,	   1993;	   Frumkin	  &	  Galeskiewicz,	   2004;	   Li,	   2007)	   but	   such	   convergence	   is	  typically	  only	  a	  matter	  of	  organizational	  form	  or	  purely	  an	  operational,	  policy	  and	  contractual	  matter.	  It	  should	  be	  clear	  that	  the	  notion	  that	  a	  single	  category	  or	  overall	  designation	  –	  public,	  commercial	  (“for-­‐profit”),	  or	  nonprofit	  –	  can	  adequately	  describe	  all	  organizations	  can	  be	  highly	  deceptive;	  .	  It	  may	  be	  undeniable	  that	  selected	  cases	  of	  institutional	  isomorphism	  tend	  toward	  the	   form	  we	   are	   calling	   bureaucratic	   firms	   as	   characterized	   as	   institutional	   isomorphism	   by	  DiMaggio	  and	  Powell	  (1983).	  Even	  so,	  the	  characteristic	  organization	  types	  this	  points	  toward	  are	  merely	   one	   facet	   of	  much	   larger	   and	  more	   complex	   social,	   legal,	   economic,	   political	   and	  cultural	  realities.	  The	  recognition	  that	  all	  organizations	  are	  of	  a	  particular	  type,	   in	   fact,	  solves	  little.	  It	  merely	  transforms	  the	  question	  from	  differences	  between	  categories	  to	  sub-­‐categorical	  differences	   within	   a	   single	   category.	   The	   question	   remains,	   what	   precisely	   are	   those	  differences?	  How,	   then,	   are	  we	   to	   characterize	   the	   groups,	   organizations,	   institutions,	   associations,	  assemblies,	  crowds,	  networks,	  and	  all	  the	  other	  organization	  of	  voluntary	  action?	  The	  problem	  is	  not	  as	  daunting	  as	   it	  may	  at	   first	  appear.	  A	  key	  step	  would	  be	  to	  move	  away	  from	  the	  “one	  institution/one	   mission”	   approach	   of	   the	   tax	   code	   and	   NTEE-­‐type	   classifications	   and	   make	  provision	   in	   theory	   for	   the	   modular	   nature	   of	   the	   contemporary	   organizations	   of	   voluntary	  action.	   In	   many	   cases,	   we	   already	   do	   exactly	   this	   in	   our	   ordinary	   language.	   Thus,	   when	   we	  follow	  the	  clues	  in	  ordinary	  usage	  and	  descriptions,	  a	  fairly	  clear,	  model	  of	  modularity	  begins	  to	  emerge. The	  concept	  of	  modularity	  used	  here	   is	  derived	   from	  Sidney	  Tarrow	  who	  noted	   that	  Tilly's	   concept	   of	   repertories	   of	   contention	   “has	   enabled	   us	   to	   definitively	   transcend	   the	  'volcanic'	   model	   of	   collective	   action	   inherited	   from	   the	   past.	   But	   by	   failing	   to	   specify	   the	  difference	  in	  generality	  between	  the	  old	  and	  the	  new	  repertorie,	  Tilly	  shows	  an	  insensitivity	  to	  the	  differences	  between	  the	  direct,	  inflexible	  and	  "attached"	  forms	  of	  the	  past	  and	  the	  indirect,	  flexible	  and	  modular	  forms	  that	  developed	  over	  the	  past	  two	  centuries"	  (1993:	  84-­‐5).	  First,	   modularity	   is	   one	   way	   to	   account	   for	   the	   otherwise	   peculiar	   usage	   of	   the	   term	  institution	  in	  nonprofit	  and	  voluntary	  action	  contexts.	  In	  sociology	  and	  anthropology	  and	  other	  social	   sciences,	   institution	   often	   has	   complex	   meanings	   that	   need	   not	   concern	   us	   for	   the	  moment.	   In	  voluntary	  action	  institution	  is	  sometimes	  used	  colloquially	  to	  connote	  qualities	  of	  long-­‐lastingness,	   or	   durability.	   Education	   can	   occur	   in	   any	   number	   of	   ways,	   but	   educational	  institutions	   are	   those	  programs,	   schools,	   colleges	   and	  universities	   that	   have	  been	   engaged	   in	  education	  for	  a	  while,	  and	  more	  importantly,	  that	  we	  expect	  to	  be	  around	  awhile	  longer,	  if	  only	  to	   sanction	   the	   credibility	   of	   their	   graduates.	   The	   same	   holds	   for	   religious	   institutions,	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charitable	   institutions,	   sports,	   cultural	   or	   arts	   institutions	   and	   all	   the	   rest.	   Institution	   is	   also	  used	  as	  a	  signal	  or	  marker	  denoting	  that	  we	  are	  concerned	  with	  the	  top	  or	  most	  general	  level	  of	  organization:	  IBM,	  WVU,	  the	  federal	  government,	  the	  Presbyterian	  Church,	  or	  the	  AFL-­‐CIO.	  All	  are	   institutions	   in	   either	   or	   both	   of	   these	   senses.	   For	   example,	   Rosemary	   Sarri	   (1970)	   uses	  institutional	  level	  this	  way.	  Institutions	   in	   this	   sense	   can	   also	   generally	   be	   classified	   by	   sector	   as	   is	   often	   done:	  public,	  state	  or	  governmental;	  market,	  commercial,	  or	  for-­‐profit;	  third,	  nonprofit	  or	  commons;	  or	   private,	   intimate	   or	   household	   sectors.	   Even	   in	   complex	   cases,	  we	   can	   usually	   clarify	   that	  Blackwater	   and	   Halliburton	   are	   private,	   for-­‐profit	   institutions	   engaged	   in	   public	   national	  defense	  work.	   It	   is,	   in	   fact,	   necessary	   to	   assume	   a	   beginning	  point	   something	   like	   this	   sector	  alignment	  as	  the	  departure	  point	  for	  notions	  of	  convergence	  and	  institutional	  isomorphism	  to	  make	  any	  sense.	  	  Yet,	   it	   is	  easy	  to	  observe	  that	   institutions	  classified	  within	  any	  one	  of	   the	  basic	  sectors	  may	  include	  within	  its	  institutional	  umbrella,	  sub-­‐units	  (modules)	  that	  are	  normally	  associated	  with	  another	  sector	  or	  sectors.	  	  Corporate	  foundations	  that	  operate	  within	  an	  overall	  corporate	  hierarchy	  are	  well-­‐known	  examples;	  within	  the	  corporate	  umbrella,	  yet	  set	  apart	  in	  important	  ways	  by	  law,	  public	  relations,	  institutional	  policy	  and	  other	  considerations.	  We	  can	  also	  expect	  to	  find	  organized	  voluntary	  action	  within	  the	  institutional	  auspices	  of	  political	  states,	  economic	  markets	  and	  even	  in	  the	  intimate	  sphere	  of	  households,	  and	  modules	  of	  public	  service,	  profit-­‐seeking	  and	  family	  life	  within	  organized	  voluntary	  action.	  That	  is	  precisely	  what	  we	  can	  observe	  almost	   anywhere	  we	   choose	   to	   look:	   In	   the	   (voluntary)	   committees	   that	   conduct	   fundraising	  campaigns	   and	   organize	   company	   picnics	   within	   corporate	   and	   governmental	   offices,	   in	   the	  “revenue	   centers”	   expected	   to	   turn	   a	   profit	   (surplus	   revenue)	   of	   nonprofit	   colleges	   and	  hospitals	  and	  government	  bureaus,	  in	  the	  nonprofit	  or	  volunteer	  family	  reunion	  associations	  of	  extended	  families	  and	  in	  many	  other	  examples	  too	  numerous	  to	  tabulate	  completely	  here.	  The	  question	   is	  how	  are	  we	  to	  account	   for	  this	  modularity?	  The	  one-­‐size-­‐fits-­‐all	  notion	  of	  sectoral	  convergence	  clearly	  is	  inadequate	  to	  the	  task.	  One	   of	   the	   markers	   of	   such	   activities	   are	   the	   well-­‐established	   moeurs	   governing	  individual	  and	  group	  behavior	  and	  identifying	  roles,	  rules,	  regulations	  and	  prohibitions	  against	  such	   things	   as	   self-­‐dealing	   among	   family	  members,	   nepotism,	   profit-­‐	   or	   rent-­‐seeking	   and	   the	  like.	   That	   this	   is	   also	   the	   case	   for	   all	   independent	   sector	   institutions	   hardly	   requires	   much	  comment.	  Museums,	  theaters,	  hospitals	  and	  many	  other	  nonprofit	  institutions	  have	  their	  book	  stores	   and	   gift	   shops,	   and	   even	   bake	   sales,	   bonnet	   sales,	   flea	   markets	   and	   other	   quasi-­‐commercial	  ventures	  that	  combine	  revenue	  generation	  and	  service.	  	  The	  model	   of	   sectoral	   modularity	   as	   it	   applies	   to	   voluntary	   action	   is	   simply	   that	   any	  institution	  of	  collective	  voluntary	  action	  may	  contain	  within	  its	  institutional	  umbrella	  sub-­‐units	  for	   commercial,	   public	   or	   even	   intimate	   purposes	   that	   differ	   from	   its	   overall,	   institutional	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classification.	  Full	  understanding	  of	  the	  institution	  requires,	  therefore,	  not	  only	  identification	  of	  the	   top-­‐level	   institutional	  mission,	  but	  also	  detailing	  of	   the	  non-­‐congruent	  modules	  within	   its	  institutional	  reach	  or	  control.	  This	  should	  enable	  us	  to	  see	  more	  clearly	  than	  ever	  before	  that	  the	  sectors	  and	  the	  governments,	  businesses,	  voluntary	  action	  and	  families	  are	  not,	   in	  reality,	  converging;	   a	   process	   most	   likely	   to	   result	   only	   in	   one	   amorphous	   organizational	   and	  institutional	  blob	  of	  bureaucratic	  firms.	  Genuine	  true	  believers	  in	  markets,	  of	  course,	  continue	  to	  hold	  out	   for	   their	  own	   form	  of	   institutional	  homogeneity,	   in	  which	  markets	  are	   seen	   in	  all	  things	  social.	  These	  are	  offset	  by	  protests	  from	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  quarters,	  the	  various	  Occupy	  movements	   and	   the	   book	   by	   Michael	   Sandel,	  What	   Money	   Can’t	   Buy	   (2012).	   The	   dominant	  institutional	  trend	  in	  some	  parts	  of	  the	  third	  sector	  may,	  indeed	  be	  increasing	  similarities	  with	  other	   bureaucratic	   firms,	   although	   whether	   the	   actual	   convergence	   is	   an	   empirical	  phenomenon,	  or	  growing	  recognition	  of	  a	  form	  of	  observer	  bias	  remains	  to	  be	  sorted	  out.	  The	  trend	  among	  the	  new	  commons	  of	  the	  independent	  sector,	  and	  perhaps	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  third	  sector,	   currently	   is	   less	   toward	   convergence	   and	   uniformity	   than	   quite	   the	   opposite;	  recognition	   of	   greater	   and	   greater	   complexity	   and	   individuality	   of	   institutions	   embracing	   a	  fuller	   range	  of	  options.	  This	  means	   that	   the	   study	  of	  voluntary	  action	   reaches	   far	  beyond	   the	  category	  of	  501(c)	  3	  corporations	  and	  nonprofit	  organizations,	   into	  the	  multitude	  of	  modules,	  groups	  and	  organized	  entities	  engaged	  in	  voluntary	  action	  within	  business,	  government	  and	  the	  intimate	  sphere	  as	  well.	  	  
Social	  Movement	  The	   study	   of	   social	   movements	   as	   forms	   of	   collective	   action	   arose	   initially	   in	   the	  nineteenth	   century	  as	  efforts	   to	  understand	   the	   contributions	  and	   limitations	  of	   socialist	   and	  labor	  movements	  to	  social	  change	  (Le	  Bon,	  1982;	  Le	  Bon,	  2001;	  Gide	  &	  Rist,	  1948).	  Gustav	  Le	  Bon,	   for	   example,	   credited	   as	   one	   of	   the	   earlier	   contributors	   to	   the	   collective	   behavior	  perspective	   with	   his	   book	   La	   psychologie	   des	   foules	   (first	   published	   in	   1895),	   the	   English	  translation	  of	  which	  was	  titled	  The	  Crowd:	  A	  Study	  of	  the	  Popular	  Mind,	  (1896).	  In	  the	  same	  year,	  Le	   Bon	   also	   published	   Psychologie	   du	   socialisme	   (The	   Psychology	   of	   Socialism)	   (1896).	   The	  collective	   behavior	   approach	   pioneered	   by	   Le	   Bon,	   also	   developed	   in	   other,	   less	   political	  directions	   several	   decades	   later	   through	   such	   diverse	   figures	   as	   Herbert	   Blumer,	   William	  Kornhauser	   and	   Neal	   Smelzer.	   In	   their	   hands,	   the	   collective	   behavior	   perspective	   became	   a	  specialized	   subfield	   of	   sociology,	   at	   one	   remove	   from	   the	   study	   of	   voluntary	   action.	   They	  formed,	   as	   it	   were,	   distinct	   and	   self-­‐contained	   knowledge	   commons.	   Students	   of	   voluntary	  action	   have	   recently	   been	   trying	   to	   bring	   the	   two	   sub-­‐fields	   back	   together	   ever	   since,	   most	  recently	  through	  resource	  mobilization	  perspectives	  (Adair,	  1996;	  Buechler,	  1993;	  Edwards	  &	  McCarthy,	  2004;	  Jenkins,	  2006;	  Morris	  &	  Mueller,	  1992;	  Zald	  &	  McCarthy,	  1987).	  King	  &	  Soule	  (2008)	   even	   approach	   the	   peace,	   women’s	   and	   environmental	   movements	   as	   entrepreneurs	  within	  social	  movement	  industries.	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Along	  the	  way,	  a	   large	  body	  of	  historical,	  descriptive	  and	  atheoretical	  social	  movement	  studies	   have	   been	   published;	   of	   the	   utopian	   socialist	   communities	   of	   the	   mid-­‐nineteenth	  century	   (Levitas,	   2010),	   the	  Oneida	  movement	   (Foster,	   2010),	   religious	  movements	   from	   the	  Lutheran	   Reformation	   (Wuthnow,	   1993)	   to	   the	   Anabaptists	   (Burkholder	   &	   Cramer,	   2012),	  Amish	  (Hostetler,	  1995),	  Old	  Order	  Mennonites	  (Lee,	  2000;	  Peterson,	  2005),	  and	  Father	  Divine	  (Burnham,	  1979;	  Weisbrot,	  1992),	  multiple	  Great	  Awakenings	  (Fogel,	  2000),	  and	  countless	  new	  social	  movements	  of	  recent	  decades.	  It	   is	   surprisingly	   easy	   to	   connect	   the	   entire	   body	   of	   social	   movement	   literature	   to	  commons	   studies.	   There	   have	   long	   been	   adherents	   in	   political	   science,	   economics	   and	  management	  for	  understanding	  social	  movements	  in	  terms	  of	  rational	  choice	  perspectives	  (e.g.	  Muller	  &	  Opp,	  1986).	  From	  this	  perspective,	  primary	  attention	  is	  on	  the	  interests	  and	  rational	  choice	   agendas	   that	   engage	   movement	   participants,	   and	   the	   allocative	   choices	   made	   by	  movement	   leaders.	   Such	   resource	   mobilization	   perspectives	   have	   been	   important,	   but	   they	  occasionally	   also	  make	   social	  movements	   sound	   very	  much	   like	  market	   firms.	   Yet,	   they	   also	  highlight	   important	   resource	  dimensions	   for	  voluntary	  action.	  Edwards	  and	  McCarthy	   (2004)	  detail	  five	  types	  of	  such	  resources	  important	  to	  movements:	  Material	  resources,	  like	  money	  and	  physical	   capital;	   human	   capital	   (volunteers,	   paid	   staff,	   executives,	   leaders);	   moral	   resources,	  like	  solidarity;	  social	  organizational	  resources	   including	  networks	  and	  strategies;	  and	  cultural	  resources	   including	   understanding	   of	   the	   issues,	   movement	   know-­‐how,	   and	   the	   prior	  movement	  experience	  of	  those	  involved.	  Each	  of	  these	  can	  be	  understood	  within	  the	  common	  pool	  resource	  perspective	  noted	  in	  Chapter	  5.	  	  Other	  perspectives	  on	  social	  movements	  also	  contribute	  to	  understanding	  them	  as	  new	  commons.	  Buechler	  (2000)	  articulates	  a	  distinction	  between	  political	  and	  cultural	  movements,	  and	   reviews	   the	   approaches	   of	   different	   European	   and	   critical	   movement	   theorists:	   Castells	  (1985)	   formulated	   a	   historically	   grounded,	   cross-­‐cultural	   theory	   of	   urban	   social	   change	  identifying	  three	  important	  themes:	  Social	  movements	  as	  modes	  of	  collective	  consumption;	  the	  defense	   of	   cultural	   or	   territorial	   identity;	   and	   local	   governments	   as	   targets	   for	   political	  mobilization.	   Like	   the	   theory	   of	   voluntary	   action,	   Castells	   also	   formulated	   a	   normative	  perspective	   in	  which	  the	  model	  of	  a	  “good	  city”	   figures	   importantly	   in	  a	  way	  compatible	  with	  the	  model	  of	  good	  commons	  presented	  previously.	  Jürgen	  Habermas	  has	  formulated	  a	  theory	  of	  ‘new’	  social	  movements	  based	  in	  social	  systems	  as	  forms	  of	  communicative	  action	  theory,	  using	  concepts	   like	   interests,	   and	   lifeworld	   (distinguished	   from	   market	   economy	   and	   state	  “systems”).	  This	  use	  of	  Habermas	  as	  a	  grounding	  for	  the	  consideration	  of	  the	  lifeworld	  of	  social	  movements	  is	  intriguing	  and,	  in	  part,	  reflected	  in	  Chapter	  One	  above.	  Alain	  Touraine	  and	  Manuel	  Castells,	  Buechler	  says,	  were	  leaders	  of	  a	  “French	  School”	  of	  movement	   studies	  who	  also	  noted	   the	  contemporary	  differences	  between	  political	  and	  socio-­‐cultural	  movements.	  This	  is	  a	  distinction	  that	  follows	  closely	  Tocqueville’s	  distinction	  between	  political	  and	  civil	  associations	  and	  poses	  the	  very	  real	  possibility	  of	  an	  equivalence	  of	  “civil”	  and	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“socio-­‐cultural”	  movement	  approaches.	  Two	  other	  studies	  published	  in	  the	   late	  1990s	  are	  the	  basis	  of	  what	  has	  become	  known	  as	  “the	  cultural	  turn”	  in	  social	  movement	  studies:	  Challenging	  
Codes,	  by	  Alberto	  Melucci	   (1995)	  analyzed	   the	  purposes	  of	   social	  movements	  as	   a	  process	  of	  creating	  collective	  identities	  Such	  an	  approach	  is	  compatible	  with	  discussion	  above	  of	  identity	  formation	  in	  commons.	  The	  Art	  of	  Moral	  Protest,	  by	  James	  Jasper	  argues	  that	  movements	  enable	  participants	  to	  voice	  their	  moral	  intuitions	  and	  principles,	  both	  of	  which	  are	  denoted	  in	  the	  new	  commons	  theory	  of	  voluntary	  action	  as	  their	  moeurs.	  	  
Summary	  (movements)	  The	  suggestion	  was	  made	  in	  a	  previous	  chapter	  that	  collective	  behavior	  offered	  a	  way	  to	  view	   social	   movements	   that	   transcends	   some	   of	   the	   weaknesses	   of	   rational	   choice	   theory,	  because	  it	  takes	  sole	  reliance	  off	  the	  singular	  phenomenon	  of	  group	  decision-­‐making	  generally	  termed	   collective	   choice	   and	   focused	   on	   a	   broader	   array	   of	   collective	   behavior	   that	   organize	  and	   compose	   collective	   action,	  without	   losing	   sight	   of	   the	   role	   of	   resource	   allocation.	   In	   this	  discussion,	   we	   have	   reviewed	   selected	   highlights	   of	   early	   and	   more	   recent	   research	   with	  implications	  for	  voluntary	  action.	  	  
Democracy	  and	  ‘The	  Sovereignty	  of	  the	  Political’	  The	  final	  issue	  to	  require	  our	  attention	  in	  the	  matter	  of	  association	  is	  an	  implication	  of	  Tocqueville’s	  previously	  noted	  distinction	  between	  civil	  and	  political	  associations.	  Scholars	  of	  voluntary	  action	  have	  long	  drawn	  a	  sharp	  line	  between	  the	  two,	  without	  specifying	  very	  clearly	  the	   basis	   of	   the	   difference.	   One	   of	   the	   insights	   of	   the	   theory	   offered	   here	   is	   to	   draw	   that	  difference.	   The	   political	   theorist	   Benjamin	   Barber	   has	   considered	   this	   question	   in	   a	   much-­‐underrated	  (for	  reasons	  that	  may	  become	  obvious)	  article	  on	  the	  role	  of	  philosophy	  in	  political	  democracy.	  While	  our	  concern	  here	   is	  not	  with	  democratic	  states,	  but	  rather	  with	  democratic	  societies	   and	   cultures,	   Barber’s	   account	   of	   political	   as	   a	   contingent,	   rather	   than	   a	   fixed,	  institutional	  distinction	  holds	  up	  well:	  	  "To	  speak	  of	   the	  autonomy	  of	   the	  political	   is	   in	   fact	   to	   speak	  of	   the	   sovereignty	  of	   the	  political.	   	  For	  by	  sovereignty	   is	  meant	  not	  merely	  the	  dominion	  of	   the	  state	  over	  other	  forms	   of	   association,	   but	   the	   dominion	   of	   politically	   adjudicated	   knowledge,	   under	  conditions	  of	  epistemological	  uncertainty,	  over	  other	   forms	  of	  knowledge.	   	  To	  be	  sure,	  this	   sovereignty	   over	   knowledge	   is	  wholly	   residual:	   	   It	   comes	   into	   play	   only	  with	   the	  breakdown	   of	   ordinary	   cognitive	   consensus,	   and	   only	   where	   such	   public	   judgment	   is	  
required	  by	  the	  need	  for	  common	  action.	  (Emphasis	  added)	  	  Where	  knowledge	  can	  prove	  itself	  certain,	  or	  at	  least	  where	  consensus	  is	  for	  the	  time	  being	  undisputed	  (as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  mainstream	  science,	  for	  example),	  or	  where	  the	  absence	  of	  consensus	  has	  no	  impact	  on	  public	  action	  (as	  in	  matters	  of	  private	  taste,	  for	  example),	  the	  political	  domain	  claims	  no	  sovereignty.	   	  But	  where	  scientists	  disagree	  on	   the	  public	  outcomes	  of	  experimental	  technologies	   (genetic	   engineering,	   for	   example),	   or	  where	  matters	  of	   taste	   are	   seen	   to	  have	   public	   consequences	   (the	   design	   of	   a	   national	   flag,	   for	   example),	   or	   where	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theoretical	   inquiry	   raises	   issues	   of	   common	   import	   (the	   dividing	   line	   between	   a	   fetus	  and	  a	  legal	  person,	  for	  example),	  the	  political	  realm	  necessarily	  becomes	  sovereign	  over	  the	   contested	   realms	   of	   science	   and	   taste	   and	   inquiry	   in	   which	   such	   disputes	   are	  ordinarily	  conducted.	  	  For	  at	  this	  point	  science,	  taste	  and	  theoretical	  inquiry	  are	  reduced	  to	  opinion	   (doxa),	   and	   it	   is	  over	  opinion	   that	   sovereignty,	  defined	  by	  public	   judgment,	  necessarily	  holds	  sway,	  albeit	  only	  by	  default."	  	  (Barber,	  1988,	  14-­‐15)	  Barber’s	  conception	  offers	  us	  a	  solid	  and	  reliable	  (if	  contingent	  and	  changeable)	  basis	  for	  distinguishing	   between	   the	   proper	   concerns	   of	   the	   public	   sphere	   and	   the	   other,	   less	   public	  concerns	   of	   the	   independent	   sector;	   for	   distinguishing,	   in	   other	   words,	   political	   and	   civil	  association.	  The	  necessity	  for	  collective	  action	  and	  perceived	  consensus	  of	  opinion,	  rather	  than	  any	   hard-­‐and	   fast	   “objective”	   institutional	   criteria	   seem	   to	   be	   the	  most	   important	   factors	   in	  determining	  what	  is	  a	  civil	  association	  at	  any	  given	  moment	  in	  history.	  All	  things	  considered,	  distinguishing	  the	  independent	  sector	  from	  the	  market	  sector	  has	  always	  been	  a	  much	  simpler	  and	  more	  straightforward	  process,	  marked	  entirely	  by	  the	  reach	  of	  the	   price	   system.	   However,	   the	   distinction	   of	   public	   and	   independent	   sectors	   has	   been	  somewhat	   problematic,	   in	   part	   because	   of	   the	   increasingly	   threadbare	   distinction	   between	  what	  is	  public	  and	  private.	  Organizationally,	  Tocqueville’s	  distinction	  between	  political	  and	  civil	  associations,	  has	  since	  the	  early	  20th	  century	  been	  largely	  adjudicated	  through	  the	  tax	  system,	  even	  though	  periodic	  cases	  like	  the	  2012	  501(c)	  4	  issue	  reveal	  the	  futility	  of	  this	  approach.	  Yet	  this	  seldom	  provides	  a	  hard	  and	  fast	  dividing	  line.	  Planned	  Parenthood	  and	  the	  Boy	  Scouts,	  for	  example,	  are	  among	  many	  civil	  associations	  that	  have	  from	  time	  to	  time	  been	  thrust	  into	  highly	  visible	   political	   positions.	   Barber	   reminds	   us	   that	   there	   is	   no	   hard	   and	   fast	   dividing	   line	  between	   political	   and	   apolitical	   (civil)	   association.	   This	   distinction	   is,	   of	   necessity,	   entirely	   a	  contingent	  one	  and	  that	  virtually	  any	  civil	  association	  could	  be	  politicized,	  and	  under	  the	  right	  circumstances	  political	  associations	  can	  be	  depoliticized.	  	  
Conclusion	  At	   least	  since	  Tocqueville,	  association	  has	  been	  seen	  as	  perhaps	   the	  most	   fundamental	  characteristic	   of	   voluntary	   action	   beyond	   the	   household,	  market	   and	   state.	   As	  we	   have	   seen,	  association	   is	   voluntary	   not	   only	   in	   the	   conventional	   sense	   that	   it	   is	   uncoerced,	   but	   equally	  important,	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   it	   is	   unsponsored	   and	   unauthorized	   by	   a	   superior	   authority,	   or	  patron.	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This	  is	  the	  place	  where	  we	  all	  belong	  right	  now.	  
9.	  Assembly	  There	   is	   a	   related	   idea	  both	   in	   law	  and	   in	  practice	   that	   is	   important	   to	  understanding	  some	   dimensions	   of	   the	   organization	   and	   operation	   of	   new	   commons	   yet	   it	   has	   inexplicably	  generated	  no	  interest	  among	  third	  sector	  scholars.	  The	  First	  Amendment	  of	  the	  U.S.	  constitution	  does	  not	  even	  mention	  association,	  but	  speaks	  only	  of	   ‘peaceable	  assembly’,	  a	  social	  condition	  to	   be	   contrasted	  with	   riots,	  mobs,	   vigilante	   groups	   and	   all	   other	   forms	   of	   assembly	   for	   non-­‐peaceful	   purposes.	  The distinction between peaceable and ‘violent’ assembly mirrors exactly the 
distinction made in Chapter Six between good and bad commons.	  Despite	  its	  iconic	  presence	  in	  the	  Bill	   of	  Rights,	   and	   a	   vast	   range	   of	   subsequent	   legal	   instruments,	   peaceable	   assembly	   is	   not	   a	  topic	   that	   has	   generated	   any	   interest	   in	   the	   social	   sciences.	   To illustrate this point, a Google 
Scholar search of the original constitutional terms “peaceable assembly” on March 3, 2012 generated 
12 articles, all of them published in law reviews and dealing exclusively with legal issues or 
questions. The more modern phrase “peaceful assembly” generated many more articles, but likewise 
only a few of either of these were social science work, with no citations involving any significant 
analysis of assembly from within the third sector literature. Of the handful of discussions in the 
economic and political science literature that appear in a search, most involve only incidental 
mentions of the term and no sustained analysis.	  Thus,	  in	  examining	  this	  topic,	  we	  must	  begin	  at	  a	  fundamental	  level,	  for	  assembly	  is,	  as	  it	  has	  always	  been,	  a	  highly	  important	  topic	  in	  voluntary	  action.	  Public	  authorities	  are	  usually	  very	  interested	  in	  the	  difference	  between	  peaceful	  and	  less	  peaceful	  forms	  of	  assembly,	  yet	  officials	  in	  autocratic	  regimes	  are	  often	  remarkably	  “tone	  deaf”	  in	   their	   ability	   to	   distinguish	   between	   the	   two,	   just	   as	   they	   may	   be	   unable	   to	   differentiate	  between	  political	  and	  non-­‐political	  speech.	  In	  contrast,	  police	  and	  other	  officials	  in	  democratic	  regimes	  often	  become	  highly	  skilled	  in	  not	  only	  “reading”	  the	  peaceable	  quotient”	  of	  gatherings	  but	   also	   in	   recognizing	  what	   specific	   types	   of	   actions	  will	   “tip”	   an	   assembly	   from	   a	   peaceful	  gathering	   toward	   violence.	   	   The	   peaceable	   quotient	  may	   be	   said	   to	   be	   the	   probability	   that	   a	  peaceful	   assembly	   will	   turn	   violent.	   The	   lower	   the	   probability,	   the	   more	   peaceable	   the	  gathering.	   Such	   concerns	   were	   typical	   in	   early	   studies	   of	   crowd	   behavior	   in	   the	   Blumer	  tradition	   of	   collective	   behavior	   research	   mentioned	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter.	   Also	   important	  here	  are	  what	  Tilly	  (1990)	  calls	  “repertories	  of	  contestation”	  and	  what	  Elijah	  Anderson	  (2011)	  calls	  “the	  cosmopolitan	  canopy.”	  Assemblies	  can	  be	   thought	  of	  as	  orderly	  crowds,	  or	  non-­‐riots:	   temporary,	   time-­‐limited	  and	   location-­‐specific	   associations.	   At	   times,	   assemblies	   may	   be	   preliminary	   stages	   in	   the	  constitution	  of	  more	  durable	  associations.	  Thus,	  for	  example,	  the	  Constitutional	  Convention	  of	  1776	   in	  Philadelphia	  was	  an	  assembly	  that	  served	  as	  a	  necessary	  prelude	  to	   the	   formation	  of	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the	   American	   republic,	   and	   the	   second	   such	   assembly	   in	   1786	   served	   the	   role	   of	   orderly	  adjustments	   to	   an	   unworkable	   confederation	   that	   saved	   the	   union	   without	   the	   necessity	   of	  widespread	  violence	  or	  bloodshed.	  The	  public	  life	  of	  most	  communities	  includes	  a	  wide	  array	  of	  such	  peaceful	  assemblies:	  This	  includes	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  church	  services,	  religious	  gatherings,	  crowds	   of	   spectators	   at	   special	   events	   or	   pageants,	   community	   meetings,	   public	   hearings,	  annual	   meetings,	   as	   well	   as	   events	   like	   parades,	   community	   picnics	   and	   concerts	   and	   barn	  raisings	  about	  which	  adherents	  of	  gemeinschaft	  often	  wax	  poetic.	  Assemblies	  may	  be	  regular,	  periodic	  events	  or	  one-­‐time	  happenings	  or	  something	  in	  between.	  There	  is	  often	  a	  strong	  relationship	  between	  associations,	  organizations	  and	  assemblies:	  More	  (or	  fewer)	  associations	  and	  organizations	  in	  a	  particular	  community	  will,	  in	  all	  probability	  be	  associated	  with	  more	  (or	  fewer)	  assemblies,	  although	  time	  and	  causal	  arrows	  can	  easily	  flow	  in	  either	  direction.	  Communities	  at	  all	   levels	   including	  nations	  with	  rich	  histories	  of	  assembly	  and	   broad	   repertories	   of	   moeurs	   of	   assembly	   are	   also	   likely	   to	   have	   strong	   traditions	   of	  association.	   This	   suggests	   what	   may	   be	   an	   important	   developmental	   step	   in	   the	   growth	   of	  democratic	   culture	   and	   society.	   We	   should	   not	   expect	   countries	   like	   Egypt,	   Syria	   and	   other	  Middle	  Eastern	  autocracies	  lacking	  strong	  civic	  traditions	  including	  moeurs	  of	  associations	  and	  assemblies	  to	  suddenly	  develop	  into	  strong	  democratic	  societies	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  single	  set	  of	  assemblies	  like	  the	  public	  crowds	  of	  the	  Arab	  Spring	  of	  2011	  and	  2012,	  no	  matter	  how	  powerful	  and	  evocative	  they	  may	  appear	  to	  outsiders.	  When	  such	  assemblies	  brought	  reform	  in	  Eastern	  and	  Central	  Europe	   in	   the	   late	  1980s	  and	  1990s,	   it	  was	  usually	  because	   they	   tapped	  directly	  into	   historical	  moeurs	   and	   political	   traditions	   that	   had	   survived	   the	   totalitarian	   era,	   like	   the	  Singing	  Revolutions	  in	  Latvia	  and	  Estonia,	  and	  the	  theater	  assemblies	  in	  Prague.	  Even	  so,	   it	  may	  well	  be	  that,	  as	  with	  the	  18th	  century	  coffee	  houses	  of	  major	  European	  cities,	   long	  series	  of	  repeated	  assemblies	  may	  provide	  key	  components	  of	   the	  necessary	  basis	  for	   education,	   socialization	   and	  development	  of	   an	   infrastructure	  of	   associations	   as	  well	   as	   a	  matrix	   for	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   public	   sphere.	   See	   Fisher	   (2012)	   for	   a	   more	   complex	   and	  sophisticated	   take	  on	  this	  set	  of	  dynamics.	  The	  chapters	  by	  Hal	  Saunders	  and	  Priya	  Parker	   in	  Lohmann	  &	  Van	  Til	  (2011)	  also	  discuss	  important	  examples	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  strategic	  use	  of	  sustained	  dialogue	  in	  this	  process.	  The	  American	  Civil	  Rights	  movement	  and	  the	  European	  Civil	  Society	  movements	  of	  the	  early	  1990s	  are	   filled	  with	  examples	  of	   the	  complex	  and	   intersecting	  roles	  of	  association	  and	  assembly	   in	   social	   change.	   An	   excellent	   starting	   place	   for	   those	   unfamiliar	   with	   Civil	   Rights	  history	  are	  the	  three	  volumes	  of	  civil	  rights	  history	  by	  Taylor	  Branch	  (1979;	  1988;	  2006)	  which	  detail	   a	   wide	   variety	   of	   marches,	   sit-­‐ins,	   protests,	   and	   other	   assemblies	   as	   well	   as	   the	  organizations	   important	   to	   the	   movement.	   You	   Tube	   videos	   offer	   one	   starting	   point	   for	   the	  more	   recent	   European	   and	   Middle	   Eastern	   movements.	   A	   You-­‐Tube	   video,	   The	   Singing	  
Revolution:	  Estonia,	  1991	  which	  documents	  events	  in	  Estonia	  is	  particularly	  enlightening	  in	  this	  respect.	  (See	  http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Re1Lj3dH0fc	  ).	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  It	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that	   among	   new	   commons	   voluntary	   action,	   associations	   and	  assemblies	  can	  also	  include	  less	  formal	  and	  purposive	  assemblies	  like	  those	  that	  Whyte	  (1943)	  called	   ‘street	   corner	   societies’,	   and	   include	   ‘jam	   sessions’	   (Cameron,	   1954;	   Vallerand,	   2008),	  ‘garage	   bands’	   of	   jazz	   and	   rock	   musicians	   (Allsop,	   2004;	   Campbell,	   1995)	   communities	   of	  practice	   (Wenger,	   2001),	   the	   unnamed	   assemblies	   of	   Latino	   men	   passing	   time	   gathered	   on	  street	  corners	  or	  shopping	  mall	  parking	  lots	  awaiting	  work	  as	  day	  laborers	  (Pinedo	  Turnovsky,	  2004),	   union	   organizers’	   impromptu	   gatherings	   in	   factory	   parking	   lots	   or	   plant	   gates	  (Bronfenbrenner,	  2000;	  Milkman	  &	  Voss,	  2004),	  and	  Vaclav	  Havel’s	  “magic	  lantern”	  gatherings	  in	  Prague	  (Ash,	  1993;	  Schäffner	  &	  Hertog,	  1994).	  	  In	  Chapter	  One	  above	  the	  focus	  on	  deliberative	  democracy	  among	  political	  theorists	  was	  noted;	   such	   deliberations	   typically	   involve	   some	   type	   of	   assembly.	   The	  Kettering	   Foundation	  model	  of	  public	  deliberation,	  like	  other	  forms	  of	  deliberation	  and	  dialogue	  are	  built	  on	  a	  variety	  of	   general	   and	   specific	   models	   of	   civic	   assembly	   (Fine	   &	   Harrington,	   2004;	   Lindsay,	   2000;	  Matthews	   and	   Macafee,	   1997).	   Assemblies	   also	   include,	   for	   example,	   the	   celebrated	   New	  England	   town	  meetings	   (Adams,	  2004;	  Zimmerman,	  1999),	  and	  also	   the	  community	  choruses	  and	   annual	   community	   assemblies	   for	   singing	   of	   Handel’s	   Messiah	   during	   the	   Christmas	  holidays,	   and	   the	   unprecedented	   Latvian	   and	   Estonian	   “singing	   revolutions”	   (Ginkel,	   2002;	  Thomson,	  1992).	  At	  one	  time,	  many	  schools	  held	  regular	  assemblies	  of	  their	  students	  and	  some	  still	   do.	   Assemblies	   were	   held	   regularly	   in	   the	   central	   court	   of	   my	   elementary	   school	   in	  Minnesota,	   and	  our	   granddaughters’	   kindergarten	   in	  California	  had	  a	   regular	  Friday-­‐morning	  assembly	   at	   which	   announcements,	   group	   singing	   and	   other	   expressions	   of	   ‘community’	   to	  which	  parents	  and	  grandparents	  are	  also	  invited.	   	  The	  United	  Way	  community	  practice	  model	  recommends	   provision	   for	   the	   assemblies	   it	   calls	   ‘community	   forums’	   for	   its	   2600	   member	  communities.	  	  All	  of	  these	  and	  many	  other	  assemblies	  are,	  like	  voluntary	  associations,	  characterized	  by	  voluntary	   participation,	   shared	   resources	   and	   shared	   purposes.	   In	   some	   cases,	   the	   shared	  purpose	  or	  mission	  of	  assemblies	  may	  be	  to	  discover	  or	  reach	  agreement	  on	  a	  more	  enduring	  purpose.	  Assemblies,	   like	   associations,	   are	   thus	  part	   of	   the	   larger	   category	   of	   new	   commons.	  Likewise,	  we	  should	  expect	   that	  social	  capital,	   in	   the	   form	  of	   trust	  and	  networks,	  and	  moeurs	  can	   also	   emerge	   from	   assemblies,	   as	   occurs	   in	   constitutional	   conventions.	   The	   simplest	  examples	  of	  this	  with	  direct	  implications	  for	  democratic	  society	  and	  culture	  are	  the	  consensus	  decisions	   and	   the	   need	   for	   further	   action	   that	   emerge	   from	   neighborhood	   meetings,	   public	  hearings	  and	  other	  assemblies.	  In	  cases	  of	  complex	  issues	  and	  problems,	  including	  insufficiently	  recognized	   or	   inadequately	   defined	   social	   problems,	   or	   perhaps	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   a	  precipitating	   social	   movement,	   an	   assembly	   can	   be	   a	   motive	   force	   in	   stimulating	   further	  voluntary	   action.	   In	   fact,	   this	   is	   a	   technique	   used	   in	  many	   types	   of	   community	   organization.	  More	   complex	   (in	   their	   genesis)	   but	   particularly	   cogent	   examples	   of	   the	   uses	   of	   assembly	   in	  community	   problem	   solving	   would	   include	   the	   community	   meetings	   that	   precede	   (and	  may	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prevent)	   or	   follow	   ‘race	   riots’	   and	   civil	   disturbances,	   student	   and	   parent	   assemblies	   that	  typically	   follow	  school	  shootings	  and	  other	  violent	  or	  disruptive	   incidents	   involving	  students.	  Thus,	  not	  only	  are	  assemblies	  an	  important	  type	  of	  voluntary	  action,	  because	  of	  their	  frequently	  formative	  roles	  they	  are	  also	  related	  to	  many	  other	  kinds	  of	  voluntary	  action	  that	  may	  precede	  or	  follow	  from	  the	  act	  of	  assembly.	  Civility	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  sought-­‐after	  conditions	  in	  voluntary	  action.	  In	  March,	  2010,	  a	  group	  of	  religious	  leaders	  on	  the	  American	  "right"	  and	  "left"	  made	  news	  very	  briefly	  in	  signing	  a	  "Civility	  Covenant"	  which	  included	  the	  following	  language	  urging	  Christians	  to	  "put	  away	  from	  you	  all	  bitterness	  and	  wrath	  and	  anger	  and	  wrangling	  and	  slander,	  together	  with	  all	  malice,	  and	  be	  kind	  to	  one	  another,	  tenderhearted,	  forgiving	  one	  another,	  as	  God	  in	  Christ	  has	  forgiven	  you"	  (http://articles.cnn.com/2010-­‐03-­‐26/politics/christian.civility.covenant	   _1_conservative-­‐christian-­‐leaders-­‐political-­‐pastors?_s=PM:POLITICS).  
‘Cosmopolitan	  Canopy’	  Just	  as	  assembly	  may	  be	  unique	  or	  periodic	  events,	  they	  may	  also	  be	  formally	  organized	  or	  spontaneously	  occurring.	  At	  least	  by	  intent,	  if	  not	  always	  in	  actuality,	  some	  assemblies	  can	  be	  described	  as	  attempts	  to	  invoke	  or	  deliberately	  construct	  pluralist	  or	   ‘cosmopolitan	  canopies.’	  Elijah	   Anderson’s	   Cosmopolitan	   Canopy	   (2011)	   describes	   several	   interesting	   attempts	   to	  characterize	   urban	   spaces	   in	   terms	   of	   their	   ability	   to	   combine	   peaceful	   assembly	   under	  conditions	   of	   high	   diversity.	   Anderson’s	   concept	   of	   a	   canopy	   as	   a	   form	   of	   collective	  understanding	   arising	   from	   a	   particular	   situation	   is	   useful	   for	   distinguishing	   among	   kinds	   of	  assemblies	   and	   can	   be	   extended	   to	   more	   general	   understandings	   of	   new	   commons.	   One	  connotation	  of	   the	   ‘cosmopolitan	   canopy’	   as	  Anderson	  uses	   it	   accords	  well	  with	   the	   focus	  on	  pluralism	  in	  contemporary	  society	  and	  culture.	  In	  tracking	  inter-­‐racial	  mixing	  and	  segregation	  in	  various	  commercial	  and	  civic	  spaces	  in	  downtown	  Philadelphia,	  Anderson	  identifies	  spaces,	  such	   as	  Reading	  Market,	  Rittenhouse	   Square	   and	   the	  30th	   Street	   Station	  where	  many	  diverse	  populations	  of	  the	  city	  come	  together	  and	  interact	  civilly	  and	  peacefully,	  even	  though	  much	  of	  the	  city	  is	  racially	  segregated	  and	  the	  boundaries	  between	  groups	  are	  often	  sharp,	  tense	  and,	  at	  times,	   conflict-­‐ridden.	  Other	   large	   cities	   in	   the	  U.S.	   and	   elsewhere	   also	   have	   similar	   canopies	  characterized	   by	   their	   cosmopolitan	   character	   along	   both	   similar	   racial	   and	   ethnic,	   and	  additional	  grounds	  like	  zones	  of	  religious	  tolerance	  within	  religiously	  fractious	  societies.	  It	   does	   not	   stretch	   the	   legal	   and	   social	   meaning	   of	   Anderson’s	   term	   unduly	   if	   we	  characterize	  many	  of	  the	  gatherings	  occurring	  regularly	  within	  these	  urban	  spaces	  as	  informal	  assemblies.	   Anyone	   who	   has	   ever	   visited	   one	   of	   the	   sites	   in	   contemporary	   Philadelphia,	  engaged	   in	   community	  planning	  or	  organizing,	  or	  had	  comparable	  experiences	   in	  other	   cities	  can	  easily	  recognize	  the	   face	  validity	  of	  Anderson’s	  observations,	  Further,	   the	  conception	  of	  a	  canopy	   as	   a	   pervasive	   characteristic	   that	   envelopes	   certain	   situations	   and	   make	   certain	  behavior	   acceptable	   in	   situ	   is	   a	   particularly	   way	   for	   understanding	   facets	   of	   other	   new	  commons	  as	  well.	  Experienced	  organizers	  of	  assemblies	  and	  events	  in	  commons	  routinely	  seek	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to	   construct	  and	  make	  use	  of	   canopies	   in	  exactly	   this	   sense.	  We	  will	   explore	   some	  additional	  aspects	  of	  Anderson’s	  cosmopolitan	  community	   in	  the	   final	  chapter	  below.	  Meanwhile,	   let	   the	  cosmopolitan	   canopy	   serve	   here	   as	   an	   introduction	   to	   the	   general	   topic	   of	   the	   social	   space	  within	  which	  assembly	  occurs.	  
Social	  Space	  One	   of	   the	  more	   important	   concepts	   of	   the	   new	   commons	   theory	   of	   voluntary	   action	  emerging	   from	   an	   understanding	   of	   new	   commons	   as	   associations	   and	   assemblies	   is	   the	  abstract	   idea	  of	  social,	  or	   interactional,	  space.	  Assemblies	  generally	  occur	  in	  what	  sociologists	  call	  “situations”,	  or	   interactional	  spaces	  (characterized	  principally	  by	  who	  and	  what?)	  defined	  by	  time	  (when?),	  space	  (where?)	  and	  context	  (how	  and	  why?).	  These	  “five	  W’s	  and	  H”	  are	  used	  by	  journalists	  as	  a	  skeletal	  structure	  for	  news,	  and	  by	  communications	  theorists	  to	  characterize	  communications	  as	  who	  said	  what	  to	  whom,	  by	  what	  means	  and	  with	  what	  effect?	  This	  idea	  of	  interaction	  within	   specific	   time,	   space	   and	   context	   is	   fundamental	   to	   the	   definition	   of	   social	  space	   for	   various	   iterations	   of	   the	  Bloomington	  model	   of	   commons	   in	   natural,	   economic	   and	  ecological	   forms	   involving	   human	   agents,	   the	   epistemological	   space	   of	   the	   knowledge	  commons,	   and	   Lessig’s	   legal	   space	   of	   “the	   creative	   commons”	   whether	   in	   the	   aptly-­‐named	  
cyberspace,	  or	  more	  generally,	  in	  what	  we	  might	  call	  intellectual	  property	  space.	  Social	  space	  in	  this	  sense	  also	  works	  to	  describe	  the	  associations	  and	  assemblies	  of	  voluntary	  action.	  As	  with	  three-­‐dimensional	   physical	   space,	   geometric	   metaphors	   can	   be	   useful	   in	   visualizing	   and	  understanding	  social	  spaces.	  One	  of	  the	  premier	  examples	  of	  this	  is	  the	  vertical	  branching	  tree	  of	  organization	  charts	  that	  purports	  to	  show	  relations	  within	  a	  formal	  organization.	  Graphically	  some	  assemblies	  can	  be	  represented	  as	  triangular	  consisting	  of	  a	  single	  apex,	  representing	  the	  speakers	   or	   presenters	   and	   a	   podium	   or	   stage	   or	   other	   focal	   point,	   and	   the	   broader	   base	  composed	  of	  the	  larger	  plurality	  of	  auditors,	  listeners	  or	  spectators.	  The	  social	  spaces	  of	  other	  new	  commons	  are	  more	  readily	  graphed	  as	  inclusive	  circles	  or	  as	  network	  diagrams,	  in	  which	  the	   nodes	   are	   the	   persons	   and	   the	   links	   between	   all	   of	   the	   nodes	   represent	   the	   interactions	  between	   them.	   The	   diagrams	   developed	   by	   Jacob	   Moreno’s	   sociometry	   (circa	   1953)	   first	  showed	  this	  graphically	  long	  ago.	  	   Interaction	   or	   social	   relations	   located	   in	   n-­‐dimensional	   common	   space	   figures	   both	   in	  consideration	  of	  the	  inputs,	  or	  factors	  of	  production	  and	  product	  outputs	  in	  new	  commons.	  This	  may	  be	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  why	  Hardin’s	  pasture	  metaphor	  resonates	  so	  clearly	  on	  an	  intuitive	  level;	  a	  common	  pasture	  or	  field	  is	  a	  distinct	  and	  recognizable	  physical	  space,	  perhaps	  even	  a	  cosmopolitan	  canopy,	  and	  resource	  use	  within	   the	   field	  can	  be	  mapped	  proportionally	  on	   the	  space.	  And	  real	  commons,	  whether	   in	  common	   field	  agriculture	  and	   fishing	  grounds,	  Creative	  Commons	   licensing	   of	   intellectual	   property	   in	   cyberspace,	   or	   the	   local	   United	   Way	   or	  Community	  Foundation	  appear	  more	  clear	  and	  understandable	  when	  modeled	  by	  the	  analogy	  with	  common	  pasturage.	  	   There	  can	  be	  more	  to	  social	  space,	  however,	  than	  interaction	  at	  specific	  times,	  places	  and	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contexts	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  practices	  that	  occur	  there;	  the	  moeurs	  that	  are	  part	  of	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  situation.	  A	  major	   implication	  of	   the	   idea	  of	   repertories	  as	   resources,	   for	  example,	   is	   that	  social	  space	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  the	  practice	  of	  place	  (Certeau,	  1984:	  117,	  as	  quoted	  in	  Lie,	  2003:	  120).	  	  The	  place-­‐based	  practices	  involved	  in	  a	  common	  space	  are	  defined	  principally	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  resource	  repertories	  and	  other	  moeurs	  of	  participants.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  community	  spaces	  for	  assemblies,	  both	  moeurs	  and	  practices	  are	  widely	  known	  and	  understood	  in	  most	  communities:	  
when	   something	   bad	   happens,	   we	   all	   gather	   at	   the	   town	   square…	   Someone	   will	   undoubtedly	  
organize	   a	   protest	   march	   on	   Broadway.	   This	   is	   awful…	   People	   will	   be	   gathering	   at	   the	   court	  
house;	   etc.	   However,	   recent	   declines	   in	   civic	   participation	   may	   also	   suggest	   temporary	   or	  permanent	   declines	   in	   such	   practical	   knowledge	   of	   such	   practiced	   places.	   Many	   voluntary	  action	  assemblies	   represent	  practiced	  place	   in	   terms	  of	   local	   community,	  or	  of	   community	   in	  general,	   the	  essential	   relations	  of	  which	  Tönnies	   ([1888];	  1955;	  1957),	  Goodman	  &	  Goodman	  (1960),	  Warren	  (1963)	  and	  a	  great	  many	  other	  community	  theorists	  refer	  to	  with	  the	  German	  
gemeinschaft	   und	   gesellschaft	   and	   the	   Latin	   communitas.	   This	   idea	   can	   be	   stated	   as	   a	   high	  probability	  that	  when	  a	  new	  commons	  is	  formed	  by	  an	  assembly	  through	  the	  identification	  by	  voluntary	   participants	   of	   shared	   purposes	   and	   a	   common	   pool	   of	   shared	   resources,	   that	   a	  group’s	  sense	  of	  philia,	  or	  solidarity	  together	  with	  conditions	  for	  the	  formation	  of	  social	  capital,	  increased	  trust	  and	  networking	  will	  develop.	  In	  this	  way,	  assemblies	  often	  bring	  together	  and	  focus	   the	  many	  elements	  and	  potentialities	  of	  voluntary	  action,	   in	   this	   case	   the	  emergence	  of	  social	  capital	  in	  and	  through	  time-­‐	  and	  space-­‐specific	  association.	  	  This	  may	   involve	  either	  bridging	  capital	   (that	   is,	   reaching	  across	  differences,	   including	  both	   geographic	   and	   group	   differences)	   or	   bonding	   capital	   (that	   is,	   bringing	   separate	  individuals	  and	  groups	  closer	  together)	  or	  both.	  A	  network,	  system	  or	  set	  of	  new	  commons	  can	  be	   a	   particularly	   important	   forum	   for	   bridging	   the	   diverse	   elements	   of	   a	   communitas	  
communitatum,	   a	   community	   of	   communities.	   In	   diverse	   urban	   communities,	   for	   example,	   a	  meeting	  of	  the	  various	  neighborhood	  associations	  can	  serve	  such	  a	  purpose.	  For	  the	  emergence	  of	  social	  capital	  in	  the	  form	  of	  greater	  trust,	  not	  only	  signals	  internal	  communitas,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  new	  networks	  and	  connection	   to	  existing	  networks,	   it	   also	   signals	  bridging	  connection	  to	  other	  communities.	  For	   a	   clearer	   sense	   of	   commons	   in	   space,	   place	   and	   practice,	   we	   can	   identify	   several	  distinct	   types	   of	   spaces	   that	   are	   important	   in	   voluntary	   action.	   One	   of	   these	   we	   might	   call,	  natural,	   or	   unconstructed	   physical	   space.	   Thus	   the	   common	   or	   shared	   territory	   of	   iterant	  groups	  or	  tribes,	  whether	  forest	  or	  open	  range,	  that	  is	  shared	  peacefully	  by	  a	  number	  of	  distinct	  bands	  or	  tribal	  groups	  each	  of	  whom	  may	  implicitly	  realize	  a	  time	  reserved	  for	  their	  exclusive	  use,	  without	  any	  convention	  or	  agreement	  would	  be	  an	  example	  of	  such	  a	  space.	  This	  contrasts	  with	   architectural,	   or	   built	   space	   that	   is	   also	   physical.	   Wherever	   there	   is	   interaction	   or	  communication	  between	  separate	  groups	  within	  a	  territory	  or	  space	  we	  may	  have	  an	  instance	  of	   what	   Lie	   (2003)	   calls	   “spaces	   of	   intercultural	   communication.”	   There	   is	   a	   long	   history	   of	  voluntary	  action	  interest	  in	  structuring	  such	  communication,	  as	  the	  discussion	  of	  Jane	  Addams	  and	   Hull	   House	   in	   Chapter	   One	   and	   Anderson’s	   cosmopolitan	   canopies	   illustrate.	   Creating	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spaces	  for	  intercultural	  communication,	  as	  Jane	  Addams	  did	  or,	  identifying	  them	  like	  Anderson	  (2011)	   where	   they	   already	   exist	   would	   seem	   to	   be	   a	   singularly	   important	   task	   under	   the	  conditions	  of	  pluralism	  existing	  in	  contemporary	  communities,	  and	  voluntary	  associations	  and	  assemblies.	  Meetings	  of	  the	  NAACP	  or	  local	  inter-­‐racial,	  or	  inter-­‐religious	  councils	  appear	  to	  be	  other	  examples	  of	  ways	  of	  creating	  such	  spaces.	  There	  are	  also	  undoubtedly	  thousands	  of	  less	  dramatic,	  more	   prosaic	   urban	   assemblies	   that	   occur	   as	  modules	  within	   all	  manner	   of	   public,	  private	  and	  common	  spaces.	  Most	   concepts	  of	   social	   space,	  whether	  physical	  or	   interactional,	   are	  multidimensional	  although	  the	  dimensions	  are	  not	  always	  clear.	  This	  was	  noted	  in	  Chapter	  4	  in	  the	  discussion	  of	  enclosure	   of	   suburban	   backyard	   commons.	   Thus,	   within	   the	   built	   and	   socially	   constructed	  environments	   of	   cities,	   the	   urban	   planners’	   concept	   of	   the	   street	   as	   a	   physical	   space	   to	   be	  designed,	   constructed	   and	   maintained	   according	   to	   sets	   of	   engineering	   standards	   interacts	  with,	  but	  sometimes	  also	  competes	  or	  conflicts	  with	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  street	  as	  a	  space	  for	  pedestrian	   contact	   and	   interaction.	   Such	  competing	  perspectives	  of	   the	   city	  were	  explored	   to	  great	   effect	   in	   the	   pioneering	   work	   of	   Jane	   Jacobs	   (1961)	   in	   New	   York	   and	   Toronto.	  Traditionally	  streets	  are	  also	  where	  many	  crowds	  and	  assemblies	  first	  gather.	  To	  make	  this	  concept	  of	  interactional,	  social	  or	  communication	  space	  more	  meaningful,	  we	   can	   follow	   the	   provocative	   suggestions	   of	   Lie	   to	   deploy	   the	   perspective	   of	   the	   Dutch	  geographer,	  Michel	  de	  Certeau.	  According	  to	  Lie’s	  reading	  of	  de	  Certeau,	  spaces	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  lived	  places.	  Thus,	  for	  example,	  the	  lived	  places	  that	  most	  contemporary	  nonprofit	  managers	  are	  most	   familiar	  with	  are	  probably	  home	  and	  office.	  Students	  may	  be	  most	   familiar	  not	  only	  with	   classrooms	   and	   dorms,	   but	   also	   general	   assembly	   points	   like	   campus	   quads	   or	   student	  centers.	  Places	  in	  this	  sense	  are	  fixed	  and	  stable	  with	  definite	  and	  established	  boundaries	  that	  can	   be	   determined,	   defined	   and	   perhaps	   defended,	   when	   necessary.	   By	   contrast,	   de	   Certeau	  notes,	   borders	   of	   spaces	   are	   flexible,	   often	   indeterminate	   and	   constructed	   in	   symbolic,	  interpretive	  ways	   (Lie,	   2003:	   121).	   Thus	   in	   de	   Certeau’s	   sense,	   a	   dining	   room	   is	   a	   place	   but	  family	  dinner	  is	  a	  space.	  Weekly	  staff	  meetings,	  monthly	  board	  meetings,	  annual	  meetings	  and	  professional	  workshops	   are	   also	  names	   for	   familiar	   spaces,	   regardless	  of	   the	  places	   in	  which	  they	   occur.	   One	   of	   the	   intents	   of	   the	   theory	   is	   to	   draw	   attention	   beyond	   the	   spaces	   of	  professional	  office	  culture	  and	  to	  see	  the	  vast	  range	  of	  other	  interactional,	  communication	  and	  social	  spaces	  associated	  with	  voluntary	  action	  and	  the	  production	  of	  common	  goods.	  In	  addition	  to	   assemblies	   occurring	   in	   classrooms,	  meeting	   rooms,	   offices,	   and	   hotel	   conference	   centers,	  some	   assemblies,	   including	   crowds	   associated	   with	   festivals,	   parades,	   protest	   marches	   and	  pilgrimages,	   occur	   on	   the	   streets	   and	   in	   other	   public	   and	   common	   spaces.	   In	   recent	   years,	  entirely	   unprecedented	   forms	   of	   electronic	   assembly	   have	   also	   emerged	   on	  web	   sites,	   blogs,	  email	  discussion	  lists,	  Facebook,	  and	  produced	  an	  entirely	  new	  vocabulary	  with	  terms	  like	  flash	  mobs,	  and	  crowd	  sourcing.	  
Public	  Space	  When	  we	  think	  of	  assembly,	  one	  idea	  that	  comes	  immediately	  to	  mind	  is	  that	  of	  public	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spaces	   in	  which	   large	  gatherings	  may	  occur.	  Who	  can	  ever	   forget	   the	  television	   images	  of	   the	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  gathered	  in	  Tahrir	  Square	  in	  Cairo	  during	  the	  Arab	  Spring	  of	  2011,	  for	  example?	  Or,	   the	  1963	  crowd	  on	   the	  Washington	  Mall	   for	  Dr.	  Martin	  Luther	  King’s	   “I	  Have	  A	  Dream”	   speech.	   Equally	   evocative,	   but	   less	   familiar	   perhaps,	   are	   the	   crowds	   assembled	   in	  Estonia	  and	  Latvia	  during	  the	  singing	  revolutions	  in	  1991.	  	  One	   of	   the	   most	   fundamental	   and	   significant	   uses	   of	   the	   notion	   of	   interactional	   and	  communicative	  space	  for	  assembly	  in	  the	  third	  sector	  literature	  is	  found	  in	  recent	  speculations	  and	   critiques	   of	   the	   idea	   of	   public	   space.	   Yet,	   one	   of	   the	   unfortunate	   characteristics	   of	  many	  cityscapes	  today	  is	  the	  decline	  of	  genuine	  public	  space.	  As	  a	  recent	  architectural	  review	  noted,	  “[S]tadiums	  are	  about	  as	  close	  as	  many	  cities	  come	  today	  to	  creating	  large-­‐scale	  public	  spaces”	  (Kimmelman,	  2012).	  Note	  that	  Kimmelman	  doesn’t	  say	  that	  stadiums	  are	  public	  spaces,	  but	  that	  they	  come	  close;	  ticketed	  entry	  being	  the	  key	  feature	  as	  noted	  previously.	  And,	  of	  course,	  as	  an	  architecture	  critic,	  he	   is	  most	   interested	   in	  social	  uses	  of	  physical	  space.	   	  At	   least	  some	  of	   the	  interest	  in	  shrinking	  public	  space	  comes	  from	  confusion	  between	  physical	  public	  space	  and	  the	  social	  and	  political	  spaces	  of	  the	  public	  sphere.	  Current	  interest	  in	  the	  latter	  can	  be	  traced	  most	  recently	   to	  Habermas’	   analysis	   of	   the	   transformation	   of	   the	  modern	   European	   public	   sphere	  (Habermas,	  1989).	  	  This	   is	   another	   case	  where	   the	  addition	  of	   the	   third	  and	   common	  alternative	  enriches	  the	  analysis.	  It	  would	  be	  a	  mistake	  to	  see	  this	  simply	  as	  a	  two-­‐way	  exchange:	  declining	  public	  spaces	  are	  simply	  being	  privatized.	  In	  many	  cases	  throughout	  the	  world	  they	  are	  entering	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  commons.	  One	  need	  only	  think	  of	  the	  crowds,	  often	  numbering	  in	  the	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  attending	  major	  sporting	  events	  around	  the	  world.	  	  These	  are	  not,	  in	  any	  strict	  sense,	  public	  events	  because	  tickets	  are	  required	  for	  admission	  (and	  cable	  or	  other	  subscriptions	  for	  viewing).	   Yet,	   they	   are	   also	   not	   in	   any	   strict	   sense	   private;	   no	   more	   so	   than	   the	   courts	   of	  medieval	   kings	   and	   dukes.	   In	   fact,	   they	   fit	   well	   within	   the	   conception	   of	   assemblies	   as	   new	  commons	   introduced	   immediately	   above.	   And,	   sporting	   events	   are	   by	   no	   means	   the	   only	  examples	   of	   such	   assemblies	   as	   new	   commons.	   Rock	   concerts,	   music	   and	   arts	   festivals	   and	  concerts,	  and	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  other	  cultural	  and	  religious	  assemblies	  large	  and	  small	  also	  fall	  within	  this	  domain.	  Two	  or	  more	  million	  people	  gather	  each	  year	  in	  Mecca,	  Saudi	  Arabia	  for	  the	  annual	  hajj,	  the	   pilgrimage	   that	   is	   one	   of	   the	   five	   pillars	   of	   Islam.	   Photographs	   of	   the	   event	   show	   daily	  political	   gatherings	   of	   crowds	   rivaling	   or	   exceeding	   those	   in	   Tahrir	   Square.	   Yet	   this	   is	   by	   no	  account	   a	   public	   assembly,	   for	   strict	   rules	   prohibit	   the	   entry	   of	   non-­‐Muslims	   into	  Mecca	   and	  Medina	  during	  the	  annual	  hajj.	  Similarly,	  some	  of	  the	  Hindi	  pilgrimages	  that	  also	  attract	  millions	  to	  the	  banks	  of	  the	  Ganges	  River	  and	  other	  pilgrimage	  sites	  in	  India	  may	  represent	  the	  largest	  commons-­‐based	  assemblies	  in	  the	  contemporary	  world.	  Without	  the	  distinction	  of	  common	  and	  public	   space	   in	   mind,	   however,	   we	   do	   not	   quite	   know	   how	   to	   speak	   of	   such	   events,	   except	  perhaps	   to	   resort	   to	   the	   familiar	  quasi-­‐public	  and	  semi-­‐public	   terminology.	  Commons	   theory,	  assembly,	  and	  the	  category	  of	  common	  spaces	  alongside	  public	  and	  private	  spaces	  offer	  novel	  and	  powerful	  ways	  to	  think	  about	  such	  events.	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Three	  Models	  of	  Public	  Space	  It	  is	  useful	  in	  this	  connection	  to	  look	  further	  at	  the	  concept	  of	  public	  space.	  The	  political	  philosopher	  Seyla	  Benhabib	  (1992)	  isolates	  three	  (equally	  non-­‐physical)	  models	  of	  public	  space	  in	  contemporary	  western	  political	  thought:	  1)	  The	  agonistic	  (or	  polemical)	  view	  of	  public	  space	  as	  ‘civic	  virtue’	  from	  the	  classical	  tradition.	  In	  modern	  political	  theory,	  she	  says,	  this	  view	  was	  most	   clearly	   articulated	   by	   Hannah	   Arendt	   in	   The	   Human	   Condition,	   a	   work	   that	   figured	  prominently	   in	  my	  original	   statement	   of	   commons	   theory	   (Lohmann,	   1992)	   and	   is	   discussed	  further	   below.	   2)	   The	   “public	   space”	   of	   the	   liberal	   tradition	   derived	   from	   Kant,	   where	   the	  ‘legalistic	   problem’	   of	   a	   ‘just	   and	   stable	  public	   order’	   is	   the	   centerpiece	  of	   theory.	  This	   is	   the	  view	  most	  commonly	  advanced	  by	  nonprofit	  sector	  theorists.	   	  3)	  The	  ‘discursive	  public	  space’	  envisioned	   by	   Habermas	   that	   emerges	   from	   a	   democratic	   or	   socialist	   restructure	   of	   late	  capitalist	  societies.	  This	  view	  is	  most	  associated	  with	  voluntary	  action	  and	  advocacy	  by	  political	  philosophers	  of	  models	  of	  deliberative	  democracy.	  Each	   of	   Benhabib’s	   three	   options	   can	   further	   our	   understandings	   of	   the	   role	   of	   new	  commons.	   However,	   all	   require	   some	   tweaking,	   since	   they	   are	   still	   premised	   on	   the	   radical	  dichotomy	   of	   private	   and	   public,	   which	   in	   turn,	   further	   provokes	   unnecessary	   confusion	  between	   the	   multiple	   senses	   of	   the	   terms	   private	   and	   public	   already	   noted.	   On	   this	   basis,	  numerous	   contemporary	   third	   sector	   analysts	   and	   critics	   have	   felt	   the	   necessity	   to	   define	  voluntary	  action	  with	  ironic	  euphemisms	  like	  “private	  production	  of	  public	  goods”.	  	  	  The	   new	   commons	   theory	   of	   voluntary	   action	   incorporates	   another,	   more	   subtle	  distinction,	  one	  which,	  consistent	  with	  the	  legal	  origins	  of	  the	  third	  sector	  discussed	  above,	  first	  emerged	  in	  Benhabib’s	  Kantian	  model,	  as	  a	  purely	  legalistic	  option,	  but	  which	  has	  more	  recently	  erupted	  into	  full	  institutional	  bloom.	  	  In	  it,	  incorporation,	  foundations,	  trusts,	  and	  the	  full	  legal	  penumbra	  of	  rights	  and	  privileges	  work	  together	  to	  define	  precisely	  a	  “just	  and	  stable	  order”,	  that	   is	   also	   in	   important	   senses	   a	   “spontaneous	   order”.	   The	   result	   is	   different	   not	   only	   from	  public	  of	  the	  civic	  virtue	  approach	  of	  Arendt’s	  ancients,	  but	  also	  from	  the	  Enlightenment	  view	  of	  Kant	   and	   others	   (notably	   Hobbes	   and	   Rousseau).	   The	   resulting	   third	   space	   involves	   placing	  limits	   on	   the	   idea	   of	   both	   public	   and	   private	   space	   that,	   in	   effect,	   open	   up	   the	   new	   and	  unprecedented	  idea	  of	  common	  space.	  	  Habermas	   examined	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   new	   model	   of	   the	   public	   sphere	   in	   the	   18th	  century,	  and	   its	  subsequent	   fall	  and	  replacement	  by	  a	  more	  recent	  model,	  but	  says	  enticingly	  little	  of	  the	  exact	  nature	  of	  the	  model	  that	   it	  replaced	  in	  Europe.	  In	  this	  earlier,	  pre-­‐bourgeois	  view,	  public	  matters	  were	   the	   exclusive	   concern	  of	   government	  officials,	   too	   important	   to	  be	  trusted	   to	  what	   in	   democratic	   societies	   are	   termed	   the	   public.	   Sheehan	   (1989)	   for	   example,	  quotes	  two	  ministers	  of	  the	  Prussian	  crown	  who	  wrote	  in	  1794	  “a	  private	  individual	  does	  not	  possess	  the	  right	  to	  issue	  public	  judgments,	  let	  alone	  unfavorable	  judgments	  upon	  the	  actions,	  procedures,	   laws,	   proclamations	   or	   decrees	   of	   sovereigns,	   their	   ministers,	   administrative	  boards,	  or	  courts	  of	  justice.”	  When	  they	  argued,	  Sheehan	  critiques,	  “that	  private	  individuals	  do	  not	   know	   enough	   about	   public	   policies	   and	   public	   figures	   to	   have	   worthwhile	   opinions,	   the	  ministers	  were	   using	   a	   concept	   of	   ‘public’	   to	   designate	   public	   affairs	   that	  were	   too	   complex,	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arcane	   and	   sensitive	   for	   public	   consumption”	   (Sheehan,	   1989:	   190).	   This	   view	   is	   the	  quintessence	  of	  all	  autocratic	  and	  bureaucratic	  conceptions	  of	  public	  space,	  and	   incompatible	  with	  modern	  sensibilities	  in	  democratic	  society.	  	  The	   three	   approaches	   examined	   by	   Benhabib,	   she	   says,	   all	   limit	   ‘public	   space’	   to	  normative	  political	   theory	  (an	   idea	  that	   is	   itself	  an	  expression	  of	  what	   in	  the	  next	  chapter	  we	  will	   identify	  as	  a	  knowledge	  commons,	   as	  well	   as	   the	  view	  of	  a	  political	   elite	  of	  philosophers	  distinct	   from	   the	   democratic	   polity,	   Barber	   (1988)	   reminds	   us.	   This	   should	   not	   be	   read	   as	   a	  criticism;	  as	  a	  political	  philosopher	  speaking	  to	  principally	  to	  other	  political	  philosophers	  about	  matters	  of	  theory,	  Benhabib	  has	  no	  need	  to	  move	  beyond	  that	  limit.	  She	  is	  speaking	  within	  the	  confines	  of	  a	  knowledge	  commons,	  and	  should	  not	  be	  read	  as	  addressing	  public	  policy,	  as	  the	  Prussian	   ministers	   above	   clearly	   were.	   Likewise,	   approaches	   to	   public	   space	   used	   by	  economists	  also	  adhere	  to	  similar	  professional	  and	  disciplinary	  limitations	  up	  until	  the	  moment	  they	  are	  invoked	  as	  public	  policy	  prescriptions.	  	  Any	   approach	   to	   common	   space	   in	   voluntary	   action	   practice,	   however,	   is	   first	   and	  foremost	   a	   common	   concern.	   It	  may	   also	   have	   to	   attend	   to	   public	   political	   connotations,	   but	  speaks	   primarily	   to	   the	   interests	   of	   relevant	   religious,	   literary,	   artistic,	   educational	   and	  scientific	  commons.	  Third	  sector	  uses	  of	  public	  (interest,	  issues,	  good,	  etc.)	  	  at	  this	  point	  reveal	  some	   of	   the	  more	   serious	   limitations	   of	   the	   English	   language	   term	   public.	   The	   German	   term	  
öffentlichkeit	   as	   used	   by	  Habermas	   has	   been	   translated	   into	   English	   as	   public.	   But	   it	   is	  more	  robust	   than	   its	   English	   counterpart	   and	   can	   accommodate	  not	   only	  political	   publics,	   but	   also	  literary,	   religious,	   artistic,	   educational	   and	   scientific	   publics	   as	  well.	   In	  English,	  we	  must	   find	  more	  roundabout	  ways	   to	  accomplish	   this	  result.	  Parsing	  various	  distinctions	  between	  public	  and	   common,	   which	   have	   typically	   been	   used	   as	   synonyms	   offers	   one	   way	   to	   do	   this.	   The	  commons	  theory	  of	  voluntary	  action	  introduces	  three	  measures	  to	  deal	  with	  this.	  The	  first	  is	  to	  limit	   the	   term	   public	   after	   the	   manner	   of	   the	   discussion	   above	   in	   order	   to	   distinguish	  production	  of	  three	  types	  of	  goods:	  public,	  private	  and	  common.	  The	  second	  is	  to	  expand	  that	  usage	  to	  communication	  spaces	  and	  to	  speak	  of	  public,	  private	  and	  common	  spaces	  or	  spheres	  as	  well.	  The	   third	   is	   to	   introduce	  an	  additional	   term,	   the	   focused	  public,	   to	   characterize	   some	  public	  spaces	  as	  a	  type	  of	  social	  or	  cultural	  organization.	  	  A	   focused	   public	   is	   defined	   as	   a	   body	   of	   persons	   large	   enough	   that	  members	   are	   not	  personally	   known	   to	   one	   another	   but	   who	  would	   if	   they	   were	   to	  meet	   have	   some	   basis	   for	  mutual	   recognition,	   identity	   or	   affiliation.	   	   A	   focused	   public	   is	   ordinarily	   the	  most	   expansive	  form	  of	   the	  knowledge	   commons	  discussed	   in	  Chapter	  9.	  Thus,	   for	   example,	   the	  17th	   century	  English	  public	  that	  included	  not	  only	  the	  amateur	  scientists	  but	  also	  their	  readers,	  patrons	  and	  supporters	  constituted	  such	  a	  focused	  public.	  Members	  of	  a	  focused	  public	  may	  not	  all	  belong	  to	  the	   same	   organization,	   yet	   they	   ‘voluntarily’	   share	   common	   values,	   interests	   or	   sense	   of	  mission.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  professional	  communities	  of	  social	  workers,	  economists	  or	  what	  are	  sometimes	   called	   theater	   buffs	   are	   focused	   publics,	   and	   AARP,	   the	   American	   Association	   of	  Retired	  Persons	  is	  not	  –	  even	  though	  it	  probably	  involves	  more	  people,	  may	  be	  more	  politically	  engaged,	   and	   is	   similarly	   purposive.	   The	   difference	   is	   AARP	   is	   a	   formal	   membership	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organization,	  being	  a	  theater	  buff	  or	  enthusiast	  for	  the	  paintings	  of	  a	  particular	  artist	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  social	  organization,	  or	  cultural	  affinity.	  As	  we	  shall	  see	  below,	  being	  convinced	  of	  a	  particular	  social	  problem	  viewpoint	  or	   the	  outlook	  of	  a	  social	  movement	  does	  not	  always	   involve	  active	  participation	   in	  movement	   organizations.	   It	  may	   be	   a	  matter	   of	   simple	   value	   preferences	   or	  cultural	   affinity.	  This	   is	   the	   realm	  of	   focused	  publics.	  The	   term	   focused	  public	   can	  usually	  be	  used	   in	   conjunction	   with	   at	   least	   one	   additional	   adjective,	   as	   in	   consumer-­‐focused	   public,	  science-­‐focused	   public,	   technology-­‐focused	   public	   and	   a	   wide	   variety	   of	   other	   possibilities	  (Lohmann	  and	  Lohmann,	  2010).	  Many	   focused	  publics	  come	   to	  have	   ‘given’	  names;	  examples	  include	   Wall	   Street	   and	   Broadway	   (New	   York),	   Hollywood	   and	   The	   City	   (in	   London),	   the	  scientific	  community,	   the	  art	  world,	  and,	  of	  course,	  Rome,	  Mecca,	  Christians,	   Jews,	  Muslims	  or	  Buddhists,	  atheists,	  agnostics,	  and	  all	  the	  related	  labels.	  	  As	   these	   examples	   suggest,	   focused	   publics	  may	   be	   centered	   on	   a	   physical	   space,	   but	  sometimes	   only	   on	   a	  more	   abstract	   social	   or	   cultural	   space.	   A	  wide	   variety	   of	   terms	   exist	   to	  characterize	  the	  latter:	  the	  fourth	  estate	  and	  the	  Republic	  of	  Letters	  are	  two	  examples.	  Chapter	  9	  will	  explore	  a	  number	  of	  common	  themes	  and	  issues	  that	  enable	  us	  to	  speak	  generally	  about	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  such	  instances.	  Before	  that,	  however,	  we	  need	  to	  look	  further	  at	  some	  particular	  types	  of	  focused	  publics.	  
Canopies	  In	  general	  usage,	  a	  canopy	  is	  a	  covering	  or	  roofed	  structure.	  Thus	  in	  forestry,	  it	  is	  a	  dense	  covering	   of	   branches	   and	   leaves	   high	   in	   the	   treetops	   of	   a	   forest	   or	   jungle.	   In	   the	   commons	  theory	  of	  voluntary	  action,	  a	  canopy	  can	  be	  said	  to	  be	  that	  component	  of	  a	  social	  space	  defining	  a	  recognizable	  physical	  space	  for	  presentation	  and	  recognition	  of	  the	  autonomous,	  self-­‐defining	  authority	  or	   legitimacy	  of	  an	  assembled	  body;	   their	  right	   to	  be	   there	  and	  to	  do	  what	   they	  do.	  Such	  a	  canopy	  is	  composed	  of	  several	  dimensions,	  including	  attention,	  focus,	  or	  listening	  on	  the	  part	   of	   those	   present,	   and	   responsiveness,	   in	   such	   forms	   as	   applause	   or	   verbal	   reactions,	  questions	   and	   follow-­‐on	   comments	   as	   well	   as	   a	   broad	   range	   of	   other	   implicit	   or	   unspoken	  moeurs.	   Canopies,	   in	   this	   sense,	   are	   integral	   parts	   of	   what	   has	   traditionally	   been	   termed	  “definition	  of	  situations.”	  For	  our	  purposes,	  they	  are	  the	  understandings	  that	  people	  have	  of	  the	  context	  within	  which	  voluntary	  action	  does	  and	  can	  occur.	  Canopies	   enclosing	   and	   defining	   social	   spaces	   may	   be	   of	   several	   types	   in	   addition	   to	  Anderson’s	   (2011)	   cosmopolitan	   version,	   which	   is	   of	   particular	   interest	   under	   conditions	   of	  pluralism.	   For	   example,	   there	   are	   secret	   canopies	   like	   those	   that	   cover	   the	   associations	   of	  political	  dissidents	  everywhere,	  including	  the	  polygamists	  mentioned	  previously.	  A	  special	  sub-­‐type	  of	  secret	  canopies	  are	  the	  canopies	  of	  computer	  hacker	  groups	  like	  Anonymous,	  terrorist	  groups	  like	  Al	  Qaeda,	  and	  domestic	  splinter	  groups	  like	  the	  Michigan	  Militia,	  assorted	  Mafioso	  and	   earlier	   in	   history	   the	   Ku	   Klux	   Klan.	   Third	   sector	   scholars	   have	   generally	   written	   such	  commons	   off	   along	  with	   political	   associations,	   but	   the	   concept	   of	   bad	   commons	   allows	   us	   to	  make	  a	  place	  for	  them	  in	  the	  larger	  schema	  of	  the	  third	  sector,	  while	  the	  term	  canopy	  of	  secrecy	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differentiates	   those	  most	   strongly	   nonpublic	   in	   an	   information	   or	   awareness	   sense.	   There	   is	  also	   the	   canopy	   that	   arises	   when	   a	   group,	   association	   or	   assembly	   has	   a	   heightened	   or	  exaggerated	  sense	  of	  mission	  and	  its	  own	  lofty	  position	  in	  the	  scheme	  of	  things.	  Associations	  of	  “real	  world	  superheroes”	  who	  use	  their	  own	  superhero	  persona	  to	  cross	  the	  line	  from	  gaming	  and	   engage	   in	   essentially	   vigilante	   activity	   would	   be	   an	   example	   (Hughes,	   2006;	   Mazé	   and	  Jacobs,	  undated).	  Such	  canopies,	  and	  we	  shall	  resist	  the	  temptation	  to	  name	  them	  at	  this	  point,	  are	  of	  two	  major	  types:	  There	  are	  canopies	  that	  emerge	  directly	  from	  common	  associations	  and	  assemblies,	  as	  expressions	  of	  group	  social	  and	  moral	  capital.	  Leaders	  and	  many	  participants	  in	  the	  civil	  rights	  movement,	  for	  example,	  were	  aware	  that	  they	  were	  engaged	  in	  unique	  activities	  and	   developing	  moeurs	   of	   historic	   importance,	   and	   that	   canopy	   gave	   their	   efforts	   an	   added	  sense	  of	  urgency,	  importance	  and	  dedication.	  Canopies	  of	  this	  sort	  develop	  a	  sense	  of	  collective	  self-­‐worth	  that	  both	  earnest	  participants	  and	  the	  slightly	  cynical	  have	  been	  known	  to	  describe	  as	  “doing	  God’s	  work”	  and	  with	  other,	  similar	  phrases.	  Then,	  there	  are	  the	  canopies	  of	  duplicity	  and	  hypocrisy	  thrown	  by	  others	  over	  “those	  people”	  who	  are	  suspected,	  rumored	  and	  accused	  of	  being	   insincere,	  posturing	  and	   false	   in	   some	  of	   their	   appearances.	  A	   further	  body	  of	   social	  science	  work	  exists	  characterizing	  religion	  under	  sacred	  canopies.	  Peter	  Berger	  may	  have	  been	  the	   first	   to	   use	   canopy	   in	   this	   sense,	   in	   a	   1967	   study	   of	   religion	   entitled	  The	   Sacred	   Canopy	  (1990	  [1967]).	  	  	  In	  Elijah	  Anderson’s	  (2011)	  examples	  in	  Philadelphia,	  especially	  in	  Reading	  Market	  and	  Rittenhouse	  Square,	  the	  cosmopolitan	  canopies	  he	  describes	  and	  analyzes	  are	  social	  spaces	  that	  evolved	   spontaneously	   over	   time.	   By	   contrast,	   in	   many	   conventionally	   convened	   crowds,	  classrooms,	  street	  scenes	  or	  gathering	  assemblies	  of	  interest	  in	  voluntary	  action,	  there	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  a	  leader	  or	  group	  of	  organizers,	  conveners	  or	  facilitators	  deliberately	  seeking	  to	  establish	  a	   canopy.	   There	   may	   also	   be	   a	   defining	   moment	   when	   the	   canopy	   emerges	   (or	   not)	   and	  becomes	   apparent	   to	   those	   involved	   –	   for	   example,	   when	   the	   curtain	   opens,	   the	   conductor	  arrives	  onstage,	  the	  speaker	  is	   introduced,	  or	  the	  chairperson	  announces	  that	  the	  “real	  event”	  has	  begin.	  Even	  such	  a	  prosaic	  activity	  as	  calling	  a	  meeting	  to	  order	  may	  be	  an	  evocation	  of	  a	  canopy;	  we	  are	  no	  longer	  a	  group	  of	  separate	  individuals	  but	  rather	  now	  share	  the	  canopy	  of	  a	  common	   identity	   for	   the	   duration	   of	   the	   meeting.	   In	   such	   circumstances,	   the	   classic	   stance	  would	  to	  be	  say	  that	  the	  canopy	  is	  invoked	  or	  descends	  upon	  the	  commons,	  invoking	  divine	  or	  other	  authority.	   In	  democratic	  circumstances,	   it	   is	  more	  appropriate	   to	  see	   this	  as	  a	  distillate	  from	  the	  common	  authority	  of	  the	  group.	  	  In	  either	  case,	  when	  invoking	  a	  canopy	  is	  successful	  and	  that	  moment	  arrives	  we	  may	  speak	  of	  the	  emergence	  or	  appearance	  of	  a	  common	  space,	  a	  sense	  that	  most	  who	  are	  “there”	  can	  share	  as	  the	  contemporaneous	  realization	  of	  the	  sense	  of	  being	   together	   in	   time/space	   for	   some	   shared	   reasons.	   At	   that	   moment	   and	   until	   the	  subsequent	   closure	   of	   the	   canopy,	   the	   shared	   experience	   becomes	   an	   additional	   common	  resource	   for	   those	  present.	  Anyone	  who	  has	  ever	  held	  a	  committee	  meeting	   in	  a	  public	  other	  lounge	   or	   space	   like	   Reading	   Market	   where	   other	   nonparticipants	   are	   reading,	   conversing,	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sleeping	  or	  listening	  should	  be	  able	  to	  grasp	  Anderson’s	  concept	  as	  well	  as	  the	  narrower	  canopy	  of	  a	  canopy	  within	  that	  cosmopolitan	  space	  intended	  here.	  The	  concept	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  as	  elaborated	  by	  Habermas	  and	  others	  is	  also	  a	  canopy	  of	   sorts.	   There	  must	   have	   been	  moments	   of	   self-­‐conscious	   opening	   and	   closing	   in	   the	   public	  sphere	  canopies	  that	  emerged	  in	  18th	  century	  coffee	  houses	  of	  London,	  Paris,	  Vienna	  and	  Berlin,	  for	   example,	  when	   those	   spaces	  were	   transformed	   from	  ordinary	   commercial	   establishments	  for	   buying	   and	   selling	   coffee	   to	   enabled	   venues	   of	   the	   public	   sphere	  where	   information	   and	  knowledge	   of	   public	   affairs	   previously	   limited	   to	   those	   Prussian	   government	   ministers	   and	  their	   counterparts	   could	   be	   exchanged,	   newspapers	   were	   planned,	   edited,	   and	   read,	  discussions,	  deliberations	  and	  debates	  were	  held	  and	  other	  civic	  activities	  took	  place.	  Likewise,	  in	  the	  meetings	  of	  the	  various	  academies	  and	  other	  scientific	  societies	  that	  began	  in	  abundance	  in	  the	  17th	  century	  distinct	  social	  spaces	  dedicated	  to	  scientific	  knowledge	  were	  first	  realized	  in	  the	   modern	   world.	   Quite	   probably,	   just	   as	   Anderson	   describes	   in	   the	   various	   venues	   in	  Philadelphia,	  these	  coffee	  house	  spaces	  functioned	  differently	  at	  different	  times	  of	  the	  day	  and	  year,	  at	  one	  time	  merely	  selling	  coffee	  to	  rotating	  rounds	  of	  customers,	  with	  ‘regulars’	  intent	  on	  civic	  exchange	  gradually	  accumulating	  while	  until	  some	  type	  of	  plurality	  was	  attained	  or	  some	  recognized	   leader,	   wit	   or	   organizer	   arrived	   (e.g.	   Oliver	   Goldsmith,	   Jonathan	   Swift,	   Joseph	  Addison,	  Richard	  Steele	  or	  Benjamin	  Franklin).	  At	  that	  point,	  and	  associated	  with	  what	  can	  be	  called	  a	  baudekin,	  a	  transformation	  in	  the	  definition	  of	  the	  situation	  would	  have	  taken	  place	  and	  everyone	  in	  the	  venue	  would	  recognize	  that	  it	  would	  be	  proper	  to	  convene	  a	  meeting,	  make	  a	  brief	   speech,	   or	   engage	   in	   other	   behaviors	   not	   usually	   associated	   with	   commercial	   coffee	  houses,	  because	  the	  canopy	  made	  this	  part	  of	  the	  public	  sphere.	  	  Likewise,	  at	  some	  other	  point,	  it	  would	  be	  similarly	  clear	  that	  the	  social	  space	  of	  the	  public	  sphere	  had	  closed	  and	  the	  coffee	  house	  was	  once	  again	  an	  ordinary	  commercial	  venue.	  Much	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  canopies	  can	  be	  established	   for	   non-­‐public	   affairs,	   such	   as	   collective	   religious,	   artistic	   or	   educational	  experiences.	   There	   are,	   in	   fact,	   all	   sorts	   of	   clever	   and	   waggish	   ways	   to	   describe	   similar	  transformations	   in	   the	  meaning	   of	   a	   situation,	   as	   in	   the	   expression	   “I	   went	   to	   a	   fight	   and	   a	  hockey	  game	  broke	  out.”	  Experienced	  classroom	  teachers	  and	  students,	  for	  example,	  will	  both	  be	   familiar	  with	   the	  moment	  when	   invoking	   the	   canopy	   is	   the	  point	   at	  which	   students	   cease	  private	  conversations	  and	  turn	  their	  collective	  attention	  to	  the	  learning	  experience	  at	  hand	  and	  the	   instructor.	   Just	   as	  with	   the	   other	   examples,	   a	   classroom	   is	   neither	   a	   public	   nor	   a	   private	  venue,	  and	   that	  moment,	   like	  others	  when	  students	  are	   “talking	   in	  class”	  or	  engaged	   in	  other	  private	  behavior	   like	   texting	  outside	  the	  canopy	   illustrates	  another	  example,	  or	  venue	  of	  new	  commons.	  
Venue	  Venue,	  defined	  as	  the	  scene	  or	  place	  where	  collective	  actions	  take	  place	  and	  canopies	  are	  invoked,	   is	  an	   important	   term	  to	   focus	  attention	  on	   the	  physical	  spatial	   space	  of	  an	  assembly	  where	  the	  regular	  or	  predictable	  emergence	  of	  a	  canopy	  is	  to	  be	  expected.	  Two	  types	  of	  venues	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are	  particularly	  important	  for	  voluntary	  action:	  general,	  or	  multi-­‐purpose	  sites,	  like	  the	  London	  coffee	   houses,	   contemporary	   community	   rooms,	   campus	   or	   student	   centers	   and	   specific	   or	  dedicated	  venues,	  like	  Masonic	  Halls,	  theaters,	  ball	  rooms,	  concert	  stages	  and	  sports	  arenas	  and	  stadia.	  Such	  dedicated	  venues	  are	  often	  commercial	  establishments	  where	  people	  pay	   for	   the	  opportunity	   to	   join	   the	   canopy.	  Note	   also	   that	   the	   canopy	   experience	   in	   a	   commercial	   venue	  (NFL	  stadium	  or	  MLB	   field)	   is	   typically	  very	  similar	   to	   the	  nonprofit	   (NCAA	  or	  Olympic)	  one.	  The	  tax-­‐category	  of	  the	  sponsoring	  corporation	  apparently	  has	  little	  effect	  on	  the	  experience	  of	  voluntary	  action	  in	  dedicated	  venues.	  	  Thus	   a	  meeting	   room	   is	   a	  multi-­‐purpose	   venue	   that	   can	   host	   a	   bake	   sale,	   instruction,	  business	   meeting,	   or	   line	   dancing.	   By	   contrast,	   theaters,	   temples,	   concert	   halls,	   libraries,	  gymnasiums,	  chapels,	  and	  laboratories	  tend	  to	  be	  venues	  for	  specific	  purposes,	  although	  any	  of	  these,	   like	   Vaclav	   Havel’s	   Magic	   Lantern	   Theater,	   might	   be	   used	   for	   other	   purposes	   under	  appropriate	   circumstances	   (Ash,	   1990).	   The	   venues	   of	   voluntary	   action	   are	   a	   little-­‐studied	  phenomenon.	   Also	   of	   interest	   is	   the	   shift	   away	   from	   purpose-­‐built	   venues	   for	   third	   sector	  entities	  among	  voluntary	  action	  organizations	  between	   the	   late	  19th	   century	  and	   the	  present.	  Every	   large	   city	   in	   the	   U.S.,	   London,	   Paris	   and	   most	   other	   cities	   are	   dotted	   with	   buildings	  constructed	   especially	   for	   assemblies	   of	   social	   clubs,	   religious	   groups	   and	   fraternal	  organizations,	  Masonic	  temples,	  churches,	  synagogues	  and	  temples	  and	  a	  host	  of	  other	  purpose-­‐built	   venues	   for	   voluntary	   action	   dating	   from	   the	   19th	   and	   early	   20th	   century.	   Today,	  gymnasiums	   (e.g.,	   YMCA’s,	   nonprofit	   and	   private	   health	   clubs)	   as	   well	   as	   churches	   and	  foundations	  with	   their	  own	  buildings	  are	  among	   the	  remaining	  purposive	  venues,	  but	   for	   the	  most	   part	   voluntary	   action	   venues	   have	   been	   absorbed	   into	   the	   general	   venues	   of	   office	  buildings,	  and	  in	  some	  cases,	  former	  homes	  converted	  to	  office	  or	  common	  use.	  
Baudekin	  The	  provocative	  notion	  introduced	  by	  Anderson’s	  discussion	  of	  the	  cosmopolitan	  canopy	  in	  Philadelphia	  also	  has	  additional	  implications	  for	  the	  commons	  theory	  of	  voluntary	  action.	  We	  can	  characterize	  some	  of	  these	  with	  baudekin,	  an	  archaic	  English	  term	  also	  spelled	  baldachin	  to	  describe	  the	  canopy	  or	  architectural	  feature	  covering	  a	  bishop’s	  throne	  or	  seat	  (cathedra)	  as	  a	  symbol	  of	  authority.	  Thus	  we	  can	  define	  the	  baudekin	  of	  a	  commons	  as	  the	  canopy	  of	  authority	  covering	   any	   particular	   new	   commons.	   For	   example,	   there	   was	   a	   very	   clear	   baudekin	  surrounding	  the	  Continental	  Congress	  in	  Philadelphia	  in	  1776,	  and	  assorted	  state	  constitutional	  conventions,	  like	  the	  First	  and	  Second	  Wheeling	  Conventions	  on	  May	  13	  and	  June	  11,	  1861	  from	  which	   the	  new	  state	  of	  West	  Virginia	  was	   formed	  by	   secession	   from	   the	   secessionist	   state	  of	  Virginia	   and	   remained	   in	   the	   union.	   	   Baudekins	   as	   canopies	   of	   authority	   are	   particularly	  interesting	   features	   in	   the	   context	   of	   human	   rights	   and	   freedom	   movements.	   There	   are	  numerous	   additional	   examples	   of	   events	   that	   established	   moral	   baudekins	   like	   the	   student	  lunch	   counter	   sit-­‐ins	   and	   the	   Selma,	   Alabama	   demonstration	   at	   the	   Pettis	   bridge,	   the	   Seneca	  
  197 
Falls	  convention	   in	  1848,	   the	  Stonewall	   riots	   in	  1969,	  Bloody	  Sunday,	  November	  21,	  1920,	   in	  Dublin.	  	  In	  contemporary	  voluntary	  action,	  baudekins	  come	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  (figuratively	  speaking)	  shapes,	  sizes,	  and	  forms.	  Whereas	  medieval	  baudekins	  were	  tangible	  symbols	  of	  office	  like	  the	  cathedra	   and	   part	   of	   the	   collection	   of	   venerable	   objects	   possessed	   by	   notable	   persons	   and	  institutions	   as	   signs	   of	   their	   authority,	   modern	   baudekins	   tend	   to	   be	   intangible	   symbols	   of	  democratic	  authority	  claimed	  by	  individuals	  or	  groups,	  often	  in	  the	  form	  of	  reserved	  spaces	  or	  venerated	   places.	   Thus,	   presidents,	   conveners	   or	   chairpeople	   frequently	   sit	   at	   the	   head	   of	   a	  conference	  table	  or	  stand	  at	  the	  front	  of	  the	  room	  for	  purposes	  of	  convening	  and	  “running”	  or	  presiding	   over	   meetings,	   while	   other	   group	   leaders	   seek	   to	   enhance	   their	   democratic	  credentials	   by	   explicitly	   rejecting	   such	   baudekins.	   However,	   for	   modern	   board	   members,	   a	  gavel	  as	  a	  symbol	  of	  authority	   is	  decided	   limited.	   In	   large	  gatherings	   the	  convening	  official(s)	  willingly	  or	  not	  stand	  at	  a	  rostrum	  or	  on	  a	  dais	  or	  raised	  platform	  and	  use	  a	  microphone.	  The	  performance	  or	  procedure	  of	  rotating	  speaking	  privileges	  may	  include	  moving	  to	  and	  from	  the	  rostrum/microphone,	   microphones	   stationed	   in	   the	   audience,	   or	   in	   the	   case	   of	   a	   portable	  microphone	  of	  passing	  it	  from	  one	  speaker	  to	  another.	  The	  very	  shape	  of	  portable	  microphones	  sometimes	  tends	  to	  resemble	  a	  kind	  of	  miniature	  ruler’s	  mace	  and	  subconsciously	  reinforce	  its	  role	   as	   a	   symbol	   of	   authority.	   These	   all	   represent	   instances	   of	   what	  we	   are	   here	   calling	   the	  baudekins	  as	  symbols	  of	  authority	  in	  voluntary	  action.	  	  
Baudikins,	  Focused	  Publics,	  Social	  Problems	  and	  Movements	  Shared	   recognition	   of	   canopies	   and	   baudekins	   are	   characteristic	   of	   a	   focused	   public.	  Focused	  public	  members	  may	  not	  all	  belong	  to	  the	  same	  organization,	  yet	  share	  some	  common	  values,	   mission	   or	   interests,	   including	   recognition	   of	   shared	   canopies	   of	   authority.	   Two	  important	  forms	  through	  which	  focused	  publics	  are	  established	  and	  sustained	  are	  found	  in	  the	  seemingly	  independent	  topics	  of	  social	  problems	  and	  social	  movements.	  Members	  of	  a	  focused	  public	  will	  recognize	  a	  social	  problem	  or	  affirm	  a	  social	  movement	  in	  ways	  that	  others	  do	  not,	  even	  though	  they	  do	  not	  see	  themselves	  as	  active	  members	  or	  participants.	  Focused	  publics,	  in	  this	  sense,	  can	  emerge	  either	  directly	   from	  the	  membership	  of	  associations	  or	  assemblies	  but	  also	   include	   those	   who	   are	   only	   aware	   of	   or	   supportive	   of	   them,	   with	   no	   intent	   to	   join	   or	  participate.	   Thus,	   in	   recent	   years	   both	   the	   Tea	   Party	   and	   the	   Occupy	   movements,	   like	   the	  “flower	  power”,	  conservative	  and	  other	  counter-­‐cultural	  movements	  of	   the	  1960s	  all	   inspired	  large	  coronas	  of	  focused	  publics	  who	  claimed	  to	  understand	  and	  support	  what	  the	  movement	  was	  about	  but	  did	  not	  consider	  themselves	  participants.	  Similarly,	  the	  growing	  awareness	  of	  a	  social	   problem	   can	   be	   tracked	   in	   large	   part	   by	   the	   simultaneous	   growth	   of	   core	   participants	  (“activists”)	   invoking	   the	  baudekin	  of	   the	  problem,	  and	   the	   focused	  public	  of	   core	  supporters	  who	  acknowledge,	  yes,	  this	  is	  a	  problem.	  For	  these	  reasons,	  we	  need	  to	  further	  examine	  social	  movements	  in	  the	  context	  of	  assembly	  as	  forms	  of	  voluntary	  action.	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Conclusion	  Assembly	   is	  one	  of	   the	  historically	   important,	   but	  widely	  neglected	   facets	  of	   collective	  action,	   yet	   it	   has	   received	   no	   serious	   attention	   in	   the	   literature	   of	   third	   sector	   studies.	  Assemblies,	   like	   associations,	   can	   be	   defined	   in	   terms	   of	   voluntary	   participation.	   Common	  purposes	  and	  the	  pooling	  of	  resources	  distinguish	  assemblies	  as	  collective	  behavior	  from	  other	  forms	   of	   crowds.	   Even	   so,	   the	   concept	   of	   the	   canopy	   introduced	   in	   Anderson’s	   study	   of	  cosmopolitan	  canopies	  offers	  a	  useful	  way	  to	  understand	  the	  formation	  of	  focused	  publics	  and	  the	  situated	  aspects	  of	  assembly	  that	  differentiate	  them	  from	  associations.	  As	  we	  shall	  see	  in	  the	  next	   chapter,	   several	   types	   of	   associations	   and	   assemblies	   constitute	   types	   of	   knowledge	  commons.
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The world of knowledge takes a crazy turn  
When teachers themselves begin to learn. 
 ~ Bertold Brecht 
10.	  Knowledge	  Commons	  One	  of	  the	  most	  potent	  and	  interesting	  recent	  products	  of	  the	  Bloomington	  School	  from	  the	  vantage	  point	  of	  voluntary	  action	  has	  been	   the	   introduction	  of	  a	   rational	   choice	  model	  of	  knowledge	  commons	  (Hess	  and	  Ostrom,	  2007).	  The	  essential	  idea	  is	  of	  a	  common	  resource	  pool	  in	  which	  a	  particular	  field	  of	  knowledge	  is	  the	  principal	  shared	  resource,	  with	  other	  resources	  serving	  subsidiary	  or	  supportive	  roles.	  A	  knowledge	  commons	  can	  be	  defined	  for	  our	  purposes	  as	  a	  shared,	  common	  resource	  pool	  of	  knowledge	  of	  (that	  is,	  what	  is	  known	  about)	  any	  subject,	  from	   astrophysics	   to	   Zoroastrianism,	   including	   practices	   from	   mining	   to	   hypnosis,	   together	  with	  the	  agents	  who	  know	  or	   ‘possess’	  that	  knowledge,	  their	  various	  associations,	  assemblies,	  and	  focused	  publics,	  and	  the	  rules	  they	  establish	   for	  determining	  what	  knowledge	   is	   for	   their	  purposes	  and	  how	  to	  deal	  with	  false	  knowledge.	  The	   full	   significance	  of	   the	  knowledge	  commons	  model	   is	   currently	  hamstrung	  by	   two	  major	   limitations:	   reliance	   on	   a	   static,	   rational	   individualist	   model	   of	   knowledge	   that	   treats	  knowledge	   as	   an	   abstract	   commodity	   rather	   than	   the	   shared	   perspectives	   and	   socially	  constructed	  projects	  of	  associations,	  assemblies	  and	  their	  focused	  publics.	  As	  advocates	  of	  the	  Bloomington	  model	  of	  commons	  at	  times	  seem	  to	  acknowledge,	  such	  a	  model	  is	  presently	  too	  narrowly	  drawn	  to	  fully	  embrace	  the	  real,	  robust	  nature	  of	  knowledge;	  something	  that	  includes	  (or	  ought	  to)	  the	  collective	  hunches,	   imaginings,	  nuances,	  questions,	  and	  inklings	  surrounding	  what	   is	   known	   with	   any	   degree	   of	   certainty.	   Knowledge	   is	   always	   knowledge	   of	   or	   about	  something,	  and	   it	   is	  always	  someone’s	  (and	  most	  often,	  some	  reference	  group’s)	  knowledge	  –	  our	  knowledge,	  their	  knowledge,	  or	  someone	  else’s	  knowledge.	  I	  have	  little	  doubt	  that	  personal	  knowledge	  of	  other	  individuals	  and	  even	  tacit	  knowledge	  exists	  for	  others	  much	  as	  it	  does	  for	  me	  –	   for	  example,	   an	   individual’s	  awareness	  of	   their	  own	   thoughts,	   fantasies,	   imaginings	  and	  the	  like.	  Further,	  the	  notion	  of	  sub-­‐conscious	  knowledge	  is	  an	  intriguing	  one,	  although	  for	  the	  most	  part	  beyond	  the	  bounds	  of	  inter-­‐subjective	  testability.	  For	  the	  most	  part,	  however,	  these	  are	   not	   important	   as	   forms	   of	   knowledge	   resources	   in	   commons.	   For	   all	   I	   know,	   Andrew	  Carnegie	   may	   have	   had	   lifelong	   thoughts	   along	   the	   lines	   expressed	   in	   The	   Gospel	   of	   Wealth	  (1900),	  or	  the	  entire	  work	  may	  have	  been	  ghost	  written	  by	  Carnegie’s	  advisors	  the	  week	  before	  it	   was	   published.	   This	   matters	   little.	   What	   matters	   are	   the	   public	   reality	   of	   the	   published	  artifacts	  attributed	  to	  the	  mature	  Carnegie	  and	  their	  connections	  to	  others’	  thoughts,	  words	  and	  deeds	   on	   philanthropy.	   The	   present	   effect	   on	   philanthropy	   of	   work	   attributed	   to	   Carnegie	  would	  be	  about	  the	  same	  regardless.	  Knowledge	  exists	  collectively	  as	  part	  of	  us,	  both	  as	  individuals	  and	  collectivities,	  in	  our	  individual	  shared	  memories	  and	  collective	  recollections	  and	  in	  our	  artifacts.	  Knowledge	  can	  be	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recorded,	   stored	   and	   disseminated	   in	   books,	   articles,	   journals,	   podcasts,	   lecture	   notes,	   audio	  and	   video	   recordings,	   computer	   disks,	   thumb	   drives,	   stone	   tablets,	   braided	   ropes,	   and	   all	  manner	  of	  other	  knowledge	  media.	  The	  ideal	  type	  of	  its	  dissemination	  is	  from	  one	  person	  who	  is	  knowledgeable	   	  to	  others	  who	  are	  not.	  Knowledge	  is	  not	  some	  abstract,	  metaphysical	  ether	  existing	  apart	  from	  us,	  even	  though	  it	  is	  sometimes	  discussed	  as	  if	  it	  were.	  	  Knowledge	  is	  part	  of	  who	  we	  are.	  I	  think,	  therefore	  I	  am,	  says	  the	  Cartesian	  rationalist.	  Unspoken	  is	  that	  I	  think	  at	  least	  partly	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  what	  I	  know.	  As	  Charles	  H.	  Cooley	  (1912:	  9)	  noted	  many	  decades	  ago,	  “Descartes	  might	  [just	  as	  well]	  have	  said	  ‘We	  think’	  cogitamus	  on	  as	  good	  grounds	  as	  he	  said	  cogito.”	   	  In	  Cooley’s	  wake,	  communicative	  rationalists	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  say	  we	  think	  about	  who	  we	  want	  to	  be	  because	  of	  who	  we	  are,	  what	  we	  see,	  what	  we	  know	  and	   can	   read,	   write	   and	   imagine,	   what	   we	   can	   tell	   one	   another	   and	   learn	   from	   others.	   The	  Bloomington	  model	   of	   the	   knowledge	   commons	   (Hess	  &	  Ostrom,	   2007)	   is	   an	   important	   first	  step,	  but	  ironically	  it	  is	  handicapped	  by	  the	  lack	  of	  explicit	  treatment	  of	  the	  social	  and	  physical	  distribution	  and	  the	  cultural	  organization	  of	  knowledge.	  Even	  more	  important	  for	  our	  purposes,	  it	  also	  lacks	  pathways	  for	  routine	  consideration	  of	  the	  implications	  of	  knowledge	  as	  a	  resource	  for	   voluntary	   action.	   This	   is	   not	   because	   the	   knowledge	   commons	   is	   a	   faulty	   conception,	   but	  only	   that	   the	   2007	   volume	   which	   is	   still	   the	   main	   ur-­‐document	   on	   the	   subject	   was	   a	  preliminary,	   somewhat	   tentative,	   opening	   statement	   on	   this	   very	   important	   topic.	   Several	  contributors	  to	  the	  2007	  volume	  on	  knowledge	  commons	  clearly	  point	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  more	  sophisticated,	  less	  rationalistic	  models	  of	  knowledge	  commons	  and	  some	  of	  their	  contributions	  are	  noted	  below.	  	  
Knowledge	  Commons	  and	  Moeurs	  The	   concept	   of	   moeurs	   (which	   in	   some	   of	   its	   knowledge	   aspects	   parallels	   the	   more	  recent	  cognitive	  concept	  of	  memes)	  is	  key	  to	  linking	  knowledge	  commons	  and	  voluntary	  action,	  and	   possibly	   all	   knowledge	   and	   action.	   As	   Kahan	   (1996:	   x)	   remarks,	   moeurs	   include	   “the	  different	   notions	   [people]	   possess,	   the	   opinions	   that	   hold	   sway	   among	   them,	   and	   the	   sum	  of	  ideas	   that	   form	  their	  mental	  habits.”	   	   Such	  notions,	  opinions	  and	   ideas,	   including	   ideas	  about	  practices,	   conform	   in	   all	   important	   respects	  with	   the	   concept	  of	   common	  pool	   resources	   and	  common	  goods	  noted	  in	  previous	  chapters.	  Knowledge	  may	  be	  both	  a	  resource	  and	  an	  output	  of	  voluntary	   action	   production.	   Conventional	   research	   articles,	   for	   example,	   include	   both	   a	  literature	  review	  (an	  inventory	  of	  resources)	  and	  findings	  and	  conclusions	  (two	  different	  types	  of	  outputs	  or	  products).	  Knowledge	  production	  and	  use	  are,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  voluntary	  action,	  uncoerced	  and	  unconstrained,	  with	  a	  distinction	  (whether	  clear	  or	  uncertain	  and	  fluctuating	  as	  in	   Barber’s	   definition	   of	   political)	   between	   those	   who	   know	   and	   those	   who	   do	   not.	   Such	   a	  conception	  of	  knowledge	  in	  active	  use	  or	  consideration	  implies	  another	  large	  category	  of	  those	  things	  that	  may	  be	  known	  but	  do	  not	  function	  as	  resources	  for	  action.	  For	  example,	  it	  has	  long	  been	  known,	  at	  least	  by	  a	  small	  group	  of	  historians	  and	  others,	  that	  Tocqueville	  traveled	  to	  and	  around	   the	  United	  States	  not	  alone	  but	  with	  his	   friend	  and	  companion	  Gustave	  de	  Beaumont	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and	  that	   their	   trip	  was	  originally	  posed	  as	  a	  study	  of	  American	  prisons,	  That	  particular	  bit	  of	  knowledge	  has	  no	   important	   resonance	   in	   third	   sector	   research.	  Yet	   the	   comparably	  esoteric	  meme	   that	   Tocqueville	   visited	   New	   England,	   and	   may	   have	   observed	   one	   or	   more	   town	  meetings	  is	  seen	  by	  most	  observers	  as	  highly	  significant,	  while	  Gary	  Wills	  (2004)	  observation	  that	   Tocqueville’s	   Democracy	   in	   America,	   was	   written	   primarily	   for	   French,	   not	   American,	  readers	  is	  still	  somewhat	  an	  uncertainty	  as	  of	  this	  writing.	  	  Knowledge,	   like	   language	  and	  culture	  with	  which	   it	   is	   closely	  associated,	   is	   a	  uniquely	  human	  product.	  There	   is	   a	  necessary	   tautology	  working	  here.	   For	   all	   I	   know,	  bees	   and	  bears	  may	  have	  their	  own	  forms	  of	  knowledge,	  but	  if	  they	  do	  we	  are	  not	  among	  the	  knowers	  and	  tend	  to	   dismiss	   whatever	   knowledge	   they	   possess	   as	   purely	   instinctual.	   Thus,	   to	   be	   altogether	  convincing,	   a	   model	   of	   knowledge	   commons	   must	   take	   account	   of	   the	   social	   divisions	   of	  knowledge	   –	   like	   the	   classical	   Aristotelian	   nature,	   culture	   and	   people	   distinction	   noted	   by	  McCully	  (2008).	  Not	  only	  should	  we	  be	  concerned	  with	  who	  knows	  what,	  when	  and	  where,	  but	  also	  how	  and	  why	  they	  learned	  what	  they	  know,	  how	  they	  pass	  it	  on,	  and	  how	  and	  when	  they	  use	   what	   they	   know.	   As	   Alvin	   Gouldner	   (1970)	   observed,	   theories	   are	   also	   types	   of	   social	  organization;	   the	  type	  he	  termed	  infrastructures.	  They	  constitute	   forms	  of	  collective	  behavior	  not	  unlike	  the	  constituencies	  of	  public	  policies	  surrounding	  public	  agencies	  and	  bureaus	  or	  the	  seller-­‐buyer	   constellations	   that	   form	   around	   products	   in	   markets.	   Not	   only	   do	   such	  organizations	   possess	   latent	   patterns	   or	   distributions	   of	   sentiment	   and	   assumptions,	   and	  connotations	   that	   resonate	   differently	   in	   various	   parts	   of	   the	   population	   (e.g,	   their	   focused	  publics),	  they	  may	  also	  have	  differing	  political	  implications	  that	  point	  in	  varying	  directions.	  	  Gouldner	  (1970)	  also	  offered	  an	  altogether	  different	  tragic	  sense	  from	  the	  tendentiously	  narrow	  “tragedy”	  of	  Hardin’s	  (1968)	  commons	  tragedy	  –	  succumbing	  to	  free	  riding	  –	  when	  he	  says:	   [Humans]	   surmount	   tragedy	  when	   they	   use	   themselves	   up	   fully.	   .	   .	   .	   The	   tragic	   sense	  does	   not	   derive	   from	   the	   feeling	   that	   [people]	   must	   always	   be	   less	   than	   history	   and	  culture	   demand;	   it	   derives,	   rather,	   from	   the	   sense	   that	   they	   have	   been	   less	   than	   they	  could	   have	   been,	   that	   they	   have	   needlessly	   betrayed	   themselves,	   needlessly	   foregone	  fulfillments	  that	  would	  have	  injured	  no	  one.”	  	  	  Gouldner,	   in	   the	   gendered	   style	   still	   common	   in	   1970,	   actually	   said	   “Men	   surmount	  tragedy…”	   His	   point	   loses	   nothing	   if	   we	   extend	   it	   to	   the	   other	   half	   of	   humanity	   as	   well.	  Gouldner’s	   comment	   shines	   the	   light	   of	   Taylor’s	   social	   imaginary	   on	   the	   path	   from	  Hardin’s	  stark	   duality	   of	   private	   tragedy	   or	   public	   success,	   through	   the	   Bloomington	   School	  model	   of	  rational	   rules	   to	   the	  actual	  practices	  of	  knowledgeable	  people	  engaged	   in	  voluntary	  action	   in	  new	  commons.	  His	  idea	  of	  humans	  “using	  themselves	  up	  fully”	  has	  connotations	  of	  involvement,	  commitment,	   engagement	   and	   solidarity	   that	   are	   very	   essential	   to	   any	   forms	   of	   voluntary	  action.	  Such	  absorption	  will	  be	  familiar	  to	  people	  fully	  engaged	  in	  religion,	  science,	  the	  arts,	  or	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such	   esoteric	   forms	   of	   voluntary	   action	   as	   stamp	   collecting	   or	   other	   hobbies.	   In	   order	   to	  develop	   this	   idea	   further,	   we	   can	   examine	   two	   different	   examples	   of	   knowledge	   commons	  among	   many	   requiring	   such	   major	   commitment	   and	   offering	   solidarity:	   calculus	   and	   social	  problems.	  	  
Calculus	  As	  A	  Knowledge	  Commons	  For	  people	  in	  the	  social	  sciences,	  with	  the	  notable	  exception	  of	  economists,	  few	  subjects	  are	   as	   daunting,	   strange	   and	   foreign	   as	   the	   calculus.	   (For	   readers	  who	  have	   little	   idea	   of	   the	  importance	   of	   calculus	   in	   mathematics,	   see:	  http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/11/change-­‐we-­‐can-­‐believe-­‐in/	   ).	   The	   idea	   of	  calculus	  as	  an	  intergenerational	  social	  and	  cultural	  organization	  may	  be	  a	  strange	  one	  to	  some	  readers	  who	   are	   accustomed	   to	   thinking	  only	   of	  mathematics	   as	   esoteric	   knowledge	   and	  not	  considering	  the	  knowers	  who	  make	  it	  so.	  Yet,	  the	  calculus	  has	  a	  definite	  social	  organization	  that	  includes	  such	  clear	  roles	  as	  the	  founders,	  the	  17th	  century	  mathematicians	  Leibnitz	  and	  Newton,	  teachers,	  expert	  and	  novice	  users	  in	  each	  generation,	  advocates,	  enthusiasts,	  aficionados,	  critics	  and	  more.	  The	  social	  organization	  of	  knowers	  of	  calculus	  is	  thus	  a	  clear	  example	  of	  a	  knowledge	  commons.	  Moreover,	   the	   calculus	  has	   important	  dimensions	   as	   a	  philanthropy,	   like	   those	  we	  will	   take	   up	   in	   Chapter	  Ten.	   For	   those	  who	   know	   calculus,	   it	   represents	   a	   common	   resource	  pool	  of	  terms,	  concepts,	  formulas,	  procedures	  and	  ‘working	  knowledge’	  that	  any	  of	  the	  initiated	  can	   draw	   upon	   to	   define,	   model	   and	   resolve	   problems	   and	   communicate	   them	   to	   others.	  Moreover,	   the	   split	   between	   those	  who	  know	   calculus	   only	   as	   a	  mathematics	   and	   those	  who	  know	  it	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  solving	  problems	  in	  practice	  is	  important	  to	  note.	  The	  unique	  combination	  of	   knowers,	   rules	   and	   knowledge	   resources	   taken	   together	   sum	   up	   what	   is	   meant	   by	   the	  knowledge	  commons	  of	  calculus.	  As	  part	  of	  the	  stratification	  system	  of	  the	  calculus	  knowledge	  commons,	  the	  most	  basic	  distinction	   can	  be	  drawn	  between	   those	  who	   ‘know	  calculus’	   at	   any	   level	   and	   the	   rest	   of	   the	  population	  who	  don’t.	  Further	  distinctions	  can	  be	  made	  between	  those	  who	  don’t	  know	  it,	  but	  know	  a	   little	  bit	   about	   it,	   e.g.,	  understand	   that	   it	   is	   a	   subfield	  of	  mathematics,	   and	   those	  who	  aren’t	   even	   aware	   of	   that.	   This	   can	   be	   further	   divided	   into	   several	   categories	   of	   novices,	  including	   those	   who	   have	   partially	   mastered	   the	   subject,	   those	   who	   have	   a	   general	  understanding	   of	   the	   subject	   and	   make	   use	   of	   it	   in	   routine	   applications	   like	   economic	   and	  applied	   statistics	   formulae	  without	   the	  need	   for	   any	   further	  knowledge	  all	   the	  way	   to	   expert	  users.	   All	   of	   these	   are	   distinguished	   from	   the	   non-­‐knowers	  who,	   regardless	   of	  whether	   they	  have	  heard	  the	  word,	  but	  have	  no	  idea	  what	  it	  may	  mean.	  One	   of	   the	   reasons	   that	   calculus	  makes	   a	   good	   introductory	   example	   of	   a	   knowledge	  commons	   is	   because	   of	   the	   clarity	   of	   the	   distinctions	   that	   can	   be	   drawn.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   the	  calculus,	  many	  of	  these	  distinctions	  are	  so	  sharp	  that,	   in	  theory,	  any	  student	  of	  calculus	  could	  trace	  her/his	  lineage	  from	  teacher	  to	  teacher’s	  teacher	  over	  the	  several	  hundred	  years	  directly	  back	   to	   the	   founders,	   much	   like	   an	   ancestral	   family	   tree.	   The	   ability	   to	   ‘do’	   calculus	   also	  differentiates	  those	  who	  are	  members	  of	  the	  calculus	  knowledge	  commons	  -­‐	  from	  those	  barely	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able	   to	   read	   or	   understand	   the	  words,	   grasp	   the	   formulae	   or	  work	   the	   elementary	   textbook	  problems	   to	   those	   with	   great	   facility	   at	   applying	   calculus	   to	   creatively	   solving	   engineering,	  economic	   and	   scientific	   problems.	   As	  with	   other	  mathematics,	   creativity	   also	   enters	   into	   the	  calculus	  knowledge	  commons	  at	  multiple	  levels,	  setting	  those	  able	  to	  derive	  creative	  solutions	  truly	   characterized	   as	   ‘beautiful	   to	   those	   whose	   work	   with	   calculus	   is	   entirely	   work-­‐a-­‐day,	  unimaginative	  and	  uninspiring.	  For	  example,	  regardless	  of	  how	  much	  of	  the	  mathematics	  they	  did	   themselves,	   Frank	   Lloyd	   Wright’s	   cantilevers	   and	   Frank	   Gehry’s	   fish	   scale-­‐inspired	  buildings	  like	  the	  Bilbao	  Museum,	  are	  both	  highly	  creative	  exercises	  in	  calculus.	  All	   those	   who	   know	   calculus	   in	   any	   of	   these	   ways	   are	   members	   of	   its	   knowledge	  commons:	  Not	  only	  are	  they	  able	  to	   ‘speak’	  calculus,	  whether	  their	  native	  language	  is	  English,	  Chinese	  or	  Urdu.	  They	  are	  also	  able	  to	  engage	  in	  mutual	  aid	  and	  self	  help,	  assisting	  one	  another	  with	   problems	   in	   ways	   that	   no	   non-­‐member	   of	   the	   calculus	   knowledge	   commons	   could	  probably	  even	  recognize,	  much	  less	  assist	  with.	  Calculus	  is	  thus	  a	  particularly	  good	  example	  of	  a	  field	  of	  knowledge	  with	  clear	  boundaries	  between	  knowers	  and	  ‘not-­‐knowers’,	  a	  distinct	  set	  of	  social	  relations	  and	  even	  a	  social	  and	  cultural	  organization	  among	  members	  of	  the	  knowledge	  commons	   of	   calculus	   characterized	   by	   institutions	   of	   learning,	   mutual	   aid	   and	   self-­‐help.	  Learning	   calculus	   is	   also	  a	   clear	   case	  of	   voluntary	  action,	   in	  which	  one	  must	  voluntarily	   seek	  membership	  in	  the	  association	  of	  those	  who	  know,	  and	  learns	  to	  use	  –	  and	  contribute	  to	  –	  the	  common	   resource	   pool	   of	   its	   knowledge.	   Although	   knowledge	   commons	   are	   not	   always	   as	  clear-­‐cut	  as	  in	  this	  case,	  many	  forms	  of	  knowledge	  function	  in	  similar	  ways	  as	  common	  resource	  pools	   for	   those	  who	   learn,	   possess	   and	   use	   knowledge.	   Carpentry,	   chess,	   chemistry,	   clothing	  design	   and	   community	   organization,	   for	   example,	   all	   function	   in	   similar	   ways	   as	   knowledge	  commons.	   So	   also	   does	   knowledge	   of	   social	   problems	   which	   represents	   another	   form	   of	  knowledge	  commons	  closer	  to	  the	  core	  topic	  of	  voluntary	  action.	  
Social	  Problems	  As	  Knowledge	  Commons	  Social	  problems	  are	  one	  of	  the	  important	  types	  of	  social	  organization	  included	  within	  the	  sphere	   of	   the	   theory	   of	   voluntary	   action.	   That	   sentence	   is	   not	   a	  misprint.	  Many	   people	   have	  become	  accustomed	  to	  thinking	  of	  social	  problems	  in	  purely	  idealistic	  terms	  as	  pure	  thoughts,	  ideas	   or	   theories	   of	   knowledge	   clouds	   existing	   more-­‐or-­‐less	   independently	   somewhere	   “out	  there”	  and	  able	  to	  act	  virtually	  as	  autonomous	  agents	  on	  human	  affairs.	  The	  existence	  of	  social	  problems	   as	   a	   distinct	   form	   of	   knowledge-­‐based	   social	   and	   cultural	   organization	   –	   as	   new	  commons	   –	   may	   escape	   notice	   entirely	   unless	   we	   think	   very	   carefully	   about	   it.	   One	   of	   the	  possibilities	   that	   the	   commons	   theory	   of	   voluntary	   action,	   and	   specifically	   the	   concepts	   of	  common	   goods,	   association,	   assembly,	   canopy,	   venue	   and	   baudekin	   open	   is	   to	   bring	   social	  problems	  down	  from	  the	  clouds	  of	  idealism	  and	  pure	  thought,	  as	  it	  were,	  where	  they	  are	  often	  left	   as	   purely	   mental	   conceptions	   and	   tie	   them	   directly	   to	   the	   daily	   lifeworlds	   of	   voluntary	  action.	  Any	  full	  understanding	  of	  social	  problems	  as	  new	  commons,	  for	  example,	  would	  	  include	  insight	   into	  whose	  problems	  they	  are	  and	  when.	  What	   individuals,	  groups,	  classes	  or	  kinds	  of	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people	  in	  what	  periods	  of	  history	  see	  something	  as	  problematic?	  Answering	  such	  questions	  is	  easier	  today	  than	  it	  would	  have	  been	  a	  generation	  ago.	  Along	  with	  the	  other	  characteristics	  of	  social	  problems	  emphasized	  in	  previous	  theories,	  most	   recently	   theories	   of	   the	   social	   construction	   of	   social	   problems	   open	   pathways	   to	   such	  problem	  complexes	  as	  voluntary	  organizations	  with	  collective	  focus	  or	  missions,	  and	  collective	  resource	   pools	   as	   well	   as	   the	   emergent	   social	   and	   moral	   capital	   that	   characterize	   what	   we	  ordinarily	   think	   of	   as	   social	   problems	   (Kitsuse	   and	   Spector,	   1987).	   The	   three	   distinct	  conceptions	   of	   polio	   as	   a	   social	   problem	   discussed	   in	   Chapter	   5	   and	   the	   organizations	   and	  networks	   associated	   with	   each	   approach	   –	   the	   research	   labs,	   treatment	   hospitals,	   teaching,	  advocacy	   and	   fundraising	   organizations	   –	   together	   serve	   as	   a	   good	   example	   of	   this	  phenomenon.	  Similar	  types	  of	  social	  and	  cultural	  organization	  associated	  with	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  diseases	   and	   other	   social	   problems	   can	   be	   found.	   In	   these	   cases	   the	   knowledge	   of	   social	  problems	  is	  thoroughly	  connected	  with	  the	  knowledgeable	  people	  who	  inhabit	  them,	  as	  well	  as	  with	  their	  networks	  of	  associations	  and	  assemblies.	  The	  intellectual	  origins	  of	  20th	  century	  social	  problem	  thought	   in	  sociology,	  economics,	  and	  the	  other	  social	  sciences	  can	  be	  traced	  to	  several	  different	  sources	   including	  19th	  century	  social	  realist	  novelists	  like	  Charles	  Dickens,	  writing	  in	  English,	  Theodor	  Fontane	  in	  German,	  and	  Victor	  Hugo	  and	  Emile	  Zola	  in	  French	  or	  dramatist	  Henrik	  Ibsen	  in	  Norwegian	  and	  any	  number	  of	   Russian	   novelists.	   Even	   a	   simple	   listing	   of	   all	   the	   literary	   contributors	   to	   modern	   social	  problem	   thought	  would	   quickly	   become	   a	  major	   study.	   For	   anyone	   interested,	   Janet	   Horne’s	  (2002)	   study	   of	   the	   Museé	   Social	   offers	   a	   good	   starting	   point,	   detailing	   French	   literary	  contributions	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  evolving	  labor	  and	  other	  social	  movements	  and	  other	  social,	  cultural	   and	   organizational	   developments	   of	   the	   time.	   In	   the	   eighteenth	   century,	   Oliver	  Goldsmith,	   a	   contemporary	  of	  Adam	  Smith,	  Adam	  Ferguson	  and	   Jonathan	  Swift	   lamented	   the	  passing	   of	   the	   village	   commons	   in	   his	   poem,	   The	   Deserted	   Village.	   Both	   linguistically	   and	  sociologically,	   one	   of	   the	   key	   taproots	   is	   19th	   century	   public	   awareness	   of	   what	   was	   often	  referred	   to	   as	   “the	   social	   problem”	   or	   “the	   labor	   problem”	   –	   an	   interconnected	   network	   of	  issues,	  notions	  and	  ideas	  like	  unemployment,	  underemployment,	  poverty,	  urban	  housing,	  drugs,	  violence	  and	  the	  many	  other	  facets	  first	  explored	  by	  the	  novelists	  and	  embraced	  in	  rapid	  order	  by	   urban	   reformers,	   labor	   organizers,	   revolutionaries,	   politicians	   and	   social	   and	   political	  theorists,	  notably	   the	  many	  varieties	  of	  19th	   century	   socialists	   (Gide	  and	  Rist,	  1948).	  None	  of	  these	  diverse	  early	  literary	  sources	  dealt	  explicitly	  with	  the	  social	  and	  cultural	  organization	  of	  the	  social	  problem/labor	  problem,	  although	  this	  clearly	  would	  have	  been	  an	  important	  issue	  or	  concern	   for	   any	   of	   the	   reformers,	   organizers,	   revolutionaries	   and	   other	   practitioners.	   These	  literary	   sources	   are	   important	   because	   they	   offer	   one	   basis	   for	   seeing	   social	   problems	  embodied	  in	  actual	  (albeit	  fictional)	  persons	  and	  their	  relations	  and	  even	  organizations,	  rather	  than	  as	  clouds	  of	  ethereal	  ideas.	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Somewhere	  along	  the	  way,	  the	  group,	  organizational,	  institutional	  and	  cultural	  contexts	  of	   social	   and	   labor	   problems	   that	   are	   present	   in	   the	   plans	   and	   schemes	   of	   practitioners	   and	  woven	  into	  the	  plots,	  characterizations	  and	  dramatic	  action	  of	  fiction,	  were	  abstracted	  into	  the	  idealistic	  constructions	  and	  statistical	  generalities	   (clouds)	  of	   the	  social	  scientists.	  To	  see	   this	  clearly,	  one	  need	  only	  compare	  literary	  classics	  like	  David	  Copperfield,	  Les	  Miserables,	  Germinal,	  Ibsen’s	   Hedda	   Gabler,	   or	   Fontane’s	   character	   Effi	   Brest,	   or	   Tolstoy’s	   monumental	  War	   and	  
Peace,	  for	  example,	  with	  suffragist	  writings,	  Charles	  Booth’s	  quantitative	  studies	  of	  the	  poor	  of	  London	   or	   any	   modern	   social	   problems	   textbook,	   especially	   prior	   to	   1985.	   What	   is	   almost	  completely	  missing	  in	  the	  latter	  is	  the	  concrete,	  situated	  and	  historical	  nature	  of	  social	  problem	  knowledge.	  Knowledge	  of	  social	  problems	  is	  not	  the	  general	  or	  universal	  outlook	  of	  a	  society	  or	  time,	  but	  the	  understandings	  of	  particular	  new	  commons.	  It	  is	  the	  knowledge	  held	  in	  common	  by	   particular	   groups,	   classes,	   occupations,	   professions,	   religions	   or	   other	   social	   and	   cultural	  entities.	  
Mayan	  Calendar	  ‘Predictions’	  It	   may	   be	   helpful	   in	   this	   context	   to	   think	   of	   ‘Apocalypse,	   2012’	   which	   like	   ‘the	  millennium’,	   January	   1,	   2000	  became	   a	   kind	   of	   social	   problem.	  We	  now	  know	  with	   certainty	  that	  predictions	  allegedly	  derived	  from	  the	  Mayan	  Calendar	  that	  forecast	  the	  end	  of	  the	  world	  in	  2012	  did	  not	  come	  to	  fruition.	  Further,	  you	  may	  know	  that	  after	  these	  predictions	  were	  widely	  disseminated,	  there	  was	  a	  period	  of	  active	  debunking	  of	  such	  predictions	  including	  assertions	  that	  the	  end	  was	  not	  actually	  forecast	  in	  the	  Mayan	  Calendar.	  While	  the	  whole	  thing	  is	  slightly	  amusing,	  it	  is	  also	  an	  occasion	  to	  distinguish	  various	  approaches	  to	  knowledge	  of	  that	  calendar:	  the	  original	  knowledge	  of	  the	  Mayan	  calendar	  held	  by	  Mayan	  intellectuals	  at	  the	  height	  of	  that	  culture	  between	  250-­‐900	  C.E.	  has	  since	  been	  lost	  irretrievably.	  (However,	  for	  all	  I	  know,	  shreds	  of	   it	   may	   be	   retained	   in	   secret	   Mayan	   religious	   cults,	   as	   with	   Navaho	   ‘sand	   paintings’.	   This	  knowledge	   can	   be	   distinguished	   from	   contemporary	   historical,	   anthropological	   and	  mathematical	  knowledge	  of	  the	  Mayan	  calendar	  as	  reconstructed	  by	  western	  scholars,	  which	  in	  turn	  is	  different	  from	  the	  ‘knowledge’	  touted	  by	  advocates	  of	  the	  social	  problem	  posed	  by	  that	  calendar,	  who	  concocted	  an	  interesting	  myth	  and	  may	  have	  believed	  their	  own	  mythology.	  All	  of	   these	   are	   forms	   of	   knowledge,	   broadly	   speaking,	   and	   each	   is	   associated	   with	   its	   own	  associations,	   assemblies	   and	   demonstrations	   of	   collective	   behavior.	   Together	   with	   this	   and	  other	   discussions,	   they	   form	   the	   complex	   social	   and	   cultural	   organization	   of	   the	   Mayan	  Calendar	  knowledge	  commons.	  When	   considering	   things	   as	   genuinely	   foreign	   as	   original	   knowledge	   of	   the	   Mayan	  Calendar	  –	  far	  away,	  linguistically	  remote,	  occurring	  long	  ago	  and	  ultimately,	  inaccessible	  to	  any	  contemporary	   mind,	   but	   potentially	   including	   surviving	   Mayan	   villagers	   in	   urban	   and	   rural	  Central	  America	  -­‐	  it	  becomes	  relatively	  easy	  to	  visualize	  what	  can	  be	  more	  difficult	  to	  see	  in	  the	  case	  of	  knowledge	  closer	  to	  us	  in	  time	  and	  place.	  Original	  knowledge	  of	  the	  Mayan	  calendar	  and	  how	   and	   why	   it	   was	   constructed	   was	   likely	   knowledge	   possessed	   by	   a	   specific	   group	   (or	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groups)	   of	   people	   in	   particular	   places	   and	   times	   –	   one	   or	   more	   associations	   of	  priests/timekeepers:	  social	  inventors,	  and	  teachers	  responsible	  for	  dissemination	  of	  knowledge	  of	   the	   calendar	   and	  perhaps	  many	  others.	  Together,	   they	   constituted	   a	   social	   organization	  of	  knowledge;	  a	  knowledge	  commons.	  The	  same	  might	  be	  said	  to	  greater	  and	  lesser	  degrees	  of	  the	  astrological	   knowledge	   of	   other	   more-­‐or-­‐less	   unknown	   group	   of	   priest/astronomers	   who	  supervised	  the	  alignment	  of	  ancient	  temples	  like	  Stonehenge,	  the	  Zoroastrian	  religious	  leaders	  who	  supervised	  the	  rites	  in	  ancient	  Persian	  temples,	  the	  teachings	  of	  iterant	  Greek	  philosophers	  in	  the	  generations	  preceding	  Plato,	  and	  untold	  numbers	  of	  other,	  similar	  examples.	  Knowledge	  whether	   it	   has	   been	   lost	   to	   history	   or	   currently	   known	   today	   like	   the	   knowledge	   of	   the	  experience	  of	  particular	   cancers	  held	  by	  cancer	   survivors	   in	   self-­‐help	  organizations,	  does	  not	  exist	  outside	  or	  apart	  from	  human	  minds,	  but	  only	  in	  the	  individual	  and	  collective	  awareness	  of	  particular	  sets	  or	  networks	  –	  however	  small	  or	  indefinite	  –	  of	  knowers,	  displaying	  discoverable	  degrees	  of	  involvement	  or	  distance	  from	  one	  another.	  Sets	  of	  knowledge	  whether	  tacit,	  esoteric	  or	  general	  represent	  bases	  of	  distinct	   forms	  of	  human	  association	  or	  network	  of	   those	   ‘in	   the	  know’,	   possessed	   of	   some	   particular	   or	   discrete	   bits	   of	   knowledge.	   It	   may	   be	   the	   cancer	  researchers,	  or	  the	  oncologists	  who	  specialize	  in	  cancer	  treatment	  or	  the	  patients	  themselves;	  each	   is	   possessed	   of	   unique	   forms	   of	   common	   knowledge.	   Thus,	   an	   important	   part	   of	  understanding	  a	  social	  problem,	  or	  more	  generally	  any	  body	  of	  knowledge,	  is	  to	  understand	  the	  associations,	  assemblies,	  networks	  and	  other	  organized	  social	  relations	  of	  those	  who	  know	  it.	  Application	   of	   the	   commons	   theory	   of	   voluntary	   action	   to	   social	   problems	   as	  associations	  or	  networks	  of	  those	  who	  know	  serves	  to	  supplement	  but	  not	  to	  replace	  existing	  and	   more	   cognitive	   understandings	   of	   social	   problems.	   This	   is,	   no	   doubt,	   due	   to	   the	  accumulative	  nature	  of	   knowledge:	   Like	   information,	  when	  one	   learns	   something	   it	   is	   simply	  added	  to	  the	  cumulative	  stock	  of	  knowledge	  one	  possesses	  and	  when	  passed	  on	  it	  also	  becomes	  part	  of	  the	  stock	  of	  those	  who	  learned	  it,	  while	  remaining	  with	  all	  who	  already	  know	  it.	  This	  is	  particularly	   the	   case	   with	   respect	   to	   recent	   constructive	   theories	   of	   social	   problems	   (e.g.	  Kitsuse	  and	  Spector,	  1987;	  Nichols,	  2003A;	  Nichols,	  2003B).	  (Note:	  There	  is	  some	  disagreement	  among	  social	  problem	  sociologists	  between	  various	  ‘constructivist’	  and	  ‘constructional’	  theories	  on	  matters	   that	   do	  not	   bear	  directly	   on	   voluntary	   action.	   Thus	   the	   term	   constructive	   is	   used	  here	   to	   apply	   to	   all	   varieties	   of	   social	   problem	   theory	   grounded	   in	   the	  original	  work	  on	   “the	  social	  construction	  of	  reality”	  by	  Berger	  and	  Luckmann	  (1967)	   in	   the	  tradition	  of	   the	  original	  perspective	  of	  Kitsuse	  and	  Spector	  (1981).)	  The	  Spector-­‐Kitsuse	  approach,	  according	  to	  Ibarra	  (2009),	  establishes	  the	  linkages	  between	  what	  C.	  Wright	  Mills	  termed	  “personal	  troubles”	  and	  “social	  issues”	  (Mills	  1959:	  8).	  Ibarra	  goes	  on	  to	  note	  “Spector	  and	  Kitsuse	  focused	  our	  attention	  on	  the	  myriad	  processes	  through	  which	  social	  problems	  are	  constructed	  —	  identified,	  defined,	  re-­‐defined,	  acted	  upon,	  and	  dealt	  with	  by	  societal	  institutions,	  including	  the	  various	  offices	  and	  venues	  of	  law	  and	  corrections,	  medical	  and	  social	  services,	  and	  education	  and	  culture.”	  It	  is	  only	  a	   small	   step	   from	   that	   awareness	   to	   identifying	   the	   specific	   institutions	   –	   associations,	  assemblies,	  groups	  and	  organizations	  –	  involved,	  and	  how	  they	  handle	  the	  task.	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Kitsuse	  and	  Spector	  distinguish	  two	  important	  types	  of	  social	  problems,	  with	  associated	  actors	  and	  actions:	  claims	  and	  counter-­‐claims,	  with	  claims-­‐makers	  (or	  claimants)	  and	  counter-­‐claimants.	  Ibarra	  notes,	  in	  affinity	  with	  Barber	  (1988)	  above,	  that	  both	  of	  these	  were	  presented	  as	  possessing	  certainty	  and	  called	  for	  attention	  to	  two	  additional	  classes	  of	  actors	  that	  can	  be	  termed	  uncertain	  claimants	  and	  uncertain	  counter-­‐claimants.	  An	  additional	  point	  to	  note	  here	  also	  is	  that	  when	  there	  are	  only	  claimants,	  and	  no	  opposition	  from	  counter-­‐claimants,	  certainty	  of	   knowledge	   may	   indeed	   exist,	   setting	   up	   the	   distinction	   between	   political	   and	   apolitical	  knowledge	  noted	  by	  Barber.	  The	  existence	  of	  counter-­‐claimants	  regarding	  social	  problems	  (or	  any	   other	   form	  of	   knowledge)	   is	   usually	   sufficient	   to	   trigger	   the	   condition	   of	   uncertainty.	   As	  Barber	  notes,	  uncertainty	  may	  be	  sufficient	  to	  politicize	  a	  social	  problem,	  transforming	  counter-­‐claimants	  and	  claimants	  into	  partisans,	  at	  which	  point	  their	  repertories	  of	  political	  skills,	  rather	  than	  the	  voracity	  of	  the	  knowledge	  claims,	  may	  become	  foremost	  consideration.	  There	  may	  be	  only	  a	  handful	  of	  scientific	  counter-­‐claimants	  to	  evolution	  or	  global	  warming,	  for	  example,	  and	  yet	  the	  political	  skills	  of	  counter	  claimants	  and	  their	  allies	  and	  supporters	  (who	  would	  claim	  it	  is	  the	  rightness	  of	  their	  claims)	  have	  succeeded	  in	  transforming	  both	  into	  major	  policy	  debates.	  Thus,	  while	  clear	  definition	  and	  careful	  analysis	  are	  of	  great	   importance,	   they	  are	  only	  two	  of	  the	  modes	  of	  social	  problem	  knowledge	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  voluntary	  action.	  There	  are	   two	   other	   modes	   of	   social	   problem	   knowledge	   that	   are	   of	   equal	   importance	   for	  understanding	  social	  problems	  as	  voluntary	  action:	  promotion	  or	  advancement	  and	  diffusion	  of	  problem	  knowledge	  and	  advocacy.	  The	  term	  promotion	  is	  to	  some	  degree	  appropriate	  because	  it	  emphasizes	  the	  use	  of	  resources	  like	  public	  relations,	  advertising	  and	  other,	  similar	  tools	  of	  media	  relations	  to	  promote	  better	  and	  more	  widespread	  understanding	  of	  the	  problem.	  We	  can	  also	  apply	  the	  term	  diffusion	  in	  recognition	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  “diffusion	  of	  innovations”	  model	  of	  social	  change	  of	  Everett	  Rogers	  (2003	  [1962])	  that	  has	  been	  fundamental	  to	  understanding	  how	  ideas	   spread	   from	   their	   origins	   throughout	   a	   community	   (including	   local,	   national	   or	   global	  knowledge	   commons).	   Thus,	   the	   idea	   of	   diffusion	   networks	   can	   be	   used	   here	   to	   explicitly	  acknowledge	  how	  a	  social	  problem	  like	  dying	  alone	  and	  unaided	  from	  cancer	  or	  HIV-­‐AIDs,	  and	  the	  solution	  represented	  by	  hospice	  can	  spread	  from	  the	  original	  work	  of	  Cicely	  Saunders	  and	  St.	  Christopher’s	  Hospice	  in	  Hackney,	  East	  London	  to	  the	  Connecticut	  Hospice	  in	  Branford,	  CT	  in	  1974	  and	  subsequently	  across	  the	  U.S.,	  with	  similar	  diffusion	  networks	  in	  other	  countries.	  Also	  important	   in	   some	   cases	   is	   the	   role	   of	   what	   Thomas	   Kuhn	   (1970)	   termed	   paradigm	   shifts.	  McCully	   (2008),	   for	   example,	   has	   proclaimed	   a	   paradigm	   shift	   in	   understandings	   of	  philanthropy.	  Full	   understanding	   of	   social	   problems	   involves	   not	   only	   knowledge	   of	   the	   conception,	  definition,	  and	  analytical	  circumstances	  of	  the	  problem,	  but	  also	  of	  the	  various	  associations	  and	  institutions	   of	   voluntary	   action	   that	   adopt	   and	   embrace	   these	   various	   steps.	   As	   previously	  noted,	   knowledge	   of	   the	   problem	  of	   polio	   cannot	   be	   separated	   from	  knowledge	   of	   the	   Sister	  Kenney	  Institute,	  the	  Salk	  Institute	  and	  the	  March	  of	  Dimes.	  The	  development	  of	  knowledge	  of	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social	  problems	  does	  not	  just	  happen,	  just	  as	  such	  knowledge	  does	  not	  exist	  in	  a	  cognitive	  cloud	  somewhere.	   It	   requires	   a	   great	   deal	   of	   effort	   and	   interaction	   (“voluntary	   labor”)	   by	   many	  people,	  and	  unlike	  pharmaceutical	  research,	  to	  take	  a	  quite	  different	  example,	  there	  are	  seldom	  clear	   or	   unambiguous	   commercial	   possibilities	   that	   arise	   from	  defining	   and	  describing	   social	  problems.	  Thus,	  there	  is	  typically	  little	  financial	  incentive	  for	  market-­‐based	  institutions	  to	  enter	  social	  problem	  knowledge	  commons.	   	   In	  most	   instances,	   therefore,	  such	  tasks	  are	  undertaken	  initially	   by	   the	   institutions	   we	   designate	   as	   eleemosynary,	   nonprofit,	   independent	   sector,	  nongovernmental,	  or	  philanthropic;	  that	  is,	  the	  institutions	  of	  voluntary	  action.	  Following	  further	  on	  Barber’s	  epistemological	  concept	  of	  political	  knowledge,	  enables	  us	  to	   make	   one	   additional	   important	   point	   about	   voluntary	   action	   and	   new	   commons	   and	  advocacy.	   New	   commons	   focused	   on	   advocacy	   as	   knowledge	   commons	   operate	   in	   the	  borderlands	  between	  social	  problems	  and	  political	   issues,	  social	  and	  political	  movements	  and	  political	   and	   civil	   associations.	   A	  major	   subset	   of	   those	  who	   ‘know’	   or	   understand	   any	   given	  social	  problem,	  as	  in	  Zola’s	  advocacy	  in	  the	  Dreyfus	  case,	  understand	  as	  part	  of	  their	  knowledge	  not	  only	  that	  it	  is	  important	  that	  others	  also	  must	  learn	  or	  and	  come	  to	  understand	  the	  problem,	  but	  also	  that	  something	  must	  be	  done	  about	   it.	  Such	  considerations	  are	  the	  unique	  domain	  of	  advocacy.	   This	   may	   involve,	   as	   in	   the	   case	   of	   HIV-­‐AIDS,	   organizing	   demands	   for	   legislative	  action.	   Or,	   in	   other	   cases,	   it	  may	   involve	   fundraising	   or	   research,	   as	   in	   the	   case	   of	   the	  many	  ‘health’	   (actually	  disease)	   related	  associations.	   In	  each	  of	   these	  cases,	   the	  commons	   theory	  of	  voluntary	   action	   offers	   the	   opportunity	   to	   call	   attention	   to	   specific	   institutions	   of	   voluntary	  action	   devoted	   to	   identification,	   definition,	   analysis,	   causal	   analysis	   and	   intervention.	   This	  would	   include	  health	  groups	   like	   the	  American	  Cancer	  Society,	   research	   foundations	   focusing	  on	   social	   problems,	   like	   the	   Russell	   Sage	   Foundation,	   practice	   groups	   like	   the	   National	  Association	  of	  Social	  Workers,	  and	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  the	  other	  entities	  that	  make	  up	  what	  might	  be	  termed	  the	  social	  problems	  industry.	  For	   Ostrom,	   et.	   al.,	   study	   of	   the	   knowledge	   commons	   is	   grounded	   in	   the	   model	   of	  institutional	  analysis	   termed	  Institutional	  Analysis	  and	  Design	  (IAD)	  (Ostrom	  and	  Hess,	  2007,	  41-­‐44).	   	   This	   model	   is	   a	   signature	   feature	   of	   what	   Aligica	   and	   Boettke	   (2009)	   call	   the	  “Bloomington	  School”	  of	   institutional	  analysis	  and	  one	  of	   the	   leading	   forces	   in	  what	   they	  and	  others	  call	  “the	  new	  institutionalism.”	  This	  is	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  “old”	  institutionalism	  of	  the	  early	  20th	   century	   embodied	   in	   work	   by	   Thorstein	   Veblen,	   John	  Wesley	   Clark,	   John	   R.	   Commons,	  Mary	  Parker	  Follett	  and	  other	  historians,	  sociologists,	  political	  scientists	  and	  economists.	  For	  a	  consideration	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  new	  institutionalism	  in	  third	  sector	  studies,	  see	  DiMaggio	  and	  Powell	   (1990).	  The	   IAD	   framework	   is	   characterized	   as	   “a	  diagnostic	   tool	   that	   can	  be	  used	   to	  investigate	  any	  broad	  subject	  where	  humans	  repeatedly	   interact	  within	  rules	  and	  norms	   that	  guide	   their	   choice	   of	   strategies	   and	   behavior”	   (Ostrom	   and	   Hess,	   2007,	   p.	   41).	   The	   IAD	   is	   a	  multivariate	  analysis	  design	  specifying	   independent,	   intermediate	  and	  dependent	  variables.	   It	  is	  an	  example	  of	  a	  type	  of	  research	  frame	  that	  social	  researchers	  in	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s	  often	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presented	   as	   “systems	   analysis”	   or	   systems	   research	   (Boulding,	   1956;	   Bertalanffy,	   1969;	  Buckley,	  2005).	  Reliance	   is	  placed	  not	  only	  on	   the	  Hardin	   tragedy	  model,	  but	  also	  on	  Mancur	  Olson’s	   (1965)	   analysis	   of	   collective	   choice	   in	   (small)	   groups,	   and	   the	   non-­‐zero	   sum	   game	  termed	  the	  “prisoners’	  dilemma.”	  Collective	   choice	   is	   important	   to	   track	   the	   flow	   of	   institutional	   resources	   and	   the	  production	  of	  goods,	  but	  by	  itself	  it	  offers	  only	  a	  very	  incomplete	  picture	  of	  what	  happened	  and	  why.	  This	  is	  particularly	  the	  case	  for	  knowledge	  commons,	  where	  equilibrium	  assumptions	  do	  not	  prevail	  because	  knowledge	  is	  nearly	  always	  additive.	  That	  is,	  my	  learning	  anything	  does	  not	  cause	   you	   to	   forget	   what	   I	   have	   learned.	   	   In	   other	   words,	   unlike	   fisheries,	   or	   common	   field	  agriculture,	   the	   most	   fundamental	   transactions	   of	   knowledge	   commons	   do	   not	   involve	  consumption	  or	   exhaustion	  of	   common	  pool	  knowledge	   resources	   in	   any	   conventional	   sense,	  and	   typically	   involve	   refurbishment,	   renewal	  and	  expansion	  of	   them.	   It	   is	   this	  difference	   that	  requires	  that	  in	  order	  to	  fully	  understand	  knowledge	  commons	  we	  expand	  the	  IAD	  conception	  of	  “rules”	  of	  rational	  conduct	  to	  also	  include	  other	  moeurs.	  Such	  an	  expansion	  is	  related	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  new	  commons	  and	  consistent	  with	  Ostrom’s	  stipulations.	  This	  expansion	  is	   justified	  below	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  one	  of	  the	  emergent	  characteristics	  of	  commons	  in	  voluntary	  action:	  the	  capacity	   for	   –	   the	   formulation	   of	   new	   and	   revitalization	   of	   existing	  moeurs	   including	   moral	  generation	  and	   regeneration.	  This	   capacity	   is	   one	  of	   the	  most	  powerful	   features	  of	   voluntary	  action	   properly	   understood.	   The	   allusion	   here	   to	   Tocqueville’s	   self-­‐interest,	   properly	  understood,	   is	   intentional.	   The	   claim	   is	   that	   part	   of	   that	   proper	  understanding	   is	   recognition	  that,	  under	  a	  variety	  of	  conditions,	  rational	  individuals	  involved	  in	  commons	  have	  the	  capacity	  to	   generate	   new	   understandings	   of	   their	   own	   individual	   and	   the	   collective	   self-­‐interest.	  Through	  this	  capacity,	  they	  are	  able	  to	  incorporate	  the	  interests	  of	  others,	  and	  that	  failure	  to	  see	  this	  when	  it	  occurs	  contributes	  to	  fundamental	  misunderstandings	  of	  voluntary	  action.	  There	   are	   many	   similarities,	   as	   well	   as	   a	   few	   fundamental	   differences	   between	   the	  knowledge	   commons	   of	   the	   Bloomington	   School	   and	   the	   commons	   theory	   presented	   in	  Lohmann	  (1990;	  1992;	  1995)	  and	  here.	  Major	  differences	  include	  the	  rational	  individualism	  of	  the	   IAD	   to	   collective	   choice,	   and	   the	   lack	   in	   that	   view	   of	   any	   explicit	   consideration	   (beyond	  Olson’s	  collective	  choice)	  of	  group	  or	  social	  behavior,	  and	  a	  few	  more	  detailed	  differences	  noted	  below.	   There	   are	   also	   (as	   befits	   two	   perspectives	   on	   commons)	   strong	   commonalities.	   It	   is	  noteworthy	  that	   in	   the	   IAD	  a	  commons,	  or	  common	  resource	  pool	  (CRP)	   is	  a	  “natural	  or	  man	  made	   resource	   system	   that	   is	   sufficiently	   large	   as	   to	   make	   it	   costly	   (but	   not	   impossible)	   to	  exclude	   potential	   beneficiaries	   from	   obtaining	   benefits	   from	   its	   use.”	   (Ostrom,	   1990,	   30)	  Substituting	   the	  more	  neutral	   term	   “difficult”	   for	   the	  quasi-­‐economic	  usage	  of	   “costly”	   in	   this	  definition	  highlights	  the	  conception	  of	  rationality	  as	  explanation	  noted	  previously,	  and	  takes	  the	  emphasis	   off	   the	   necessity	   of	   calculation	   in	  making	   decisions.	   This	   one	   of	   the	  ways	   in	  which	  commons	   offer	   a	   possible	   third	   way	   that	   Hardin	   missed,	   distinct	   both	   from	   public	   resource	  pools	  in	  which	  exclusion	  isn’t	  feasible	  and	  the	  interests	  of	  all	  are	  concerned,	  and	  from	  private	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resource	   pools	   (e.g.,	   stock	   corporations)	   in	   which	   exclusive	   use	   by	   multiple	   owners	   is	  straightforward.	   In	   the	   IAD	  model,	   resources	   are	   measured	   as	   stocks,	   while	   harvests	   of	   use	  units	   are	   measured	   as	   flows.	   In	   the	   commons	   theory	   of	   voluntary	   action,	   resources	   may	  sometimes	   be	   measured	   either	   as	   stocks	   or	   flows,	   but	   more	   frequently	   are	   merely	   noted,	  deployed	  or	  withdrawn.	  In	  both	  approaches,	  appropriation	  is	  the	  process	  of	  withdrawing	  units	  from	   a	   stock	   of	   resources	   (or	   CRP);	   it	   figures	   in	   the	   commons	   theory	   of	   voluntary	   action	  primarily	  in	  cases	  of	  financial	  resources.	  Appropriators	  are	  the	  actors	  or	  agents	  who	  withdraw	  units	  	  (Ostrom,	  1990,	  30)	  while	  providers	  are	  those	  who	  arrange	  for	  the	  provisioning	  of	  a	  CPR	  (Ostrom,	   1990,	   31).	   	   In	   voluntary	   action,	   those	  who	   provision	   a	   common	   resource	   are	  most	  commonly	  termed	  donors	  or	  funders,	  and	  appropriators	  are	  most	  frequently	  the	  intermediaries	  or	  agents	  who	  mediate	  between	  donors	  and	  clients	  or	  beneficiaries.	  A	  producer	  is	  “anyone	  who	  actually	   constructs,	   repairs,	   or	   takes	   actions	   that	   insure	   the	   long-­‐term	   sustenance	   of	   the	  resource	   system	   itself.”	   (Ostrom,	   1990,	   31)	   In	   the	   commons	   theory	   of	   voluntary	   action	   as	   in	  knowledge	   commons,	   this	   definition	   of	   producer	   may	   be	   used	   either	   in	   an	   economic	   or	   a	  dramaturgical	  sense,	  and	  often	  both	  simultaneously.	  
Associations	  Produce	  Common	  Goods	  An	  essay	  entitled	  “Collective	  Action,	  Civic	  Engagement	  and	  the	  Knowledge	  Commons,”	  by	  Peter	   Levine,	   in	   Hess	   and	   Ostrom,	   (2007:	   247-­‐276)	   helps	   to	   bring	   the	   Bloomington	   School	  concept	  of	  commons,	  one	  of	  its	  important	  lacuna,	  and	  the	  knowledge	  commons	  more	  directly	  in	  line	  with	   the	   commons	   theory	  of	   voluntary	   action.	   Levine	   suggests	   that	   knowledge	   is	   always	  public	   knowledge,	   and	   consistently	   a	   public	   good,	   and	   that	   the	   process	   of	   creating	   public	  knowledge	  is	  also	  a	  good	  (Levine	  in	  Hess	  &	  Ostrom,	  2007,	  p.	  247)	  although	  his	  statement	  does	  not	  specify	  what	  kind	  of	  good.	  As	  with	  many	  who	  attempt	  to	  resolve	  important	  issues	  using	  the	  private/public	  dichotomy,	  Levine	  may	  have	  felt	  he	  needed	  to	  leave	  himself	  some	  wiggle	  room.	  Failure	   to	   specify	   the	   latter	   should	   be	   read	   as	   an	   indicator	   of	   the	   problematic	   nature	   of	   this	  dichotomy	   in	   this	   instance.	   Conceptions	   of	   knowledge	   as	   exclusively	   either	   private	   or	   public	  seriously	   misstate	   the	   matter	   by	   failing	   to	   take	   into	   account	   the	   very	   real	   transaction	   costs	  involved	  in	  acquiring	  and	  using	  knowledge,	  and	  also	  fail	  to	  adequately	  account	  for	  esoteric	  or	  secret	   knowledge	   of	   groups,	   professions	   and	   communities.	   (The	   notion	   of	   secret	   public	  knowledge	  is	  an	  obvious	  oxymoron.)	  	  Levine	  highlights	  the	  very	  type	  of	  problem	  the	  addition	  of	  common	  goods	  is	  intended	  to	  resolve,	  the	  “sort	  of/kind	  of”	  problem	  often	  papered	  over	  in	  both	  the	  third	  sector	  and	  commons	  literatures	   with	   terms	   like	   quasi-­‐public	   and	   semi-­‐public.	   “There	   is”	   he	   says	   “an	   important	  category	   of	   commons	   that	   are	   owned	   by	   private	   nonprofit	   organizations.	   The	   fundamentally	  meaningless	   nature	   of	   this	   term	   “nonprofit	   organization”	   is	   treated	   elsewhere	   in	   this	   study.	  Levine’s	   essential	   point	   remains	   valid	   and	   important	   if	   we	   substitute	   “corporations”	   for	  organizations	  in	  this	  sentence.	  The	  owner	  (a	  private	  organization)	  has	  the	  right	  and	  power	  to	  limit	  access	  but	  it	  considers	  itself	  the	  steward	  of	  a	  public	  good”	  (Levine,	  2007,	  p.	  251).	  The	  issue	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of	   ownership	   here	   appears	   to	   refer	   to	   patent	   or	   copyright,	   and	   in	   the	   case	   of	   nonprofit	  corporations	   might	   be	   a	   right	   exercised	   either	   by	   the	   board	   or	   an	   individual	   employee,	  volunteer	   or	   donor	   on	   behalf	   of	   the	   collectivity	   (often	   called	   the	   “work	   for	   hire”	   doctrine).	  Public	   libraries	   and	   some	   other	   types	   of	   organizations,	   he	   suggests,	   such	   as	   archives	   and	  museums	   admit	   members	   only	   on	   the	   condition	   that	   they	   act	   to	   preserve	   and	   protect	   the	  common	  resource	  pool.	  Other	   independent	   sector	   institutions,	   like	   scientific	   and	  professional	  societies,	   may	   impose	   precisely	   such	   conditions	   on	   their	   members	   to	   enhance	   common	  resource	   pools,	   and	   religious	   and	   scientific,	   other	   organizations,	   universities	   and	   civic	  organizations	  may,	  he	  says,	  “vary	  in	  their	  rules	  and	  structures,	  but	  they	  often	  have	  this	  function	  of	  protecting	  or	  enhancing	  a	  quasi-­‐public	  [or	  common]	  good”	  (p.	  251;	  italics	  added).	  The	  already	  discussed	  third	  type	  of	  common	  goods	  offers	  a	  fundamental	  alternative	  and	  a	   way	   out	   of	   assuming	   that	   knowledge	  must	   always	   be	   either	   private	   or	   public.	   Part	   of	   the	  proposed	   solution	   also	   involves	   getting	   beyond	   the	   directly	   equating	   the	   ideal	   types	   of	   each	  type	   of	   goods	   exclusively	  with	   one	   sector	   (market,	   state	   and	   commons).	   As	   discussed	   above,	  modules	   of	   organizations	   in	   any	   sector	  may	   be	   involved	   in	   production	   of	   any	   of	   these	   three	  types	   of	   goods:	   private,	   common	   and	   public.3	   This	   is	   altogether	   consistent	   with	   Levine’s	  argument,	   if	   not	  his	   choice	  of	  words.	   It	   is	   also	   consistent	  with	   the	   apparent	  objectives	  of	   the	  Indiana	   approach	   to	   knowledge	   commons	   to	   treat	   knowledge	   as	   sometimes	   a	   common	   good	  and	   sometimes	   a	   private	   good,	   rather	   than	   always	   as	   a	   public	   good.	   The	   traditional	   use	   of	  patents	   and	   copyrights	   would	   appear	   to	   confirm	   the	   public/private	   distinction	   in	   both	   an	  economic	  and	  a	  legal	  sense.	  Lessig’s	  introduction	  and	  the	  popularity	  of	  the	  “creative	  commons”	  license	  would	   similarly	   seem	   to	   support	   the	   reality	  of	   the	   third	   –	   common	  goods	  –	  option.	   It	  remains	  to	  be	  seen,	  however,	  whether	  this	  third	  approach	  will	  be	  workable	  in	  our	  commercial	  republic.	   Thus,	   we	   have	   the	   private	   goods	   of	   secret,	   esoteric,	   and	   patented	   knowledge,	   for	  example.	   In	   addition,	   knowledge	   production	   of	   all	   types	   is	   shared	   among	   private,	   public	   and	  common	  goods	  producers.	   It	  even	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  case	  that	  knowledge	  is	  seldom	  genuinely	  public	  in	  the	  fullest	  sense	  of	  that	  term,	  because	  of	  the	  transaction	  costs	  involved	  in	  acquiring	  it.	  Rather	  it	  is	  frequently	  a	  common	  good;	  a	  common-­‐pool	  resource	  shared	  by	  some	  specific	  body	  of	   interested	  parties	  –	  researchers,	   scholars,	  archivists,	   librarians,	   instructors,	   students,	   chess	  players,	   stamp	   collectors	   or	   others.	   This	   is	   certainly	   the	   case	   with	   both	   calculus	   and	   social	  problems,	  as	  discussed	  above..	  	  Thus,	  the	  addition	  of	  common	  to	  the	  familiar	  public/private	  dichotomy	  is	  in	  discussion	  of	  knowledge	  commons	  an	  altogether	  friendly	  amendment.	  In	  his	  article	  Levine	  “	  assumes	  that	  associations	   (and	   not	   just	   logical	   aggregates	   of	   people)	   are	   needed	   to	   support	   a	   knowledge	  commons	   in	   which	   ordinary	   citizens	   can	   be	   creative.”	   He	   goes	   on	   to	   note	   further	   that	   it	   is	  
                                                
3 This usage may initially be slightly disorienting because some theorists in political theory have long 
used the term ‘common good’ in roughly the universal sense (universal, that is, within a particular 
nation state) which economists impart to public goods. 
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essential	  for	  the	  success	  of	  knowledge	  commons	  that	  young	  people	  “above	  all	  adolescents	  not	  on	  a	   track	   to	  attend	  college”	  be	   included	  and	   that	  universities	  assume	  responsibilities	   in	   this	  area.	  A	  third	  assumption,	  he	  notes,	  is	  that	  “there	  is	  a	  particular	  need	  for	  associations	  that	  create	  local	  knowledge:	  information	  and	  insights	  of	  use	  to	  places	  and	  communities”	  (ibid.	  247).	  In	  this	  brief	  discussion,	  Levine	  takes	  the	  subject	  of	  knowledge	  commons	  completely	  out	  of	  the	  narrow	  orbit	   of	   the	   IAD	  model	   with	   its	   rationalist,	   individualist	   and	   subjectivist	   limits	   and	   brings	   it	  directly	   in	   line	   with	   the	   commons	   theory	   of	   voluntary	   action.	   We	   agree,	   it	   seems,	   that	  knowledge	  implies	  associated	  knowers	  and	  groups	  of	  the	  knowledgeable.	  Levine	  also	  makes	  a	  number	  of	  other	  useful	  observations	  that	  can	  serve	  as	  connections	  between	   the	   IAD	  model	  and	   the	  commons	   theory	  of	  voluntary	  action.	  For	  example,	  he	  cites	  a	  previous	  study	  setting	  forth	  a	  distinction	  between	  libertarian	  and	  associational	  commons.	  This	  comment	   is	   not	   intended	   as	   a	   partisan	   statement,	   although	   libertarian	   here	   relates	   to	   two	  frequently	   cited	   weaknesses	   of	   libertarianism,	   extreme	   individualism	   and	   anarchism	   as	  philosophies:	   the	   inability	   to	   act	   collectively	   and	   the	   absence	   of	   convincing	   models	   of	  community.	   In	   the	   former,	   anyone	  has	  a	   right	   to	  use,	   and	   sometimes	   to	   contribute	  back	   to,	   a	  public	  [or,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  a	  common]	  good.	  For	  our	  purposes,	  libertarian	  commons	  are	  those	  that	  anyone	  can	  use,	  and	  contribute	  voluntarily	  to	  the	  CRP.	  Many	  interesting	  examples	  of	  such	  libertarian	   knowledge	   commons	   have	   sprung	   up	   on	   the	   internet,	   including	   the	   familiar	  categories	   of	   Creative	   Commons	   licensing,	   open-­‐source	   software.	   The	   well-­‐known	   limit	   of	  libertarian	   commons	   is	   self-­‐interest	   and	   the	   exhaustion	   of	   the	   common	   pool	   resource	   by	  excessive	  free	  riding.	  Interestingly,	  this	  may	  be	  less	  an	  issue	  in	  the	  case	  of	  knowledge	  commons	  than	   other	   areas	   because	   of	   the	   non-­‐exclusive	   nature	   of	   knowledge.	   Examples	   of	   libertarian	  commons	  are	  many	  including,	  for	  a	  time,	  the	  privately-­‐owned	  park	  in	  New	  York	  City	  where	  the	  Occupy	  Wall	  Street	  movement	  first	  encamped	  (which	  the	  land	  owners	  eventually	  enclosed).	  In	  contrast,	   an	   associational	   commons,	   Levine	   says,	   is	   a	   common	   resource	   pool	   controlled	   by	   a	  particular	   group.	   (p.	   251)	   such	   as	   the	   Utah-­‐based	   genealogical	   archives	   owned	   by	   the	   LDS	  church.	  Further,	  while	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  anarchic	  condition	  described	  for	  libertarian	  commons	  the	  adjective	  is	  necessary,	  there	  is	  no	  need	  for	  the	  adjective	  associational	  commons,	  since	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  the	  chapters	  above,	  it	  is	  in	  the	  very	  nature	  of	  an	  association	  that,	  regardless	  of	  legal	  status	  or	  degree	  of	  formality,	  they	  are	  commons,	  possessed	  of	  common	  pool	  resources.	  	  The	   importance	  of	   the	   libertarian/associational	  distinction	  comes	   from	  Levine’s	   listing	  of	   the	   advantages	   of	   associations	   over	   libertarian	   commons.	   Among	   those	   cited	   are:	   (1)	   An	  association	  can	  protect	  its	  common	  resource	  pool	  (he	  cites	  litigation	  and	  lobbying	  as	  means	  of	  doing	  so.	  There	  are	  others	  including	  incorporation):	  Peterson’s	  model	  of	  the	  anarchists’	  annual	  meeting	  is	  instructive	  as	  an	  example	  of	  an	  uncontrollable	  commons	  (Bergstrom,	  2001).	  Without	  the	   capacity	   for	   organized	   collective	   action,	   conventions	   of	   principled	   anarchists,	   Peterson	  argued,	   lack	   the	   capacity	   for	   collective	   rational	   action	   under	   changed	   circumstances	   (like	  changing	  their	  convention	  to	  a	  cheaper	  hotel);	  	  (2)	  Associations	  can	  offer	  selective	  incentives	  to	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prospective	   commoners	   (“such	  as	   free	   access	   to	   the	   good	   that	   they	   control”)	   in	   exchange	   for	  their	   membership.	   (3)	   In	   contrast	   to	   associations,	   libertarian	   commons	   easily	   suffer	   from	  uncontrollable	  free-­‐rider	  problems.	  A	  celebrated	  (and	  fictional?)	  example	  of	  such	  a	  libertarian	  commons	  is	  the	  “chamber	  of	  whispers”	  said	  to	  have	  been	  associated	  with	  the	  original	  Hebrew	  temple	  in	  Jerusalem,	  into	  which	  all	  could	  enter	  unobserved	  and	  anonymously,	  the	  poor	  in	  order	  to	  seek	  relief,	  and	  the	  non-­‐poor	  to	  donate.	  (4)	  Associations	  are	  potentially	  democratic,	  and	  can	  offer	  their	  members	  opportunities	  to	  deliberate	  and	  make	  decisions	  about	  fair	  procedures.	  (5)	  Associations	  can	  publicly	  articulate	  values	   for	  which	   they	  wish	   to	  be	  known.	   (6)	  Associations	  can	  recruit	  and	  reach	  out	  to	  others	  in	  more	  effective	  ways	  than	  individuals	  working	  alone.	  (7)	  Associations	   can	   be	   ongoing	   and	   continuous,	   recruiting	   young	   members	   for	   the	   future,	   etc.	  Thus,	   although	   libertarian	   knowledge	   commons	   like	   the	   original	  Wikipedia,	  may	   be	   popular,	  fashionable	  or	  preferred,	  over	  time	  they	  tend	  to	  formalize	  as	  associations	  for	  these	  reasons.	  
Association,	  Community	  and	  Knowledge	  Commons	  
	   In	   a	   seeming	   bit	   of	   overstatement,	   Tocqueville	   in	   Democracy	   in	   America	   (1945,	   xx)	  characterized	   the	   science	   of	   association	   as	   “the	   mother	   of	   all	   sciences.”	   Geographers,	  mathematicians,	  psychologists	  and	  numerous	  representatives	  of	  other	  disciplines	  have	  all	  made	  claims	  of	  the	  maternity	  of	  their	  own	  disciplines,	  but	  I	  am	  unaware	  of	  any	  evidence	  that	  anyone	  previously	   has	   taken	   Tocqueville’s	   claim	   on	   behalf	   of	   association	   seriously.	   Analysts	   of	  voluntary	   action	   have	   generally	   passed	   over	   this	   claim	   in	   awkward	   silence:	   Could	   this	   be	  overstatement,	  exaggeration,	  or	  hyperbole;	  perhaps	  an	  excess	  of	  Gallic	  enthusiasm?	  What	  could	  he	  have	  meant	  by	  such	  a	  seemingly	  outlandish	  claim?	  Consider	  for	  a	  moment	  the	  consequences	  of	  taking	  him	  at	  his	  word.	  What	  if	  the	  very	  idea	  of	  a	  science	  as	  an	  organized	  body	  of	  knowledge	  implied	   not	   only	   cognitive	   order	   –	   terms,	   concepts,	   definitions,	   propositions,	   findings	   and	  theories	  embedded	  in	  a	  unifying	  logical	  and	  semantic	  structure	  –	  but	  also	  an	  actual	  association	  of	  the	  holders	  of	  that	  knowledge?	  What	  if	  full	  understanding	  of	  any	  body	  of	  knowledge	  did,	  in	  fact,	   involve	   understanding	   the	   associations	   of	   those	   in	   the	   know?	   While	   this	   idea	   was	  otherwise	  unstated	  in	  Tocqueville’s	  day	  (thus	  who	  can	  say	  with	  certainty	  whether	  or	  not	  it	  was	  known	   by	   his	   contemporaries?),	   it	   has	   become	   something	   of	   a	   mainstay	   in	   contemporary	  philosophy	  of	  science.	  The	  idea	  of	  a	  body	  of	  knowledge	  as	  partly	  an	  association	  of	  knowers,	  is	  fundamental	   to	   such	   otherwise	   diverse	   views	   as	   the	   Kuhnian	   paradigm-­‐shift	   model	   (Kuhn,	  1970),	   the	   social	   construction	   of	   reality	   (Berger	   and	   Luckmann,	   1967),	   the	   sociology	   of	  knowledge	   (Mannheim,	   1941),	   diffusion	   of	   innovations	   (Rogers,	   2003	   [1962]),	   	   and	   assorted	  social	  network	  theories	  and	  other	  perspectives.	  Recently	  Kwame	  A.	  Appiah	  (2011)	  built	  on	  the	  Kuhnian	   idea	   of	   a	   paradigm	   shift	   and	   applied	   it	   to	   “moral	   revolutions”	   several	   examples	   of	  which	   began	   during	   the	   same	   19th	   century	   period	   noted	   by	   Tilly	   above.	   What	   are	   social	  movements	  like	  the	  civil	  rights	  movement	  and	  social	  problems	  like	  poverty	  if	  not	  in	  part	  moral	  revolutions?	  At	  the	  very	  time	  of	  Tocqueville’s	  visit	  to	  the	  U.S.,	  American	  philosophy	  and	  several	  modern	  scientific	  disciplines	  were	  in	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  formation	  and	  recognition.	  Whether	  or	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not	   Tocqueville’s	   colorful	   metaphor	   of	   “mother	   of	   all	   knowledge”	   retains	   its	   vitality,	   there	  should	  be	  little	  question	  that	  large	  numbers	  of	  highly	  knowledgeable	  persons	  today	  understand	  their	  knowledge	  to	  be	  intimately	  tied	  to	  their	  association	  with	  others.	  Sciences	  and	  disciplines	  are	   characterized	   in	   part	   by	   their	   plurality	   and	   by	   their	   institutions	   for	   learning,	   as	   well	   as	  conflict	  resolution,	  diffusion	  and	  dissemination.	  It	  appears	  that	  the	  prescient	  French	  aristocrat	  may	   genuinely	   have	   caught	   an	   early	   glimpse	   of	   this	   in	   his	   observation	   of	   associations	   in	   the	  emerging	  democratic	  society	  of	  American	  communities;	  but	  also	  in	  his	  highly	  versatile	  concept	  of	  moeurs.	  	  Knowledge,	   like	   language	  and	  culture	  with	  which	   it	   is	   closely	  associated,	   is	   a	  uniquely	  human,	  and	  therefore	  social,	  product.	  Thus,	  to	  be	  altogether	  convincing,	  a	  model	  of	  knowledge	  commons	   must	   take	   into	   account	   the	   social	   organization	   of	   knowledge	   –	   which	   may	   be	   as	  important	   in	   today’s	   knowledge	   economy	   than	   the	   division	   of	   labor	   was	   to	   19th	   century	  industrial	  society.	  Not	  only	  should	  we	  be	  concerned	  with	  who	  knows	  what,	  when	  and	  where,	  but	  also	  how	  and	  why	  they	   learned	   it	  and	  how	  they	  employ	   it.	  As	  Gouldner	  (1970)	  observed,	  theories	   are	   also	   infrastructures,	   and	   focused	   publics	   are	   an	   important	   part	   of	   that	  infrastructure.	  	  It	  is	  safe	  to	  say	  that	  community	  is	  also	  one	  of	  the	  important	  characteristics	  of	  knowledge	  commons	   in	   some	   rather	   interesting	   ways	   first	   highlighted	   by	   the	   earliest	   of	   the	   American	  pragmatists.	   According	   to	   Richard	   Bernstein,	   Charles	   Saunders	   “Pierce’s	   theory	   of	   inquiry	  stands	  as	  one	  of	  the	  great	  attempts	  in	  modern	  philosophy	  to	  show	  how	  the	  classic	  dichotomies	  between	  thought	  and	  action,	  or	  theory	  and	  praxis,	  can	  be	  united	  in	  a	  theory	  of	  a	  community	  of	  inquirers	   committed	   to	   continuous,	   rational,	   self-­‐critical	   activity”	   (Bernstein,	   1971:	   199)	  Pierce’s	  concept	  of	  community	  brings	  together	  knowledge	  and	  action	  in	  ways	  directly	  related	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  reality	  itself.	  This	  connection	  was	  made	  later	  and	  more	  explicitly	  in	  the	  claim	  by	  Peter	   Berger	   and	   Thomas	   Luckmann,	   based	   on	   work	   written	   in	   German	   by	   the	  phenomenologist	  Alfred	  Schutz,	   that	   reality	   is	   socially	   constructed	   through	   the	   association	  of	  diverse	   persons.	   Reaction	   against	   applications	   of	   this	   notion	   to	   the	   physical	   universe	   and	  biosphere	   from	   dedicated	   Cartesians	   has	   been	   sharp	   and	   loud.	   	   Nevertheless,	   the	   pragmatic	  conception	  of	  reality	  embraces	  the	  concept	  of	  community	  in	  a	  way	  that	  has	  direct	  consequences	  for	  value	  determination	  in	  a	  knowledge	  commons.	  The	   real,	   then,	   is	   that	  which,	   sooner	   or	   later,	   information	   and	   reasoning	  would	   finally	  result	   in,	  and	  which	   is	   therefore	   independent	  of	   the	  vagaries	  of	  you	  and	  me.	  Thus,	   the	  very	  origin	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  reality	  shows	  that	  this	  conception	  involves	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  community,	  without	  definite	  limits,	  and	  capable	  of	  a	  definite	  increase	  in	  knowledge.	  And	  so,	  these	  two	  series	  of	  cognitions	  -­‐	  the	  real	  and	  the	  unreal	  -­‐	  consist	  of	  those	  which,	  at	  a	  time	  sufficiently	  future,	  the	  community	  will	  always	  continue	  to	  affirm;	  and	  those	  which,	  under	   the	   same	   conditions,	   ever	  will	   be	   denied.	   Now	   a	   proposition	  whose	   falsity	   can	  never	  be	  discovered,	  and	  the	  error	  of	  which	  is	  absolutely	  incognizable,	  contains,	  on	  our	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principle,	  no	  absolute	  error.	  Consequently,	   that	  which	  is	  thought	   in	  these	  cognitions,	   is	  real,	  as	  it	  really	  is.	  There	  is	  nothing,	  then,	  to	  prevent	  our	  knowing	  outward	  things	  as	  they	  really	  are,	  and	  it	  is	  most	  likely	  that	  we	  do	  thus	  know	  them	  in	  numberless	  cases,	  although	  we	  can	  never	  be	  absolutely	  certain	  of	  doing	  so	  in	  any	  special	  case.	  (Bernstein,	  1971,	  176,	  quoting	  Pierce)	  	   The	   intent	   here	   is	   not	   to	   engage	   any	  of	   these	   interesting	  philosophical	   questions.	   It	   is	  sufficient	   to	  note	   the	  manner	   in	  which	  Pierce’s	  view	  of	   the	  connection	  of	  knowledge,	  practice	  and	   community	   is	   consistent	   with	   the	   general	   thrust	   of	   the	   argument	   herein,	   It	   offers	   a	  distinctive	   take	   on	   knowledge	   commons.	   From	   Tocqueville’s	   “mother	   of	   all	   sciences”	  observation	  in	  the	  mid	  19th	  century	  to	  the	  present	  moment,	  there	  has	  been	  reason	  to	  recognize	  that	   knowledge	   is	   not	   merely	   an	   abstract	   logical	   association	   of	   ideas,	   but	   also	   the	   basis	   of	  interpersonal	   associations	   of	   knowers;	   communities	   of	   real	   people	   whose	   shared	   views	   of	  aspects	  or	  portions	  of	  reality	  are	  shaped	  by	  the	  shared	  knowledge	  they	  possess.	  This	  is	  as	  true	  for	  communities	  of	  scientific	  and	  technical	  knowledge	  as	   it	   is	  of	  those	  who	  locally	  know	  what	  happened	  and	  to	  whom	  at	  the	  Fourth	  of	  July	  celebration	  last	  year,	  or	  why	  the	  local	  newspaper	  suddenly	   began	   to	   cover	   United	  Way	   events	   the	   year	   that	   the	   publisher’s	  wife	  was	   asked	   to	  chair	  the	  campaign,	  and	  what	  is	  the	  best	  pedestrian	  route	  to	  the	  local	  public	  park.	  Knowledge,	  thus,	  also	  implies	  community.	  	   Scientific	   communities	   and	   academic	   disciplines	   are	   uniquely	   interesting	   examples	   of	  knowledge	  commons,	  however,	  because	  of	  the	  self-­‐conscious,	  deliberate	  manner	  in	  which	  they	  not	  only	  construct	  and	  amend	  their	  views	  of	  reality	  through	  the	  systematic	  and	  open	  (“public”)	  consideration	  of	  evidence	  and	  argument,	  but	  also	  for	  their	  moral-­‐political	  work	  in	  construction	  and	  agreeing	  upon	  the	  rules	  by	  which	  such	  considerations	  go	  forth.	  They	  are	  in	  that	  sense,	  the	  paradigm	  examples	  of	   knowledge	   commons.	   In	  other	   cases,	   construction	   trades,	   for	   example,	  this	   same	   process	   is	   often	   hidden	   from	   view	   because,	   once	   formulated,	   other	   individuals,	  market	  firms	  and	  government	  bureaus	  all	  have	  both	  means	  and	  motives	  to	  borrow,	  claim	  and	  proclaim	   the	   knowledge	   of	   such	   commons	   as	   their	   own.	   But	   the	   independent	   sector	   of	  voluntary	  action	  within	  the	  legal	  infrastructure	  of	  protections	  that	  have	  grown	  up	  is	  capable	  of	  generating	  the	  necessary	  moeurs	  from	  nothing	  other	  than	  the	  interactions	  of	  an	  association	  of	  interested	  persons.	  These	  processes	  may	  be	  essentially	   similar	   in	  other	  knowledge	   commons	  and	  communities	  even	  when	  the	  processes	  for	  constructing	  norms	  and	  rules	  may	  appear	  to	  be	  radically	  different	  than	  the	  explicit,	  rational	  approach	  of	  scientists.	  	  	   This	   is	   the	   most	   basic	   reason	   for	   bringing	   together	   voluntary	   action,	   association,	  assembly,	  commons	  and	  community	  under	  the	  heading	  of	  Tocqueville’s	  mother	  of	  all	  sciences	  comment	   and	   knowledge	   commons.	   In	   scientific	   communities,	   as	   in	   residential	   and	   other	  communities,	  it	  is	  the	  social	  process	  of	  interaction	  -­‐	  rubbing	  shoulders,	  as	  it	  were	  -­‐	  that	  rules	  of	  appropriate	  conduct	  can	  be	  suggested,	  agreed	  upon,	  put	  to	  the	  test,	  and	  revised	  as	  necessary.	  Whether	  we	   look	  at	   the	  national	   and	   international	   scientific	   societies,	   or	   their	  17th	  and	  18th	  century	  royal	  counterparts,	  we	  see	  essentially	  similar	  processes.	  And,	  these	  same	  processes	  and	  procedures	  are	  also	  to	  be	  seen	  in	  other	  forms	  of	  knowledge	  commons.	  Then,	  when	  we	  look	  at	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other	  associations	   from	  this	  vantage	  point,	   the	  analogous	   interactions	  between	  members	  of	  a	  social	   club	   or	   fraternal	   organization,	   pilgrimage,	   religious	   bodies,	   or	   self-­‐help	   group,	   for	  example,	  and	  the	  resources	  of	  the	  knowledge	  they	  share	  will	  be	  apparent.	  Even	  so,	  sciences	  are	  unique	  as	  knowledge	  commons	  in	  the	  explicit,	  self-­‐conscious	  nature	  of	  their	  rule	  making.	  
News	  As	  A	  Common	  Resource	  Pool	  Another	   knowledge-­‐based	   common	   resource	   pool	   to	   be	   considered	   here	   has	   close	  connections	  to	  both	  social	  movements	  and	  social	  problems	  and	  illustrates	  other	  facets,	  as	  well	  as	  some	  of	  the	  limits	  of	  knowledge	  commons.	  News	  is	  an	  important	  component	  of	  democratic	  society	  and	  culture;	  journalists	  even	  speak	  of	  the	  ‘public’s	  right	  to	  know’	  as	  a	  corollary	  of	  press	  freedom.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  is	  wise	  to	  recall	  A.J.	  Liebling’s	  comment	  that	  freedom	  of	  the	  press	  belongs	  to	  those	  who	  own	  one.	  In	  the	  age	  of	  the	  internet,	  we	  are	  approaching	  the	  point	  where	  that	  might	  include	  everyone.	  News	  was	  until	  recently	  the	  seemingly	  straightforward	  product,	  or	  output,	   of	   “the	   media”	   –	   newspapers,	   news	   magazines,	   radio	   and	   television.	   Describing	   the	  production	  of	  news	  has	  become	  a	  much	  more	  complex	  matter	  with	  the	  rise	  of	  new	  information	  technologies,	   the	  24-­‐hour	  news	   cycle,	   and	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	   completely	  new	  communications	  media:	  emails,	  blogs,	  tweets,	  and	  assorted	  other	  ‘social	  media’,	  including	  a	  sizeable	  and	  growing	  nonprofit	   news	   sector	   (Lohmann,	   2014).	  Nonprofit	   news	   vendors	   like	   Pro	  Publica,	   the	  Texas	  Tribune,	  Minnesota’s	  MinnPost,	   and	  numerous	   others	   have	   joined	   such	   stalwarts	   as	  National	  Public	  Radio	  and	  PBS	  and	  CSPAN	  to	  exploit	   the	  crisis	  of	   the	  news	   industry	  brought	  on	  by	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  internet	  and	  falling	  advertising	  revenues.	  News	   in	   something	   like	   its	   present	   form	   emerged	   into	   the	   modern	   world	   at	   the	  intersection	   of	   technological	   developments	   in	   printing,	   the	   spread	   of	   literacy	   and	   the	  emergence	  of	   the	  new,	  broader	  public	  sphere	   tracked	  by	  Habermas	  (1989),	   the	   transitions	   in	  repertories	  of	  contestation	  noted	  by	  Tilly	  (Tarrow,	  1993;	  Tilly,	  1986),	  Tocqueville’s	  notation	  of	  the	   distinction	   between	   political	   and	   civil	   associations,	   changes	   in	   cities	   wrought	   by	  urbanization	   and	   industrialization	   and	   the	   development	   of	   large	   scale	   organization	   (Hart,	  2001).	   The	   first	   German	   and	   Dutch	   newspapers	   appeared	   in	   the	   first	   decades	   of	   the	   17th	  century,	   with	   the	   first	   English	   language	   broadsheet	   appearing	   in	   Amsterdam	   in	   1620.	   The	  earliest	   French	   paper,	   La	   Gazette,	   appearing	   in	   1631,	   with	   one	   edition	   of	   the	   first	   American	  paper,	   Occurrences	   Both	   Foreign	   and	   Domestic,	   appearing	   in	   Boston	   in	   1690.	   News	   sheets	  printed	   on	   silk	   and	   privately	   circulated	   among	   government	   officials	   and	   conforming	   to	   the	  officials-­‐only	  conception	  of	  “public”	  affairs	  already	  noted	  were	  reportedly	  circulated	  in	  China	  as	  early	   as	   the	  Han	  Dynasty	   in	   the	   2nd-­‐3rd	   centuries	   C.E.	   Similar	   private	   circulations	   printed	   on	  paper	   are	   reported	   as	   late	   as	   the	  Ming	  Dynasty	   in	   the	   16th	   century.	   By	   the	  mid-­‐19th	   century	  many	   newspapers,	   like	   the	   one	   in	   Germany	   edited	   by	   Karl	   Marx	   before	   he	   was	   expelled	   to	  England,	  were	   closely	   associated	  with	   political	   parties	   and	   factions.	   It	  was	   really	   only	   at	   the	  start	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  with	  the	  rise	  of	  press	  barons	  (an	  international	  type	  represented	  most	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recently	   by	   Rupert	   Murdoch)	   like	   Joseph	   Pulitzer	   and	  William	   R.	   Hearst	   in	   the	   U.S.	   that	   the	  commercial	  model	  of	  mass-­‐market	  news	  reached	  full	  maturity.	  It’s	  called	  news	  for	  a	  reason:	  Modern	  news	  is	  one	  of	  the	  first	  places	  that	  most	  people	  in	  civil	  society	  learn	  of	  the	  problematic	  nature	  of	  new	  social	  problems,	  or	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  new	  social	  movements.	  In	  saying	  that,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  recognize	  that	  news	  is	  not	  a	  product	  only	  of	  recognized	  news	  media.	   It	   is	  also	  a	  reflection	  of	   the	  surrounding	  knowledge	  commons,	  partly	  created	  by	  the	  media	  themselves	  but	  also	  partly	  the	  product	  of	  public	  opinion,	  both	  in	  general	  and	   among	   diverse	   focused	   publics.	   In	   voluntary	   action,	   specialists	   in	   social	   problems	   and	  movements	  may	  get	  their	  initial	  information	  from	  general	  media	  sources,	  but	  other	  important	  information	   flows	   move	   within	   and	   among	   members	   of	   knowledge	   commons	   through	  specialized	   newsletters,	   journal	   articles,	   published	   interviews,	   lectures,	   conference	  presentations,	   working	   papers,	   word	   of	   mouth	   and	   interpersonal	   communications.	   are	   also	  important	   sources	   of	   news	   and	   information.	   In	   the	   past	   several	   decades,	   discussion	   lists	   like	  ARNOVA-­‐L	  (which	  I	   founded),	  blogs,	  websites	  and	  the	  full	  panoply	  of	  social	  media	  also	  play	  a	  role	  in	  philanthropy,	  social	  economy	  and	  all	  of	  the	  other	  the	  focused	  publics	  of	  the	  third	  sector.	  There	  are	  two	  additional	  aspects	  of	  the	  conception	  of	  news	  that	  are	  of	  greatest	  interest	  in	  the	  context	  of	  knowledge	  commons.	  The	  first	  is	  the	  relation	  between	  focused	  publics	  and	  the	  audiences	   for	   news	   circulation	   and	   the	   second	   is	   the	   dynamic	   relation	   between	   commonly	  known	  information	  and	  knowledge	  and	  voluntary	  action	  that	  news	  represents.	  Not	  just	  public	  officials	  but	  everyone	  engaged	  in	  voluntary	  action	  acts	  upon	  their	  news-­‐based	  understandings.	  This	   includes	   not	   only	   general	   news	   but	   also	   the	   news	   circulating	   within	   relevant	   focused	  publics.	  The	  hierarchical	  nature	  of	  the	  various	  meanings	  of	  common	  good	  previously	  discussed	  also	  applies	  here	  in	  its	  fullest	  sense.	  It	  is	  easy	  to	  take	  for	  granted	  that	  news	  is	  directed	  at	  “the	  general	   public”	   in	   the	   most	   universal	   sense	   of	   that	   term;	   that	   news	   as	   information	   and	  knowledge	  are	  intended	  for	  everyone	  and	  available	  to	  all	  who	  care	  to	  pay	  attention.	  Yet	  that	  is	  a	  very	  recent	  aspiration,	  and	  far	  from	  a	  universal	  development.	  	  News	   also	   illustrates	   in	   vivid	   ways	   the	   dynamic	   relation	   between	   information,	   in	  Edelman’s	   sense	   of	   novelty,	   uncertainty	   and	   unfamiliarity,	   and	   knowledge,	   in	   the	   sense	   of	  familiarity,	  predictability	  and	  certainty	  (Edelman,	  1971).	  News	  as	  knowledge	  commons	  is	  thus	  a	  key	  element	  in	  the	  dynamic	  process	  of	  political	  knowledge	  described	  by	  Barber	  (1988).	  News	  writing	  is,	  for	  these	  reasons,	  sometimes	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  first	  draft	  of	  history.	  Today,	  it	  is	  well	  known	  that	  both	  Presidents	  Lincoln	  and	  Kennedy	  were	  assassinated,	  as	  well	  as	  where,	  when,	  how	   and	   by	   whom.	   On	   the	   days	   these	   events	   occurred,	   news	   of	   the	   events	   unfolded	   only	  gradually	  with	  new	  developments	  being	  reported	  at	  the	  speed	  of	  the	  technologies	  of	  the	  time:	  telegraph,	  daily	  newspapers	  and	  television.	  	  In	  democratic	  society	  and	  culture,	  general	  news	  regarding	  the	  polity,	  economy,	  society	  and	  culture	  and	  resulting	  shifts	  of	  public	  opinion	  are	  among	  the	  staples	  of	  everyday	  life.	  This	  is	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the	  reason	  so	  many	  media	  outlets	  feel	  confident	  proclaiming	  the	  “public’s	  right	  to	  know.”	  One	  of	  the	  most	  fundamental	  assumptions	  of	  civil	  society,	  something	  so	  basic	  that	  it	  seldom	  needs	  to	  be	  discussed	  explicitly,	  is	  that	  democratic	  citizens	  must	  be	  informed	  in	  order	  to	  act	  rationally.	  It	  is	  part	  of	  news	  as	  knowledge	  commons	  that	  we	  generally	  leave	  decisions	  about	  what	  we	  need	  to	   be	   informed	   about	   to	   editors,	   reporters	   and	   others.	   Roughly	   for	   the	   past	   century	   these	  decisions	   have	   been	   left	   in	   the	   hands	   of	   employees	   of	   commercial	   establishments	   whose	  decisions	  are,	   in	   large	  part,	   informed	  by	  available	   space	  or	   time	  –	   the	  news	  hole	   not	   filled	  by	  advertising.	  In	  that	  configuration,	  scholars	  of	  the	  third	  sector	  could	  comfortably	  afford	  to	  ignore	  news	   as	   a	   common	   good.	   After	   all,	   research	   on	   journalism	  was	   part	   of	   an	   entirely	   separate	  knowledge	  commons	  (communication	  studies).	  With	  the	  recent	  rise	  of	  nonprofit	  news	  vendors,	  however,	   the	  growing	  role	  of	  news	  as	  a	  common	  good	  becomes	  a	  topic	  of	   interest	  (Lohmann,	  2012b).	  A	  final	  reason	  for	  considering	  news	  as	  knowledge	  commons	  is	  the	  growing	  prospect	  that	  with	   the	   rich	   range	   of	   news	   sources	   available	   today,	   consumers	   of	   news	   are	   increasingly	  tailoring	  their	  selection	  of	  news	  outlets	  to	  confirm	  their	  established	  opinions/biases.	   	  As	  such,	  the	   role	   of	   general	   news	   and	   the	   corresponding	   role	   of	   public	   opinion	   are	   likely	   to	   decrease	  while	  the	  role	  of	  focused	  publics	  and	  public	  opinion	  within	  them	  is	  likely	  to	  grow.	  Thus,	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  Republican/conservative	  voters	  are	  inclined	  to	  seek	  confirmation	  of	  their	  zeitgeist	  through	  Fox	  News,	  while	  Democratic/liberal	   voters	   lean	  more	   towards	   the	  New	  York	   Times,	  MSNBC,	  CNN	  and	   the	   traditional	  news	  networks:	  ABC,	  CBS	  and	  NBC.	  The	  very	   fact	   that	  one	   faction	   is	  concentrated	  heavily	  in	  a	  single	  news	  source	  while	  the	  other	  is	  distributed	  among	  several	  may	  also	  say	  something	  about	  the	  contemporary	  distribution	  of	  pluralism	  as	  a	  value.	  In	  this	  context,	  public	   opinion	   in	   the	   21st	   century	   comes	   to	   look	   more	   like	   the	   19th	   than	   the	   20th	   century:	  bifurcated	   into	   two	  (or	  more)	  knowledge	  commons	  that	  are	   increasingly	  exclusive	  matters	  of	  attention	  of	  focused	  publics	  converging	  around	  major	  political	  ideologies.	  
Peer	  Production	  	   There	   is	   some	   convergence	   among	   scholars	   working	   in	   the	   Bloomington	   commons	  theory	   tradition	  with	   the	  main	   currents	   of	   the	   commons	   theory	   of	   voluntary	   action	   over	   the	  assertion	  that	  at	  least	  some	  types	  of	  associations	  are	  commons.	  Commons	  theory	  also	  offers	  a	  more	   profound	   alternative	   to	   the	   economics	   of	   the	   firm	   for	   understanding	   the	   dynamics	   of	  associations,	  assemblies	  and	  voluntary	  action.	  One	  facet	  of	  that	  alternative	  comes	  most	  clearly	  into	  focus	  in	  the	  work	  of	  an	  independent	  theorist,	  Yochai	  Benkler	  on	  what	  he	  terms	  “social”	  or	  “peer	  production”	  much	  of	  which	  is	  focused	  on	  information	  and	  knowledge	  industries	  and	  thus	  informs	  the	  perspective	  of	  knowledge	  commons	  introduced	  here.	  The	  term	  “peer	  production”	  is	  preferred	  here	  in	  discussing	  Benkler’s	  analysis	  of	  the	  production	  of	  open	  source	  software	  as	  an	  example	   of	   voluntary	   action	   on	   the	   grounds	   that	   there	   are	   other	   possible	   forms	   of	   social	  production	  involved	  in	  voluntary	  action	  in	  addition	  to	  markets,	  firms	  and	  the	  form	  of	  collective	  behavior	  he	  calls	  peer	  producers.	  
  219 
In	   an	   essay	   titled	   “Coase’s	   Penguin”	   Benkler	   (2002)	   expands	   the	   range	   of	   options	   for	  social	  (or	  collective)	  production	  beyond	  Ronald	  Coase’s	  (1937)	  dyad	  of	  markets	  and	  firms	  and,	  although	  he	  doesn’t	  mention	   it,	  Hardin’s	  (1968)	  use	  of	  public	  and	  private.	  The	  penguin	   in	  the	  title	  is	  Tux,	  the	  trademark	  of	  Linux,	  the	  open	  source	  operating	  system	  that	  serves	  as	  Benkler’s	  principal	   example.	   	   Social	  production	   is	  Benkler’s	   term	   for	   solutions	   to	   the	   class	  of	  problems	  traditionally	  called	  collective	  choice	  problems.	  As	  such,	  his	  approach	  needs	  to	  be	  seen	  alongside	  Coase	   but	   also	  Hardin,	  Mancur	  Olson,	   Elinor	   and	  Vincent	  Ostrom,	   and	   others.	   But	   unlike	   the	  others,	   Benkler	   very	   deftly	   shifts	   the	   question	   from	   how	   to	   what,	   from	   means	   to	   ends:	  “Collaborative	   production	   systems	   pose	   an	   information	   problem.”	   Benkler	   writes,	   “	   The	  question	  that	  individual	  agents	  in	  such	  a	  system	  need	  to	  solve	  in	  order	  to	  be	  productive	  is	  what	  they	   should	  do.”	  This	  problem,	   as	   the	   title	  of	   the	  essay	   indicates	   intentionally	   echoes	  Coase’s	  examination	  of	   the	   economic	   case	   for	   firms,	   but	  with	   remarkably	  different	   results.	   “Markets”	  according	  to	  Benkler,	  solve	  the	  problem	  of	  information	  “by	  attaching	  price	  signals	  to	  alternative	  courses	  of	  action.”	  Firms,	  he	  says,	  solve	  the	  problem	  by	  assigning	  differing	  importance	  or	  value	  to	  varying	  signals	  from	  different	  agents.	  Peer	  production,	  he	  argues,	  is	  yet	  another	  approach.	  In	   Benkler’s	   view,	   “commons-­‐based	   peer	   production”,	   of	   the	   type	   seen	   in	   the	  development	   of	   the	   Linux	   open-­‐source	   operating	   system,	   offers	   an	   “emerging	   third	  model	   of	  production”	   that	   “relies	   on	   decentralized	   information	   gathering	   and	   exchange	   to	   reduce	   the	  uncertainty	  of	  participants”	   (Benkler,	  2002).	   “The	  advantages	  of	  peer	  production”	   to	  Benkler,	  are	   “improved	   identification	   and	   allocation	   of	   human	   creativity.”	   It	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that	  while	   peer	   production	   is	   a	   radically	   new	   and	   innovative	   form	   of	   action	   by	   volunteer	  participants,	  it	  is	  only	  feasible	  in	  some	  instances	  of	  voluntary	  action	  at	  the	  community	  level,	  for	  “it	  depends	  on	  very	  large	  aggregations	  of	  individuals	  independently	  scouring	  their	  information	  environment	   in	   search	   of	   opportunities	   to	   be	   creative	   in	   small	   or	   large	   increments.	   These	  individuals	  then	  self-­‐identify	  for	  tasks	  and	  perform	  them	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  motivational	  reasons	  that	  I	  discuss	  at	  some	  length.”	  While	  it	  may	  seem	  a	  minor	  technical	  limit,	  this	  is	  actually	  a	  very	  demanding	   constraint	   on	   voluntary	   behavior.	   In	   a	   number	   of	   cases,	   the	   model	   of	   peer	  production	   of	   philanthropy,	   for	   example,	   has	   been	   tried	   and	   explicitly	   rejected.	   Benkler’s	  condition	   of	   “large	   numbers	   of	   individuals	   independently	   scouring	   their	   information	  environment	   in	   search	   of	   opportunities”	   actually	   reverses	   Olson’s	   (1965)	   condition	   of	   very	  small	   group	   size.	  Thus,	   in	   juxtaposition,	  Olson’s	   and	  Benkler’s	  models	   together	  may	  have	   the	  potential	  to	  define	  the	  limits	  or	  boundaries	  of	  voluntary	  action	  in	  some	  very	  intriguing	  ways.	  	  Knowledge	   commons	   as	   peer	   production	   in	   Benkler’s	   sense	   has	   many	   different	  applications	   in	   voluntary	   action.	   The	   current	   system	   of	   mutual	   aid	   and	   self-­‐help	   is	   built	  substantially	  on	  distinctive	  models	  of	  peer	  production	  (Borkman,	  1999).	  There	  are	  also	  other	  interesting	   cases	   in	  which	   the	  Benkler	  model	  of	  peer	  production	   can	  be	  applied	   to	  voluntary	  action.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  widespread,	  perhaps,	  is	  Deweyian	  problem	  solving,	  which	  has	  been	  the	  general	   model	   of	   planning,	   decision-­‐making,	   action	   and	   evaluation	   behind	   a	   great	   deal	   of	  
  220 
voluntary	   action	   for	   more	   than	   half	   a	   century.	   In	   light	   of	   the	   previous	   discussion	   of	   social	  problems	   as	   knowledge	   commons,	   Deweyian	   problem	   solving	   as	   a	   serial	   model	   of	   peer	  production	   of	   knowledge	   commons	  working	   through	   problem	   definitions,	   selection	   of	   action	  strategies,	   and	   evaluation	   of	   results	   brings	   together	   many	   of	   the	   themes	   and	   issues	   most	  important	   to	   those	   engaged	   in	   voluntary	   action.	   Sometimes	   solutions	   must	   be	   invented,	   for	  example,	   introducing	  a	   role	   for	   social	   imaginaries.	   In	  other	   cases	   they	  can	  simply	  be	   selected	  from	   among	   existing	   repertories	   and	   enacted.	   A	   community	   of	   research	   scientists,	   each	   self-­‐defining	  “the	  research	  problem”	  to	  be	  solved	  and	  taking	  individual	  action	  to	  tackle	  a	  part	  of	  it,	  for	   example,	   represents	   a	   commons-­‐based	   model	   of	   knowledge	   production	   that	   has	   proven	  very	   robust	   over	   the	   past	   three	   centuries.	   Much	   the	   same	  might	   be	   said	   for	   peer	   review	   in	  journal-­‐based	   publication	   across	   the	   full	   range	   of	   academic	   disciplines.	   Sciences,	   arts	   and	  humanities	  each	  employ	  their	  own	  variations	  on	  models	  of	  commons-­‐based	  peer	  production,	  in	  a	  manner	   completely	   consistent	  with	   the	   self-­‐defining	   nature	   of	   knowledge	   commons.	   In	   the	  absence	  of	  direction	  by	  patrons	  and	  the	  academy,	  for	  example,	  modern	  movements	  in	  painting,	  sculpture,	   music	   and	   other	   arts	   (e.g.,	   the	   French	   Impressionists,	   surrealists,	   abstract	  impressionists,	   and	   so	  many	   other	  movements)	   have	   relied	   time	   and	   again	   on	   forms	   of	   peer	  production,	   less	   to	  produce	   individual	  works	   than	   to	  define	  and	   install	  whole	  new	  aesthetics.	  For	   this	   reason	   they	   belong	  not	   just	   under	  Benkler’s	   heading	   of	   peer	   production	   but	   of	   peer	  production	  of	  common	  goods	  by	  knowledge	  commons.	  Such	   examples,	   however,	   all	   represent	   something	   of	   a	   weakening	   of	   the	   rigorous	  conditions	  Benkler	  sets	  up	  to	  characterize	  the	  case	  of	  Linux.	  Thus,	  it	  may	  be	  only	  partly	  relevant	  that	  in	  Benkler’s	  analysis	  those	  cases	  where	  “the	  problems	  of	  motivation	  and	  organization	  can	  be	   solved,	   then	   commons-­‐based	   peer	   production	   has	   two	   major	   advantages	   over	   firms	   and	  markets.	  First,	  it	  places	  the	  point	  of	  decision	  about	  assigning	  any	  given	  person	  to	  any	  given	  set	  of	  resources	  with	  the	  individual..	  .	  .”	  Secondly,	  peer	  production	  uses	  peer	  review	  and	  analogous	  procedures	  to	  regulate	  and	  channel	  the	  flow	  of	  information.	  	  In	   peer	   production,	   Benkler	   says,	   the	   “motivation	   problem	   is	   solved	   by	   two	   distinct	  analytic	  moves.”	  The	  first	  is	  the	  proposition	  that	  humans	  may	  engage	  in	  the	  same	  act	  for	  many	  different	  reasons.	  	  More	  importantly,	  he	  says,	  across	  the	  full	  range	  of	  human	  experience,	  there	  are	  instances	  in	  which	  “the	  presence	  of	  monetary	  rewards	  is	  inversely	  related	  to	  the	  presence	  of	  other,	  social-­‐psychological	  rewards.”	  Peer	  production	  thus	  brings	  into	  rational	  individualism	  the	  recognition	  that	  is	  self	  evident	  to	  many	  people	  engaged	  in	  voluntary	  action:	  others	  are	  not	  always	   simply	   motivated	   purely	   by	   self-­‐interest	   and	   the	   prospect	   of	   measurable	   reward,	   as	  models	  of	  market,	  firm	  and	  closely	  related	  models	  of	  reciprocity	  would	  have	  it.	  People	  will	  also	  work	   some	   of	   the	   time	   for	   recognition,	   commendation,	   personal	   affirmation,	   affiliation,	  solidarity	  and	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  other	  reasons.	  Examination	  of	  the	  work	  of	  James	  Boyle	  below	  will	   go	   even	   further	   and	   introduce	   the	   circumstances	   under	  which,	   Boyle	   argues,	  motivation	  does	  not	  matter	  at	  all.	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Benkler’s	  “second	  analytic	  move	  involves	  understanding	  that	  when	  a	  project	  of	  any	  size	  is	   broken	   up	   into	   little	   pieces,	   each	   of	   which	   can	   be	   performed	   by	   an	   individual	   in	   a	   short	  amount	   of	   time,	   the	  motivation	   to	   get	   any	   given	   individual	   to	   contribute	   need	   only	   be	   very	  small.”	   Although	   Benkler	   was	   speaking	   of	   the	   internet-­‐based	   development	   of	   open	   source	  operating	  systems	  and	  application	  software,	  the	  applicability	  to	  other	  forms	  of	  voluntary	  action	  should	  be	  clear:	  This	   is,	   for	  example,	   the	  precise	   logic	  supporting	  the	  use	  of	   large	  numbers	  of	  community	  volunteers	  in	  disaster	  relief	  as	  well	  as	  large	  scale	  fundraising	  efforts.	  And,	  it	  points	  to	   one	   of	   the	   constant	   tensions	   in	   such	   efforts:	   the	   need	   to	   “coordinate”	   the	   overall	   effort	   is	  often	  in	  conflict	  with	  individual	  assessments	  of	  what	  needs	  to	  be	  done.	  In	   Benkler’s	   assessment,	   “peer	   production	   will	   thrive	   where	   projects	   have	   three	  characteristics.”	   Such	   projects	  must	   be	   seen	   as	  modular	   types;	   that	   is	   breakable	   into	   smaller	  pieces	  or	  units.	  Secondly,	  such	  modules	  must	  be	  “predominately	  fine-­‐grained,	  or	  small	  in	  size….	  “	   Finally,	   the	   cost	   of	   integration	   of	   the	   modules	   into	   a	   final,	   finished	   product	   must	   be	   low,	  including	  the	  cost	  of	  quality	  control.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  here	  that	  Benkler’s	  observations	  are	  purely	   speculative	   inferences	   based	   on	   a	   single	   case,	   and	   like	   all	   theory	   warrant	   further	  examination.	  There	  has	  been	  virtually	  no	  examination	  of	  the	  possibilities	  of	  social	  production	  in	  voluntary	  action	  in	  which	  one	  or	  more	  of	  these	  conditions	  are	  not	  present:	  Where	  projects	  are	  not	  readily	  modular,	  or	  not	  “fine-­‐grained”	  and	  where	  the	  costs	  of	  integration	  or	  quality	  control	  are	  high.	  Even	  so,	  the	  Benkler	  model	  of	  peer	  or	  social	  production	  is	  extremely	  interesting	  as	  a	  possible	  guide	  for	  understanding	  a	  great	  deal	  about	  voluntary	  action	  and	  knowledge	  commons.	  Part	   of	   the	   reason	   that	   Benkler’s	   efforts	   in	   outlining	   peer	   production	   represent	   a	   notable	  extension	  of	   the	  Bloomington	  School	  model	  of	  knowledge	  commons	   is	  because	  of	   the	  way	  he	  builds	  upon	  the	  basic	  recognition	  of	  norms-­‐as-­‐rules:	  “Social	  norms	  .	  .	  .	  play	  a	  role	  in	  sustaining	  some	  of	  these	  collaborations,	  in	  both	  small	  groups	  and	  larger	  groups	  where	  the	  platform	  allows	  for	  effective	  monitoring	  and	  repair	  when	  individuals	  defect.”	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  Benkler	  is	  emphatic	  in	  what	  we	  might	  call	  his	  own	  Coasian	  two-­‐sector	  model:	   social	   production	   vs.	   firms.	  Unlike	  Hardin,	   public	   options	   are	  not	   considered,	   but	   like	  practically	  everyone	  else	  independent	  or	  third	  sector	  options	  are	  ignored	  completely.	  He	  insists	  that	   he	   is	   “not	   suggesting	   that	   peer	   production	  will	   supplant	  markets	   or	   firms”	   or	   that	   “it	   is	  always	  the	  more	  efficient	  model	  of	  production	  for	  information	  and	  culture.”	  What	  he	  is	  saying,	  he	  notes,	  “is	  that	  this	  emerging	  third	  model	  is	  (1)	  distinct	  from	  the	  other	  two	  (market	  and	  firm)	  and	   (2)	   has	   certain	   systematic	   advantages	   over	   the	   other	   two	   in	   identifying	   and	   allocating	  human	   capital/creativity.”	   We	   might	   be	   equally	   emphatic	   in	   suggesting	   that,	   while	   peer	  production	   in	   Benkler’s	   sense	   constitutes	   an	   important	   alternative	   to	   production	   by	   both	  markets	  and	  firms,	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  this	  exhausts	  the	  range	  of	  possibilities	  for	  additional	  forms	  of	  commons-­‐based	  production.	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Enclosure	  and	  the	  Internet	  Much	  of	   James	  Boyle’s	   attention	  has	  been	  devoted	   to	   the	   internet-­‐as-­‐commons	   (Boyle,	  2003a;	   Boyle	   2003b).	   Boyle,	   a	   lawyer,	   also	   used	   the	   commons	  metaphor	   as	   the	   source	   of	   a	  powerful	  new	  claim	  that	  the	   internet	   is	  provoking	  a	  “second	  enclosure	  movement”	  as	  various	  information	   providers	   seek	   to	   “enclose”	   or	   privatize	   greater	   and	   greater	   quantities	   of	   freely	  available	   information	  (Boyle,	  2008).	  His	  general	  analysis	   is	   interesting,	  but	  one	  aspect	  of	   it	   is	  particularly	  germane	  to	  the	  knowledge	  commons	  and	  the	  commons	  theory	  of	  voluntary	  action.	  That	   is	  his	  explanation	   for	   the	  circumstances	  under	  which	   the	  motives	  of	  peer	  producers	  are	  unimportant.	   He	   begins	   with	   several	   assumptions:	   A	   random	   distribution	   of	   incentives	   for	  different	   people;	   a	   global	   network	   like	   the	   Internet	   (which,	   ala	   Benkler,	   also	  would	   seem	   to	  imply	  large	  numbers);	  transmission,	  information	  sharing	  and	  copying	  costs	  that	  approach	  zero;	  and	  (also	  like	  Benkler)	  a	  modular	  creation	  process.	  	  Based	  on	  these	  assumptions,	  Boyle	  says	  “it	  just	  does	  not	  matter	  why	  they	  do	  it.	  In	  lots	  of	  cases,	  they	  will	  do	  it.	  One	  person	  works	  for	  love	  of	  the	  species,	  another	  in	  the	  hope	  of	  a	  better	  job,	  a	  third	  for	  the	  joy	  of	  solving	  puzzles,	  and	  so	  on.	  Each	  person	  has	  his	  own	  reserve	  price,	  the	  point	   at	  which	   he	   says,	   ‘Now	   I	  will	   turn	   off	  Survivor	  and	   go	   and	   create	   something.’	   But	   on	   a	  global	  network,	  there	  are	  a	  lot	  of	  people,	  and	  with	  numbers	  that	  big	  and	  information	  overhead	  that	   small,	   even	   relatively	   hard	   projects	   will	   attract	   motivated	   and	   skilled	   people	   whose	  particular	  reserve	  price	  has	  been	  crossed.	  For	  the	  whole	  structure	  to	  work	  without	  large-­‐scale	  centralized	  coordination,	   the	  creation	  process	  has	   to	  be	  modular,	  with	  units	  of	  different	  sizes	  and	  complexities,	  each	  requiring	  slightly	  different	  expertise,	  all	  of	  which	  can	  be	  added	  together	  to	   make	   a	   grand	   whole.”	   The	   parallels	   with	   other	   forms	   of	   voluntary	   action	   arising	   out	   of	  Boyle’s	   reflections	   on	   the	   internet	   are,	   like	   Benkler’s,	   very	   intriguing	   and	   worthy	   of	   further	  consideration	   by	   voluntary	   action	   theorists.	   In	   its	   own	   way,	   Boyle’s	   argument	   against	   the	  central	   importance	   of	  motivation	   in	   peer	   production	   undermines	   the	   importance	   of	   not	   only	  rational	  self-­‐interest	  but	  also	  Tocqueville’s	  “self-­‐interest	  properly	  understood”	  just	  as	  suggested	  earlier.	  It	  matters	  little	  in	  peer	  production	  (like	  voluntary	  action	  generally)	  why	  people	  do	  what	  they	  do;	  what	  matters	  most	  is	  the	  reasons	  they	  offer	  to	  one	  another	  for	  their	  actions.	  
Dignity	  and	  Honor	  Knowledge	   is	   not	  merely	   scientific	   and	   technical.	   Moral	   knowledge	   is	   also	   one	   of	   the	  important	  categories	  for	  voluntary	  action,	  as	  well	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  explore	  further	  the	  claim	  introduced	  earlier	  that	  the	  capacity	  to	  produce	  elements	  of	  moral	  order	  in	  the	  form	  of	  moeurs,	  perhaps	   as	   a	   form	   of	   peer	   or	   social	   production,	   is	   one	   of	   the	   most	   interesting	   emergent	  properties	  of	  new	  commons	  in	  voluntary	  action.	  One	  of	  the	  important	  ways	  in	  which	  commons	  are	  capable	  of	  producing	  their	  own	  moeurs	  can	  be	  demonstrated	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  complex	  relations	  between	  dignity	  and	  honor	  in	  new	  commons.	  We	  can	  illustrate	  the	  moral	  dynamism	  of	  commons	   in	   voluntary	   action	   by	   focusing	   on	   Peter	   Berger’s	   (1990)	   analysis	   of	   the	  way(s)	   in	  which	   dignity	   has	   displaced	   honor	   in	   the	   modern	   world	   and	   at	   least	   one	   recent	   analysis	   of	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Berger’s	  view	  by	  Augsburger	  (1992).	  	  Berger	  (1990,	  339-­‐347)	  argued	  that	  in	  the	  modern	  world,	  dignity	  has	  replaced	  honor	  in	  understanding	  the	  social	  construction	  of	  self-­‐definition,	  or	  identity.	  Honor	  in	  traditional	  society	  was	   a	  moral	   absolute.	   In	   contemporary	   (often	   rural)	   social	   systems	  where	   this	   displacement	  has	  not	  occurred,	  communities	  include	  an	  all-­‐inclusive	  honor-­‐based	  system	  grounded	  in	  gender	  and	  status	  [and,	  one	  might	  add,	  age]	  in	  the	  community	  (Augsburger,	  1992:107).	  Honor	  is	  due	  to	  persons	  absolutely	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  these	  statuses	  and	  quite	  independent	  of	  any	  other	  personal	  characteristics	  of	  the	  honoree.	  Dishonor,	  in	  such	  regimes,	  involves	  not	  only	  loss	  of	  face,	  but	  also	  spoilage	   of	   identity	   and	  possibly	   even	   loss	   of	   one’s	   secure	   place	   in	   the	   social	   structure.	   “The	  concept	   of	   honor	   implies	   that	   identity	   is	   essentially,	   or	   at	   least	   importantly,	   linked	   to	  institutional	  roles”	  (Berger,	  1990:	  343,	  as	  quoted	  in	  Augsburger,	  1992:	  108).	  For	  our	  immediate	  purposes,	  commons	  in	  such	  traditional,	  honor-­‐based	  systems	  are	  outside	  the	  focus	  of	  concern	  here,	   except	   to	   note	   that	   the	   central	   place	   of	   honor	   is	   easily	   overlooked	   by	   advocates	   of	  community	   who	   otherwise	   look	   fondly	   on	   the	   traditional	   conditions	   of	   gemeinschaft	  disconnected	  from	  this	  dimension.	  They	  may	  fail	  to	  note,	  among	  other	  things,	  that	  honor	  unlike	  dignity	  is	  a	  local	  and	  not	  at	  all	  a	  universal	  condition.	  In	  modern	   communities,	   dignity	   is	   universal	   or	   nearly	   universal	   reaching	   beyond	   the	  particular	  community,	  but	  also	  more	  subjective	  and	  personal,	  attaching	  to	  the	  personality	  and	  not	  to	  all	  instances	  of	  a	  particular	  status.	  Dignity	  is	  a	  condition	  of	  the	  intrinsic	  humanity	  of	  the	  person.	  Individual	  persons	  and	  not	  the	  community	  are	  the	  bearers	  of	  their	  own	  dignity,	  partly	  or	   wholly	   apart	   from	   their	   gender,	   age	   or	   other	   status	   indicators.	   “The	   modern	   concept	   of	  dignity	  .	  .	  .	  	  implies	  that	  identity	  is	  essentially	  independent	  of	  institutional	  roles”	  (Berger,	  1990:	  343	  as	  quoted	  in	  Augsburger,	  1992:	  108)	  In	  medieval	  Europe,	  for	  example,	  “honor	  was	  lodged	  in	   the	   world	   of	   intact,	   stable	   institutions	   and	   their	   disintegration	   makes	   it	   an	   increasingly	  meaningless	  notion.	  .	  .	  .	  Identity	  is	  no	  longer	  an	  objectively	  certified,	  subjectively	  received,	  fact;	  a	   given.	   Instead	   it	   is	   a	   goal	   of	   a	   devious	   and	  difficult	   quest.”	   (Augsburger,1992,	   summarizing	  Berger,	  1990,	  108)	  	  So	   what	   does	   this	   have	   to	   do	   with	   voluntary	   action	   and	   the	   ability	   of	   knowledge	  commons	   to	   generate	  moeurs	   along	  with	   other	   forms	   of	   common	   goods?	  The	   answer	   to	   that	  question	   involves	   the	   role	   of	   institution-­‐specific	   survivals	   or	   revivals	   of	   honor.	   According	   to	  Berger,	   “[t]he	  crucial	  ethical	   test	   is	  whether	  we	  can	  succeed	   in	  embodying	  and	  stabilizing	  the	  discoveries	  of	  human	  dignity	  to	  transform	  and	  direct	  the	  sense	  of	  honor	  that	  returns,	  ipso	  facto,	  with	  any	  return	  to	  institutions	  in	  society.”	  (Augsburger,	  1992	  summarizing	  Berger,	  1990,	  109)	  This	  makes	   for	  a	  peculiar	  dialectical	  relation	  between	  honor	  and	  dignity	   in	   those	   institutions.	  The	   standard	   of	   human	   dignity	   tells	   us	   that	   we	   should,	   for	   example,	   honor	   university	   and	  foundation	   presidents,	   association	   leaders,	   important	   researchers,	   and	   others	   in	  institutionalized	  commons,	  but	  only	  when	  they	  have	  been	  deemed	  personally	  worthy	  of	  honor;	  when	   their	   personal	   dignity	  measures	   up	   to	   that	   expected	   of	   them	   in	   particular	   institutional	  roles.	  The	  trouble	  is	  that	  part	  of	  the	  institutionalization	  process	  today	  includes	  organizational	  and	  public	  relations	  dynamics	  that	  create	  strong	  pressures	  in	  many	  institutions	  to	  return	  to	  the	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earlier,	  medieval,	  standard	  of	  honor	  based	  solely	  on	  office	  or	  status.	  Berger,	  Augsburger,	  and	  others	  see	  this	  replacement	  largely	  in	  theological	  terms.	  From	  the	   vantage	   point	   of	   voluntary	   action,	   however,	   the	   dialectic	   of	   dignity	   and	   honor	   is	   a	  more	  generic	   one	  with	   implications	   for	   the	  moral	   dynamics	   of	  most,	   if	   not	   all,	   forms	   of	   voluntary	  action.	   	  In	  particular,	  what	  Augsberger	  calls	  Berger’s	  “crucial	  ethical	  test”	  points	  to	  a	  centrally	  important	   dynamic	   for	   voluntary	   action.	   In	   the	   initial	   (often,	   social	   movement)	   phases	   of	  philanthropic	  action,	  for	  example,	  characterized	  principally	  by	  collective	  behavior	  and	  what	  we	  might	   call	   social	   invention,	   activists	   engaged	   in	   voluntary	   action	   and	   their	   opponents	  will	   be	  almost	   exclusively	   relying	   on	   and	   concerned	   with	   matters	   of	   personal	   dignity.	   Referring	   to	  agitators	   for	   social	   change	   as	   outsiders	   or	   dirty,	   unkempt,	   unruly,	   out	   of	   control,	   irrational,	  ignorant,	  subversive	  persons	  organized	  in	  gangs	  and	  mobs	  has	  been	  a	  time	  honored	  approach	  to	  criticism	  from	  well	  before	  the	  civil	  rights	  sit-­‐ins	  and	  marches	  of	  the	  1950s	  and	  1960s	  through	  the	  Tea	  Party,	  Arab	  Spring,	  London,	  and	  Occupy	  Wall	  Street	  uprisings	  of	  2010	  and	  2011.	  All	  of	  these	   adjectives	   are	   intended	   to	   impugn	   the	   dignity	   and	   thereby	   the	   honor	   of	   those	   so	  characterized.	  Seldom	  will	  any	  identity-­‐based	  defense	  be	  sufficient,	  or	  even	  attempted	  in	  such	  cases;	   except	   that	   part	   of	   the	   journalistic	   formula	   in	   covering	   such	   stories	   is	   to	   note	   the	  diversity	   of	   statuses	   represented:	   doctors,	   lawyers,	   businessmen,	   housewives,	   college	  professors	  and	  students,	  etc.	  	  	  The	   character	   of	   this	   dynamic	   process	   in	   voluntary	   action	   suggests	   that	   dignity	   and	  honor	  should	  not	  be	  viewed	  as	  categorical	  opposites	  under	  modern	  conditions.	  Instead,	  from	  an	  institutional	  standpoint,	  manifestations	  of	  dignity/honor	  can	  instead	  be	  distinguished	  by	  their	  relative	   degrees	   of	   difference.	   Even	   within	   an	   institution	   as	   ancient	   and	   venerable	   as	   the	  Catholic	   Church,	   this	   distinction	   appears	   to	   hold.	   Thus,	   for	   the	   ancient	   and	   venerable	   Irish	  Catholic	  church,	  the	  same	  kinds	  of	  sex	  scandals	  involving	  priests	  and	  other	  religious	  that	  in	  the	  relatively	  upstart	  and	  pluralistic	  U.S.	  Catholic	  community	  were	  treated	  as	  breeches	  of	  dignity,	  as	  the	  personal	  failings	  and	  crimes	  of	  individual	  priests,	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  bishops	  who	  failed	  to	  act	   have	   been	   seen	   much	   more	   as	   matters	   of	   honor	   and	   institutional	   failure,	   calling	   into	  question	  the	  entire	  establishment	  of	  the	  Irish	  Catholic	  church.	  (Dalby	  &	  Donadio,	  2011)	  	  The	   dignity/honor	   complex	   also	   has	   an	   important	   manifestation	   in	   nonprofit	  management	  in	  the	  variable	  responses	  to	  the	  set	  of	  acts	  of	  seriously	  inappropriate	  conduct	  that	  are	  (or	  should	  be)	  the	  basis	  for	  resignation	  by	  supervisory	  personnel	  whose	  subordinates	  have	  acted	  inappropriately.	  As	  a	  moral	  rule	   involving	  dignity,	  we	  might	  expect	  all	  persons	  guilty	  of	  serious	  misconduct	   to	  accept	   responsibility	   for	   the	  consequences	  of	   their	  actions,	  whether	  or	  not	   they	  actually	  do.	  But	   this	   is	  a	  matter	  of	   individual	   identity	  and	  responsibility.	  What	  about	  the	  necessity	  of	  accepting	  responsibility	  for	  the	  actions	  of	  others	  under	  your	  supervision,	  as	  a	  matter	   of	   protecting	   the	   honor	   of	   the	   institution?	   Is	   a	  manager	   expected	   to	   at	   least	   offer	   to	  resign	  only	  for	  her	  own	  misconduct?	  For	  personal	  misconduct	  and	  the	  actions	  of	  subordinates	  that	   were	   explicitly	   countenanced	   and	   condoned?	   Is	   this	   the	   case	   for	   acts	   by	   peers,	   or	   by	  subordinates	  that	  the	  supervisor	  was	  aware	  of	  but	  never	  explicitly	  approved?	  Or,	  for	  all	  acts	  of	  serious	   misconduct,	   whether	   or	   not	   the	   moral	   agent	   knew	   of	   them?	   Merely	   lumping	   such	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questions	   into	   the	   large	   eclectic	   pot	   of	   accountability	   is	   unlikely	   to	   resolve	   them.	   However,	  recognizing	   the	   honor-­‐dignity	   complex	   identified	   by	   Berger	   and	   its	   place	   in	   third	   sector	  institutions	  offers	  a	  good	  start.	  One	   other	   rather	   curious	   and	   utterly	   self-­‐serving	   contemporary	   working	   of	   this	  dignity/honor	  complex	  involves	  the	  rather	  archaic,	  even	  medieval,	  view	  that	  top	  management	  of	  well-­‐established	  institutions	  (corporate	  CEOs,	  university	  presidents,	  foundation	  heads,	  state	  governors	  and	  U.S.	  Presidents)	  can	  best	  preserve	  the	  honor	  inherent	  in	  the	  institutions	  (not	  to	  mention	   their	   personal	   dignity!)	   by	   demanding	   the	   resignations	   of	   subordinates	   not	   only	   for	  their	  own	  misconduct,	  but	  also	  for	  the	  failings	  of	  the	  top	  leaders	  who	  ask	  them	  to	  “fall	  on	  their	  swords	  for	  the	  boss”.	  
Conclusion:	  Enclosure	  of	  Knowledge	  Commons	  In	   the	   contemporary	  world,	   scientific	   and	   technical	  knowledge	  has	  moved	   to	  a	   central	  place	  of	   importance	   in	  all	   sectors,	  and	  knowledge	  commons	  have	   taken	  a	  central	  place	   in	   the	  independent	   sphere	   of	   voluntary	   action.	   Recognizing	   the	   role	   of	   knowledge	   commons	   can	  enhance	   understanding	   of	   a	   wide	   diversity	   of	   topics,	   from	   subjects	   like	   calculus	   to	   social	  problems	  and	  news.	  The	  general	  threat	  facing	  all	  knowledge	  commons	  is	  the	  threat	  of	  enclosure	  and	  privatization	  of	  knowledge,	  although	  those	  fears	  can	  be	  attached	  to	  quite	  different	  objects	  and	  lead	  to	  very	  different	  conclusions.	  Conservatives	  and	  libertarians	  have	  well-­‐founded	  fears	  that	  government	  will	  seek	  to	  impound	  knowledge,	  restricting	  the	  free	  flow	  of	  information	  and	  knowledge	   for	   the	   service	   of	   its	   own	   ends.	   Liberals	   have	   equally	   well-­‐founded	   fears	   that	  knowledge	  will	  be	  enclosed,	  privatized	  and	  commodified	  for	  the	  private	  gain	  of	  the	  wealthy	  and	  powerful.	   Such	   enclosures	  may	   be	   of	   several	   different	   types.	   	   One	   of	   the	   principal	   dynamics	  behind	   the	   formation	   and	   maintenance	   of	   knowledge	   commons	   is	   the	   set	   of	   purposes	   or	  mission	  we	  associate	  with	  the	  term	  philanthropy.
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Drama’s	  laws	  the	  drama’s	  patrons	  give.	  
For	  we	  who	  live	  to	  please	  must	  please	  to	  live.	  
~	  Samuel	  Johnson	  
11.	  Philanthropy	  Commons,	   common	   goods	   and	   the	   associations	   and	   assemblies	   capable	   of	   producing	  them,	  and	  especially	  knowledge	  commons,	  are	  all	  part	  of	  the	  ideal-­‐typical	  framework	  for	  multi-­‐disciplinary	   consideration	   of	   a	   broad	   class	   of	   the	   social,	   economic,	   political	   and	   cultural	  organization	   of	   voluntary	   action.	   Commons	  occur	   in	   emergent	   spaces	   termed	   collectively	   the	  third	  sector	  outside	  of	  economic	  markets	  and	  the	  formal	  institutional	  frameworks	  of	  popular	  or	  democratic	  governments	  when	  groups	  of	  individuals	  jointly	  and	  voluntarily	  agree	  upon	  shared	  purposes	   and	   combine	   their	   money,	   knowledge,	   skills	   and	   other	   resources	   into	   common	  resource	  pools.	  This	  chapter	  is	  devoted	  to	  consideration	  of	  two	  of	  the	  most	  important	  missions	  of	   commons,	   philanthropy	   and	   charity.	   It	   might	   be	   argued	   by	   some	   that	   the	   two	   together	  subsume	  the	  entire	  mission	  of	  voluntary	  action.	   Indeed	  the	  U.S.	   tax	  code	  does	  argue	  precisely	  that	  at	  least	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  sole	  basis	  for	  tax	  exemption;	  a	  category	  which	  is	  termed,	  rather	  confusingly,	  “public	  charity.”	  	  And	  to	  add	  to	  the	  confusion	  tax	  exemption	  under	  Section	  501(c)4	  is	  said	  to	  be	  for	  organizational	  missions	  of	  “social	  welfare”,	  once	  a	  category	  devoted	  exclusively	  to	  civil	  or	  voluntary	  association.	  In	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  Citizens	  United	  case	  in	  2010	  the	  category	  has	  been	   opened	   up	   to	   novel	   forms	   of	   Political	   Action	   Committee	   (PAC)	   and	   political	   campaign	  financing	   involving	   astronomical	   sums.	   This	   transformation	   has	   been	   popularly	   “credited”	   to	  Karl	  Rove	  although	  the	  Comedy	  Channel’s	  Stephen	  Colbert	  was	  quite	  vocal,	  seemingly	  tongue-­‐in-­‐cheek,	  in	  his	  advocacy	  of	  the	  same	  approach.	  The	  shared	  resources	  of	  philanthropy	  and	  charity,	  beginning	  with	  shared	  language	  and	  individual	   relationships,	   become	   the	   basis	   for	   the	   production	   of	   common	   goods,	   the	   most	  fundamental	  of	  which	  are	  the	  form	  of	  social	  capital	  the	  Greeks	  termed	  philia,	  or	  civic	  friendship	  and	  solidarity;	  and	  diaconia,	  or	  social	  capital.	  The	  Romans	  had	  a	  related	  term,	  caritas	  or	  love	  of	  others,	  which	  is	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  modern	  term	  charity.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  organized	  voluntary	  action,	  all	   three	   of	   these	   terms	   have	   proven	   equally	   capable	   of	   generating	   mutually	   agreed	   upon	  
moeurs,	  including	  rules,	  practices,	  routines,	  rituals,	  repertories	  of	  action,	  and	  contestation,	  and	  advocacy,	   individual	   and	   group	   identities,	   and	   news,	   any	   or	   all	   of	   which	   both	   precipitate	  outcomes	  and	   serve	  as	   resources	   for	   the	  basis	   for	   action.	  The	  most	  profound	  common	  goods	  produced	   in	   the	  same	  way	  are	  scientific,	   technical,	  humanistic	  and	  other	   forms	  of	  knowledge,	  culture,	  in	  both	  the	  sense	  of	  high	  culture	  and	  low	  or	  popular	  culture,	  and	  ultimately,	  civilization	  itself.	   In	  this	  chapter,	  we	  will	  focus	  upon	  clarifying	  the	  concepts	  of	  philanthropy,	  charity	  and	  a	  set	  of	   related	   concepts,	   associated	  with	  and	   flowing	   from	   the	   connections	  between	   them	  and	  the	   model	   of	   common	   goods	   associations.	   This	   includes	   clarifying	   a	   small	   number	   of	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assumptions	   upon	   which	   the	   model	   of	   common	   goods	   association	   appears	   to	   rest,	   and	   a	  number	  of	  theoretical	  propositions	  derived	  from	  the	  model.	  The	  concept	  of	  the	  benefactory	  will	  be	  basic	   to	   this	  discussion,	  which	   is	   important,	   in	  part,	  because	   it	  allows	  us	  to	  get	  an	  entirely	  different,	  more	  detailed,	  perspective	  on	  the	  relations	  between	  individuals,	  social	  roles	  and	  the	  production	   of	   commons	   goods.	   Too	   often	   today,	   in	   both	   popular	   and	   scholarly	   accounts,	  voluntary	  action	  is	  portrayed	  in	  purely	  psychological	  terms	  as	  an	  extension	  of	  simple	  individual	  self-­‐interest;	   just	  another	  avenue	   for	   individuals	   to	  get	  as	  much	  as	   they	  can	  of	  what	  ever	   it	   is	  they	  happen	  to	  want.	  We	  should	  be	  clear	  that	  in	  cases	  of	  genuine	  philanthropy	  and	  charity,	  and	  other	   forms	   of	   voluntary	   action,	   there	   is	   typically	   something	   much	   more	   complex	   and	  interesting	  taking	  place.	  The	   discussion	   here	   is	   informed	   by	   a	   sense	   very	   like	   Isaiah	   Berlin’s	   value-­‐pluralism,	  which	  in	  itself	  might	  be	  read	  as	  a	  rather	  compact	  definition	  of	  the	  wider	  third	  sector	  from	  the	  vantage	  point	  of	   its	  metavalues:	   “the	  conception	   that	   there	  are	  many	  different	  ends	   that	  men	  (sic)	  may	   seek	   and	   still	   be	   fully	   rational,	   fully	  men,	   capable	   of	   understanding	   each	   other	   and	  sympathizing	  and	  deriving	   light	   from	  each	  other”	   (Berlin	  as	  quoted	  by	  Banville,	  2013).	   In	   the	  ideal	   type	   of	   the	  market,	   participants	   are	   unified	   by	   their	   shared	   pursuit	   of	  maximizing	   self	  interest,	   and	   in	   the	   ideal	   type	   of	   the	   state	   participants	   are	   said	   to	   be	   unified	   by	   shared	  commitment	  to	  the	  public	  interest,	  which	  is	  public	  good.	  In	  both	  cases,	  the	  sectors	  are	  defined	  by	  singular	  objectives:	  profit	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  market,	  and	  a	  singular	  public	  good	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  state.	  By	  contrast,	  plurality	  –	  a	  plurality	  of	  missions,	  means,	  and	  media	  is	  the	  basic	  condition	  of	  the	  third	  sector;	  a	  condition	  that	  allows	  new	  commons	  to	  thrive.	  Many	  different	  groups	  can	  establish	  many	  different	  objectives.	  The	  third	  sector	  is	  among	  the	  key	  domains	  for	  the	  pursuit	  of	  many	   different	   ends,	   and	   that	   voluntary	   action	   in	   new	   commons	   are	   vehicles	   for	   building	  human	  understanding,	  sympathy	  and	  mutual	  enlightenment.	  
Charity	  As	  A	  Form	  of	  Philanthropy	  One	  of	   the	  most	   fundamental,	   and	  most	   confusing,	   issues	   to	  be	   considered	  here	   is	   the	  relation	  between	  charity	  as	  that	  idea	  is	  conventionally	  understood,	  “public	  charity”	  as	  a	  figure	  of	   tax	  policy,	   and	  philanthropy.	  This	   is	  actually	  a	   contemporary	  variant	  on	  a	   set	  of	  old	   issues	  reflected	  by	  the	  philosophical	  conflict	  between	  joiners	  and	  splitters:	  Is	  charity,	  as	  some	  splitters	  claim,	   a	   type	   of	   philanthropy,	   or	   is	   charity,	   as	   joiners	   claim,	   the	   more	   basic	   category	   and	  philanthropy	  an	  activity	  “built	  up”	   from	  individual	  acts	  of	  charity?	  The	  claim	  that	   the	  two	  are	  completely	   separate	   and	   unrelated	   is	   rejected	   here	   as	   implausible	   and	   tendentious.	   The	   best	  answer	   may	   well	   be	   that	   such	   questions	   are	   ultimately	   unsolvable	   except	   philologically.	  Philanthropy	  is	  originally	  Greek,	  with	  strong	  roots	  in	  the	  democratic	  Athenian	  polis,	  and	  charity	  is	  Roman	  with	  no	  particular	  ties	  to	  the	  Republic	  but	  strong	  historical	  ties	  to	  the	  Roman	  Empire	  and	  its	  European	  aftermath,	  the	  Roman	  Catholic	  Church	  in	  northern	  and	  Western	  Europe.	  	  In	  very	  complex	  ways,	  one	  can	  also	  connect	  the	  even	  older	  Jewish	  tradition	  of	  zedekah	  and	   the	  more	   recent	  Muslim	   zakat	   historically	   interwoven	  with	   charity	   and	   philanthropy	   as	  
  228 
well.	   Even	   less	   frequently	   considered	   are	   Buddhist	   traditions	   of	   dana,	   earlier	   Indian	   beliefs	  from	  which	  dana	  arose,	  the	  entire	  Confucian	  ethical	  tradition	  and	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  additional	  culturally	  based	  moeurs	  that	  resemble	  Western	  charity	  and	  philanthropy.	  These	  must	  be	  seen	  as	  major	  oversights	  in	  our	  increasingly	  pluralistic	  world.	  For	  reasons	  that	  will	  be	  clear	  below,	  one	  approach	  to	  all	  of	   these	  complex	  religious	  and	  cultural	   tradition	   is	   to	  view	  contemporary	  charity,	  zedakah	  and	  zakat,	  dana	  and	  other	  beliefs	  regarding	  giving,	  helping	  others,	  benevolence	  and	  good	  works	  as	  variations	  of	  a	  single,	  all-­‐encompassing	  category	  of	  philanthropy	  as	  defined	  
below.	  	  
Self	  Interest,	  Love	  and	  Philanthropy	  Perhaps	   to	   avoid	   the	   complex	   issues	   of	   meaning,	   and	   most	   of	   all,	   connotation	   noted	  above,	  many	  knowledgeable	  people	  treat	  philanthropy	  in	  strictly	  financial	  terms	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  fundraising	   and	   foundations.	   This	   has	   the	   effect	   of	   reducing	   philanthropy	   to	   a	   purely	  instrumental	  notion.	  While	  this	  may	  be	  acceptable	  for	  narrow	  issues	  of	  nonprofit	  management,	  it	  is	  unsatisfactory	  here	  for	  consideration	  of	  philanthropy	  in	  the	  context	  of	  democracy	  in	  society	  and	  culture.	  In	  short,	  this	  view	  fails	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  mission	  and	  purposive	  aspects	  –	  the	  ends	   –	   of	   philanthropy.	   One	   of	   the	   many	   useful	   contributions	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   knowledge	  commons,	  detailed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  is	  that	  it	  serves	  as	  a	  reminder	  that	  philanthropy	  is	  not	   exclusively	   a	   matter	   of	   money,	   but	   of	   all	   types	   of	   efforts	   to	   engage	   one’s	   humanity	   and	  contribute	  to	  the	  production	  of	  common	  goods.	  Andrew	  Carnegie,	  Margaret	  Olivia	  Sage,	  John	  D.	  Rockefeller	   Jr.,	   and	   Bill	   Gates	   most	   assuredly	   are	   philanthropists,	   but	   so	   too	   are	   Benjamin	  Franklin,	   James	  Madison,	   Jane	   Addams,	   Albert	   Einstein,	   Jonas	   Salk,	  Mother	   Teresa	   and	   Steve	  Jobs.	   In	   this	   and	   following	   chapters	   an	   attempt	   is	   made	   to	   clarify	   view	   of	   philanthropy	   as	  voluntary	   action	   either	   within	   or	   in	   creating	   or	   constituting	   new	   commons,	   with	   particular	  attention	  to	  the	  relation	  of	  individual	  philanthropists	  and	  common	  goods	  of	  various	  types.	  Self-­‐interest	   properly	   understood,	   love	   and	   philanthropy	   are	   terms	   that	   are	   very	  important	  in	  the	  context	  of	  collective	  efforts	  in	  new	  commons,	  but	  which	  seldom	  occur	  together	  in	   the	   existing	   published	   literature.	   Researchers	   and	   theorists	   have	   been	   striving	   for	   several	  decades	   to	   come	   to	   a	   better	   understanding	   of	   philanthropy,	   including	   more	   sophisticated	  understandings	   of	   the	   role	   of	   self-­‐interest.	   Robert	   Payton,	   founding	   director	   of	   the	   Indiana	  Center	   on	   Philanthropy	   and	   George	   McCully,	   pracademic	   and	   moving	   force	   at	   the	  Massachusetts-­‐based	   Philanthropic	   Directory	   have	   been	   at	   the	   forefront	   of	   identifying	   and	  calling	   attention	   to	  new,	   innovative,	   robust	   and	   convincing	   accounts	   of	   philanthropy	   suitable	  for	   the	   21st	   century.	  What	   is	   presented	   here	   is	   based	   on	   a	  mix	   of	   quotations	   from	  McCully’s	  published	   writings,	   email	   correspondence	   and	   conversations	   with	   him.	   McCully	   (2008)	   sees	  contemporary	   understanding	   and	   practice	   of	   philanthropy	   undergoing	   a	   paradigm	   shift.	  Philanthropy,	  in	  Payton’s	  (1988)	  well-­‐known	  definition	  and	  title,	  is	  said	  to	  be	  “voluntary	  action	  for	  the	  public	  good”	  (Payton,	  1988).	  Close	  reading	  of	  that	  work	  supports	  the	  view	  that	  Payton	  did	  not	  use	  the	  term	  public	  good	  in	  the	  narrow	  economic	  sense	  (as	  in	  Anheier,	  2005),	  but	  more	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in	  the	  sense	  of	  the	  general	  common	  good	  noted	  above.	  Philanthropy	  according	  to	  McCully	  refers	  to	  action	   for	   the	  common	  good	  undertaken	   for	   the	   love	  of	  humanity	  and	  what	   it	  means	   to	  be	  human.	  Trained	  as	  a	  historian	  and	  humanities	  scholar,	  McCully	  does	  not	  rely	  on	  the	  customary	  vague	  references	  tracing	  the	  concept	  to	  ancient	  Greece	  scattered	  throughout	  the	  social	  science	  literature.	   Instead,	   he	   traces	   the	   original	   term	   to	   line	   46	   in	   Aeschylus’s	   Prometheus	   Bound,	  written	   around	   460	   BCE,	   at	   which	   the	   protagonist	   Prometheus	   is	   accused	   by	   Zeus	   of	   an	  excessive	   love	  of	  humanity	  –	  philanthropia	  –	  and	  made	  to	  suffer	  greatly	   for	  his	   transgression.	  
Prometheus	  Bound	  is	  one	  of	  the	  best	  known	  of	  the	  ancient	  Greek	  tragedies,	  which	  gave	  meaning	  to	  the	  term	  used	  by	  Hardin	  in	  introducing	  commons	  theory.	  For	  those	  who,	  like	  the	  author,	  may	  actually	  be	  interested	  in	  such	  matters,	  Garrett	  Hardin’s	  “tragedy”	  of	  the	  commons	  does	  not	  refer	  to	   any	   actual	   tragedy	   in	   anything	   like	   this	   original	   Greek	   sense,	   but	   merely	   to	   a	   set	   of	  undesirable	  outcomes.	   	   In	  spite	  of	   the	   tragic	   implications	  of	   that	  origin,	  according	   to	  McCully,	  for	  the	  next	  2,500	  years	  the	  term	  philanthropy	  as	  the	  love	  of	  humanity	  has	  held	  up	  consistently	  as	  an	  ideal.	  	  One	  test	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  human	  that	  includes	  this	  sense	  of	  the	  tragic	  in	  an	  overall	  sense	  of	  philanthropy	  is	  given	  voice	  by	  Shakespeare’s	  Hamlet:	  What	  a	  piece	  of	  work	  is	  a	  (hu)man,	  how	  noble	  in	  reason,	  how	  infinite	  in	  faculties,	  in	  form	  and	  moving	  how	  express	   and	  admirable,	   in	   action	  how	   like	  an	  angel!	   In	   apprehension	  how	  like	  a	  god!	  The	  beauty	  of	  the	  world,	  the	  paragon	  of	  animals,	  and	  yet	  to	  me,	  what	  is	  this	  quintessence	  of	  dust?	  One	  advantage	  of	  including	  (and	  differentiating)	  the	  Payton	  and	  McCully	  approaches	  to	  philanthropy	  and	  Berlin’s	  sense	  of	  value	  pluralism	  is	  that	  this	  allows	  us	  to	  treat	  the	  knowledge	  and	  value	  gifts	  of	  scientific,	  religious,	  artistic	  and	  other	  figures	  within	  a	  broad	  common	  frame	  of	  philanthropy;	  to	  see	  Moses,	  Jesus,	  Mohammed,	  Francis	  d’Assisi,	  René	  Descartes,	  Galileo,	  Michael	  Angelo,	  Niccolo	  Machiavelli,	  Albert	  Einstein,	  et.	  al.	  along	  with	  the	  money	  men	  and	  providers	  of	  other	  resources	  as	  part	  of	  our	  philanthropic	  heritage.	  	  An	  interesting	  array	  of	  distinctions	  arise	  when	  we	  combine	  the	  concept	  of	  various	  types	  of	  common	  good	  discussed	   in	  Chapter	  Four	  with	  Payton’s	  concept	  of	  voluntary	  action	   for	   the	  public	   good	   and	   love	   of	   what	   it	   means	   to	   be	   human.	   We	   can	   begin	   to	   see	   that	   there	   are	  numerous	  distinct	  approaches	  to	  philanthropy	  that	  vary	   in	   important	  ways.	   Implicit	   in	  nearly	  all	   of	   these	   views	   of	   philanthropy	   is	   the	   “win-­‐win”	   assumption;	   that	   philanthropic	   and	  charitable	   and	   other	   common	   good	   is	   not	   achieved	   at	   the	   cost	   of	   harm	   to	   others.	   This	   is	   in	  marked	   contrast	   to	   assorted	   20th	   century	   revolutionary	   doctrines	   which	   often	   assume	   the	  necessity	  of	  casualties	  and	  victims	  for	  the	  greater	  good	  of	  the	  cause.	  As	  the	  revolutionary	  cliché	  has	  it,	  you	  can’t	  make	  an	  omlette	  if	  you	  don’t	  break	  some	  eggs.	  At	  the	  very	  most,	  philanthropists	  may	   adhere	   to	   a	   kind	   of	   Paretoan	   optimality,	  whereby	   gains	   to	   some	   are	   to	   be	   realized	   only	  without	   harm	   to	   others.	   Philanthropic	   harm,	   when	   it	   does	   occur	   is	   acceptable	   only	   as	   an	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unanticipated	  consequence	  and	  not	  inherent	  in	  the	  goal	  or	  mission;	  a	  learning	  experience	  and	  lesson	  for	  next	  time.	  There	  can	  be	  philanthropy	  that	  is	  good	  for	  members	  of	  an	  association	  or	  organization	   (club	   goods),	   a	   community	   (community	   goods),	   a	   nation	   (national	   community	  goods,	  a	  type	  of	  general	  common	  good),	  a	  region	  (general	  common	  good)	  or	  universal	  common	  good,	   like	   reduction	   of	   the	   threat	   of	   thermonuclear	   war	   that	   is	   genuinely	   good	   for	   all	   of	  humanity,	   perhaps	   explicitly	   including	   future	   generations.	   The	   difficulty	   in	   such	   optimistic	  outlook	  may	  be	   that	   there	  are	   times	   that	   it	  can	  only	  be	  realized	  by	  willful	  neglect	  of	  negative	  consequences.	  Thus,	  one	  of	  the	  constant	  challenges	  posed	  by	  philanthropy	  as	  voluntary	  action	  is	   to	   think	   carefully	   about	   and	   clarify	  who	   the	   segment	   of	   humanity	  may	   be	   that	   is	   actually	  positively	  affected	  by	  specific	  acts	  of	  philanthropy	  and	  whether	  there	  are	  ignored	  or	  overlooked	  consequences	  for	  others.	  	  In	   the	   past	   half	   century	   the	   term	   philanthropy	   lost	   some	   of	   its	   more	   profound	  connotations	  and	  took	  on	  the	  narrower	  connotations	  of	  a	  synonym	  for	  fundraising,	  foundations	  and	  an	  organizational	  function	  of	  nonprofit	  corporations	  –	  a	  field	  of	  operations	  with	  a	  decidedly	  non-­‐tragic	   outlook!	   In	   its	   original	   broad	   sense	   philanthropy	   as	   love	   of	   humanity	   connoted	  caring	  for,	  enhancing,	  or	  developing	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  human	  as	  McCully	  (2008)	  noted.	  Any	  tragic	  aspect	  of	  this	  is	  ordinarily	  interpreted	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  finality	  of	  life	  and	  the	  necessities	  of	  estate	  planning.	  No	  amount	  of	  good	  work	  is	  sufficient	  to	  overcome	  the	  reality	  that	  in	  the	  end	  all	  of	   us	   will	   die,	   and	   therefore	   provision	   for	   intergenerational	   distribution	   of	   wealth	   must	   be	  made.	   McCully	  strives	  to	  set	  forth	  a	  more	  humane	  and	  humanistic	  concept,	  more	  expansive	  and	  inclusive	   than	   the	   narrowly	   historical	   and	   empirical	   concept	   laid	   out	   in	   Robert	   Bremner’s	  
American	   Philanthropy	   ([1960]	   1988).	   Bremner’s	   somewhat	   cautions	   approach	   is	  understandable,	  perhaps;	  that	  book	  was	  the	  first	  of	  its	  kind	  published	  in	  many	  years	  and	  works	  primarily	  by	  example,	  never	  explicitly	  defining	  its	  principal	  term.	  (It	  could	  be	  argued,	  of	  course,	  that	  the	  entire	  book	  stands	  as	  a	  definition	  of	  philanthropy.)	  McCully	  tells	  us	  that	  the	  term	  was	  defined	  in	  ancient	  Greece	  by	  a	  dictionary	  produced	  by	  the	  Platonic	  Academy	  as	  ““A	  state	  of	  well-­‐educated	  habits,	  stemming	  from	  love	  of	  humanity…	  productive	  of	  benefit	  to	  humans”	  (emphasis	  added).	  In	  a	  very	  real	  sense,	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  benefactory,	  introduced	  previously	  and	  discussed	  below,	  are	  not	  to	  be	  found	  in	  modern	  management	  theory,	  but	  long	  ago	  in	  Athens,	  as	  I	  wrote	  in	  1992	  (Lohmann,	  1992,	  94).	  McCully	   notes	   also	   that	   the	   Greek	   term	   philanthropia	   was	   translated	   into	   Latin	   as	  
humanitas,	   as	   “humaneness”	   or	   ”humanity”	   or	   “humanitarian,	   giving	   rise	   to	   a	   number	   of	  important	  connotations,	  including	  the	  humanities	  as	  academic	  disciplines,	  and	  civic	  humanism	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  Eleven.	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  this	  love	  of	  humanity	  is	  also	  the	  connotation	  that	  gave	  rise	  to	  the	  term	  humanities	  in	  the	  contemporary	  collegiate	  curriculum.	  That	  point	  is	  especially	   important	   in	  Chapter	  Fifteen.	   In	  one	  of	  the	   interesting	  applications	  of	   this	  model	  of	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philanthropy,	   McCully	   makes	   the	   argument	   that	   the	   United	   States	   was	   founded	   as	   a	   nation	  based	  on	  philanthropic	  understanding:	  	  Alexander	   Hamilton,	   in	   the	   first	   paragraph	   of	   the	   first	   Federalist	   Paper,	   launched	   the	  Founders’	   argument	   for	   ratification	  of	  our	  Constitution	  by	  noting	   that	   “It	   is	   commonly	  remarked”	  that	  Americans	  were	  at	  a	  new	  place	  in	  history,	  in	  which	  for	  the	  first	  time	  they	  could	   design	   their	   own	   government,	   for	   the	   betterment	   of	   mankind.	   (emphasis	  added)	  	  “This”	  he	  said	  “adds	  the	  inducements	  of	  philanthropy	  to	  those	  of	  patriotism.”	  	  He	  was	  not	  talking	  about	  rich	  people	  helping	  poor	  people,	  or	  “giving	  back”;	  he	  was	  saying	  that	   the	  United	   States	   of	   America	  was	   intended	   to	   be	   a	   philanthropic	   nation,	   a	   gift	   to	  mankind,	  to	  improve	  the	  human	  condition.	  	  To	  be	  “philanthropic”	  in	  this	  Classical	  sense	  was	   therefore,	   and	   still	   is	   today,	   quintessentially	   American—adding,	   as	   it	   were,	   the	  inducements	   of	   patriotism	   to	   those	   of	   philanthropy.	   (George	   McCully,	   blog	   entry	   at	  http://www.tacticalphilanthropy.com/2011/08/reinvigorating-­‐a-­‐humanistic-­‐philanthropy;	  downloaded	  on	  August	  28,	  2011).	  	  This	   succinct,	   powerful	   model	   of	   philanthropy	   helps	   to	   explain	   and	   tie	   together	  fundraising,	   foundations,	   tax	  exempt	  “public	  charities”,	  new	  commons	   in	  science	  and	  religion,	  Alexis	  de	  Tocqueville’s	  distinction	  of	  political	  and	  civic	  associations	  a	  generation	  after	  Hamilton	  wrote,	   to	   the	  Marshall	   Plan,	   hurricane	   aid	   to	   Haiti,	   famine	   aid	   to	   Somalia	   and	   other	   African	  nations,	   political	   instances	   like	   the	   Marshall	   Plan	   following	   World	   War	   II	   and	   countless	  examples,	   including	   the	   worldwide	   diffusion	   of	   the	   moeurs	   at	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   “association	  revolution”	  and	   the	  philanthropy	  of	  BRAC	  (the	  Bangladesh	  Regional	  Action	  Centre).	   It	   should	  also	  be	  noted	  that	  a	  good	  deal	  of	  prudence	  and	  modesty	  are	  required	  here	  if	  the	  model	  is	  not	  to	  be	   merely	   another	   tool	   in	   the	   armamentarium	   of	   “ugly	   Americans”	   boorishly	   boasting	   and	  immodestly	  flaunting	  our	  chauvinism	  and	  superiority	  to	  an	  ungrateful	  world	  of	  foreigners.	  	  Philanthropy	   for	   people	   everywhere	   can	   be	   the	   basis	   for	   expressions	   of	   chauvinism,	  nativism	   and	   false	   humility	   and	   pride,	   and	   some	   Americans	   are	   notably	   good	   at	   it.	   More	  importantly	  than	  taking	  credit	  for	  ideas	  set	  forth	  more	  than	  two	  centuries	  ago,	  is	  recognition	  of	  the	  continuing	  vitality	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  contemporary	  gifts	  to	  the	  world	  wherever	  they	  originate.	  	  McCully’s	  model	  offers	  the	  important	  additional	  reminder	  that	  18th	  century	  Americans	  did	  not	  invent	   philanthropy;	   they	  merely	   embraced	   it	   much	   as	   people	   around	   the	   world	   in	   the	   21st	  century	   have.	   Gradually,	   but	   unmistakably	   beginning	   with	   the	   voluntary	   associations	   that	  Tocqueville	   observed,	   new	   commons	  were	   and	   continue	   to	   be	   an	   important	   part	   of	   this	   new	  cultural	   dynamic	   of	   community,	   national	   and	   international	   philanthropy.	   The	   model	   is,	   like	  knowledge	   of	   calculus	   and	   effective	   treatments	   of	   polio,	   openly	   given	   and	   available	   for	   all	   to	  emulate	  and	  indigenize,	  or	  adapt	  to	  their	  own	  circumstances.	  The	  many	  strands	  of	  the	  example	  of	  BRAC	  sending	  NGO	  missions	  from	  Bangladesh	  to,	  among	  other	  places,	  Western	  Europe	  and	  the	  Americas	  illustrates	  this	  clearly.	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Nature,	  Culture	  and	  Human	  Service	  Philanthropy	  as	  action	  for	  the	  love	  of	  humanity	  poses	  a	  virtual	  avalanche	  of	  interesting	  examples	  and	  implications	  for	  theory	  and	  practice.	  McCully	  and	  his	  associates	  at	  the	  Catalog	  for	  Philanthropy	  have	  developed	  a	  grounded	  taxonomy	  to	  rival	   (and	  replace)	   the	  NTEE,	  based	   in	  three	  key	  categories:	  Nature,	  Culture	  and	  Human	  Services,	   the	   latter	  defined	  as	  what	  humans	  can	  do	  for	  each	  other	  (McCully,	  2008:	  123-­‐125)	  McCully,	  founder	  and	  President	  of	  the	  Catalog	  and	   principal	   author	   of	   its	   taxonomy,	   notes,	   “These	   are	   not	   just	   stable	   [categories],	   they	   are	  [truly]	  Classical	  (cf.	  Aristotle’s	  Physics,	  Metaphysics,	  Ethics).” Although	  the	  Catalog	  is	  a	  group	  or	  organizational	  effort,	   the	  guilding	  vision	  is	  McCully’s.	  For	  further	  discussion	  of	  the	  Taxonomy,	  see	  McCully,	  2008.	  One	  of	  the	  charming	  features	  of	  this	  model	  of	  philanthropy	  is	  it’s	  sweeping	  interdisciplinary	  scope,	  bridging	  the	  very	  gap	  that	  C.P.	  Snow	  (1959)	  once	  remarked	  upon	  and	  bringing	   interested	   humanists	   into	   the	   mix	   alongside	   scientists,	   social	   scientists	   and	  practitioners	   of	   all	   sorts.	   The	   NTEE	   classification	   scheme	   in	   its	   ambling	   “…and	   the	   kitchen	  sink…”	  manner,	  shows	  the	  marks	  of	  the	  committee	  product	  that	  it	  is.	  Not	  to	  see	  the	  advantages	  of	  more	   securely	   grounding	   taxonomic	   efforts	   in	   an	   epistemological	   distinction	   nearly	   2,500	  years	  old	  merely	  because	  it	  is	  based	  in	  humanities	  rather	  than	  19th	  century	  social	  science	  would	  smack	  of	  the	  worst	  of	  disciplinary	  chauvinism.	  	  Unlike	   the	   NTEE,	   which	   is	   grounded	   in	   the	   U.S.	   tax	   code,	   the	   Catalog	   taxonomy	   is	  grounded	   in	   social,	   political	   and	   cultural	   traditions	   reaching	   back	   to	   ancient	   Athens	   and	  embracing	  all	  of	  western	  civilization.	  This	  model	  of	  philanthropy	  suggests	  a	  logical	  hierarchy	  in	  which	  other	   terms	  and	  concepts	   can	  easily	   find	  a	  place.	  Most	   importantly,	   charities	   (whether	  individual	   acts	   of	   charity	   or	   organized	   public	   charity	   in	   the	   Anglo-­‐American	   legal	   sense)	   are	  types	   of	   human	   services	   or	   in	   the	   Aristotelian	   sense,	   ethics.	   Locating	   this	   under	   the	   broader	  category	  of	  human	  services	  or	  ethics	  is	  unproblematic.	  Over	  the	  last	  century,	  for	  example,	  social	  work,	  one	  of	   the	   largest	  and	  most	   important	  professional	  category	   in	  this	  area,	  has	  embraced	  almost	  exactly	  this	  same	  terminology.	  	  Among	  other	  things,	  this	  typology	  works	  well	  both	  with	  commons	  theory,	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  differentiating	  three	  types	  of	  commons,	  whether	  new	  or	  old,	  and	  voluntary	   action	   theory,	   where	   it	   provides	   yet	   another	   basis	   for	   the	   distinction	   of	   charity	  (people-­‐oriented,	  or	  human	  services)	  as	  a	  subset	  of	  philanthropy	  as	  noted	  above.	  	  Before	   I	   was	   familiar	   with	   McCully’s	   typology,	   I	   derived	   a	   grounded	   distinction	  somewhat	  at	   variance	  with	   it	   from	   the	   commons	   literature	   (Lohmann,	  2009):	   I	  distinguished	  natural	   commons	   from	   human	   involved	   natural	   commons	   (e.g.	   fishing	   grounds	   and	   common	  field	  agriculture)	  and	  social	  commons	  based	  on	  examining	  a	  large	  body	  of	  published	  studies.	  It	  is	   a	   relatively	   simple	   exercise	   to	   reconcile	   this	   with	   McCully’s	   more	   fundamental	   terms.	   It	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  whether	  the	  classicism	  of	  McCully’s	  approach	  will	  be	  able	  to	  overcome	  some	  or	  all	  of	  the	  objections	  raised	  by	  Evers,	  LaVille	  and	  other	  European	  scholars,	  as	  noted	  in	  Chapter	  Four.	  It	  is	  already	  clear	  that	  McCully’s	  approach	  has	  major	  adverse	  implications	  for	  the	  regnant	  nonprofit	   model	   outlined	   in	   that	   same	   chapter.	   One	   of	   the	   more	   controversial	   aspects	   of	  McCully’s	   approach	   is	   his	   repeated	   claim	   that	   only	   some	   of	   the	   missions	   of	   nonprofit	  corporations	  qualify	  as	  philanthropic.	  His	  current	  estimate	  is	  that	  only	  about	  10	  percent	  of	  U.S.	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nonprofit	   corporations	   are	   engaged	   in	   philanthropy	   as	   defined	   by	   the	   Catalog.	   The	  model	   of	  bureaucratic	  firms	  discussed	  in	  this	  volume	  offers	  one	  way	  to	  deal	  with	  this	  difference.	  
Philanthropy,	  Commons,	  and	  Democratic	  Society	  and	  Culture	  There	  is	   little	  doubt	  that	  the	  group	  portrait	  of	  the	  third	  sector	  continues	  to	  grow	  more	  complex	  and	  variegated.	  The	  juxtaposition	  of	  models	  enables	  us	  to	  view	  within	  a	  unified	  frame	  an	  ever	  broader	  range	  of	  voluntary	  action	  and	  new	  commons	  including	  all	  the	  types	  mentioned	  in	   Chapter	   3:	   philanthropy	   as	   love	   of	   humanity,	   charity	   as	   a	   subset	   of	   philanthropy,	   public	  charity	  as	  a	  U.S.	  tax	  category	  that	  only	  partially	  overlaps	  with	  philanthropy,	  nonprofit	  firms	  that	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  concerned	  with	  philanthropy	  or	  particular	  other	  common	  goods,	  and	  finally,	  the	  whole	   broad	   class	   of	   ‘nonprofit	   organizations’.	   There	   is	  much	   yet	   to	   be	   sorted	   out	   here.	  McCully’s	   notion	   of	   philanthropy	   might	   or	   might	   not	   embrace	   all	   social	   clubs,	   membership	  associations	   and	   types	   of	   activities	  whose	   sole	   or	   principal	   purpose	   is	   purely	   recreational	   (a	  fundamental	  human	  need?),	  with	  mutual	  aid	  and	  self	  help	  activities	  (diverse	  forms	  of	  particular	  common	  goods)	   and	  point	   toward	  an	  understanding	   in	   terms	  of	   getting	   together	  with	  others	  and	  action	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  others.	  The	  sheer	  confusion	  created	  by	  the	  U.S.	  Supreme	  Court’s	  
Citizens	   United	   decision	   and	   subsequent	   expansion	   of	   the	   501(c)	   4	   category	   into	   obvious	  political	   associations	   is	   just	   one	   example.	   Also	   clearly	   part	   of	   democratic	   society	   and	   culture	  would	   be	   all	   forms	   of	   deliberation	   and	   dialogue,	  where	   the	   purpose	   of	   getting	   together	  with	  others	   would	   embrace	   or	   incorporate	   what	   we	   might	   term,	   following	   Barber,	   doxalogy,	   the	  studied	  arts	  of	  speaking,	  listening,	  influencing	  and	  seeking	  to	  be	  influenced	  by	  the	  opinions	  of	  others	   in	   civic	   friendship.	   Doxology	   (with	   a	   capital	   D	   and	   an	   o)	   has	   a	   particular	  meaning	   in	  Christian	  liturgy	  where	  it	  refers	  to	  a	  short	  hymn	  of	  praise	  to	  God.	  The	  term	  is	  derived	  from	  two	  Greek	  roots:	  doxa,	  meaning	  glory,	  and	  logos,	  meaning	  words	  or	  speaking.	  Hence:	  speaking	  of	  the	  glory	  of	  God.	  However,	  as	  the	  Barber	  quote	  above	  notes,	  Barber	  and	  others	  also	  use	  the	  term	  
doxa	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   expressions	   of	   opinion.	   In	   this	   sense	   (also	   basic	   to	   orthodoxy	   and	  heterodoxy)	  we	   can	   speak	   of	   (lower	   case)	   doxalogy	   (small	   d	   and	   an	   a)	   as	   knowledge	   of	   the	  general	   process	   or	   art	   of	   speaking	   (which	   necessarily	   also	   implies	   listening	   to)	   opinions.	  Although	   the	   a	   is	   purposely	   inserted	   here	   to	   differentiate	   the	   religious	   and	   secular	  connotations,	  people	  of	  many	   faiths	  would	  concur	   fully	  with	  this	  meaning	  with	  the	  additional	  insight	  that	  thoughtful	  conversation	  is	  to	  the	  glory	  of	  God.	  Whether	  or	  not	  some	  or	  all	  of	  such	  activities	   merit	   consideration	   as	   philanthropy	   remains	   to	   be	   seen.	   Yet,	   these	   are	   largely	  mopping	   up	   exercises.	   The	   essential	   core	   of	   this	   new	   expansive	   view	   of	   philanthropy,	   that	  McCully,	  with	   a	   nod	   to	   his	   former	   faculty	   colleague	   Thomas	  Kuhn	   (1970),	   terms	   a	   paradigm	  shift	  is	  clear.	  
Philanthropy	  and	  Self	  Interest,	  Properly	  Understood	  The	  main	   threat	   to	   this	   view	   of	   philanthropy	   is	   the	   rationalism,	   and	   in	   particular	   the	  narrow	  concept	  of	  self-­‐interest,	  currently	  enshrined	  in	  the	  current	  economic	  and	  management	  view	  of	   the	   third	  sector	  of	  nonprofit	   corporations,	  and	  at	   least	   to	  some	  degree	   in	   the	  Ostrom	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commons	  model.	  On	  its	  face,	  the	  whole	  idea	  of	  holding	  the	  entire	  2,500	  year	  universal	  history	  of	  philanthropy	  up	  to	  a	  single	  standard	  of	  18th	  century	  western	  rationality	  is	  absurd.	  	  Worse,	  the	  entire	   intellectual	   edifice	   of	   treating	   organized	  philanthropic	   activity	   and	   voluntary	   action	   as	  the	  production	  of	   self-­‐interested	  nonprofit	  bureaucratic	   firms	   rests	  on	  misreading	  of	   a	   single	  quotation	   in	   a	   book	   published	   more	   than	   200	   years	   ago.	   It	   is	   to	   misunderstandings	   and	  misapplications	   of	   Adam	   Smith’s	   supposedly	   narrow	   doctrine	   of	   self-­‐interest	   like	   those	  currently	   touted	   by	   various	   analysts	   and	   advocates	   of	   nonprofit	   bureaucratic	   firms	   that	   the	  concept	  of	  philanthropy	  as	  love	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  human	  poses	  the	  most	  effective	  counter.	  	  The	  idea	  that	  any	  individual’s	  or	  association’s	  love	  of	  humanity	  must	  be	  contingent	  upon	  not	   just	  Adam	  Smith’s	  but	  any	   theorist’s	  concepts	  of	  self-­‐interest,	  or	  subject	   to	  any	  particular	  relationship	  of	  means	  and	  ends	  (as	  contemporary	  concepts	  like	  efficiency	  and	  effectiveness	  and	  best	  practices	  suggest)	  is	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  most	  fundamental	  ideals	  of	  freedom	  of	  association	  and	  assembly	   in	  a	  pluralistic	  society.	   It	   is	  also	  a	  prime	  example,	  one	  that	   involves	  economists	  and	  management	   theorists	   and	   not	   philosophers,	   of	   Barber’s	   maxim,	   quoted	   above,	   on	   the	  sovereignty	   of	   the	   political.	   In	   this	   case,	   our	   preference	   ought	   to	   be	   the	   sovereignty	   of	  independent	  sector	  practice	  over	  disciplinary	  theory	  of	  one	  or	  two	  fields.	  I	  readily	  concede	  that	  very	  point	  here:	  This	  is	  a	  work	  of	  theory	  but	  based	  in	  long	  years	  of	  observation	  and	  practice.	  If	  any	  of	  my	  observations	  are	  deemed	  to	  be	  wrong	  by	  participants	  in	  a	  new	  commons	  or	  engaged	  in	  philanthropy,	  I	  claim	  no	  further	  epistemological	  basis,	  other	  than	  factual	  errors	  on	  their	  part,	  for	  proving	  their	  conclusions	  in	  error.	  	  This	   gloomy	   assessment	   remains	   true	   whether	   attempts	   to	   impose	   such	   values	   are	  deliberate	   or	   intentional	   or	   not.	   The	   difficulty	   of	   defining	   the	   “self	   interest”	   of	   social	   clubs,	  charity,	   education,	   basic	   sciences	   and	   the	   arts	   and	   other	   common	   goods	   production	   from	  outside	   of	   the	   actual	   commons	   themselves	   raises	   the	   first	   and	   most	   important	   challenge	   of	  proper	  understanding	  in	  such	  cases.	  Arguments	  like	  this	  one	  for	  the	  autonomy	  of	  independent	  voluntary	   action	   are	   very	   powerful,	   with	   one	   important	   qualifier:	   They	   offer	   no	   defense	   for	  those	   commons	   that	   voluntarily	   surrender	   their	   autonomy	   and	   self-­‐determination	   to	  consultants,	   professional	   management	   authorities,	   political	   philosophers,	   social	   scientists	   or	  others	  who	  promulgate	  standards	  of	  efficiency,	  effectiveness,	  “best”	  practices,	  or	  other	  external	  moeurs	   by	   which	   “rational”	   commons	   “should”	   be	   governed,	   or	   agree	   to	   contracts	   imposing	  such	  requirements.	  Adam	  Smith	  is	  usually	  cited	  as	  the	  original	  source	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  self-­‐interest.	  In	   a	   famous,	   and	   often	   quoted	   line	   the	   Scottish	   philosopher	   wrote:	   "It	   is	   not	   from	   the	  benevolence	  of	  the	  butcher,	  the	  brewer,	  or	  the	  baker,	  that	  we	  expect	  our	  dinner,	  but	  from	  their	  regard	  to	  their	  own	  self-­‐interest.	  We	  address	  ourselves,	  not	  to	  their	  humanity	  but	  to	  their	  self-­‐love,	  and	  never	  talk	  to	  them	  of	  our	  own	  necessities	  but	  of	  their	  advantages."	  	  A	   careful	   reading	   of	   this	   statement	   in	   context	   should	  make	   clear	   that,	   unlike	   Hobbes,	  quoted	  below,	   Smith	   is	  not	  presenting	   anything	   approaching	   a	  universal	   standard	   for	  human	  action	  here,	  but	  only	  addressing	  self-­‐interest	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  commercial	  transactions	  (of	  the	  butcher,	  brewer	  and	  baker,	  none	  of	  which	  is	  a	  notably	  philanthropic	  occupation.)	  The	  most	  obvious	  question	  is:	  and	  what	  about	  after	  we’ve	  had	  our	  dinner?	  Or	  served	  a	  meal	  to	  others	  at	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the	  church	  social	  or	   the	  soup	  kitchen?	  To	  conclude	   from	  this	  statement	  alone	  or	  with	  Smith’s	  two	   other	   recorded	   comments	   in	   a	   similar	   vein	   in	  The	  Wealth	   of	  Nations	   (1776	   [1981])	   that	  humans	   are	   simply,	   universally	   and	   exclusively	   self-­‐centered	   and	   self-­‐interested	   in	   some	  fundamental	  sense	  is	  a	  false	  and	  misleading	  reading	  of	  Smith	  and	  one	  that	  is	  subversive	  to	  the	  very	  idea	  and	  history	  of	  philanthropy,	  not	  to	  mention	  all	  of	  the	  related	  particular	  and	  general	  common	  goods,	  including	  religion,	  culture,	  science	  and	  education.	  It	  is	  understandable	  why	  the	  assumption	  of	  self-­‐interest	  construed	  in	  this	  manner	  makes	  complete	  sense	  in	  micro-­‐economic	  theory,	  which	  deals	  with	  exchanges	  between	  self-­‐interested	  persons	  pursuing	   their	  own	  gain.	  The	   objection	   here	   is	   to	   characterizing	   philanthropic	   exchanges	   in	   the	   same	   manner.	   The	  challenge	   this	   poses,	   however,	   for	   philanthropic	   exchange	   should	   not	   be	   underestimated.	  Scholars	   have	   been	   trying	   for	   decades	   to	   solve	   it.	   This	   may	   be	   the	   principal	   reason	   why	  “nonprofit	  theory”	  in	  any	  country	  has	  made	  so	  little	  gain	  in	  the	  past	  four	  decades	  and	  why	  so	  many	  scholars	  have	  sought	  refuge	  in	  the	  friendlier	  climes	  of	  civil	  society	  theory.	  Proper	   credit	   for	   the	   constricted	   view	   of	   humanity	   usually	   attributed	   to	   the	   generally	  cheerful	  and	  optimistic	  Smith,	  who	  got	  things	  right	  about	  the	  marketplace	  and	  never	  intended	  to	  speak	  universally	  about	  all	  human	  behavior,	  as	  we	  shall	  see,	  belongs	  with	  the	  earlier	  and	  far	  gloomier	  times	  of	  Thomas	  Hobbes,	  who	  said	  in	  an	  analysis	  not	  of	  economics	  but	  of	  politics	  “of	  the	  voluntary	  acts	  of	  every	  man,	  the	  object	  is	  some	  Good	  to	  himselfe”	  (Hobbes	  1996	  [1651],	  p.	  192).	   Smith’s	   view	   of	   self-­‐interest	   was	   more	   nuanced	   than	   Hobbes’	   and	   probably	   more	  resembled	  Tocqueville’s.	   Far	   less	   frequently	  quoted	   in	   the	   literature	  of	   voluntary	   action	   than	  the	   lines	   above	   is	   Smith’s	   (Smith,	   Raphael	  &	  Macfie,	   1976	   [1759])	   similarly	  well-­‐known	   first	  paragraph	   of	   “The	   Theory	   of	   Moral	   Sentiments”:	   “How	   selfish	   soever	   man	   (sic)	   may	   be	  supposed,	  there	  are	  evidently	  some	  principles	  in	  his	  nature,	  which	  interest	  him	  in	  the	  fortune	  of	  others,	  and	  render	  their	  happiness	  necessary	  to	  him,	  though	  he	  derives	  nothing	  from	  it	  except	  the	  pleasure	  of	  seeing	  it.”	  A	  gender-­‐neutral	  version	  of	  this	  statement	  might	  be	  something	  like:	  
However	  selfish	  we	  assume	  humans	  to	  be,	   there	  also	  appear	  to	  be	  some	  principles	   in	  our	  nature	  
that	  interest	  us	  in	  the	  fortune	  of	  others	  and	  make	  their	  happiness	  important	  to	  us	  even	  when	  we	  
derive	   nothing	   from	   others’	   happiness	   except	   for	   the	   pleasure	   of	   seeing	   it.	   In	   a	   proper	   three-­‐dimensional	  understanding	  of	  Smith,	  such	  “interest.	  .	  .	  in	  the	  fortune	  of	  others”	  and	  the	  related	  Smithian	  notion	  of	  sympathy,	  and	  “the	  pleasure	  of	  seeing	  it”	  which	  is	  a	  tolerably	  good	  definition	  must	  be	  seen,	  along	  with	  the	  butcher’s	  (and	  our	  own)	  concern	  for	  our	  respective	  dinners,	  as	  key	  components	   of	   what	   Tocqueville	   in	   English	   translations	   later	   called	   self-­‐interest,	   properly	  
understood.	   There	   is	   no	   suggestion	   whatsoever	   in	   Smith	   or	   Tocqueville	   that	   one	   of	   these	  concepts	   of	   self-­‐interest	   must	   trump	   the	   other	   or	   is	   a	   secondary	   consideration	   of	   lesser	  importance,	  although	   the	  suggestion	   in	  Smith	   is	  quite	  clear	   that	   it	  may,	   in	  a	  market	  economy	  philanthropic	   interest	  may	  be	  a	  partial	  or	  minority	  concern.	  Thus	  there	   is	  simply	  no	  basis	   for	  the	   current	   erroneous	   interpretation	   that	   the	   narrow	   self-­‐interest	   of	   the	   butcher	   earning	   his	  dinner	  is	  the	  sine	  qua	  non	  of	  rational	  conduct	  of	  all	  types.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  fundamental	  anchor	  points	  from	  philanthropy	  in	  the	  commons	  theory	  of	  voluntary	  action	  is	  the	  premise	  that	  it	  is	  theoretically	  incoherence	  and	  historically	  inaccuracy	  of	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grounding	  authentic	  doctrines	  of	  organized	  charity	  and	  philanthropy	  which	  are	  far	  older	  than	  the	  Smith’s	  shoemaker’s	  dinner	  quotation,	  or	  even	  Hobbes’	  comment	  in	  such	  carefully	  selected	  and	   misleading	   expressions	   of	   individual	   self-­‐interest	   in	   a	   commercial	   context.	   We	   should,	  instead,	   read	   all	   of	   Smith	   more	   carefully	   and	   sympathetically,	   or	   perhaps	   even	   along	   with	  another	   of	   the	   Scottish	   moralists,	   David	   Hume	   and	   follow	   a	   rich	   tradition	   in	   philanthropy	  rejecting	  ‘the	  selfish	  system’	  altogether:	  	  “I	  am	  sensible	  that,	  generally	  speaking,	   the	  representations	  of	   this	  quality	  [selfishness]	  have	  been	  carried	  much	  too	  far;.	   .	   .	  So	  far	  from	  thinking	  that	  men	  have	  no	  affection	  for	  anything	  beyond	   themselves,	   I	   am	  of	   opinion	   that,	   though	   it	   be	   rare	   to	  meet	  with	  one	  who	  loves	  a	  single	  person	  better	  than	  himself,	  yet	  it	  is	  as	  rare	  to	  meet	  with	  one	  in	  whom	  all	  the	  kind	  affections,	  taken	  together,	  do	  not	  overbalance	  all	  the	  selfish.”	  (Hume,	  Norton	  &	  Norton,	  [1738]	  2000:	  486-­‐7.)	  
 There	   is	   a	   notable	   irony	   in	   holding	   up	   this	   statement	   by	   Hume,	   who	   was	   elsewhere	  notorious	  for	  his	  corrosive	  comments	  against	  the	  Christian	  religion	  as	  a	  paragon	  of	  charitable	  attitudes.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  purely	  selfish	  person	  is,	  in	  Hume’s	  18th	  century	  estimation,	  not	  the	  norm	  but	  something	  of	  a	  freak.	  Perhaps	  this	  is	  less	  true	  today	  in	  the	  world	  of	  philanthropy,	  but	  only	  because	  of	  the	  pervasive	  influence	  of	  “being	  more	  business-­‐like”.	  Hume	  goes	  on	  to	  count	  promise	  keeping,	  justice,	  obedience	  to	  government,	  and	  several	  other	  virtues	  that	  are	  useful	  to	  mankind	   generally	   (Treatise,	   III.	   iii).	   Nowhere	   does	   he	   maintain,	   however,	   that	   these	  predominate,	  or	  even	  that	  most	  human	  beings	  are	  possessed	  of	  any	  high	  degree	  of	  disinterested	  affection	  for	  others.	  He	  does	  insist	  that	  there	  is	  some,	  and	  that	  it	  might	  in	  the	  end	  prevail.	  (This	  point	  was	  made	  in	  R.	  J.	  Kilcullen.	  Adam	  Smith:	  The	  Moral	  Sentiments.	  1996).	  Hume	   further	   expressed	   his	   own	   distinct	   philanthropic	   conception	   thus:	   “Let	   these	  generous	  sentiments	  be	  supposed	  ever	  so	  weak;	  let	  them	  be	  insufficient	  to	  move	  even	  a	  hand	  or	  finger	  of	  our	  body;	  they	  must	  still	  direct	  the	  determinations	  of	  our	  mind,	  and	  where	  every	  thing	  else	  is	  equal,	  produce	  a	  cool	  preference	  of	  what	  is	  useful	  and	  serviceable	  to	  mankind...	  A	  moral	  distinction,	   therefore,	   immediately	   arises;	   a	   general	   sentiment	   of	   blame	   and	   approbation	   [or	  approval].”	   Such	   a	   “cool	   preference	   of	   what	   is	   useful	   and	   serviceable”	   accords	   well	   –	   much	  better	  than	  any	  of	  the	  usual	  connotations	  of	  “self-­‐interest”	  in	  fact	  –	  not	  only	  with	  the	  concept	  of	  philanthropy	   outlined	   above,	   but	   also	   with	   the	   standard	   of	   rationality	   as	   the	   stating	   and	  acceptance	  of	  reasons	  introduced	  in	  Chapter	  2.	  Taken	  together	  with	  Adam	  Smith’s	  view	  above,	  it	   offers	   a	   tolerably	   good	   conception	   of	   what	   came	   later	   as	   Tocqueville’s	   conception	   of	   self	  
interest	   properly	   understood.	  On	   the	  whole,	   these	   expressions	  of	   Smith	   and	  Hume	   (as	  well	   as	  others	   in	   a	   similar	   vein	   by	   Shaftsbury,	   Cotton	  Mather,	   as	  well	   as	   Alexander	  Hamilton,	   James	  Madison	   and	   other	   makers	   of	   the	   American	   Revolution	   and	   many	   since)	   tend	   not	   only	   to	  reinforce	   a	   standard	   quite	   different	   from	   the	   narrow	   self-­‐interest	   view	   of	   Hobbes	   and	   the	  misrepresented	  Smith.	  	  They	  also	  open	  the	  pathway	  to	  a	  view	  of	  the	  new	  commons	  as	  a	  vehicle	  for	  the	  voluntary,	  collective	  pursuit	  of	  shared	  philanthropic	  objectives	  or	  missions	  without	  the	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necessity	  of	   imposing	  any	  pre-­‐conceived	  notions	  of	   self-­‐interest,	  or	   related	   ideas	  about	  being	  “business-­‐like”	   or	   alternative	   profit	  motives	   upon	   all	   concerned.	   Equally	   emphatic	   in	   Smith’s	  rejection	   of	   Hobbes	   was	   the	   British	   philosopher	   Joseph	   Butler,	   who	   noted	   that	   among	   our	  ‘desires’	  may	  be	  a	  genuine	  desire	  for	  the	  happiness	  of	  others.	  Butler	  distinguished	  between	  self-­‐interest	   and	   self-­‐love	  and	   rejected	   the	   idea	   that	   Smith’s	   statement	   regarding	   “the	  pleasure	  of	  seeing	  it”	  meant	  that	  apparent	  other	  interest	  was	  really	  only	  just	  another	  dimension	  of	  looking	  after	  our	  own	  self	  interest.	  This	  is	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  “warm	  glow”	  response	  that	  micro-­‐economists	  sometimes	  seek	  to	  track.	  (See,	  for	  example,	  Andreoni,	  1990.)	  Action	  for	  the	  love	  of	  humanity,	  in	  the	   context	   of	   a	   well-­‐thought	   out	   life	   plan,	   involves	   something	  more	   than	   a	   “warm	   glow”;	   a	  temporary	  emotional	  flush	  of	  positive	  sensation.	  Yet,	  this	  is	  generally	  outside	  the	  consideration	  of	  rational	  individualism	  where	  memory	  and	  history	  are	  of	  no	  account	  and	  moment-­‐to-­‐moment	  sensations	  are	  all	  that	  matter.	  Of	  course,	  all	  these	  clarifications	  and	  statements	  prove	  nothing	  about	  the	  matter	  in	  any	  definitive	  sense.	  They	  merely	  serve	  to	  remind	  us	  that	  at	  least	  since	  the	  18th	  century	  there	  have	  been	  objections	  raised	  to	  the	  narrow	  claim	  that	  self-­‐interest	  is	  a	  sufficient	  general	  explanation	  for	   all	   human	   conduct.	  Moreover,	   they	   underscore	   the	   point	   that,	   regardless	   of	   any	   counter-­‐claims	   regarding	   the	   reality	   of	   self-­‐interest	   as	   a	   primary	   motive	   in	   state	   and	   market,	   in	  situations	   involving	   the	   pursuit	   of	   common	   goods,	   humans	   are	   fully	   capable	   of	   acting	   on	   the	  basis	  of	  their	  legal	  and	  constitutional	  rights	  to	  do	  as	  they	  choose,	  including	  act	  as	  if	  Smith,	  Hume	  and	  Tocqueville	  were	  right.	  In	  this	  important	  sense,	  the	  love	  of	  humanity	  can	  prevail	  –	  provided	  that	  we	  and	  the	  butcher,	  brewer	  and	  baker	  and	  their	  family	  members,	  customers	  and	  all	  others	  serving	  on	  assorted	  philanthropic	  boards	  and	  committees	  have	  had	  our	  dinner.	  Of	  course,	  non-­‐self-­‐interested	  behavior	   in	   commons	   is	   conditional	  on	   the	  condition	   that	   those	   involved	  have	  met	   their	   basic	   needs	   for	   food,	   and	   other	   necessities	   of	   survival,	   consistent	   with	   Arendt’s	  definition	  of	  labor.	  	  
Enlightenment	  and	  Philanthropy	  	   The	   very	   core	   of	   the	   diverse	   concerns	   for	   philanthropy	   in	   our	   age	   and	   its	   role	   in	   the	  project	   for	   the	   next	   stage	   in	   democracy	   come	   together	   around	   what	   has	   been	   termed	   “the	  unfinished	  project	  of	   enlightenment“	   (c.f.	  Honneth,	  1992).	   Like	  Dewey,	  Mead,	  Follett,	  Hannah	  Arendt,	   Jürgen	   Habermas,	   James	   Madison	   and	   Benjamin	   Franklin,	   Seyla	   Benhabib,	   a	  contemporary	  political	  philosopher	  “locates	  the	  resources	  to	  realize	  the	  values	  underwritten	  by	  universal	  rationality	  within	  our	  reach.	  Modernity,	  [she	  says],	  embodies	  the	  as-­‐yet	  unexploited	  potential	   of	   the	   Enlightenment	   for	   achieving	   human	   potential	   through	   a	   sphere	   of	   public	  discourse	  and	  action	  within	  which	  every	  norm	  governing	   collective	   life	   can	  be	   contested	  and	  validated.”	  Philosophers	  being	  philosophers,	   the	  mistake	  that	   is	  easily	  made	  is	  to	  assume	  that	  this	   is	   only	   a	   realm	   for	   talk.	   Benhabib	   makes	   clear,	   however,	   that	   it	   is	   a	   “sphere	   of	   public	  discourse	  and	  action”.	  (emphasis	  added)	  She	   goes	   on	   “Modernity,	   in	   this	   sense,	   is	   an	   unfinished	   human	   project,	   [whether	   it	   is	  labeled	  modern,	   or	   post-­‐modern	   or	   something	   else	   entirely].	   But	   it	   is	   an	   endangered	   human	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project,	   as	   well,	   she	   says.	   Modernity	   has	   been	   imperfectly	   realized	   in	   established	   liberal	  democratic	  practices,	  which	  are	  the	  heir	  to	  nearly	  three	  hundred	  years	  of	  bourgeois	  revolutions	  culminating	  in	  the	  one-­‐sided	  institutionalization	  of	  a	  rationality	  that	  threatens	  to	  entirely	  erode	  moral	  values	  and	  moral	  capacities	  not	  related	  instrumentally	  to	  systematic	  goals	  and	  interests.”	  (xi.	  Series	  Editor’s	  Introduction.	  in	  Benhabib,	  2003).	  	   There	   is	  perhaps	  no	  more	  critical	   example	  of	   the	   institutionalization	  of	   self-­‐interest	   in	  the	  model	  of	  enlightenment	  rationality	  and	  the	  model	  of	  individualist	  rationality	  that	  enforces	  it	  than	  this	  “one	  sided	  institutionalization”	  as	  it	  plays	  out	  in	  the	  conduct	  of	  philanthropy.	  It	   isn’t	  simply	   wrong;	   it	   is	   destructively	   so.	   Yet,	   the	   real	   meaning	   of	   enlightenment	   in	   this	   context	  remains	   somewhat	   elusive.	   To	   be	   sure,	   educational	   programs	   of	   all	   types	   that	   awaken	   and	  enlighten	   students	   to	   the	   potentials	   of	   living	   together	   fit	   easily	   here.	   Some	   of	   the	   most	  interesting	   examples	   of	   the	   last	   fifty	   years	   have	   come	   from	   racial,	   women’s’,	   mental	   illness,	  disability,	  gay	  rights	  and	  other	  civil	  rights	  movements	  that	  have	  served	  philanthropic	  ends	  and	  acted	   to	   enlighten	   their	   participants	   to	   public	   good	   and	   other	   facets	   of	   what	   it	  means	   to	   be	  human.	  This	  statement	  will	  be	  controversial	  with	  some	  readers,	  and	  seem	  excessively	  “touchy-­‐feely”	  with	  others,	  particularly	  those	  who	  are	  affluent,	  emotionally	  secure,	  and	  possessed	  of	  a	  strong	   sense	   of	   identity	   and	   secure	   social	   status.	   Anyone	  who	   has	   observed	   or	  worked	  with	  even	  a	  single	  person	  who	  is	  none	  of	  these	  long	  enough	  to	  see	  them	  overcome	  a	  damaged	  sense	  of	  self-­‐worth	  and	  a	  “spoiled”	  identity	  will	  recognize	  what	  I	  am	  saying.	  
Love	  and	  Common	  Goods	  Production	  	  	  
 In	   this	   section,	   the	   notion	   of	   common	   goods	   introduced	   in	   Chapter	   6	   will	   be	   extended	  considerably	  without	  change	  to	  the	  underlying	  concept.	  There	  is	  no	  better	  place	  to	  begin	  such	  a	  task	   than	  by	  considering	   the	  challenge	  of	   love,	   in	   it’s	  philanthropic	  sense,	  as	  a	  common	  good.	  For	  another	  perspective	  -­‐	  both	  Christian	  and	  progressive	  -­‐	  on	  this,	  see	  the	  web	  site	  of	  the	  New	  Evangelical	   Partnership	   for	   the	   common	   good	   (http://newevangelicalpartnership.org/	  retrieved	  on	  8/1/2011).	  
 The	  role	  of	  common	  goods	   in	  philanthropy	  can	  only	  be	  understood	  in	  the	  context	  of	   the	  strategic	   and	   tactical	   expression	   of	   several	   distinct	   forms	   of	   love,	   all	   of	   them	   related	   to	  philanthropy	   as	   what	   it	   means	   to	   be	   human	   revived	   by	  McCully.	   Love	   in	   this	   context	   is	   not	  fundamentally	  an	  emotional	  response	  but	  a	  dimension	  of	  human	  social	  relations	  that	  explains	  how,	  and	  more	  importantly	  why,	  individual	  persons	  in	  new	  commons,	  would	  rationally	  choose	  to	  pursue	  common,	  rather	  than	  purely	  private	  goods.	  Romantic	  love,	   it	   is	  often	  suggested,	  can	  make	  people	  do	  crazy	  things.	  But,	  that	  reference	  is	  to	  eros,	  or	  sexual	  love.	  Our	  principal	  interest	  is	   in	   two	  other	  kinds	  of	   love	  that	  are	   far	  more	   important	   for	  voluntary	  action,	  and	  both	  quite	  rational	  in	  character:	  philantropia	  or	  the	  embrace	  of	  things	  human,	  and	  caritas,	  the	  Latin	  term	  for	   love	  of	  another	  which	  is	  at	  the	  root	  of	  the	  modern	  term.	  Charity	   involves	  a	  special	  case	  of	  philanthropy,	  as	  noted	  above;	  love	  of	  some	  particular	  aspect	  or	  segment	  of	  humanity.	  Together,	  philanthropy	  and	  charity	  figure	  importantly	   in	  the	  history	  of	  voluntary	  action	  and	  as	  we	  shall	  see	   together	   offer	   good	   beginning	   points	   for	   understanding	   common	   goods	   production	   in	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voluntary	  action.	  	  	   Not	  only	  charity	  and	  philanthropy	  as	  these	  terms	  are	  ordinarily	  construed,	  but	  clubs	  and	  associations,	   are	  all	  premised	  on	  variations	  of	  expanded	   forms	  of	  philanthropia	   in	  which	   it	   is	  fully	   and	   completely	   rational	   not	   merely	   to	   serve	   one’s	   own	   (or	   one’s	   organization’s)	   self-­‐interests,	   but	   to	   expand	   that	   very	   concept	   of	   self-­‐interest	   to	   include	   consideration	   for	   the	  interests	  of	  others.	  	  	   Tocqueville	  and	  his	  translators	  have	  spun	  a	  somewhat	  obscure	  version	  of	  this	  quality	  with	  the	  phrase	  “self-­‐interest	  properly	  understood”,	  although	  it	  is	  certainly	  understandable	  why	  this	  phrase	  was	  used.	  Many	  people	  are	  quite	  uncomfortable	  with	   the	   idea	  of	   speaking	   in	   terms	  of	  rational	   love,	   yet	   that	   is	  what	   the	  great	  Frenchman	   should	  have	   said.	  That	   is	   clearly	  what	  he	  meant,	   as	   Bellah	   and	   his	   colleagues	   suggested	   with	   their	   title,	   “Habits	   of	   the	   Heart“	   (1985),	  which	  as	  noted	  previously	  was	  Tocqueville’s	  phrase	  not	  for	  emotions	  but	  for	  moeurs,	  including	  rules	   and	   practices.	   Thus	   common	   goods	   qua	  moeurs	   are	   not	   merely	   intermediate	   between	  public	   and	   private	   goods	   in	   a	   narrow	   technical	   sense.	   They	   are	   also	   imbued	   with	   or	  characterized	  by	  philanthropic	  or	  charitable	   love,	   that	   is,	  concern	   for	  another	  or	  others.	  They	  are	   thus,	   as	   Tocqueville,	   Bellah,	   et.	   al.,	   have	   said	   habits	   of	   the	   heart,	   however	   much	   their	  production	   must	   also	   be	   concerned	   with	   matters	   of	   the	   mind;	   their	   rational	   pursuit	   and	  explanation	   to	   others.	   It	   is,	   above	   all	   else,	   these	   qualities	   of	   rational	   love	   of	   humanity,	   of	  humanness,	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  human	  -­‐	  philanthropy	  (philanthropia)	  and	  charity	  (caritas)	  –	  that	  form	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  distinction	  noted	  in	  Chapter	  6	  between	  good	  and	  other,	  not-­‐so-­‐good	  commons.	  	  
Philanthropy:	  Enlightenment	  and	  Sublimity	  	  Conventional	   perspectives	   on	   charity	   and	   human	   services	   as	   a	   broad	   general	   type	   of	  philanthropy	  fit	  readily	  within	  notions	  of	  philanthropic	  love	  and	  expand	  upon	  our	  ideas	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  human.	  Likewise,	  notions	  of	  the	  incomplete	  project	  of	  enlightenment	  fit	  readily	  with	   ideas	   of	   education	   and	   science.	   But	   there	   are	   large	   parts	   of	   the	   world	   of	   modern	  philanthropy	  that	  cannot	  be	  readily	  fitted	  to	  these	  considerations;	  in	  particular,	  religion	  and	  the	  arts	   have	   proven	   particularly	   difficult	   to	   connect	   to	   voluntary	   action	   except	   at	   a	   purely	  instrumental	   level	   that	   addresses	   only	   questions	   of	  means	   and	   leaves	   the	   larger	   question	   of	  ends	   and	  ultimate	  purposes	  untouched.	  Arts	  management	   and	   church	  management,	   thus	   can	  provide	   some	   valuable	   and	   useful	   lessons	   in	   how	   to	   pay	   bills,	   design	   space	   and	   use	   limited	  funds	  in	  “more	  business-­‐like”	  ways,	  but	  the	  nonprofit	  model	  and	  other	  third	  sector	  perspectives	  offer	   little	   guidance	   in	   the	   larger	   institutional	   issues	   of	   churches,	   synagogues,	   temples,	  museums,	  nonprofit,	  public	  or	  community	  theaters,	  and	  other	  artistic	  and	  religious	  pursuits	  as	  philanthropy.	   It	   is	   possible,	   however,	   to	   begin	   to	   remedy	   that	   deficit	   without	   venturing	   too	  deeply	  into	  controversial	  or	  overly	  complex	  territories.	  	  We	  can	  begin	  by	  noting	  that	  philanthropy	  should	  no	  longer	  be	  seen	  as	  the	  teacakes	  and	  lace	   gingerbread	   construct	   of	   our	   Victorian	   forebears.	   Payton	   and	  McCully	   together	  with	   the	  actions	   of	   thousands	   (perhaps	   millions,	   worldwide)	   have	   given	   us	   a	   powerful	   new,	   deeply	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grounded	   and	   modern	   framework	   within	   which	   to	   view	   the	   mission	   of	   voluntary	   action	   as	  philanthropy	   and	   to	   speak	   meaningfully	   to	   our	   time	   of	   the	   institutions	   of	   philanthropy	   and	  philanthropic	   institutions.	  Proper	   reading	  of	  Adam	  Smith	  and	  David	  Hume	  and	   the	  American	  pragmatists	   together	   with	   a	   revised	   reading	   of	   the	   Ostroms	   and	   the	   Bloomington	   school	   on	  knowledge	  commons	  point	  the	  way	  for	  us	  out	  of	  the	  territory	  of	  narrow	  rational	  self-­‐interest,	  and	  Tocqueville	  has	  bequeathed	  us	  the	  robust	  standard	  of	  self-­‐interest,	  properly	  understood	  as	  philanthropic	   love.	   All	   of	   the	   previous	   discussion	   on	   new	   commons,	   including	   associations,	  assemblies,	   collective	   behavior,	   social	   movements	   and	   social	   problems	   and	   all	   the	   rest,	   also	  gives	  us	  an	  organized,	  collective	  context	  quite	  distinct	  from	  the	  framework	  of	  the	  self-­‐interested	  nonprofit	   bureaucratic	   corporate	   firm	   within	   which	   to	   organize	   and	   act	   upon	   these	  understandings.	  Among	  their	  other	  qualities,	  the	  pluralistic	  character	  of	  new	  commons	  gives	  the	  capacity	  to	   handle	   many	   different	   types	   of	   judgment	   peacefully.	   Judgments	   of	   what	   is	   good	   are	  fundamental	  moral	  concerns.	  Yet	  distinguishing	  common	  goods	  from	  public	  and	  private	  goods	  can	  only	  take	  us	  partway	  toward	  a	  full	  understanding	  of	  philanthropy.	  Judgments	  of	  truth	  are	  a	  philosophical	   concern,	   while	   science	   is	   more	   concerned	   with	   verification	   and	   replication.	  Religion	  and	  art	  are,	  at	  their	  cores,	  concerned	  with	  quite	  different	  types	  of	  judgments	  to	  which	  many	  authorities	  have	  attached	  the	  terms	  beauty	  and	  the	  sublime.	  	  In	  both	  instances,	  these	  are	  distinctive	  contributions	  –	  gifts	  of	  knowledge	  –	   to	   the	  common	  good	  of	  humanity.	  Part	  of	   the	  very	  fabric	  of	  that	  knowledge	  –	  just	  as	  with	  calculus	  or	  astronomy	  –	  is	  it’s	  universal	  character.	  This	  strain	  toward	  the	  universal	  is	  perhaps	  most	  clearly	  evident	  in	  Kant’s	  felicific	  calculus	  and	  Rawls	  theory	  of	  justice,	  but	  in	  a	  global,	  interconnected	  world	  it	  is	  an	  important	  undercurrent	  of	  all	   third	   sector	   thought.	   The	   paradox	   in	   the	   perspective	   outlined	   here	   is	   that	   what	   is	   most	  universal	   about	   the	   third	   sector	   is	   its	   locality,	  difference	  and	  diversity.	  Free	  agents	  acting	   for	  collective	  ends,	  voluntarily	  with	  common	  resource	  pools	  will	  diverge	  more	  often	  than	  they	  will	  converge	  with	  the	  interests	  of	  others.	  	  Action	  in	  the	  new	  commons	  is	  importantly,	  but	  not	  exclusively,	  an	  ethical	  concern.	  Those	  of	  us	  associated	  with	  social	  services,	  social	  change	  and	  other	  facets	  of	  the	  third	  sector	  need	  to	  remind	  ourselves,	  from	  time	  to	  time,	  that	  rational	  choice	  and	  ethics	  are	  not	  the	  only	  or	  even	  the	  foremost	   concerns	   for	  many	   in	  past	   and	  present	   voluntary	   action.	  Determinations	  of	  mission	  are	   also	  partly	   aesthetic	   judgments	   and	  while	   the	   collective	  behavior	  of	   religious	  and	  artistic	  institutions	   engaged	   in	   voluntary	   action	   can	   largely	   be	   characterized	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   general	  model	  of	  new	  commons,	  questions	  of	  mission	  and	  purpose	  often	  cannot.	  Therefore,	  I	  propose	  in	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  chapter	  to	  examine	  philanthropy	  in	  art	  and	  religion	  using	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  sublime.	  This	  is	  not	  as	  idiosyncratic	  as	  it	  may	  at	  first	  appear.	  Standards	  of	  beauty	  have	  an	  important	  place	  in	  philanthropy,	  and	  philanthropic	  thinkers	  like	  Jane	  Addams	  and	  Allen	  Eaton.	  Eaton	   was	   a	   long-­‐time	   staff	   member	   at	   the	   Russell	   Sage	   Foundation	   from	   the	   1920s	   to	   the	  1950s.	  Under	   the	  directorship	  of	   Shelby	  Harrison,	  he	   long	  advocated	   for,	   and	  briefly	   ran,	   the	  Department	  of	  Art	  and	  Social	  Work,	  more	  committed	  to	  the	  arts	  and	  crafts	  movement	  than	  to	  social	   work	   as	   that	   term	   is	   now	   understood.	   Eaton’s	   organizational	   work	   is	   of	   fundamental	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importance	   in	   the	   development	   of	   Appalachian	   studies	   and	   local	   and	   regional	   crafts.	   In	   his	  writing,	  he	  operated	  primarily	  with	  an	  aesthetic	  of	  beauty.	  Under	  the	  influence	  of	  romanticism,	  practitioners	  in	  countless	  religious	  and	  arts	  organizations	  were,	  for	  a	  long	  time,	  concerned	  with	  the	  place	  of	  beauty,	  but	  to	  my	  knowledge	  no	  one	  has	  sought	  to	  examine	  the	  sublime,	  which	  in	  the	  context	  of	  modern	  art	  is	  an	  even	  more	  relevant	  category.	  	  The	   philosopher	   Iris	   Murdoch	   is	   one	   of	   the	   few	   writers	   to	   tackle	   even	   part	   of	   this	  complex	  matter	  in	  an	  essay	  entitled	  “The	  Sublime	  and	  the	  Good.”	  She	  began	  by	  disagreeing	  in	  part	   with	   Leo	   Tolstoy’s	   observation	   that	   “Instead	   of	   giving	   a	   definition	   of	   true	   art	   and	   then	  deciding	  what	   is	   and	  what	   is	   not	   good	   art	   by	   judging	  whether	   a	  work	   conforms	   or	   does	   not	  conform	  to	  this	  definition,	  a	  certain	  class	  of	  works	  that	  for	  some	  reason	  pleases	  a	  certain	  class	  of	  
people	   is	  accepted	  as	  being	  art	  and	  a	  definition	  is	  then	  devised	  to	  cover	  all	   these	  productions”	  (Tolstoy,	  quoted	  by	  Murdoch,	  1959.	  italics	  added.).	  	  Note	  the	  role	  of	  what	  were	  termed	  focused	  publics	  in	  that	  statement.	  Murdoch	  disagrees	  with	  Tolstoy	  on	  one	  point	  in	  this	  quotation.	  She	  says	  her	  concern	  is	  with	   defining	   art	   in	   general	   and	   not	   judging	   particular	  works.	   Such	   a	   general	   definition,	   she	  says,	  “must	  stand	  to	  be	  judged	  by	  great	  works	  of	  art	  which	  we	  know	  to	  be	  such	  independently”	  (Murdoch	  1959).	  Murdoch’s	  formulation	  is	  offered	  here	  not	  because	  she	  offers	  any	  really	  sound	  advice	  applicable	  to	  philanthropy	  in	  the	  arts,	  but	  because	  her	  attempt	  more	  than	  half	  a	  century	  ago	   is	   the	  most	  current	  effort	   I	  could	   find	   juxtaposing	  these	  moral	  and	  aesthetic	  categories.	  She	  offers	  what	  sounds	  like	  her	  own	  definition	  of	  a	  focused	  public:	  “a	  certain	  class	  of	  works	  that	  for	  some	  reason	  pleases	  a	  certain	  class	  of	  people	   is	  accepted	  as	  being	  art	  and	  a	  definition	  is	  then	  devised	  to	  cover	  all	  these	  productions”..	  	  In	   that	   half	   century,	   an	   increasing	   variety	   of	   such	   publics	   focused	   on	   the	   arts	   have	  rejected	  the	  standard	  of	  beauty	  in	  favor	  of	  other	  standards	  entirely,	  usually	  termed	  the	  sublime.	  Although	   the	   concept	   had	   an	   even	   earlier	   provenance,	   it	   is	   usually	   traced	   to	   an	   essay	   by	  Immanuel	  Kant	   entitled	   “On	   the	  Feelings	  of	  Beauty	   and	   the	   Sublime”	  drawing	   the	  distinction	  between	  the	  two	  (see	  entry	   in	  Kant	  1999).	  Kant’s	  essay	  was	  not	  a	  work	  of	   formal	  philosophy	  but	   simply	   a	   commentary	  on	   aesthetics.	  Nonetheless,	   his	   distinction	  between	  beauty	   and	   the	  sublime	  caught	  on	  and	  is,	  in	  fact,	  responsible	  for	  a	  number	  of	  important	  cleavages	  in	  painting,	  literature,	  drama,	  poetry	  and	  other	  art	   forms	   throughout	   the	  19th	  and	  20th	  centuries	  and	   into	  the	  21st.	  Beauty,	  as	  an	  aesthetic	  standard	  is	  often	  said	  (according	  to	  Murdoch)	  to	  consist	  of	  such	  diverse	  things	  as	  pleasing	  appearance,	  proportion,	  harmony,	  symmetry	  and	  a	  variety	  of	  similar	  considerations.	  Beauty	  is	  also	  said	  to	  be	  in	  the	  eye	  (or	  ear	  or	  other	  sense)	  of	  the	  beholder,	  but	  since	   the	   early	   20th	   century,	   students	   of	   the	   arts	   have	   frequently	   downplayed	   or	   dismissed	  entirely	  the	  importance	  of	  beauty	  as	  an	  aesthetic	  standard,	  often	  in	  favor	  of	  sublimity.	  It	  was	  not	  Kant,	  but	  the	  novelist	  Victor	  Hugo	  who	  in	  1831	  introduced	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  grotesque	  as	  sublime	  into	  literature	  and,	  as	  a	  consequence,	  laid	  at	  least	  part	  of	  the	  groundwork	  for	   contemporary	  approaches	   to	   social	  problems	  with	  his	   characterization	  of	  Quasimodo,	   the	  hunchback	   of	   Notre	   Dame.	   In	   the	   century	   following	   Hugo,	   the	   concept	   of	   the	   grotesque	  was	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gradually	   broadened	   and	   refined	   to	   extend	   sympathetic	   understanding	   to	   a	   wide	   variety	   of	  previously	   untouchable/unremarkable	   objects.	   In	   contemporary	   café	   society	   –	   a	   term	  elaborated	   further	   in	   the	   final	   chapter	   –	   the	   grotesque	   is	   often	   released	   from	   any	   aesthetic	  connection	   to	   the	   sublime	   and	   becomes	   an	   aesthetic	   of	   its	   own.	   As	   such,	   many	   third	   sector	  theorists	  strongly	  resist	  suggestions	  of	  any	  possible	  connection	  between	  modern	  art	  of	  any	  sort	  and	  philanthropy;	   except	   as	   a	  matters	   of	   collections	   and	   exhibitions.	   Yet	   the	   connections	   are	  there.	  	  One	  can	  track	  the	  entire	  pre-­‐history	  of	  social	  problem	  studies	  as	  a	  proliferation	  of	  Hugo’s	  sublimity	   through	   operas	   like	   Le	   Boheme,	   novels	   like	   Les	   Miserables,	   the	   oeuvre	   of	   Charles	  Dickens,	   Emile	   Zola,	   and	   through	   many	   other	   venues.	   The	   realist	   aesthetic	   sensibilities	   of	  modern	  social	  problem	  studies	  in	  social	  science,	  to	  the	  extent	  we	  can	  speak	  of	  such	  an	  idea,	  are	  essentially	  a	  continuation	  of	  sublimity	  in	  19th	  century	  writers,	  augmented	  by	  perspectives	  like	  G.H.	  Mead’s	  “taking	  the	  role	  of	  the	  other”	  (Mead	  1938).	  Popular	  dramatic	  and	  musical	  works	  as	  diverse	  as	  Porgy	  and	  Bess,	  The	  Phantom	  of	  the	  Opera,	  Sweeney	  Todd:	  The	  Demon	  Barber	  of	  Fleet	  
Street,	  Les	  Miserablés,	  Rent	  and	  Urinetown	  specifically	  address	  both	  social	  problems	  and	  from	  a	  vantage	  point	  that	  can	  be	  characterized	  as	  capitalizing	  on	  the	  sublimity	  of	  the	  grotesque.	  With	  this	  list,	  I	  certainly	  do	  not	  intend	  to	  characterize	  either	  homosexuality	  or	  poverty	  as	  grotesque.	  However,	   the	   theme	  of	   the	   sudden	  onset	  of	   large	  numbers	  of	  unanticipated	  deaths	  of	   friends	  and	  loved	  ones	  in	  the	  community	  portrayed	  in	  Rent	  certainly	  qualifies	  as	  a	  sublime	  theme	  and	  probably	  grotesque	  as	  well.	  There	  is	  a	  large	  body	  of	  published	  literature	  tracking	  the	  relations	  between	   social	   problems	   and	   literature.	   I	   intend	   nothing	   further	   here	   than	   pointing	   readers	  unfamiliar	  with	   it	   in	   that	   general	   direction	   and	   suggesting	   that	   organized	   response	   to	   social	  problems,	  even	  before	  it	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  service	  delivery	  is	  also	  part	  of	  the	  third	  sector.	  And,	  this	  is	  only	  one	  of	  numerous	  directions	  that	  artistic	  attention	  to	  the	  sublime	  has	  taken,	  even	  as	  specific	   instances	  of	  aesthetic	   focus	   in	  philanthropy,	  such	  as	   the	  efforts	   in	   the	  1940s	  by	  Allen	  Eaton	  to	  establish	  a	  Department	  of	  Art	  and	  Social	  Work	  at	  the	  Russell	  Sage	  Foundation,	  held	  out	  strongly	  for	  beauty	  (Lohmann,	  1994).	  	  Virtually	  the	  entire	  cumulative	  social	  scientific	  body	  of	  research	  on	  collective	  behavior,	  social	  movement,	  social	  problem,	  and	  deviance	  studies	  are,	  in	  the	  larger	  sense,	  derived	  from	  the	  shift	  of	   focus	  in	   literature	  from	  beauty	  to	  the	  sublime.	  And,	   from	  a	  fascination	  with	  noble	  and	  enlightening	  characters	  to	  not	  merely	  the	  downtrodden	  but	  lost	  innocence	  and	  even	  depravity.	  With	  aesthetics	   in	  a	   largely	  off-­‐screen	  role,	   focus	  on	  the	  grotesque	  has	  been	  a	  key	  part	  of	   the	  revolution	  in	  modern	  philanthropy	  in	  the	  past	  two	  centuries,	  if	  only	  by	  cutting	  social	  problems	  loose	   from	   the	  dominant	   tendencies	   in	   culture.	   Everything	   from	  19th	   century	  French,	  English	  and	  American	  developments	  of	  “moral	  treatment”	  of	  the	  mentally	  ill,	  to	  Jane	  Addams’	  move	  to	  Halstead	  Street	  in	  Chicago	  –	  where	  the	  first	  program	  at	  Hull	  House	  was	  an	  art	  museum	  (Glowiki	  &	  Hendry,	  2004;	  Grob	  2009;	  Rosenberg	  2004).	  Yet	  the	  separation	  has	  not	  been	  complete.	  Not	  least,	  the	  entire	  field	  of	  thanatology	  (death	  and	  dying)	  and	  hospice	  programs	  fit	  readily	  within	  a	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framework	   of	   sublimity	   and	   provide	   an	   important	   link	   between	   aesthetic	   and	   theological	  approaches	  to	  the	  sublime	  (Szabo	  2010).	  In	  order	  to	  make	  all	  of	  these	  connections	  and	  see	  their	  relation	  to	  the	  new	  commons,	  it	  may	  help	  to	  look	  more	  closely	  at	  what	  Kant	  and	  others	  meant	  by	  the	  sublime.	  What	  is	  it	  that	  the	  sublime	  as	  a	  philosophical	  category	  refers	  to,	  how	  does	  this	  relate	  to	  our	  conception	  of	  philanthropy	  as	  voluntary	  action	  for	  common	  good,	  defined	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  human?	  In	  its	  most	  general	  sense,	  the	  concept of the sublime refers to greatness, 
or largeness, such as the theological idea of greatness beyond measure or bounds. As Kant 
noted, something that is sublime is so large that it overwhelms our capacity to imagine it. The 
idea of eternity, for example, is a sublime idea, as are the human plurality of notions of God 
(hence, the tie of this aesthetic category to religion as well as science). Although most 
frequently used as an artistic category, the idea of sublimity also has religious, moral, 
scientific and other implications. Scientifically, for example, the associated notions of the 
unbounded universe and of curved space are sublime ideas. Sublimity is used in the 
discussion of philanthropy to refer to some dimensions of what it means to be human. 
Although not often discussed in these terms, the ideas of charity and community are both 
usually intended as sublime ideals by their users. Enlightenment of an entire population is 
also a sublime ideal. Thus, it is not a major stretch to suggest that notions of the sublime, in 
art, science, charity, education, like common (or public, in Payton’s sense) good are among 
the major unifying themes of philanthropy.  Murdoch	  set	  out	  in	  1959	  to	  state	  the	  relation	  between	  the	  sublime	  and	  the	  good,	  and	  got	  distracted	   into	   the	  question	  of	   the	  general	  meaning	  of	  art.	   I	  don’t	  believe	   that	   I	   can	  push	  her	  argument	  further	  more	  than	  50	  years	  later,	  but	  I	  can	  note	  that	  the	  aesthetic	  qualities	  of	  beauty	  and	  sublimity,	  like	  the	  moral	  quality	  of	  goodness,	  may	  offer	  alternative	  usable	  standards	  for	  the	  assessment	   of	   some,	   and	   perhaps	   all,	   dimensions	   of	   philanthropy.	   Thus,	   when	   we	   speak	   of	  common	  goods	  we	  are	  often	  also	  speaking	  of	  sublime	  goods.	  This	  is	  important	  to	  remember	  in	  the	  moral	  universes	  of	  modern	  philanthropy,	  influenced	  as	  it	  is	  by	  management,	  marketing	  and	  public	  relations.	  It	  can	  be	  easy	  and	  comfortable	  to	  promote	  heavily	  discounted	  versions	  of	  the	  sublime:	   “Where	   Greatness	   is	   Learned”	   my	   university	   once	   proclaimed,	   thus	   turning	   the	  sublime	  into	  a	  marketing	  strategy,	  and	  encouraging	  the	  more	  circumspect	  to	  add	  “And	  couches	  are	   burned”.	   However,	   obstetricians	   who	   superintend	   the	   birth	   of	   babies,	   social	   workers	  ministers,	   nurses	   and	   others	  who	   attend	   the	   dying	   of	   hospice	   patients,	   actors	  who	   enact	   the	  poetry	  of	  Shakespeare,	  those	  who	  experience	  Michael	  Angelo’s	  David	  firsthand	  or	  attend	  a	  live	  performance	   of	   Beethoven’s	   Ninth	   Symphony,	   scientists	   who	   plumb	   the	   mysteries	   of	   the	  universe	   and	  many	  other	  denizens	   of	   the	   independent	   sector	   know	   full	  well	   that	   sublimity	   –	  true	  greatness	  in	  its	  many	  forms	  –	  is	  both	  real	  and	  worthy	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  human.
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Conclusion	  	   Philanthropy	   is	   a	   central	   –	   perhaps	   the	   core	   –	   concept	   for	   understanding	   voluntary	  action	  in	  new	  commons	  and	  may	  currently	  be	  involved	  in	  a	  major	  paradigm	  shift	  recognizing	  its	  contemporary	   centrality	   and	   its	   continuing	   vital	   role	   in	   western	   civilization,	   history	   and	  contemporary	   world	   cultures.	   Philanthropy,	   in	   George	   McCully’s	   sense	   also	   opens	   up	   the	  narrow	   corridors	   of	   management-­‐oriented,	   rationalistic,	   and	   social	   science	   perspectives	   on	  both	   the	   third	   sector	   as	   a	   nonprofit	   sector	   and	   on	   commons	   and	   also	   an	   avenue	   for	  moving	  beyond	   the	   narrow,	   technocratic	   focus	   on	   abstract	   qualities	   of	   effectiveness,	   and	   efficiency.	  Philanthropy	  thus	  offers	  multiple	  bases	  for	  reimagining	  (and	  expanding)	  the	  role	  and	  scope	  of	  the	   third	   sector	   and	   locating	   what	   is	   most	   important	   in	   common	   goods.	   Similar	   humanistic	  perspectives	   are	   found	   in	   the	   tap	   root	   of	   sublimity	   that	   has	   nourished	   most,	   if	   not	   all,	  contemporary	   social	   science	   approaches	   to	   social	   problems.	   Thus,	   philanthropy,	   broadly	  conceived	   as	   voluntary	   action	   affirming	  what	   it	  means	   to	   be	   human,	   in	   a	   broadly	   conceived	  independent	  sector	  has	  an	  important	  role	  to	  play	  in	  any	  movement	  toward	  an	  expanded	  view	  of	  democracy	  in	  society	  and	  culture.
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Having	  a	  market	  economy	  is	  really	  different	  from	  having	  a	  market	  society	  
~	  Camila	  Villejo,	  Chilean	  education	  reformer	  
12.	  Social	  Economy	  As	  Gift	  Economy	  
 Kant,	   in	   fashioning	   the	   issue	   of	   the	   sublime,	   and	   Victor	   Hugo’s	   presentation	   of	  Quasimodo	  as	  the	  locus	  classicus	  of	  character	  studies	  of	  the	  grotesque	  as	  sublime	  have,	  as	  much	  as	   the	   framers	   of	   the	   American	   republic,	  made	   important	   philanthropic	   contributions	   to	   the	  modern	  world.	  To	   the	  extent	  we	  chose	   to	  do	  so,	  we	  can	  also	  give	  added	  meaning	   to	   them	  by	  tracing	   the	   contributions	   that	   precede	   and	   follow	   them.	   Such	   is	   the	   way	   of	   additions	   to	  democratic	   culture.	   All	   of	   these	   contributions	   are	   widely	   regarded	   by	   one	   focused	   public	   or	  another	  as	  gifts	  to	  the	  their	  world,	  or	  our	  common	  world.	  The	  same	  can	  be	  said	  of	  authors	  of	  the	  books	  of	  the	  Bible,	  Greek	  philosophers,	  the	  Koran,	  the	  writers	  of	  the	  Upanishads,	  Shakespeare,	  Bacon	  and	  Leibnitz,	  Einstein,	  Taylor’s	  The	  Science	  of	  Shoveling,	  and	  countless	  other	  individuals	  and	  groups	  contributing	  to	  knowledge	  commons	  through	  the	  ages.	  Wherever	  we	  can	  identify	  a	  body	  of	  knowledge	  we	  can	  also	  identify	  or	  assume	  the	  presence	  of	  its	  knowledge	  commons,	  the	  social	  or	  cultural	  associations	  and	  assemblies	  of	  proponents,	  developers,	  critics,	  and	  sometimes	  anti-­‐commons	  of	  those	  actively	  opposed	  to	  it.	  The	   major	   outputs	   of	   knowledge	   commons,	   regardless	   of	   the	   knowledge	   involved,	  whether	  sublime,	  mundane	  or	  ridiculous,	  constitute	  gifts	  just	  as	  surely	  as	  donations	  and	  grants,	  and	  the	  recurrent	  patterns	  of	  giving	  and	  utilizing	  knowledge	  resources	  constitute	  knowledge-­‐based	  social	  economies	  (in	  the	  plural).	  Some	  gifts	  are	  accounted	  as	  more	  important	  and	  some	  are	  less,	  but	  scholars,	  authors,	  researchers,	  artists	  and	  others	  all	  make	  contributions	  to	  fields	  of	  knowledge	  in	  the	  same	  manner	  that	  donors	  make	  contributions	  of	  (albeit	  of	  different,	  financial	  or	   property)	   resources	   to	   the	   common	   resource	   pools	   of	   voluntary	   action.	   Likewise,	  contributions	  of	  knowledge,	  like	  other	  common	  goods	  outputs,	  may	  also	  serve	  as	  resources	  for	  further	   contributions	   and	   the	   production	   of	   further	   knowledge.	   This	   is	   the	   justification	   for	  literature	  reviews	  in	  research	  papers,	  for	  example.	  All	  such	  gifts	  are	  philanthropic	  in	  nature,	  but	  some	  are	  eventually	  judged	  to	  be	  truly	  notable,	  world-­‐class	  gifts	  or	  philanthropic	  acts	  of	  historic	  dimensions.	  Such	  judging	  is	  generally	  the	  responsibility	  of	  differing	  combinations	  of	  three	  types	  of	   knowledge	   commons	   (listed	   in	   order	   of	   priority):	   (1)	   Knowledge	   commons	   themselves.	  Scientists	   are	   the	   best	   judges	   of	   what	   are	   important	   contributions	   to	   scientific	   knowledge.	  Theologians,	  social	  workers	  genealogists	  and	  gin	  rummy	  players	  perform	  the	  same	  role	  in	  their	  special	   areas	   of	   knowledge.	   They	   are	   the	   ones	   who	   we	   recognize	   know	   the	   most	   on	   their	  particular	   subjects.	   This	   is	   one	   of	   the	   unrecognized	   corollaries	   of	   freedom	  of	   association.	   (2)	  Specialized	  knowledge	  commons	  organized	   for	  critical	  or	  evaluative	  purposes,	   like	  historians,	  drama,	  art,	  and	  literary	  critics,	  anthropologists,	  and	  others.	  When	  looking	  only	  at	  the	  individual	  products	  of	   criticism	  and	  evaluation	  –	  monographs,	   reviews,	   reports,	   and	   the	   like	  –	   it	   can	  be	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very	  easy	  to	  miss	  the	  collective	  nature	  of	  these	  enterprises.	  Such	  criticism	  without	  a	  consistent	  audience	  –	  a	   focused	  public	  –	   is	  diminished	   in	   importance.	  Some	  critical	  associations	  operate	  within	   formally	   organized	   professional	   or	   membership	   associations.	   (3)	   In	   some	   cases,	  organization	  and	  association	  are	  purely	  cultural,	  most	  commonly	  “bodies	  of	  opinion”	  or	  focused	  publics,	   rather	   than	   formal	   organizations	   and	   corporations.	   Yet,	   whether	   an	   organization	   is	  formal	  or	  purely	  cultural,	  the	  result	  is	  much	  the	  same.	  A	  single	  expression	  of	  opinion	  or	  critical	  judgment	   assigning	   value	   to	   the	   outputs	   of	   a	   knowledge	   commons	   is	   ordinarily	  meaningless	  outside	  the	  larger	  context	  of	  opinions	  that	  precede,	  follow,	  confirm	  or	  challenge	  it.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  surprisingly	  little	  of	  the	  output	  of	  knowledge	  commons	  truly	  qualifies	  as	   public	   goods,	   if	   only	   because	   the	   contributions	   within	   one	   field	   may	   be	   matters	   of	  indifference,	  or	  even	  opposition	  and	  conflict,	  within	  other	  associations,	  assemblies	  or	   focused	  publics.	  If	  you	  are	  not	  a	  bridge	  player,	  for	  example,	  an	  account	  justifying	  a	  change	  in	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  game	  will	   likely	  be	  a	  matter	  of	   genuine	   indifference.	  Even	   so,	   limited	   interest,	   opposition	  and	  even	  conflict	  to	  the	  outputs	  of	  particular	  knowledge	  commons	  do	  not	  mitigate	  the	  fact	  that	  these	   outputs	   of	   knowledge	   commons	   are	   gifts.	   It	   is	   this	   character	   as	   gifts	   and	   the	   larger	  cultural	  meanings	  of	  giving	  that	  are	  responsible	  for	  the	  tensions,	  security	  measures	  to	  prevent	  “industrial	  espionage”,	  patents,	  and	  other	  paraphernalia	  surrounding	  the	  outputs	  of	  knowledge	  commons	   owned	   (and	   fully	   enclosed)	   by	   market	   firms.	   If	   such	   apparatus	   isn’t	   in	   place,	   the	  knowledge	  can	  easily	  be	  “given	  away”	  and	  once	  that	  Pandora’s	  box	  is	  opened,	  it	  cannot	  easily	  be	  shut	  again.	  When	  one	  says	  knowledge	  commons,	  one	  also	  implies	  gifts.	  It	  may	  be	  for	  this	  reason	  that	  a	  number	  of	  years	  ago	  Schrift	  (1997:	  1)	  wrote,	  “Over	  the	  past	  two	  decades,	  the	  theme	  of	  gifts	  and	  giving	  has	  emerged	  as	  a	  central	  issue	  within	  a	  range	  of	  divergent	   fields.”	   Since	   that	   time,	   strong	   interest	   in	   gift	   exchange	   has	   continued	   and	   even	  accelerated;	  a	  trend	  that	   is	  particularly	   important	  to	  the	  commons	  theory	  of	  voluntary	  action.	  From	  its	  origins,	  gift	  theory	  has	  been	  recognized	  as	  a	  subject	  of	  great	  complexity	  and	  subtlety	  (Godbout,	   Caillé,	   and	   Winkler,	   1998	   is	   one	   of	   my	   personal	   favorites.	   See	   also	   Bailey,	   1971;	  Barnes,	  2003;	  Davis,	  2000;	  Eaton,	  1932;	  Hyde,	  2007;	  Kass,	  2002;	  Kettering,	  1988a;	  Kettering,	  1988b;	   Lindahl,	   1995;	  Mei-­‐Hui,	   1994;	  Wadell,	   1991).	   Giving	   has	   been	   deeply	  woven	   into	   the	  themes	  of	  voluntary	  action	  and,	  in	  particular,	  philanthropy.	  We	  can	  begin	  to	  consider	  this	  more	  carefully	  with	  a	  brief	  survey	  of	  existing	  gift	  theory. 
Gift	  Theory	  What	  we	   can	   call	   gift	   theory,	   according	   to	   Schrift	   (1997:	   3)	   can	  be	   traced	   to	   an	   act	   of	  philanthropy	  within	   belles	   lettres	   or	   the	   19th	   century	   literary	   knowledge	   commons;	   an	   1844	  essay	   entitled	   “Gifts”	   by	   the	   American	   philosopher	   and	   essayist,	   Ralph	  Waldo	   Emerson	   that	  includes,	  among	  other	  things,	  an	  early	  statement	  of	  reciprocity	  as	  moeur.	  (An	  online	  version	  of	  Emerson’s	   essay	   is	   at:	   http://grammar.about.com/od/classicessays/a/emersongifts.htm).	  Emerson’s	  essay	  was	  published	  only	  a	  dozen	  years	  after	  Hugo’s	  1832	  Hunchback	  of	  Notre	  Dame	  and	   about	   the	   same	   time	   as	   Tocqueville’s	   famous	   trip	   to	   America.	   From	   the	   start,	   Emerson	  “makes	   clear	   the	   paradoxical	   and	   problematic	   nature	   of	   the	   gift”	   (Schrift,	   1997:1).	   A	   few	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decades	   later	   Frederick	   Nietzsche	   initiated	   another	   gift	   theme	   in	   German	   literature	   in	   the	  opening	  passage	  of	  Alzo	  Sprach	  Zarathustra	  (Thus	  Spoke	  Zarathustra),	  first	  published	  in	  1884.	  Despite	  such	  American	  and	  German	  origins,	  however,	   it	  has	   largely	  been	  20th	   century	  French	  intellectuals	  who	  have	  shown	  the	  greatest	  sustained	  interest	  in	  the	  topic	  of	  gifts.	  Of	  particular	  note	   is	  Marcel	  Mauss’	  essay	  sur	   le	  don	  (essay	  on	  the	  gift)	  published	  in	  1924	  since	   it	   initiated	  a	  continuing	  interest	  in	  gifts	  in	  anthropology	  that	  includes	  more	  recent	  contributions	  by	  Claude	  Levi-­‐Strauss,	   Rodolphe	   Gasché	   and	   others,	   including	   the	   American	   anthropologist,	   Marshall	  Sahlens	  and	  others	  in	  that	  discipline.	  Schrift	  also	  cites	  additional,	  and	  sometimes	  quite	  obscure,	  points	  of	  French	  interest,	  including	  Georges	  Bataille’s	  (1933)	  essay,	  The	  Notion	  of	  Expenditure,	  long	   known	   primarily	   only	   among	   French	   intellectuals,	   and	   Martin	   Heideigger’s	   (German)	  philosophical	  discussion	  of	  es	  gibt	  (it	  gives)	  in	  his	  publication,	  Being	  and	  Time,	  first	  published	  in	  1927	  would	  be	  fascinating	  to	  consider	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  giving	  in	  new	  commons.	  In	  recent	  decades,	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  other	  French	  philosophers	  such	  as	  Jacques	  Derrida,	  Heléne	  Cixous	  and	  Pierre	  Bourdeau	  have	  also	  published	  important	  work	  on	  gifts	  and	  giving;	   these	  also	  have	  had	  little	   impact	   on	   contemporary	   thinking	   about	   philanthropy	   and	   new	   commons.	   Bourdeau’s	  work	   on	   gifts,	   done	   in	   connection	  with	   his	   theory	   of	   practice,	   may	   be	   of	   particular	   note	   for	  voluntary	  action,	  as	  is	  the	  previously	  mentioned	  work	  by	  the	  French	  Canadian	  Godbout,	  et.	  al.	  (1998).	  In	  recent	  decades	  Schrift	  (1997:	  3)	  says,	  gift	  theory	  has	  moved	  to	  center	  stage	  in	  several	  disciplines	  and	  in	  interdisciplinary	  work:	  “The	  theme	  of	  the	  gift	  …	  can	  be	  located	  at	  the	  center	  of	  discussions	  in	  deconstruction,	  gender,	  ethics,	  philosophy,	  anthropology	  and	  economics”	  and	  it	  already	  serves	  as	  a	  major	  intersection	  for	  interdisciplinary	  discussion.	  If	  we	  added	  such	  topics	  as	  class,	  race	  and	  religion	  to	  those	  where	  gifts	  have	  already	  been	  a	  major	  focus	  we	  would	  have	  a	  formula	   for	   bringing	   giving	   directly	   into	   the	   discussion	   of	   pluralism,	   the	   third	   sector	   and	  philanthropy.	  The	  general	   thrust	  of	   current	   thinking	  has	  already	  been	   to	   link	  gifts	  and	  giving	  into	  larger	  perspectives	  on	  exchange,	  contrasting,	  for	  example,	  gift	  exchange	  with	  both	  market	  exchange	  and	  coercive	  exchanges	  like	  the	  collection	  of	  taxes.	  Anthropologists	  have	  noted	  giving	  as	   a	   major	   feature	   of	   an	   enormous	   number	   of	   different	   cultures,	   perhaps	   even	   a	   cultural	  universal,	   including	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   Kula	   cycle	   (Malinowski,	   1944),	   the	   Mola	   ring,	  potlatches,	   and	   numerous	   other	   examples	   supporting	   the	   general	   conclusion,	   among	   others,	  that	  exchange	  in	  Pacific	  Island	  cultures	  prior	  to	  the	  19th	  century	  was	  gift-­‐based.	  Schrift	   mentions	   but	   does	   not	   detail	   the	   large	   literature	   in	   economics	   and	   sociology	  devoted	  to	  the	  analysis	  of	  reciprocity,	  which	  has	  been	  one	  among	  several	  interrelated	  questions	  of	  interest	  to	  analysts	  of	  gifts	  from	  the	  time	  of	  Emerson	  (e.g.,	  Dufwenberg	  &	  Kirchsteiger,	  2004;	  Falk	  &	   Fischbacher,	   2006;	   Gouldner,	   1960;	  Hooghe,	   2002;	  Komter,	   1996;	  Nowak	  &	   Sigmund,	  2005;	   Sugden,	   1984).	   Despite	   all	   of	   this	   richness	   and	   for	   reasons	   not	   altogether	   clear	   or	  defensible,	   economic	  perspectives	  on	  narrow,	   self-­‐interested	  exchange	  and	   reciprocity	   rather	  than	   these	   anthropological,	   sociological,	   or	  philosophical	  work	  on	   giving,	   appear	   to	  have	  had	  the	  greatest	   impact	  on	   theorists	  of	  voluntary	  action.	  Even	  superficial	  examination	  of	   this	   rich	  literature	  suggests	  that	  this	  is	  a	  perspective	  that	  ought	  to	  be	  revised	  in	  the	  future.	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The	   study	   of	   gifts	   arises	   from	   very	   different	   places,	   and	   there	   are	   a	   lot	   of	   theoretical	  rough	   edges	   as	   a	   result.	   For	   example,	   the	   present	   focus	   on	   gifts	   in	   democratic	   society	   and	  voluntary	  action	  runs	  counter	  to	  at	  least	  one	  gift-­‐based	  critique	  of	  public	  life,	  in	  a	  way	  that	  has	  particular	   implications	   for	   understanding	   the	   role	   of	   gifts,	   association	   and	   philanthropy	   in	  relation	  to	  the	  public	  economy.	  The	  issue	  raised	  in	  this	  discussion	  raises	  the	  possibility	  of	  the	  reappearance	  of	   familiar	  disciplinary	   cleavages	   in	   our	  understanding	  of	   the	   role	   of	   gifts	  with	  economists,	   political	   scientists	   and	   public	   administrators	   taking	   one	   approach	   to	   the	   gift	  economy,	   while	   sociologists,	   anthropologists	   and	   social	   workers,	   especially	   those	   with	  particular	   interest	   in	   home	   and	   family,	   take	   another.	   As	   detailed	   in	   the	   chapter	   below,	   the	  concept	   of	   “bad	   commons”	   can	  be	  used	  productively	   to	  mediate	   some	  of	   these	  differences.	  A	  growing	   number	   of	   analyses	   focused	   exclusively	   on	   government	   and	   public	   affairs	   have	  concluded	   that	   big	   money	   gifts	   intended	   to	   purchase	   political	   influence	   is	   not	   only	   a	   major	  problem,	   it	   is	   the	   root	   problem	   for	   democracy	   today	   (Kaiser,	   2010;	   Lessig,	   2011).	   Recent	  comments	  by	   former	   Justice	  Stevens	   suggest	   that	   this	  was	  a	  minority	   concern	   in	   the	  Citizens	  United	  (2010)	  case	  (Leaming,	  2012).	  As	  Lawrence	  Lessig	  puts	  it,	  money	  in	  politics	  is	  “the	  root	  –	  not	  the	  single	  cause	  of	  everything	  that	  ails	  us	  (as	  a	  people),	  not	  the	  one	  reform	  that	  would	  make	  democracy	  hum,	  but	  instead	  the	  root,	  the	  thing	  that	  feeds	  the	  other	  ills	  and	  the	  one	  thing	  that	  we	  must	  kill	  first.	  The	  cure	  would	  be	  generative	  –	  the	  single,	  if	  impossibly	  difficult	  intervention	  that	  would	  give	  us	  the	  chance	  to	  repair	  the	  rest”	  (Lessig,	  quoted	  by	  Klein,	  2012)	  While	   Lessig’s	   diagnosis	   is	   generally	   correct,	   the	   difficulties	   with	   his	   prescription	   are	  threefold:	  First,	  his	  assessment	  might	  not	  be	  deemed	  relevant	  to	  discussions	  of	  philanthropy	  at	  all	  were	  it	  not	  for	  Lessig’s	  previous	  contributions	  to	  commons	  theory	  and	  gift	  theory,	  and	  more	  important,	   the	   proximity	   of	   parts	   of	   the	   social	   economy	   to	   public	   policy	   (Boris	   and	   Steuerle,	  2006;	  Smith	  and	  Lipsky,	  1992;	  Salamon,	  2003).	  Lessig	  is	  a	  lawyer	  who	  pioneered	  the	  theory	  and	  practice	   of	   “the	   Creative	   Commons”	   license.	   In	   the	   quoted	   statement,	   Lessig’s	   conception	   of	  democracy	  is	  clearly	  limited	  to	  government	  and	  to	  the	  current,	  passive	  model	  of	  citizenship	  in	  a	  democracy	  consisting	  primarily	  of	  voting	  to	  elect	  public	  officials	  and	   leaving	  the	  rest	   to	   those	  officials	   and	   interest	   groups.	   Whether	   this	   is	   Lessig’s	   general	   understanding	   or	   merely	   a	  description	  of	  the	  current	  state	  of	  affairs	  in	  Washington	  DC	  is	  not	  altogether	  clear.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	   the	   differences	   here	   may	   amount	   to	   straw	   man	   argument,	   as	   regards	   Lessig’s	   specific	  intent.	   Even	   so,	   the	   distinctions	  made	   are	   important	   ones.	   If	  we	   look	   beyond	   that	   view,	   it	   is	  anything	  but	  clear	  from	  Lessig’s	  account	  how	  or	  why	  the	  open	  democratic	  society	  and	  culture	  (sometimes	  referred	  to	   in	  contemporary	  political	  argot	  as	  “the	  world	  outside	  the	  beltway”)	   is	  affected	  by	   corruption	   in	   the	   legislative	   branch.	   For	   some	   citizens	  political	   corruption	  of	   any	  kind	   is	   simply	   further	   grounds	   for	  withdrawing	   from	  public	   life,	   declining	   civic	   participation	  and	  greater	  engagement	  with	  café	  society	  or	  other	  alternatives	  to	  civil	  society	  examined	  in	  the	  final	   chapter.	  Of	  most	   immediate	   concern	  here	   is	  Lessig’s	   indictment	  of	  what	  he	   calls	   the	   gift	  economy	  (italics	  added)	  as	  fundamental	  to	  the	  problem.	  	  There	   is	   little	   doubt	   that,	   as	   both	   the	   convicted	   influence	   peddler	   Jack	   Abramoff	   and	  Lessig	   note,	   gifts	   are	   a	   major	   part	   of	   the	   problem	   of	   the	   corrosive	   influence	   of	   K	   Street,	   or	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Washington	  lobbyists	  on	  American	  public	  life.	  However,	  in	  characterizing	  the	  role	  of	  expensive	  meals,	  golf	  weekends	  and	  travel	  junkets,	  exotic	  vacations,	  cash	  payments,	  luxury	  items,	  and	  all	  of	  the	  other	  ‘gifts’	  of	  subornation	  that	  define	  modern	  lobbying	  as	  the	  gift	  economy,	  there	  is	  an	  inherent	  threat	  to	  the	  entire	  regime	  of	  legitimate	  philanthropy	  of	  such	  a	  broad	  brush	  approach.	  It	  is	  almost	  as	  though	  he	  is	  equating	  a	  billionaire	  or	  corporation	  bribing	  a	  congressman	  with	  an	  ordinary	  citizen’s	  donation	  to	  a	  favorite	  charity	  or	  giving	  a	  gift	  to	  a	  child,	  or	  lovers	  exchanging	  gifts.	  The	  social	  economy	  of	  gifts	  is	  simply	  too	  complex	  to	  sustain	  any	  such	  a	  generalization,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  accept	  one	  so	  corrosive	  and	  jaded.	  It	  seems	  unlikely	  that	  Lessig,	  the	  canny	  and	  sophisticated	  inventor	  of	  the	  creative	  commons	  license,	  would	  knowingly	  embrace	  such	  a	  view.	  It	  is	  very	  likely,	  however,	  that	  others	  less	  charitably	  disposed	  to	  philanthropy	  may	  seize	  upon	  Lessig’s	  comments	  as	   further	  proof	  of	  a	  general	   indictment	  of	  gift	  economies	   in	  general	  and	  philanthropy.	  	  What	   is	   currently	   going	   on	   in	   Washington,	   and	   what	   has	   gone	   on	   to	   one	   degree	   or	  another	   in	   governments	   from	   time	   immemorial	   shows	   what	   happens	   when	   the	   moral	  environment	   of	   philanthropy	   is	   built	   entirely	   on	   moeurs	   (beliefs,	   rules	   and	   practices)	   of	  individual	  self-­‐interest,	  and	  not	  on	  love	  of	  humanity.	  The	  focus	  in	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  the	  involvement	  of	  new	  commons	  and	  giving	  in	  social	  economies	  concerned	  with	  genuine	  gift	  exchange	  for	  charitable	  and	  philanthropic	  purposes.	  Marshall	   Sahlins	   (1972)	   reads	   Mauss	   in	   the	   context	   of	   Hobbes	   and	   suggests	   that	   he	  substituted	  for	  the	  latter’s	  war	  of	  all	  against	  all,	  the	  seemingly	  more	  encouraging	  possibility	  of	  the	   exchange	   of	   everything	   between	   everybody;	   a	   mode	   of	   gift	   exchange	   substituting	   for	  war/violence.	   That	   idea	   in	   itself	  might	   offer	   an	   interesting	   starting	   point	   for	   a	   theory	   of	   the	  third	  sector.	  Perhaps	  market	  exchange	  as	  quid	  pro	  quo;	  State	  exchange	  as	  redistribution;	  Need-­‐based	  exchange	  in	  the	  household/intimate	  sphere	  and	  gift	  exchange	  in	  new	  commons.	  There	  is	  merit	  (and	  also	  some	  obvious	  limits)	  to	  this	  idea.	  However,	  Sahlens,	  like	  Hardin,	  Olson	  and	  the	  Bloomington	  School	  fails	  to	  get	  beyond	  the	  familiar	  dualism	  of	  public/private,	  economy/politics	  or	  market/state	  dichotomies,	   and	  open	  up	   room	   for	  an	   independent	   sector	  mixing	   individual	  and	   collective	   voluntary	   action,	   philanthropy,	   association	   and	   social	   economies.	   Although	  micro-­‐gift	   economies	   are	   modular	   and	   widely	   found	   in	   statecraft,	   market	   settings	   and	  households,	  it	  is	  only	  the	  third,	  or	  independent	  sector	  that	  is	  formed	  or	  defined	  in	  fundamental	  ways	  by	  gift	  exchange.	   It	   is	  also	   in	   the	   independent	   sector,	   and	  particularly	   in	  new	  commons	  that	  a	  distinctive	  three-­‐way	  gift	  transaction	  is	  found.	  
Philanthropy	  As	  Gift	  Exchange	  The	   notion	   that	   all	   gift	   exchanges,	   like	   market	   transactions,	   are	   binary	   exchanges	  between	   two	   entities,	   figuratively	   speaking	   the	   giver	   and	   the	   receiver	   as	   in	   Figure	   12.1,	  represents	   a	   fundamental	  misunderstanding	   of	   the	   gift	   exchanges	   of	   organized	   philanthropy,	  and	  in	  particular	  charity.	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  one	  that	  has	  been	  debunked	  by	  anthropological	  studies	  of	  actual	  giving	  which	  have	  found	  cycles,	  rings,	  circles	  and	  numerous	  instances	  of	  more	  complex	  exchanges.	  Much	  of	  this	  work	  was	  originally	  done	  outside	  of	  third	  sector	  studies	  and	  has	  only	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been	  selectively	  incorporated	  there	  because	  it	  is	  so	  out	  of	  character	  with	  the	  dominant	  rational	  choice	   perspectives.	   Recent	   work	   on	   giving	   circles	   by	   Eikenberry	   (2009)	   begins	   to	   capture	  some	   of	   the	   nuances	   of	   those	   complex	   exchanges.	   Even	   so,	   the	   main	   body	   of	   work	   in	  philanthropy	   leaves	   out	   the	   illusive	   “third	   (and	   additional)	   parties”	   to	   gift	   transactions,	   and	  therein	  misreads	  single,	  complex	  gifting	  acts	  as	  separate	  and	  independent	  exchanges.	  Giving	  as	  voluntary	  action	  has	  more	  in	  common	  with	  Malinowski’s	  Kula	  ring	  or	  the	  Tlingit	  Potlatch	  than	  it	  does	  with	  any	  ordinary	  market	  transaction.	  Yet	  in	  the	  rush	  to	  apply	  market	  perspectives	  to	  new	  commons	   and	   philanthropy,	   and	  with	   the	   nearly	   exclusive	   focus	   on	   bureaucratic	   firms,	   third	  sector	  scholars	  have	  seriously	  misrepresented	   the	  nature	  of	  gift	  exchange	   in	   the	   independent	  sectors	   of	   social	   economies.	   In	   the	   following	   section,	   a	   preliminary	   alternative	  model	   of	   gift	  exchange	  termed	  the	  philanthropod	  will	  be	  outlined.	  
Figure	  12.1.	  
	  
Philanthropod:	  The	  Triad	  of	  Gift	  Exchange	  Gift	   exchange	   in	   commons	   is	   fundamentally	   different	   in	   its	   form	   and	   structure	   from	  ordinary	  commercial	  exchange	  of	  microeconomic	  theory,	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  purposes	  of	  the	  exchange	   and	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   number	   of	   key	   roles	   and	   statuses	   or	   positions	   involved.	   Gift	  exchange	  in	  voluntary	  action	  requires	  a	  minimum	  of	  three	  or	  more	  actors	  or	  roles	  to	  adequately	  describe	  what	  happens.	  A	  principal	   challenge	   for	   contemporary	  voluntary	  action	   theory	  after	  years	   of	   trying	   to	   characterize	   gifts	   in	   terms	   of	   ordinary	   commercial	   transactions	   is	   to	  rediscover	  once-­‐familiar	  models	  of	  gift	  exchange	  to	  describe	  and	  explain	  what	  is	  actually	  taking	  place.	  This	   is	   a	  particular	  problem	  at	  present	   since	   such	  efforts	  have	  been	   rewritten	   into	   the	  binary	   code	   of	   Adam	   Smith’s	   butcher	   and	   baker	   and	   the	   equilibrium	   models	   of	   profitable	  exchange,	  even	  though	  Smith	  himself	  desisted	  from	  that	  view,	  as	  we	  have	  already	  seen.	  	  A	  more	  complex	  and	  nuanced	  model	  of	  gift	  exchange	  applicable	  to	  the	  social	  economy	  of	  institutional	  philanthropic	  benefactories,	  performatories	  and	  moeuratoria	  involves	  a	  minimum	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of	  three	  terms	  (See	  Figure	  12.2).	  Most	  philanthropic	  gifts	  are	  a	  closely	  related	  set	  of	  experiences	  and	   inter-­‐connected	  situations	  (or	  moments)	   that	  can	  be	  characterized	  as	  multi-­‐phase,	  multi-­‐party	   exchange	   having	   more	   in	   common	   with	   the	   Kula	   and	   other	   Polynesian	   gift	   exchanges	  identified	  by	  anthropologists	   than	  with	  market	  exchange.	  One	  of	   these	  –	   the	  donor	  moment	   -­‐	  involves	   philanthropic	   donors	   (or	   patrons)	   donating	   to	   the	   agents	   of	   target	   causes,	   while	  another	   –	   the	   common	   goods	   production	   moment	   –	   occurs	   between	   service	   providers	   and	  clients	   and	   is	   usually	   treated	   in	   the	   quasi-­‐market	   model	   as	   a	   completely	   independent	  transaction	  with	  no	  direct	  reference	  to	  the	  gift.	  In	  social	  and	  health	  service	  settings	  this	  serves	  to	  reinforce	  moeurs	  like	  the	  confidentiality	  of	  the	  patient/client.	  It	  also	  leads	  to	  a	  fundamental	  over-­‐simplification	   of	   the	   philanthropic	   character	   of	   the	   exchange.	   A	   better	   model	   of	   gift	  exchange	  would	  treat	  donations	  to	  common	  resource	  pools	  and	  the	  resulting	  service	  delivery	  (or,	   more	   generally	   common	   goods	   production)	   based	   on	   those	   pools	   are	   not	   discrete	   and	  unrelated	   transactions,	   but	   as	   parts	   of	   a	   unified	   set	   of	   transactions	   that	   give	   meaning	   and	  purpose	   to	   the	  exchange.	  These	  exchanges	  are	  presented	  as	   three-­‐party	   transactions	  here	   for	  simplicity.	   Why	   donate?	   So	   that	   some	   good	   may	   result.	   How	   to	   do	   good	   works	   except	   by	  procuring	  necessary	  resources?	  The	  connections	  are	  ineluctable.	  This	  may	  involve	  any	  number	  of	   transactions	   (of	   n-­‐parties)	   as	   common-­‐pool	   resources	   make	   their	   way	   from	   donors	   (the	  original	  suppliers	  of	  resources)	  to	  the	  production	  of	  common	  goods.	  But	  the	  connections	  linking	  donor	  to	  final	  result	  remain	  clear.	  	  
Figure	  12.2	  
	  One	   of	   the	   things	   that	   complicates	   understanding	   this	   type	   of	   gift	   exchange	   is	   that	   it	  doesn’t	  need	  to	  take	  place	  within	  an	  organized	  institutional	  context,	  although	  a	  large	  variety	  do	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take	  place	  there.	  Yet	  it	  is	  ethical,	  legal	  and	  possible	  for	  one	  person	  –	  a	  donor	  –	  to	  say	  to	  another	  –	  the	  agent	  or	  intermediary	  –	  “take	  this	  [resource]	  and	  use	  it	  to	  help	  [that	  class	  of	  beneficiary].	  We	  can	  name	  this	  type	  of	  transaction	  a	  triad,	  in	  order	  to	  contrast	  it	  with	  sales	  or	  purchases	  in	  markets	  characterized	  by	  the	  binary	  exchange	  between	  buyers	  and	  sellers	  of	  a	  priced	  good.	  To	  give	   it	   a	   name	  of	   its	   own,	  we	   can	   call	   it	   a	  philanthropod;	   a	   complex,	  multi-­‐part	   gift	   exchange	  occurring	   outside	   markets,	   governments	   and	   households.	   	   The	   category	   includes	   not	   only	  ordinary	   donations,	   but	   also	   giving	   circles	   (Eikenberry,	   2009),	   Kula	   exchanges	   (Malinowski,	  1944),	  potlatches	  (Allen,	  1987;	  Kan,	  1986;	  Piddocke,	  1965),	  gift	  rings	  (Landa,	  1983),	  and	  other	  known	  examples	  of	  complex	  gift	  exchange.	  	  In	   contemporary	   philanthropic	   organizations,	   patrons	   or	   donors	   are	   the	   recognized	  providers	  of	  key	  resources	  who	  make	  gifts	  to	  specialized	  agents	  or	  intermediaries	  (fundraisers,	  
librarians,	   teachers,	   social	  workers,	   lawyers	   and	   others)	  who	  must	   handle	   all	   of	   the	   necessary	  relationships	  from	  first	  meetings	  to	  casual	  relations	  or	  life-­‐long	  relations	  and	  sometimes	  even	  post-­‐mortem	   situations.	   These	   intermediaries	   receive	   the	   gifts	   of	   resources	   (typically	   called	  donations	  or	  gifts)	  explicitly	  on	  behalf	  of	  others,	  and	  continue	  their	  relations	  with	  the	  donors,	  along	   the	   way	   dealing	   with	   the	   complex	   issues	   of	   reciprocity.	   It	   would	   be	   a	   serious	   error,	  however,	   to	   assume	   that	   this	   organized	   portion	   constitutes	   the	   full	   extent	   of	   operational	  philanthropods	   in	   modern	   life.	   Even	   in	   organized	   settings,	   we	   have	   no	   names	   for,	   and	   only	  minimal	   recognition	   of	   the	   post-­‐gift	   stages	   of	   this	   process.	   In	   the	   less-­‐socially	   accepted	   and	  legitimate	   context	  of	   the	   con	  game	  Erving	  Goffman	   (1952),	   called	   similar	  operations	   “cooling	  out	   the	  mark”.	   This	   phrase	   is	   highly	   inappropriate	   in	   legitimate	   forms	   of	   gift	   giving,	   because	  both	   donor	   and	   fundraiser	   consider	   the	   gift	   appropriate,	   but	   a	   superficially	   similar	   process	  commonly	  occurs.	  Because	  a	  donation	   is	  potentially	  a	  non-­‐reciprocal	   gift,	   careful	   attention	   to	  these	  post-­‐gift	  relations	  is	  necessary	  to	  prevent	  ill-­‐will	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  donor.	  	  Within	   the	  same	   institutional	  settings	  as	   these	  agents,	  other	  specialists	  deposit,	  and	  as	  appropriate,	  invest	  the	  money	  gift	  and	  make	  its	  availability	  known	  to	  still	  other	  specialists	  who	  apply	   (“budget”)	   the	   resources	   for	   appropriate	   purposes,	   and	   engage	   the	   services	   to	   be	  delivered	  or	  the	  benefits	  to	  be	  provided	  for	  the	  production	  of	  benefits,	  performances	  or	  moeurs.	  Yet	  another	  entire	  class	  of	  intermediary	  specialists	  that	  includes	  volunteer	  coordinators,	  docent	  managers	   and	   others,	   manages	   gifts	   of	   time	   and	   effort,	   while	   other	   donations	   –	   whether	   of	  knowledge,	   equipment,	   and	   a	   wide	   variety	   of	   other	   stuff	   –	   may	   be	   handled	   by	   still	   more	  specialists	   or	   in	   an	   entirely	   ad	   hoc	   manner	   as	   circumstances	   dictate.	   Even	   so,	   all	   of	   these	  donations	   provoke	   or	   stimulate	   the	   formation	   or	   operation	   of	   philanthropods,	   or	   gift	   chains.	  Such	  gift	  chains	  tend	  to	  arise	  or	  occur	   in	  similar	   fashion	  regardless	  of	  whether	  the	  gift	  comes	  from	   an	   individual	   donor	   or	   in	   the	   form	   of	   a	   grant	   from	   an	   institutional	   donor.	   An	   entire	  industry	   has	   grown	   up	   around	   the	   handling	   of	   institutional	   gifts,	   or	   grants,	   and	   includes	   a	  number	   of	   specialized	   occupations	   like	   prospect	   researchers,	   grant	   writers	   and	   those	   who	  specialize	  in	  the	  sometimes	  delicate	  and	  sometimes	  highly	  political	  negotiations	  involved.	  The	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simplest	   form	  of	   the	  n-­‐dimensional	  philanthropod	   is	  a	   three-­‐part	   transaction	  between	  patron	  (donor),	   intermediary	  and	  beneficiary,	  but	   in	  most	  cases	  multiple	   intermediaries	  are	  involved	  and	  it	  is	  really	  a	  multi-­‐part	  complex	  social	  act	  of	  the	  type	  originally	  identified	  by	  Blumer	  (1955),	  Turner	  &	  Killian	  (1987),	  et.	  al.	  as	  collective	  behavior.	  	  As	  discussed	  above,	  philanthropods	  can	  also	  be	  analyzed	  from	  a	  perspective	  of	  collective	  choice,	  but	  to	  do	  so	  in	  the	  current	  context	  of	  uncertainty	  would	  almost	  certainly	  miss	  important	  aspects	  of	  what	   is	  occurring.	  The	  entire,	   complex	  gift	  exchange	  only	  acquires	   its	   full	  meaning	  from	  the	  situation	  or	  context	  as	  a	  whole;	  when	  viewed	  as	  a	  complete	  social	  act.	  Givers	  without	  beneficiaries	  in	  mind	  are	  merely	  chumps.	  The	  term	  “beneficiary”	  is	  used	  as	  a	  generic	  term	  here,	  even	   though	   technically	   speaking,	   only	   benefactories	   produce	   common	   goods	   (or	   benefits)	  clients	   or	   beneficiaries.	   Performatories	   produce	   common	   goods	   for	   audiences	   and	   focused	  publics	  and	  moeuratoria	  produce	  common	  goods	  (or	  moeurs)	  for	  focused	  publics.	  To	  say	  that	  in	  each	   instance,	   however,	   becomes	   exceedingly	   complex	   and	   exhaustive	   of	   the	   language	  resources,	  so	  let	  beneficiaries	  be	  the	  stand-­‐in	  for	  all	  three	  types	  in	  this	  discussion.	  Beneficiaries	  with	  problems	  but	  without	   the	  givers	  are	  disappointed	  and	  can	  expect	  no	  resolution,	  benefit,	  gain	  or	  service.	  	  The	   perspective	   of	   the	   philanthropod	   reaches	   far	   beyond	   the	   narrow	   confines	   of	  financially	  oriented	  fundraising	  and	  defines	  the	  micro-­‐social	  organization	  of	  the	  entire	  domain	  of	   philanthropy.	   Donations	   of	   priceless	   objects	   (paintings,	   sculptures,	   rare	   books,	   new	  knowledge)	   and	   the	   volunteering	   of	   skills	   and	   talents	   to	   a	   repertory	   can	   be	   characterized	   as	  comparable	   gift	   exchanges	   using	   the	   philanthropod.	   The	   same	   perspective	   can	   be	   applied	   to	  knowledge	   commons.	   Thus,	   learning	   calculus	   may	   appear	   initially	   to	   be	   a	   simple,	   binary	  exchange	  between	   teacher	  and	  student,	  but	   that	  view	  objectifies	   the	  knowledge	  and	  begs	   the	  question	  of	  where	  the	  teacher	  acquired	  the	  knowledge	  that	  is	  taught,	  placing	  knowledge	  along	  with	   social	   problems	   in	   some	   abstract	   cloud	   somewhere.	   Calculus,	   as	   noted	   in	   the	   previous	  chapter,	  serves	  as	  an	  excellent	  example	  of	  knowledge	  commons,	  in	  part	  because	  the	  boundaries	  between	  knowers	  who	  understand	  the	  subject	  and	  those	  who	  do	  not	  are	  so	  clear-­‐cut.	  It	  is	  also	  a	  good	  example	  because	  the	  practice	  of	  calculus	  in	  modern	  science,	  engineering,	  and	  technology	  is	  so	  easy	  and	  uncontroversial	  to	  link	  to	  the	  model	  of	  philanthropy	  as	  acting	  upon	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  human.	  One	  is	  reminded,	  for	  example,	  of	  Thorsten	  Veblen’s	  argument	  for	  engineers	  as	  the	  engine	  of	  social	  change	  in	  The	  Engineer	  and	  the	  Price	  System	  (Veblen,	  1982).	  Hardly	  anyone	  ever	  learns	  calculus	  without	  formal,	  explicit	  homage	  to	  the	  original	  patrons	  whose	  original	  gift	  was	  the	  formulation	  of	  that	  body	  of	  knowledge:	  Isaac	  Newton	  and	  Gottfried	  Leibnitz.	  	  Much	   the	   same	  may	   be	   said	   for	   the	   knowledge	   gathered	   together	   in	   this	   volume.	   The	  contributions	  of	  each	  of	  the	  contributors	  –	  note	  the	  term,	  which	  is	  in	  some	  contexts	  a	  synonym	  of	   donor	   –	   who	   are	   quoted	   or	   cited	   represents	   their	   gift	   to	   a	   common	   body	   of	   knowledge,	  leveraged	   by	   the	   present	   author	   as	   an	   intermediary.	   	   Together,	   these	   form	   a	   distinct	  philanthropod	  and	  the	  sum	  of	  such	  philanthropods	  forms	  a	  social	  economy,	  within	  which	  citing	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and	   acknowledging	   the	   gifts	   of	   others	   is	   an	   author’s	   acknowledgement	   of	   the	   need	   for	  reciprocity	  –	  specifically,	  reciprocal	  recognition.	  Together,	  these	  considerations	  also	  link	  to	  our	  both	   the	   earlier	   discussions	   of	   knowledge	   commons	   and	   community.	   In	   the	   contemporary	  climate	  of	  great	  disruption	  and	  controversy	  over	  copy-­‐rights	  and	  protection	  of	  property	  rights,	  it	   is	   important	   to	   remember	   that	   these	   philanthropic	   gifts	   are	   interwoven	  with,	   but	   distinct	  from	   the	   publisher’s	   commodity.	   It	   is	   often	   said	   that	   exact	   combinations	   of	   words	   can	   be	  copyrighted;	  the	  gift	  of	  knowledge	  in	  any	  form	  cannot.	  
Language	  and	  the	  Philanthropod	  A	  philanthropod	  in	  operation	  can	  be	  illustrated	  by	  the	  case	  of	  an	  author	  writing	  in	  one	  language	  and	  a	  reader	  able	  to	  read	  and	  benefit	  from	  the	  work	  in	  another	  language	  thanks	  to	  the	  intermediate	   agency	   of	   the	   translator.	   Within	   a	   given	   language	   community,	   of	   course,	   any	  written	   manuscript	   also	   forms	   a	   common	   resource	   pool	   involving	   the	   author,	   reader	   and	   a	  variety	   of	   largely	   invisible	   intermediaries	   including	   editors,	   publishers,	   printers,	   distributors,	  vendors	   and	   others.	   The	   simple,	   seemingly	   utilitarian	   tools	   of	   citation	   and	   attribution	   by	  authors	  may	  for	  some	  appear	  to	  be	  merely	  acceptances	  of	  legal	  reality,	  but	  they	  are	  also	  links	  to	  underlying	   operations	   of	   knowledge	   commons	   and	   community	   formations	   characterized	   as	  knowledge	   communities,	   that	   can	   in	   turn	   can	   easily	   be	   traced	  back	   further	   into	   sciences	   and	  disciplines,	   and	   the	   whole	   recognizable	   edifice	   of	   the	   knowledge	   commons.	   What	   is	   seldom	  noted	   are	   the	   large	   portions	   of	   this	   activity	   that	   fall	   within	   the	   domain	   of	   voluntary	   action,	  giving	  and	  social	  economy.	  The	  case	  of	  translation,	  however,	  merits	  special	  attention	  because	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  it	  highlights	   the	   essential	   role	   of	   intermediaries	   between	   the	   writer	   as	   donor	   or	   patron)	   and	  reader	   (a	   type	   of	   beneficiary,	   and	   potentially	   also	   the	   performer	   of	   a	   particular	   common	  knowledge	   in	   the	   process	   sometimes	   called	   paying	   it	   forward.	   It	   is	   clearer	   in	   the	   case	   of	  translation	  than	  in	  almost	  any	  other	  that	  without	  the	  translator	  as	  intermediary	  no	  transaction	  between	   author	   and	   reader	   can	   occur.	   Thus,	   without	   translations	   from	   Hebrew,	   Greek	   and	  Aramaic,	   the	   vast	   majority	   of	   English-­‐language	   readers	   would	   be	   deprived	   of	   familiar	   and	  beloved	  Bible	  teachings.	  The	  triad	  of	  the	  common	  goods	  exchange,	  patrons,	  intermediaries,	  and	  clients,	  is	  there	  always	  in	  the	  case	  of	  written	  knowledge,	  but	  it	  is	  particularly	  easy	  to	  see	  in	  the	  case	   of	   translated	   work.	   There	   are	   even	   two	   major	   cases	   where	   explicit	   consideration	   of	  translations	   offer	   a	   marked	   contrast	   in	   the	   present	   case:	   Tocqueville	   is	   the	   knowledge-­‐providing	  patron	  whose	  gift	  of	  Democracy	  in	  America	  was	  occasioned	  by	  French	  political	  issues,	  and	   originally	   written	   in	   French	   for	   a	   French	   audience	   (Wills,	   2004).	   Without	   the	   all-­‐but-­‐invisible	  intermediation	  of	  the	  initial	  1835	  Henry	  Reeve	  translation,	  and	  the	  successive	  gifts	  of	  a	  series	  of	  co-­‐editors,	  notably	  the	  1863	  re-­‐translation	  by	  Frank	  Bowen,	  culminating	  in	  the	  classic	  1945	   edition	   by	   Bradley	   Phillips,	   the	   familiar	   words	   of	   one	   of	   the	   foundational	   works	   of	  American	   political	   culture	   and	   the	   distinctive	   model	   distinguishing	   political	   and	   civil	  associations	  might	  not	  have	   taken	   their	   familiar	   form.	   In	   fact,	  without	   these	   translations	   that	  
  255 
book	  might	  be	  as	   little	  known	  to	  non-­‐specialist	  English	   language	  readers	  as	  Otto	  von	  Gierke’s	  four	  volume	  work	  on	  associations	  which	  has	  never	  been	  translated	  in	  its	  entirety,	  or	  of	  several	  important	  modern	  Japanese,	  Dutch,	  and	  Swedish	  books	  on	  volunteerism.	  
The	  Dual	  Dyad:	  Complex	  Exchange	  The	  analogies	  of	  rational	  organization	  and	  market	  exchange	  are	  behind	  both	  the	   jerry-­‐rigged	   dyadic	   model	   of	   nonprofit	   organizations	   as	   “buyers”	   of	   donations	   and	   “sellers”	   of	  benefits.	   In	   the	  present,	  market-­‐based	  model	  of	  nonprofit	   firms,	   for	  example,	   fundraising	  and	  service	   delivery	   activities	   are	   treated	   as	   separate	   and	   distinct	   classes	   of	   transactions.	   This	  model	  of	  donation	  and	  benefaction	  as	  separate	   transactions	  has	  been	  unable	   to	  account	   for	  a	  number	  of	  essential	  characteristics	  of	  voluntary	  action,	  knowledge	  commons	  and	  philanthropy.	  The	  most	  notable	  examples	  of	  this	  involve	  legal	  restrictions	  on	  voluntary	  action	  to	  preserve	  the	  integrity	  of	  philanthropy.	  	  One	  such	  restriction	  is	  the	  general	  prohibition	  by	  the	  IRS	  on	  “self-­‐dealing”	  as	  a	  condition	  for	  retaining	   tax	  exempt	  status	  –	  which	  will	  have	   to	  remain	   in	  place	  as	   long	  as	  potential	   self-­‐dealers	   fail	   to	   see	   the	   adverse	   consequences	   this	   can	   have	   for	   beneficiaries,	   although	   the	  positive	  advantages	  for	  inter-­‐donor	  transactions	  which	  presumably	  motivate	  such	  transactions	  should	   be	   clear	   to	   everyone.	   Offending	   self-­‐dealers	   who	   look	   only	   at	   the	   price-­‐based	  transactions	  they	  are	  involved	  in	  ask,	  “what’s	  the	  harm	  in	  it?”	  and	  conventional	  economic	  and	  management	  understandings	  of	   self-­‐interest	  and	  reciprocity	  have	  no	  adequate	  explanation	  or	  justification.	   They	   fail	   to	   adequately	   account	   for	   why	   self-­‐dealing	   is	   incompatible	   with	  philanthropy,	   except	   in	   the	   most	   obvious	   and	   egregious	   ways.	   The	   inadequacy	   of	   rational	  individualist	  explanations	  of	  reciprocity	  is	  confirmed,	  in	  part,	  by	  the	  long	  and	  continuing	  series	  of	  efforts	  to	  account	  for	  this	  concept	  in	  the	  published	  literature.	  Since	  no	  one	  seems	  to	  be	  able	  to	  produce	  a	  satisfactory	  account,	  subsequent	  writers	  continue	  to	  try.	  Tocqueville’s	  qualifier	  of	  
self-­‐interest,	   properly	   understood	   and	   the	   morally	   informed	   views	   of	   Adam	   Smith	   and	   David	  Hume	   describe	   but	   fail	   to	   explain	   why	   or	   how,	   leaving	   that	   to	   conventional	   wisdom.	   The	  commons	   theory	   of	   voluntary	   action	   has	   the	   resources	   to	   provide	   a	   sufficient	   explanation	   of	  both:	   Such	   self-­‐dealings	   threaten	   or	   upend	   the	   exchange	   of	   total	   resources	   involved	   in	   the	  transactions	  of	  patrons,	  intermediaries	  and	  beneficiaries,	  including	  the	  trust	  (social	  capital)	  and	  identity	  (moral	  order)	  of	  participants.	  Self-­‐dealing	   is	   also	   unacceptable	   under	   U.S.	   law	   because	   it	   frames	   an	   inauthentic	  relationship;	  because	  it	  is	  not	  what	  it	  appears	  to	  be.	  It	  creates	  a	  fictional	  “other”	  as	  beneficiary	  who	   is,	   in	  reality,	   the	  purported	  donor.	  The	  kind	  of	  moral	  approval,	   recognition	  and	  status	   in	  the	  community	  that	  are	  due	  to	  the	  generous	  person,	  whether	  donor	  or	  agent,	  do	  not	  extend	  to	  the	  person	  who	  is	  using	  the	  appearance	  of	  philanthropy	  for	  personal	  gain	  or	  self-­‐enhancement.	  Using	  the	  model	  of	  dyadic	  transactions,	  it	  is	  very	  difficult	  to	  even	  see	  why	  this	  might	  be	  the	  case.	  Accepting	  a	  donation	   is	  one	   such	   transaction.	  Providing	  a	  benefit	  or	   service	   is	   another.	   If	   the	  donor	  gains	  in	  the	  process,	  who,	  they	  might	  ask	  is	  hurt	  thereby?	  	  
  256 
Drawing	   any	   connection	   between	   the	   two	   seemingly	   discrete	   transactions	   necessarily	  involves	   an	   explicit	   contract.	   In	   the	   absence	   of	   such	   a	   contract,	   the	   “nod-­‐nod;	   wink-­‐wink”	  understandings	   of	   informal,	   tacit,	   or	   covert	   transactions	   can	   easily	   be	   used	   to	   justify	   a	  wide	  variety	   of	   indiscretions	   by	   less	   than	   scrupulous	   persons.	   This	   is,	   it	   would	   seem,	   just	   good	  business	  practice:	  what,	  indeed,	  is	  the	  harm	  in	  it?	  By	  contrast,	  recognition	  of	  the	  triadic	  nature	  of	   the	   transaction	  between	  patron,	  agent	  and	  beneficiary	  makes	  clear	   the	   two	  distinct	  but,	   in	  reality,	  related	  stages	  of	  a	  larger	  gift	  transaction	  of	  giving	  and	  receiving:	  a	  gift	  from	  the	  patron	  or	   donor	   to	   the	   trusted	   agent	   or	   intermediary	   makes	   possible	   the	   subsequent	   gift	   from	   the	  agent	   to	   the	   beneficiary	   usually	   after	   its	   fungible	   combination	  with	   other	   such	   gifts	   or	   other	  such	   transformations,	   all	   of	   which	   serve	   to	   highlight	   the	   need	   for	   trust	   of	   the	   intermediate	  agent.	  This	  triadic	  model	  also	  establishes	  a	  basis	  for	  the	  real	  nature	  of	  reciprocity	  in	  voluntary	  action.	   Such	   reciprocity	   is	   generally	   recognized	   as	   quite	   different	   from	   the	   dyadic	   stimulus-­‐response	  models	  associated	  with	  market	  exchange.	  But	  the	  current	  literature	  has	  not	  been	  very	  forthcoming	  in	  offering	  explanations	  for	  this	  difference.	  	  
Social	  Economy	  Defined	  At	   the	   current	   time,	   the	   social	   economies	  of	   voluntary	  action	   today	  may	  have	  more	   in	  common	   with	   the	   local,	   communal	   economies	   of	   the	   Middle	   Ages	   than	   with	   the	   integrated	  national	  and	  global	  market	  economies	  of	  today.	   In	  terms	  of	  production	  of	  common	  goods,	   the	  six	  mile	  (or,	  taking	  into	  account	  automobiles	  and	  gas	  prices,	  perhaps	  a	  corresponding	  25	  mile)	  limit	   remains	   largely	   in	   effect:	   Much	   of	   what	   happens	   in	   contemporary	   social	   economies	  happens	   within	   a	   25	   mile	   radius	   among	   people	   (donors,	   volunteers,	   paid	   employees,	  beneficiaries,	  collaborators	  and	  others)	  who	  come	  to	  know	  one	  another	  on	  a	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  basis.	  In	  large	  measure	  because	  of	  the	  non-­‐fungible	  nature	  of	  certain	  key	  resource	  inputs	  (volunteer	  time	  and	  energy	  and	  gifts	  of	  repertories	  of	  local	  knowledge)	  social	  economies	  tend	  to	  be	  largely	  local,	  parochial,	  and	  communal	  in	  nature	  with	  very	  large	  but	  unrecorded	  “in-­‐kind”	  components.	  In	   these	   social	   economies,	   the	   availability	   of	   resources	   tends	   to	   be	   local,	   whether	   involving	  donations,	  volunteer	   time,	  social	  capital,	   the	  knowledge	  and	  skill	   inputs,	  or	   institutional	  rules	  and	  other	  moeurs	  involved.	  Likewise,	  the	  outputs	  of	  production	  from	  philanthropy,	  knowledge	  commons,	  and	  voluntary	  action	  also	  tend	  to	  be	  largely	  local.	  Regional	  and	  national	  exceptions	  to	  this	  generalization	  tend	  to	  be	  precisely	  that	  –	  exceptions.	  The	  elderly	  snowbirds	  of	  Florida	  and	  Arizona	  who	  contribute	  to	  worthy	  causes	  “back	  home”,	  for	  example.	  	  When	   the	  moeurs	   of	   voluntary	   action	   are	  more	   widely	   diffused	   across	   localities	   they	  tend	  to	  be	  so	  in	  patterns	  that	  might	  be	  termed	  island	  hopping	  across	  information	  archipelagos,	  as	  one	  largely	  autonomous	  community	  or	  focused	  public	  after	  another	  embraces	  the	  emerging	  new	   standard	  with	   little	   concern	   for	  whether	  others	  have	  done	   so,	  with	   almost	  no	   impact	   in	  terms	  of	  merging	   or	  melding	   the	   individual	   social	   economies	   into	   larger	   regional	   or	   national	  units.	  Even	  when	  modules	  of	  a	  new	  commons	  join	  or	  contract	  with	  market	  or	  government	  units,	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  outside	  world	  are	  often	  localized	  within	  that	  particular	  unit.	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Three	  Social	  Economies	  
 As	  noted	  previously	  in	  Chapter	  Four,	  the	  term	  social	  economy	  is	  one	  of	  the	  contenders	  for	   an	   umbrella	   term	   for	   the	   third	   sector.	   The	   concept	   of	   social	   economy	   has	   given	   rise	   to	  regionally-­‐	  and	  nationally-­‐	  based	  expressions	  of	  pluralism	  as	  European	  scholars	  associated	  with	  EMES	   and	   Canadian	   scholars	   associated	   with	   ANSER,	   have	   put	   forth	   two	   distinct	   models	   of	  social	   economy.	   (Evers	   and	   Laville,	   2004;	   Quarter,	   Mook	   and	   Armstrong,	   2009).	   New	  perspectives	   in	   the	   U.S.	   third	   sector	   are	   often	   advanced	   with	   at	   least	   a	   nod	   toward	   a	  Tocqueville-­‐styled	   American	   exceptionalism	   while	   particularly	   in	   Europe,	   alternatives	   to	  nonprofit	  sector	  terminology,	  and	  the	  nondistribution	  constraint	  in	  particular,	  often	  appears	  to	  appeal	  to	  varieties	  of	  intellectual	  anti-­‐Americanism.	  Both	  are	  equally	  regrettable.	  	  There	   is	   a	   clear,	  well-­‐rounded	   and	   robust	   structural	  model	   of	   the	  U.S.	   social	   economy	  embedded	  in	  current	  U.S.	  tax	  law;	  a	  social	  economy	  that	  is	  recognizably	  distinct	  from	  both	  the	  European	  and	  the	  Canadian	  alternatives.	  I	  spelled	  out	  this	  claim	  in	  greater	  detail	  in	  an	  ARNOVA	  conference	  paper	  a	  few	  years	  ago	  (Lohmann,	  2006).	  The	  European	  model	  is	  a	  practice	  one	  and	  an	  amalgam	  of	  earlier	   labor,	   solidarity	  and	  welfare	  state	  perspectives,	  and,	   in	   the	  view	  of	   the	  European	   Union	   consists	   of	   associations,	   mutuals,	   foundations	   and	   cooperatives	  (http://www.socialeconomy.eu.org/spip.php?rubrique215,	   Retrieved	   January	   6,	   2014).	   The	  Canadian	  model	  is	  more	  academic	  and	  places	  priority	  on	  nonprofits	  and	  cooperatives	  (Quarter,	  Mook	  &	  Ryan,	  2010).	  
The	  Accidental	  Social	  Economy	  The	   U.S.	  model	   is	   rough	   around	   the	   edges,	   conceptually	   speaking.	   In	   origin,	   it	   is	   both	  legal	   and	   academic	   but	   little	   discussed,	   as	   a	   social	   economy.	   	   Practitioners,	   when	   they	   look	  beyond	  their	  own	  local	  pursuits	  at	  all,	  tend	  to	  speak	  only	  of	  “the	  nonprofit	  sector”.	  Clearly,	  the	  U.S.	   social	   economy	   incorporates	   a	   distinctive,	   well-­‐defined	   sector	   of	   roughly	   300,000	   tax-­‐exempt/tax-­‐deductible	  (501-­‐c-­‐3)	  corporations	  and	  a	  recognized	  but	  largely	  undefined	  sector	  of	  an	   indeterminate	   number	   of	   “unincorporated	   associations”.	   It	   also	   includes	   multiple	   other	  categories	   of	   nonprofit	   activity,	   paralleling	   those	   in	   the	   European	   and	   Canadian	   social	  economies.	  	  The	   centrality	  of	  501(c)3’s	   and	   the	  observation	   that	  U.S.	   tax	   law	  and	  practice	  places	   a	  strong	  emphasis	  on	  “non-­‐distribution”	  of	  profits	  should	  not	  deflect	  observers	  from	  noting	  that	  the	  U.S.	   approach	   includes	   the	   full	   range	   of	   associations,	   organizations,	   foundations,	  mutuals	  and	  cooperatives	  detailed	  in	  the	  European	  approach	  to	  the	  social	  economy,	  plus	  a	  few	  unique	  (and	  politically	  prescribed)	  outliers.	  Moreover,	  the	  U.S.	  social	  economy	  has	  been	  largely	  defined	  and	  intact	  since	  the	  third	  decade	  of	  the	  20th	  century.	  Currently,	  the	  U.S.	  social	  economy	  and	  its	  largely	   local	   character	   consist	   of	   three	   parts:	   measured,	   the	   unmeasured	   and	   the	   seemingly	  immeasurable	   sub-­‐sectors.	  Perhaps	   the	   single	  most	   important	   characteristic	  of	   the	  U.S.	   social	  economy	  apart	  from	  the	  particular	  local	  entities	  that	  compose	  it,	  is	  its	  accidental	  nature.	  It	  has	  not	   been	   deliberately	   planned,	   created	   or	   intentionally	   established	   to	   any	   degree.	   It	   is	  more	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accurate	   to	   say	   that	   the	   U.S.	   social	   economy	  was	   enabled	   incrementally,	   through	   a	   series	   of	  recognitions	   of	   opportunities	   and	   possibilities.	   U.S.	   corporate	   law	   and	   tax	   policy,	   or	   for	   that	  matter,	   constitutional	   law	   protecting	   association	   and	   assembly	   are	   not	   in	   any	   way	  straightforwardly	   constitutive	   of	   an	   independent	   sector	   in	   communities,	   states	   or	   nationally.	  There	  is	  no	  single	  statute,	  ruling,	  or	  degree	  anywhere	  defining	  or	  decreeing	  that	  there	  will	  be	  a	  third,	   independent	   or	   nonprofit	   sector	   and	   the	   categories	   of	   the	   tax	   code	   are	   written	   to	  recognize	   certain	   existing	   activities	   rather	   than	   to	   establish	   them.	   No	   further	   proof	   of	   this	  should	   be	   required	   than	   the	   observation	   that	   the	   First	   Amendment	   rights	   of	   association,	  assembly,	  religion	  and	  speech,	  the	  use	  of	  corporations	  for	  common	  good,	  and	  the	  20th	  century	  tax	   provisions	   for	   exemptions,	   deductions	   and	   credits	   sat	   largely	   unnoticed	   and	   unused	   for	  nearly	   two	   centuries,	   in	   the	   first	   instance,	   and	   five	   decades	   in	   the	   latter.	   They	   were	   finally	  triggered	  by	  a	  series	  of	  accidental	  historical	  convergences	   in	  recent	  decades,	  several	  of	  which	  are	  mentioned	  above,	  but	  no	  one	  of	  which	  was	  decisive.	  In	  light	  of	  that	  history,	  the	  U.S.	  approach	  to	  social	  economy	  might	  best	  be	  described	  as	  a	  
permissive	   one	   based	   on	   enabling	   policy	   that	   allows	  many	   different	   possible	   forms	   of	   social	  economics	   without	   actually	   endorsing	   any	   particular	   approach.	   This	   would	   include	   the	  currently	  popular	  social	  enterprise	  model	  with	  which	  some	  nonprofit	  economists	  and	  business	  schools	  are	   so	  enamored,	  as	  well	   as	  more	   traditional	   forms	  of	   trusts,	  mutual	   (e.g.,	   insurance)	  companies,	   cooperatives	   and	   foundations,	   and	   the	   idealist,	   needs-­‐based	   models	   of	   the	   19th	  century,	  the	  socialist-­‐inspired	  mutual	  and	  cooperatives	  of	  the	  early	  20th	  century,	  and	  the	  hard-­‐nosed,	   no-­‐nonsense	   quantitative,	   measurement-­‐oriented	   approaches	   of	   the	   present.	   All	   are	  legal	  and	  legitimate,	  although	  business	  and	  government	  may	  not	  be	  equally	  receptive	  to	  doing	  business	  with	  all	  of	   them	  at	  any	  particular	  moment. The	  U.S.	  model	  of	  social	  economy,	   is	   less	  grounded	   in	   ideological	   or	   political	   concerns	   than	   either	   the	  Canadian	  or	  European	   versions.	  Yet,	  despite	   its	   lack	  of	   close	  association	  with	  social	  democracy	  or	  any	  similar	   ideology,	   it	   is	  a	  robust	  match	  for	  anything	  found	  in	  Europe	  or	  Canada.	  This	  fact	  is	  easily	  missed,	  however.	  	  The	  full	  scope	  and	  range	  of	  the	  American	  social	  economy	  has	  been	  for	  much	  of	  its	  history	  deeply	  buried	  in	  the	  arcane	  precincts	  of	  state	  corporation	  law	  and	  federal	  and	  state	  tax	  codes,	  foundation	   archives	   and	   obscure	   historical	  monographs.	  What	   is	   actually	   done	  with	   the	   U.S.	  model	  of	  social	  economy	  in	  practice	  may,	  in	  many	  times	  and	  places	  appear	  to	  be	  a	  rather	  paltry	  production	   emphasizing	   extension	   of	   local	   government	   and	   rule-­‐based	   bureaucracy.	   This	   is,	  however,	  due	  far	  more	  to	  institutional	  isomorphism,	  and	  more	  importantly,	  lack	  of	  imagination,	  community	  support	  or	  access	  to	  resources	  (a	  kind	  of	  moeurs	  deficit	  among	  them)	  than	  it	  is	  any	  deficiencies	  in	  law	  or	  policy.	  It	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  which	  of	  these	  three	  models	  of	  social	  economy,	  or	  others	  yet	  to	  be	  discovered	  or	  articulated,	  will	  prevail.	  It	  is	  also	  difficult	  to	  say	  in	  any	  definitive	  sense	  whether	  one	  or	  the	  other	  is	  more	  conducive	  to	  voluntary	  action	  in	  new	  commons,	  or	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  knowledge	  commons,	  since	  all	  of	  these	  are	  found	  in	  all	  three	  social	  economies.	  Consistent	  with	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the	  predominant	  pluralism	  of	  the	  localism	  and	  pluralism	  of	  the	  independent	  sector,	  it	  is	  entirely	  plausible	  that	  each	  will	  remain	  a	  vibrant	  and	  viable	  alternative	  to	  the	  others	  for	  many	  years	  to	  come.	  The	  following	  discussion	  attempts	  to	  highlight	  features	  common	  to	  all	  three	  and	  perhaps	  others	  yet	  to	  be	  identified.	  
Social	  Economy	  Defined	  The	  idea	  of	  a	  social	  economy	  inhabiting	  the	  economic	  precincts	  outside	  the	  market	  and	  the	   state	  where	  we	  have	   already	   located	  all	   forms	  of	   voluntary	   action	   should	  be	   easy	   to	   see:	  Westlund,	  for	  example,	  stated	  "(a	  social	  economy	  is)	  democratically	  driven	  economic	  activities	  which	   neither	   are	   carried	   on	  within	   the	   public	   sector	   nor	   have	   economic	   profit	   as	   the	  main	  purpose	   of	   activity"	   (Westlund,	   et.	   al.,	   1996:	   6).	   Similarly,	   the	   government	   of	   Sweden	   (1998)	  declared	  that	  "The	  social	  economy	  consists	  of	  organized	  activities	  that	  primarily	  have	  a	  social	  purpose	   and	   is	   organizationally	   free-­‐standing	   from	   the	   public	   sector."	   The	   idea	   of	   social	  economy	   also	   points	   up	   some	   explicitly	   normative	   directions	   consistent	  with	   its	  widespread	  social	  democratic	  origins:	  According	  to	  Trädgardh,	  a	  social	  economy	  is	  "the	  social	  organization	  of	   production	   and	   distribution	   to	   achieve	   the	   highest	   possible	   sum	   of	   common	   well-­‐being/welfare"	   (quoted	   in	   Westlund,	   1996).	   This	   would	   seem	   to	   offer	   a	   macro-­‐economic	  expression	  of	   the	  concept	  of	   common	  goods	  explored	   in	  Chapter	  6.	  The	  mission	  statement	  of	  the	   Association	   for	   Social	   Economy,	   founded	   in	  Washington	  DC	   in	   1941,	   speaks	   of	   economic	  concern	  for	  human	  dignity,	  ethics	  and	  philosophy.	  Definitions	  such	  as	  these	  clearly	  point	  up	  the	  qualities	   of	   “thirdness”	   outside	   the	   state	   and	   the	  market	   as	  well	   as	   a	   philanthropic	   intent,	   as	  those	   ideas	  were	   outlined	   above.	   Thus,	   it	   should	   be	   clear	   that	   the	   idea	   of	   a	   social	   economy,	  whether	  in	  the	  European,	  Canadian	  or	  U.S.	  versions	  is	  also	  closely	  related	  to	  distinct	  purposes	  and	  missions	  frequently	  encountered	  in	  the	  independent	  sector.	  	  
ConclusionTheir	  various	  advocates	  are	  correct:	  Third	  sector	  studies	  have	  paid	  insufficient	  attention	  to	   the	   social	   economy	   as	   a	   locality-­‐based	   gift	   economy	   (LaVille,	   2011;	   Vaillancourt, 2003; Quarter,	   2010).	   From	   casual	   conversations	  with	   colleagues	   in	   other	   countries	   it	  would	   seem	  likely	  that	  the	  locality-­‐based	  character	  of	  the	  U.S.	  social	  economy	  also	  applies	  elsewhere.	  At	  the	  very	   least,	   the	   existence	   of	   the	   three	  models	   of	   social	   economy	   –	   and	   there	   are	   undoubtedly	  others	   in	   Russia,	   Japan	   and	   elsewhere	   –	   is	   suggestive	   of	   a	   kind	   of	   national	   level	   community	  diversity	  that	  may	  or	  may	  not	  transfer	  down	  to	  the	  local	  community	  level.	  Whether	  or	  not	  the	  triad	  of	  the	  philanthropod	  applies	  to	  voluntary	  action,	  new	  commons	  and	  knowledge	  commons	  in	  all	  of	  those	  situations	  remains	  to	  be	  established	  through	  careful	  examination	  of	  the	  available	  evidence.	   It	  almost	  certainly	  does	  throughout	  the	  English-­‐speaking	  world	  where	  philanthropy	  stands	   in	   contrast	   to	   market	   economics	   and	   government.	   In	   the	   following	   chapter	   we	   will	  explore	  additional	  implications	  of	  this	  view	  under	  the	  broad	  banner	  of	  community.	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Sacrifice	  is	  for	  my	  children,	  generosity	  is	  for	  my	  siblings.	  	  
Fairness	  is	  for	  my	  neighbor,	  justice	  for	  my	  fellow	  townsmen.	  
Wary	  tit-­‐for-­‐tat	  is	  for	  the	  chaps	  in	  the	  next	  valley	  
And	  outright	  raiding	  for	  the	  people	  on	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  sea.	  
~	  Fredrick	  Turner,	  to	  the	  Philanthropic	  Enterprise	  	  
discussion	  list,	  July	  27,	  2012	   	  
 
13.	  Community	  Attention	   to	  national	   “nonprofit	   sectors”	  and	  even	   the	  globalization	  of	  national	  service	  franchises	   like	   United	   Way,	   together	   with	   the	   location	   of	   a	   variety	   of	   national	   “voices”	   like	  INDEPENDENT	  SECTOR,	  the	  Urban	  Institute’s	  Center	  for	  Charitable	  Statistics,	  and	  the	  United	  Way	  of	  America,	   in	   the	   Washington	   DC	   metro	   area	   and	   the	   development	   of	   national	   resources	   like	  Guidestar,	   the	  Foundation	  Center	  with	   its	  network	  of	   libraries,	  Charity	  Navigator,	  The	  Center	  for	  Responsible	  Philanthropy,	  Nonprofit	  News,	  The	  Chronicle	  of	  Philanthropy	  and	  The	  Nonprofit	  
Quarterly	  have	  for	  the	  moment	  diverted	  attention	  away	  from	  the	  essentially	  local	  character	  of	  social	   economies,	   voluntary	   action	   and	   civil	   society	   and	   added	   credence	   to	   the	   idea	   that	   all	  voluntary	   action	   is	   in	   something	   more	   than	   a	   purely	   statistical	   sense	   an	   integral	   part	   of	   a	  genuinely	  national	   “nonprofit	   sector”	   (Anheier,	   2005;	  Hall,	   2013;	   Salamon,	  2001;).	   	  However,	  these	  pale	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	  paradoxical	  way	  in	  which	  the	  mega-­‐processes	  of	  globalization	  have	  focused	  attention	  back	  on	  the	  local	  community.	  In	  a	  truly	  global	  world,	  national	  and	  state	  capitals	   are	   becoming,	   for	  most	   people,	   simply	   nodes	   in	   vast,	   linked	  worldwide	   information	  networks	  specializing	   in	  governmental	  operations.	  The	  real	  voluntary	  action	  with	  which	   they	  are	  familiar	  occurs	  within	  their	  local	  communities,	  in	  the	  full,	  multi-­‐dimensional	  senses	  of	  that	  term.	  No	  attempt	   is	  made	  here	  to	   justify	  use	  of	   the	  controversial	  concept	  of	  community,	  or	   to	  win	  over	  skeptics.	  Anyone	  who	  fails	  to	  see	  the	  value	  of	  community	  for	  understanding	  the	  third	  sector	   will	   have	   to	   look	   elsewhere	   for	   basic	   explanations	   or	   justifications.	   The	   writings	   of	  Roland	  Warren	  and	  Robert	  Nisbet	  are	  good	  places	  to	  start.	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  also	  that	  the	  first	  published	  English	  language	  translation	  of	  Tönnies’	  masterwork	  in	  1955	  translated	  Gemeinschaft	  
and	  Gesellschaft	  as	  “Community	  and	  Association”,	  while	  subsequent	  editions	  in	  1957	  and	  1988	  were	  entitled	  “Community	  and	  Society”	  and	  a	  2001	  edition	  was	  entitled	  “Community	  and	  Civil	  Society”!	   I	   seek	   only	   to	   clarify	  my	   use	   of	   the	   term	   and	   to	   explain	   its	   relevance	   to	   voluntary	  action	  and	  new	  commons.	  The	   third	   sector	   concept,	   and	   accompanying	   notions	   like	   the	   idea	   of	   “third	   party	  government”	  (Salamon,	  1987)	  tend	  to	  see	  community	  through	  the	  national	  lens	  through	  which	  local	   communities	   become	   sub-­‐divisions	   and	   “local	   outlets”	   for	   national	   and	   international	  corporations	   and	   nonprofit	   service	   systems.	   Richard	   Cornuelle,	   who	   first	   named	   the	  independent	   sector	   (1965),	   offered	   an	   alternative	   vision	   that	   he	   called	   “denationalizing	  community”	   (Cornuelle,	   1996).	   Although	   Cornuelle	   was	   motivated	   partly	   by	   particular	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libertarian	   concerns	   about	   limiting	   the	   size	   and	   scope	   of	   national	   government,	   one	   need	   not	  share	  that	  particular	  priority	  in	  order	  to	  see	  value	  in	  his	  vision	  of	  the	  autonomy	  of	  communities.	  There	   is	   little	   inherently	   political	   or	   ideological	   in	   the	   view	   of	   a	   “denationalized”	   (e.g.,	   local)	  community	  as	   the	  primary	   locus	  of	  an	   independent,	   third	  sector.	   Indeed,	   the	   term	   itself	   is	  an	  accurate	   description	   of	   the	   behavior	   of	   the	   preponderance	   of	   voluntary	   action	   from	  Tocqueville’s	   time	   to	   the	   present:	   locally	   oriented	   to	   the	   particular	   concerns	   of	   peer	   or	  membership	  groups	  in	  street,	  block,	  neighborhood,	  town	  or	  city.	  	  While	  Cornuelle’s	  libertarian	  preference	  was	  clearly	  for	  a	  completely	  independent	  sector	  as	  a	   radical	  alternative	   to	  government,	  many	  who	  downplay	  or	   reject	   the	   importance	  of	   such	  either-­‐or	   propositions	   may	   still	   find	   many	   degrees	   of	   value	   in	   the	   concept	   for	   describing,	  explaining	   and	   striving	   for	   major	   forms	   of	   voluntary	   action	   in	   local	   community.	   Voluntary	  action	  independent	  of	  both	  governments	  and	  markets	  is	  still	  a	  very	  real	  and	  vibrant	  reality	  in	  such	  settings.	  The	  original	  concern	  of	  Cornuelle	  and	  others	  was	  that	  the	  independent	  sector	  was	  about	  to	  disappear	  completely	  in	  the	  face	  of	  expanding	  government	  in	  the	  New	  Frontier/Great	  Society	   period	   of	   the	   1960s.	   Perhaps	   like	   Putnam’s	   later	   concern	   about	   declining	   civic	  participation,	  this	  ultimately	  proved	  unfounded.	  There	  is	  an	  important	  and	  vibrant	  independent	  sector	  that	  remains	  intact	  today	  half	  a	  century	  after	  Cornuelle’s	  expressed	  concern,	  and	  it	  is	  still	  in	   such	   local	   community	   where	   most	   voluntary	   action	   occurs.	   This	   applies	   not	   only	   to	   the	  hamlets,	  villages	  and	  small	  towns	  of	  Tocqueville’s	  time	  surviving	  today	  from	  the	  world’s	  shared	  rural	   past.	   It	   applies,	   perhaps	   even	   more	   vigorously,	   to	   the	   small	   cities,	   micropolitan	   areas,	  inner	  cities	  and	  suburban	  metropolitan	  regions,	  and	  yes,	  major	  urban	  centers	  like	  Los	  Angeles,	  London,	  Paris,	  Berlin	  and	  everything	  in	  between.	  	  In	  many	  ways,	  the	  United	  States	  became	  a	  national	  and	  international	  community	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  previous	  century.	  Western	  Europe	  was	  there	  long	  before,	  but	  much	  of	  it	  had	  to	  be	  rebuilt	  after	  the	  war.	  In	  the	  period	  after	  World	  War	  II	  right	  up	  to	  the	  present,	  a	  growing	  number	   of	   us	   listened	   to	   and	   watched	   the	   same	   news	   programs,	   television	   programs	   and	  movies,	  and	  many	  of	  us	  identified	  with	  our	  respective	  nations	  as	  much	  or	  more	  that	  our	  local	  identities.	  Yet,	  in	  our	  voluntary	  action,	  participation	  for	  most	  people	  remained	  strictly	  local,	  and	  as	   the	   forces	   of	   globalization	   have	   accelerated,	   cable	   television	   and	   other	   centripetal	   forces	  continue	   to	   dissolve	   much	   of	   the	   general	   interest	   of	   that	   tenuous	   national	   community	   into	  narrower	   “interest”	   alignments.	   	   The	   “great	   community”	   of	   us	   all	   extolled	   by	   Enlightenment	  universalism	  remains	  an	  elusive	   ideal,	  and	   in	  our	  voluntary	  action	  and	  commons	  we	  typically	  remain	   intensely	   local.	   Even	   in	   those	   cases	   where	   some	   of	   our	   educational	   and	   cultural	  institutions	  achieve	  national	  and	  even	  international	  followings,	  local	  affiliations	  and	  grounding	  are	   immediately	  clear:	   the	  Pittsburgh	  Symphony,	   the	  Metropolitan	  Museum	  (of	   the	  New	  York	  metropolitan	  area),	  the	  Kimball	  Museum	  in	  Fort	  Worth,	  and	  a	  great	  many	  other	  examples.	  	  Even	  so,	  in	  this	  particular	  modern	  transition	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  local	  has	  been	  retained	  but	  utterly	   transformed:	  Contemporary	  knowledge	   commons	  nearly	   all	   possess	   an	   important	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local	   character,	   whether	   geographic	   or	   interest-­‐wise.	   The	   international	   membership	   of	   the	  Association	   for	   Nonprofit	   Organizations	   and	   Voluntary	   Action	   (ARNOVA)	   and	   International	  Society	  for	  Third	  Sector	  Research	  (ISTR),	  one	  originating	  in	  local	  U.S.	  concerns	  and	  the	  other	  in	  marked	  attempts	  at	  globalization,	  first	  of	  the	  nonprofit	  sector	  perspective	  and	  then	  of	  European	  civil	   society	   perspectives,	   are	   typical	   among	  both	  disciplinary	   and	   interdisciplinary	   academic	  societies	  in	  producing	  knowledge	  less	  for	  the	  world	  as	  a	  whole	  than	  for	  review	  and	  critique	  by	  their	  own	  members.	  	  Even	   though	   community	   is	   not	   easily	   defined,	   and	   concepts	   of	   community	   remain	  unsatisfactorily	  vague	  in	  some	  ways,	  there	  is	  little	  question	  that	  the	  term	  community	  taps	  into	  some	  of	  our	  most	  basic	  cultural	  concerns.	  As	  with	  the	  negation	  of	  the	  term	  not-­‐for-­‐profit,	  these	  often	  take	  the	  form	  of	  paradox	  and	  antonym.	  As	  Robert	  Nisbet	  noted,	  the	  quest	  for	  community	  is	   the	   essence	   of	   western	   social	   philosophy,	   yet	   conflict	   is	   its	   indispensible	   context	   (Nisbet,	  1973:	  5).	  Even	  if	  one	  prefers,	  with	  John	  Rawls	  (2005a	  [1971])	  to	  place	  justice,	  or	  with	  Frederick	  Hayek	  to	  place	  market	  exchange,	  in	  that	  exalted	  central	  position	  there	  is	  still	  little	  question	  that	  the	   plural	   and	   federal	   character	   of	   modern	   communities	   is	   an	   essential	   element	   of	   the	  advancement	   of	   democratic	   society.	   Chapter	   6	   of	   Nisbet	   (1973)	   is	   entitled	   “The	   Plural	  Community”,	  an	  idea	  that	  he	  traces	  to	  Althusius.	  The	  term	  federal	  is	  used	  in	  this	  sentence	  and	  elsewhere,	  in	  the	  general	  sense	  identified	  by	  Daniel	  Elazar	  (1972;	  1997)	  to	  refer	  to	  something	  rather	   broader	   than	   the	   American	   national	   government.	   A	   federal	   community,	   such	   as	  most	  modern	   metropolitan	   areas	   and	   regions,	   and	   the	   urban	   centers	   of	   much	   of	   contemporary	  Europe,	  is	  characterized	  by	  what	  Althusius	  named	  the	  communitas	  communitatum.	  That	  is,	  it	  is	  a	   community	   composed	   of	   many	   communities.	   Althusius’	   concept	   is	   sometimes	   modernized	  with	  reference	  to	  “the	  many	  neighborhoods”	  of	  cities	  (or	  metropolitan	  regions)	  like	  Pittsburgh,	  San	   Francisco	   or	   New	   Orleans,	   et.	   al.	   and	   sometimes	   with	   the	   technical	   planning	   concept	   of	  multiple	   nuclei.	  Models	   of	   increased	   and	   enhanced	  participation	  make	   sense	   in	   a	   community	  context	   of	   horizontal	   and	  vertical	   federation	   that	  makes	   room	   for	  many	   types	  of	   community.	  The	   Athenian	   polis	   still	   exercises	   a	   strong	   hold	   on	   our	   collective	   imagination	   even	   though	  nothing	  quite	  like	  it	  exists	  in	  modern	  circumstances.	  	  Local	   community,	   in	   the	   context	   of	   voluntary	   action	   might	   best	   be	   seen	   as	   a	  geographically	  or	  ideationally	  situated	  example	  of	  the	  four-­‐sector	  regime	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  3,	   bringing	   together	   the	   coercive	   forces	   (or	   police	   powers)	   of	   government,	   the	   price-­‐based	  exchanges	   of	   markets,	   the	   intimate	   relations	   of	   households	   and,	   most	   importantly	   for	   our	  purposes,	   commons,	   those	   pooled	   means	   and	   agreed-­‐upon	   ends	   that	   characterize	   the	  independent	   sector.	   These	   four	   sectors	   of	   local	   communities	   represent	   distinct	   institutional	  action	   spaces	   and	   their	   respective	   action	   spaces	   will	   always	   be	   located	   or	   situated	   within	  particular	  local	  communities.	  	  The	   broad	   outlines	   of	   central	   place	   theory	   are	   very	   helpful	   in	   this	   regard.	   	   All	  communities,	  and	  in	  particular	  geographical	  communities,	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  consisting	  of	  a	  central	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core	  and	  one	  or	  more	  peripheral	  regions.	  This	   is	  the	  model	  of	  the	  city	  first	   laid	  out	  by	  Robert	  Park	  and	  associates	   in	   the	  1920s,	  generalized.	  Thus,	   for	  example,	  London	   is	   the	  central	  place	  not	  only	  of	  England	  but	  also	  of	  Great	  Britain	  and	  in	  its	  heyday	  a	  century	  ago	  of	  the	  vast	  British	  Empire	  on	  which,	  it	  was	  said,	  the	  sun	  never	  set.	  But	  by	  the	  20th	  century,	  London	  itself	  was	  not	  a	  single	  place	  but	  rather	  a	  vast	  region	  of	  places.	  Much	  the	  same	  may	  be	  said	  for	  Paris,	  Berlin,	  New	  York,	  Rome,	  and	  any	  number	  of	  additional	  metropolitan	  regions.	  This	  does	  not	  diminish	  their	  importance	  as	  central	  places	  in	  social	  and	  cultural	  terms,	  but	  it	  does	  make	  talking	  about	  them	  quite	  complex.	   In	  many	  respects,	  modern	  society	  and	  culture	  emanate	   from	  an	  archipelago	  of	  inter-­‐connected	  cores,	  each	  of	  which	  is,	  in	  turn,	  part	  of	  the	  periphery	  of	  somewhere	  else.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  each	  local	  community	   is	  a	  core	  and	  periphery	  unto	  itself,	  sui	  generis,	  with	   its	  own	  unique	  history,	   identity	  and	  dynamics	  but	  only	   some	  communities	  are	  cores	   for	  broader	   regions,	   and	   only	   for	   some	   purposes.	   Thus,	   for	   example,	   a	   portion	   of	   official	  Washington	   DC,	   known	   colloquially	   as	   “inside	   the	   beltway”,	   is	   the	   core	   of	   the	   U.S.	   national	  government	   and	   of	   its	   periphery	   which	   reaches	   all	   across	   the	   country	   and	   throughout	   the	  American	  Empire.	  One	  of	  the	  D.C.	  inner	  suburbs,	  Alexandria	  VA,	  is	  notably	  the	  headquarters	  of	  a	  large	   number	   of	   national	   membership	   associations,	   including	   offices	   of	   both	   major	   political	  parties,	   traditional	   national	   voluntary	   sector	   groups	   like	   the	   Red	   Cross,	   the	   Girl	   Scouts	   and	  United	  Way,	   and	   hundreds	   of	   other	   national	   professional,	   trade,	   scientific	   and	   other	   political	  associations	   and	   knowledge	   commons.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   Washington	   (“the	   district”),	   the	  Maryland	  and	  Virginia	  edge	  cities	  and	  many	  of	  the	  suburbs,	  including	  Alexandria,	  Silver	  Spring	  and	   Columbia	   MD	   and	   numerous	   others	   also	   have	   their	   own	   separate	   and	   distinct	   local	  independent	   sectors	   and	   the	   region	   also	   has	   numerous	   inter-­‐related	   local	   and	   regional	  voluntary	  action	  networks.	  All	  of	  this	  local	  community	  activity	  is	  downplayed,	  minimized	  or	  discounted	  completely	  by	  national	  sector	  models	  as	  well	  as	  by	  centralizing	  tendencies	  in	  the	  economy	  and	  polity	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  20th	  century.	  In	  The	  Democratic	  Experience	  (1973)	  Daniel	  Boorstin	  noted	  the	  emergence	  of	  national	  consumption	  communities	  bound	  in	  communitas	  through	  clothing	  styles,	  housing	  amenities	  and	  purchases	  of	  consumer	  goods	  and	  statistical	  communities,	  held	  together	  through	  statistical	  sampling	  by	  the	  characteristics	  they	  have	  in	  common	  and	  the	  publicizing	  of	  those	   similarities.	   One	   need	   only	   note	   the	   numbers	   of	   pairs	   of	   jeans	   worn	   at	   Starbucks	  anywhere	   or	   the	   varieties	   of	   beer	   sold	   in	   bars	   everywhere	   to	   recognize	   these	   centralizing	  tendencies.	  At	  its	  core,	  the	  national	  independent	  sector	  is	  both	  a	  consumption	  community	  and	  a	  statistical	   community	   as	   well	   as	   a	   producer	   community.	   However,	   unlike	   the	   standardized	  products	   of	   the	   consumer	   economy,	   the	   products	   of	   associations,	   assemblies,	   knowledge	  commons,	  and	  other	  components	  of	  the	  independent	  sector	  are	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  local	  in	  effect,	  limited	   in	   scope,	   unique	   and	   non-­‐transferrable.	   This	   is	   the	   case	   to	   a	   far	   greater	   degree	   than	  universalizing	   labels	   allow.	  While	   they	   all	   carry	   the	   label,	   United	  Way	   annual	   campaign,	   for	  example,	  none	  of	  the	  more	  than	  2,600	  instances	  of	  that	  species	  is	  exactly	  like	  any	  other.	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In	   conventional	   approaches	   to	  nonprofit	   sectors	   today,	   implicit	  or	  explicit	   reference	   is	  made	  primarily	  to	  national	  community	  in	  the	  U.S.	  British,	  German,	  Norwegian,	  Israeli,	  Irish	  and	  other	   third	   sectors.	   The	   assumption	   is	   that	   aggregate	   national	   data	   offer	  meaningful	   units	   of	  analysis	   like	  numbers	  of	  exempt	  corporations	  and	  aggregate	  expenditures	  and	  proportions	  of	  total	   employment.	   In	   the	   final	   analysis,	   national	   aggregate	   data	   are	  most	   useful	   for	   only	   one	  purpose:	   Measuring	   nonprofit	   corporate	   contributions	   to	   the	   national	   product.	   It	   is	   not	   my	  intent	   to	  minimize	   this	   development.	   Such	  measurements	  were	   hard-­‐fought	   and	   represent	   a	  major	  advancement.	  The	  point	  is	  only	  that	  there	  is	  more	  to	  life	  in	  the	  independent	  sector,	  or	  for	  that	   matter,	   the	   wider	   third	   sector,	   than	   its	   contributions	   to	   the	   GDP	   and	   for	   theoretical	  purposes	  such	  measurements	  represent	  a	  weak,	  faulty	  and	  even	  deceptive,	  starting	  point.	  Yet,	  for	   most	   other	   purposes,	   including	   understanding	   voluntary	   action,	   local	   community	   and	  individual	  organizations	  represent	  far	  better	  starting	  points.	  	  In	   numerous	   nation	   states,	   sub-­‐national	   communities	   of	   various	   types	   exercise	  important	  roles	  in	  defining	  the	  institutional	  profile	  of	  the	  independent	  sectors.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  U.S.,	  state	  legislation	  is	  fundamental	  in	  defining	  nonprofit	  incorporation,	  although	  the	  influence	  of	   national	   model	   statutes	   by	   the	   legal	   community	  mitigates	   differences.	   Nevertheless,	   most	  states	   are	   themselves	   economic,	   political	   and	   civil	   communities	   in	  which	   the	   unique	   history,	  culture	  and	  character	  of	  the	  state	  impacts	  upon	  the	  nature	  of	  voluntary	  action	  that	  occurs	  there.	  Regional	   communities	   like	  New	  England,	   Appalachia,	   the	   South,	   the	   Southwest,	   the	  Midwest,	  and	   Pacific	   Northwest	   are	   also	   important	   in	   identifying	   the	   role	   of	   voluntary	   action	   in	  communities.	  Likewise,	  worldwide	  urban	  growth	  has	  been	  such	  that	  in	  a	  distinctly	  21st	  century	  sense,	   in	  every	  part	  of	   the	  world	   today	   large	  urban	  concentrations	   (with	   their	   sub-­‐regions	  of	  distinct	  neighborhoods,	   inner	   city,	  multiple	  nuclei,	   suburbs)	   are	   regions,	   usually	  named	   for	   a	  central	  city:	  New	  York,	  London,	  Mumbai,	  Seoul,	  Cleveland,	  Los	  Angeles,	  Budapest,	  etc.	  	  Commons	  –	  common	  pool	  resources	  shared	  by	  a	  group	  of	  voluntary	  participants	  agreed	  upon	  some	  mission	  or	  purpose	  –	  are	  explicitly	  both	  products	  of	  community	  and	  organized	  and	  institutionalized	   in	   the	   context	   of	   any	   of	   these	   types	   of	   communities.	   Collective	   choice	   and	  rational	  individualist	  models	  will	  remain	  important	  for	  the	  examination	  of	  allocative	  decisions,	  as	   will	   models	   like	   the	   Bloomington	   School’s	   IAD	   for	   the	   rational	   planning	   and	   design	   of	  commons-­‐based	   institutions.	   However,	   collective	   action	   and	   collective	   behavior	   models	   are	  equally	  important	  for	  understanding	  the	  actual	  interaction	  and	  dynamics	  of	  voluntary	  action	  in	  everyday	  life	  of	  democratic	  society	  and	  culture.	  Community	  will	  remain	  an	  important	  aspect	  of	  that	  perspective. 
Multiple	  Meanings	  The	  concept	  of	  community	   is	  both	  popular	  and	  problematic.	  The	  basic	  problem	   is	   that	  we	  all	  know	  approximately	  what	  it	  means,	  but	  no	  one	  can	  be	  certain	  what	  someone	  else	  means	  by	  it.	  A	  study	  by	  George	  Hillary	  (1963)	  identified	  more	  than	  500	  definitions	  of	  the	  basic	  term,	  and	  the	  community	  literature	  has	  grown	  considerably	  since	  then.	  There	  could	  be	  thousands	  of	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definitions	  by	  now.	  Even	  with	  qualifiers,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  make	  the	  term	  usefully	  precise.	  Thus,	  the	  use	  here	  will	  be	  admittedly	  somewhat	  general;	  community	  is	  more	  a	  matter	  of	  orientation	  than	  precise	  definition.	  The	  focus	  in	  this	  chapter	  is	  on	  community	  as	  the	  principal	  locale	  of	  voluntary	  action	  and	  more	  specifically,	  on	  local	  or	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  voluntary	  action	  in	  neighborhoods,	  towns,	  cities,	  and	  metropolitan	  and	  rural	  regions.	  	  	  There	   is	   a	   strong	   tradition	   in	   public	   charities	   stretching	   all	   the	   way	   back	   to	   the	  Elizabethan	  Poor	  Laws	  for	  voluntary,	  as	  well	  as	  legally	  obligated,	  local	  government	  action,	  and	  a	  very	  long	  tradition	  of	  scholarly	  studies	  of	  such	  efforts	  (Chalmers,	  1827;	  Gurteen,	  1882;	  Lowell,	  1880;	  Maine,	  1876).	  The	  study	  of	  commons	  is	  approximately	  of	  a	  similar	  age	  (Scrutton,	  1887;	  Maine,	  1876).	  The	  term	  community	  organization	  has	   long	  been	  used	  in	  the	  dual	  senses	  of	  the	  organization	   of	   community	   level	   voluntary	   (mostly	   welfare)	   institutions,	   and	   of	   the	   moeurs	  used	   to	   organize	   and	   mobilize	   such	   institutions,	   known	   in	   U.S.	   tax	   law	   as	   “public	   charities”	  (Alinsky,	   1989	   [1946];	   McMillen,	   1945;	   Steiner,	   1925).	   The	   term	   community	   organization	  appears	   to	  have	   first	   come	   into	  use	   to	  characterize	  community-­‐level	  defense	  efforts	   in	  World	  War	   I	   (Feagin,	   1914;	  Cheyney,	   1918).	  There	   is	   a	   basic	   inconsistency	  between	   the	  uses	  of	   the	  term	   “social	   welfare”	   for	   such	   organizations	   and	   the	   tax-­‐code	   use	   of	   the	   term	   for	   501(c)4	  organizations	  like	  Chambers	  of	  Commerce	  and	  the	  NAACP,	  not	  to	  mention	  political	  fundraising	  vehicles	   like	   Americans	   for	   Progress.	   Such	   confusion,	   already	   inherent	   in	   the	   tax-­‐based	  measurement	  scheme	   for	   the	  nonprofit	  sector,	  has	  been	  radically	  exacerbated	  by	   the	  Citizens	  United	  ruling	  (2010).	  	  	  In	   the	   context	   of	   voluntary	   action,	   community	   organization	   may	   refer	   either	   to	  neighborhoods,	   cities	   of	   all	   sizes,	   metropolitan	   regions,	   states	   like	   Texas	   or	  WV,	   geographic	  regions	  like	  Appalachia,	  nations,	  clusters	  of	  nations,	  e.g.	  the	  European	  community,	  or	  the	  global	  community,	  or	  to	  subsets	  of	   formal	  organizations	   in	  those	   locales.	  Rather	  than	  attempting	  yet	  another	   conceptualization	   here	   from	   the	   standpoint	   of	   community	   theory,	   this	   chapter	   will	  review	   some	   of	   the	   recent	   conceptualization	   of	   community-­‐oriented	   commons	   research.	   But	  first,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  mention	  briefly	  some	  of	  the	  key	  concepts	  of	  community	  theory	  from	  the	  standpoint	  of	  voluntary	  action.	  
Core	  Concepts	  Ferdinand	   Tönnies’	   seminal	   work	   entitled	   Gemeinschaft	   und	   Gesellschaft	   is	   the	   ur-­‐document	   on	   contemporary	   social	   science	   work	   on	   community.	   Most	   authorities	   consider	  contemporary	  local	  communities	  to	  be	  characterized	  by	  gemeinschaft	  while	  idealized	  versions	  of	  gesellschaft	  continue	  to	  intrigue.	  Thus,	  in	  several	  ways,	  even	  translations	  of	  Tönnies	  title	  into	  English	   illustrate	  several	  of	   the	  ambiguities	  with	   the	  concept	  of	   community.	  There	  have	  been	  three	   translations	   into	   English	   published	   in	   the	   U.S.	   in	   the	   past	   half	   century.	   They	   reveal	  important	  nuances	  in	  the	  translators’	  understandings	  of	  the	  concept	  itself.	  The	  first	  translation	  by	  Charles	  Loomis	  in	  1957	  rendered	  the	  German	  title	  as	  Association	  and	  Community;	  two	  years	  later	   the	  same	  translation	  was	  retitled	  Community	  and	  Society	   and	  a	  2001	  translation	  by	   José	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Harris	   and	  Margaret	   Hollis	  was	   titled	  Community	   and	   Civil	   Society.	   It	   is	   possible	   to	   conclude	  from	  this	  titular	  history	  alone	  that	  Tönnies	  may	  still	  have	  implications	  for	  third	  sector	  studies,	  even	   though	   almost	   no	   one	   in	   third	   sector	   studies	   seems	   to	   actually	   cite	   this	  work	   except	   in	  superficial,	  non-­‐nuanced	  ways.	  It	  may	  be	  time	  for	  a	  reconsideration	  of	  the	  man	  and	  the	  ideas.	  Through	   a	   long	   and	   productive	   career,	   Robert	   Nisbet	   was	   one	   of	   the	   foremost	  sociological	   proponents	   of	   community	   concepts.	   Ironically,	   Nisbet’s	   ideological	   conservatism,	  most	  evident	  in	  some	  of	  his	  later	  works,	  has	  meant	  that	  the	  importance	  of	  his	  contributions	  to	  a	  robust	   understanding	   of	   community	   in	   democratic	   society	   and	   culture	   may	   have	   been	  downplayed	  and	  even	  ignored	  by	  friend	  and	  foe	  alike.	  ‘Liberals’	  have	  tended	  to	  deny	  or	  discount	  the	   ‘conservative’	   implications	  of	  Nisbet’s	  and	  others’	  non-­‐ideological	  writings	  on	  community,	  while	  conservatives	  have	  taken	  a	  libertarian	  turn	  over	  the	  past	  four	  decades	  and	  abandoned	  or	  neglected	  Nisbet’s	  and	  others’	  communitarian	  references	  altogether.	  Dame	  Margaret	  Thatcher’s	  supposed	   denial	   that	   ‘society’	   exists	   during	   the	   1980s,	   ideologically	   charged	   as	   it	   was	   and	  stripped	   of	   the	   subtleties	   and	   elegance	   that	   give	   that	   statement	   plausibility	   for	  many	   in	   the	  social	   sciences,	   is	   a	   good	   example	   of	   the	   problem	   (See	  http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/04/08/context-­‐for-­‐margaret-­‐thatcher-­‐s-­‐there-­‐is-­‐no-­‐such-­‐thing-­‐as-­‐society-­‐remarks.html	  for	  some	  much-­‐needed	  context).	  	  The	  issue	  as	  well	  as	  the	  risks	  involved	  were	  perhaps	  most	  evident	  in	  the	  2012	  U.S.	  Presidential	  campaign,	  when	  the	  large	  field	  of	  Republican	  candidates	  –	  traditionally	  defenders	  of	  local	  community	  and	  voluntary	  action	  –	  apparently	  made	  no	  mention	  of	  either	  throughout	  the	  long	  campaign.	  Another	   scholar	   closely	   linked	   to	   community	   is	   Roland	   Warren.	   His	   horizontal	   and	  vertical	   dimensions	   of	   community	   parallels	   in	  many	   respects	   the	   later	   bonding	   and	   bridging	  approaches	  to	  social	  capital.	  Warren’s	  ideas	  have	  long	  been	  particularly	  well	  received	  by	  social	  welfare	  liberals	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  even	  though	  his	  overall	  sociological	  vision	  of	  community	  is	  not	  that	  far	  from	  Nisbet’s	  and	  the	  writings	  of	  the	  two	  men	  together	  still	  offer	  an	  excellent	  understanding	  of	   the	   concept	   first	   outlined	   by	   Tönnies.	   Carl	   Milofsky,	   a	   student	   of	   Warren’s	   as	   an	  undergraduate,	   has	   done	   much	   to	   interpret	   Warren’s	   ideas	   on	   community	   for	   third	   sector	  audiences	  (Milofsky,	  1988;	  Milofsky,	  2008A;	  Milofsky,	  2008B).	  
Community	  and	  Commons	  	   One	  of	  the	  challenges	  for	  contemporary	  perspectives	  on	  commons	  theory	  is	  to	  link	  both	  new	   and	   old	   commons	   to	   ideas	   of	   community.	   In	   some	   respects,	   the	   new	   commons	   and	  knowledge	  commons	  concepts	  are	  taking	  on	  some	  of	  the	  load	  traditionally	  born	  by	  community.	  Charlotte	  Hess	   (2008,	  5)	  advanced	  such	  an	  effort	  with	  a	  categorization	  of	  new	  commons	   into	  seven	  main	  (and	  overlapping)	  topics	  that	  she	  calls	  sectors	  (not	  to	  be	  confused	  with	  the	  sectors	  discussed	   above).	   She	   identifies:	   cultural	   commons,	   neighborhood	   commons,	   knowledge	  commons,	   social	   commons,	   infrastructure	   commons,	   market	   commons	   and	   global	   commons.	  The	  first	  six	  all	  involve	  potentially	  different	  notions	  or	  dimensions	  of	  community,	  emphasizing	  in	  turn	  shared	  symbols,	  physical	  proximity,	  understandings,	  perceptions,	  and	  exchange.	  	  These	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categories	  can	  be	  used	  to	  frame	  a	  brief	  literature	  review	  of	  recent	  commons	  studies	  bearing	  on	  the	  main	  themes	  of	  the	  current	  work.	  	  
Cultural	  Commons	  One	   of	   the	   persistent	   themes	   of	   a	   substantial	   body	   of	   commons	   research	   has	   been	  cultural	   enclosure	   in	   which	   investigators	   identify	   facets	   of	   a	   culture	   commons	   “open”	   or	  common	  to	  a	  population,	  group,	  or	  other	  social	  collectivity	  and	  efforts	  to	  “enclose”	  or	  privatize	  what	   had	   previously	   been	   (or	  was	   perceived	   as)	   a	   common	   pool	   resource	   and	   turn	   it	   into	   a	  market	   product	   or	   commodity.	   Such	   ‘commodifications’	   of	   culture,	   have	   also	   been	   a	   general	  theme	   in	   political	   and	   social	   theory,	   and	   an	   important	   concern	   of	   activists	   and	   community	  organizers.	   Among	   many	   such	   cases,	   examples	   have	   been	   noted	   in	   traditional	   folk	   music,	  popular	  eco-­‐	  and	  cultural	  tourist	  sites	   like	  the	  Garifuna	  Community	  of	  Roatan	  (Kirtsoglou	  and	  Theodossopoulos,	  2004),	  fashion	  as	  a	  commons	  (Bollier	  and	  Racine,	  2005)	  or	  “seed	  wars”	  and	  indigenous	   culture	   (Aoki,	   2003).	   Anthony	   McCann	   (2002)	   studied	   enclosure	   and	   traditional	  culture	   using	   the	   case	   of	   the	   Irish	   Music	   Rights	   Association.	   In	   this	   context,	   Michael	   Brown	  (2005)	  asked	  Who	  Owns	  Native	  Culture?	  and	  Susan	  Clerc	  (2002)	  asked	  Who	  Owns	  Our	  Culture?	  Each	   of	   these	   can	  be	   read	   as	   a	   contribution	   to	   the	   growing	   view	  of	   culture	   as	   a	   kind	   of	   new	  commons	  and	  culture	  production	  as	  common	  goods	  production.	  Such	  perspectives	  run	  directly	  counter	  to	  the	  legal	  developments	  of	  a	  second	  enclosure	  movement	  by	  Boyle	  (2003b),	  noted	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter.	  
Neighborhood	  Commons	  Hess’	   categories	   (2008)	   remind	   us	   also	   that	   neighborhoods	   have	   been	   the	   subject	   of	  examination	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  the	  commons,	  “[B]oth	  urban	  and	  rural	  commons	  where	  people	  living	   in	   close	   proximity	   come	   together	   to	   strengthen,	   manage,	   preserve	   or	   protect	   a	   local	  [common	  pool]	  resource”	  (Hess,	  2008:	  16).	  This	  is	  the	  case	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  neighborhood	  as	  a	  social	  unit	  (Wellman,	  2005)	  and	  of	  neighborhood-­‐level	  associations,	  like	  Latino	  community	  gardens	   (Saldivar-­‐Tanaka	   and	   Krasny.	   2004).	   Some	   recent	   studies	   of	   neighborhood	  associations,	   neighborhood	   councils	   or	  membership	   groups	   of	   residents	   or	   property	   owners,	  currently	   fall	   outside	   the	   main	   body	   of	   commons	   studies	   but	   within	   the	   larger	   domain	   of	  political	  science),	  but	  connections	  are	  not	  hard	  to	  discover	  (Dilger,	  1992;	  Nelson,	  2003).	  	  Mesch	  	  &	  Schwirian	  (1996)	  characterized	  neighborhood	  associations	  as	  collective	  action	  and	  Paulsen	  &	  Bartkowski	  (1997)	  dealt	  with	  the	  role	  of	  activists	  in	  such	  associations	  and	  gender	  differences	  in	  perceptions	  of	  their	  organizations’	  effectiveness.	  Recent	  distinctions	  have	  been	  drawn	  between	  neighborhood	   associations,	   per	   se,	   residentially	   based	   homeowner’s	   associations,	   and	  neighborhood	   watch	   organizations	   formed	   to	   defend	   residents	   against	   real	   and	   perceived	  outside	   threats	   (Garofalo	   &	  McCloud,	   1989;	   Rosenbaum,	   1987;	   Ross	   &	   Jang,	   2000).	   In	   all	   of	  these	  and	  other	  studies,	  repertories	  of	  themes	  and	  issues	  of	  common	  interest	  among	  neighbors,	  common	  missions,	  such	  as	  protection	  of	  property	  and	  residents,	  neighborhood	  ambience	  as	  a	  common	  good,	  common	  resource	  pooling	  and	  other	  commons-­‐based	  themes	  figure	  importantly.	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Knowledge	  Commons	  One	  of	  Hess’	  important	  themes	  is	  the	  knowledge	  commons,	  which	  has	  already	  dealt	  with	  knowledge	  commons	  in	  Chapter	  9	  above.	  Literature	  in	  this	  area	  is	  in	  its	  early	  stages,	  there	  are	  already	   apparent	   connections	   to	   the	   dominant	   themes	   of	   this	   study,	   such	   as	   those	   of	   Nancy	  Kranick	  on	  libraries	  as	  “storehouses	  of	  democracy”	  (Kranick,	  2007),	  while	  adding,	  perhaps,	  that	  libraries	  as	  knowledge	  commons	  are	  also	  storehouses	  of	  monarchy,	  anarchy,	  and	  autocracy	  and	  other	   political	   systems	   as	   well.	   In	   noting	   the	   class	   she	   calls	   cultural	   commons,	   Hess	   (2008)	  notes	   that	   it	   overlaps	   significantly	   with	   neighborhood	   and	   knowledge	   commons	   (p.	   15).	  Cultural	  commons	  might	  also	  include	  local,	  neighborhood	  and	  community	  arts	  associations	  and	  historical	   societies,	   artists’	   and	   art	   producers	   groups	   and	   organizations	   intended	   to	   facilitate	  the	  tasks	  of	  production	  of	  works	  of	  art,	  consumer	  groups	  like	  book	  and	  other	  discussion	  groups,	  as	  well	  as	  museums	  of	  all	  types.	  Orchestras	  generally	  tend	  to	  be	  locality	  based	  as	  their	  names	  often	   connote	   (e.g.,	   Philadelphia	   Orchestra;	   Pittsburgh	   Symphony;	   Cleveland	   Symphony,	  Wheeling	   Symphony,	   et.	   al.)	   or	   even	   institution	   specific	   (WVU	   Orchestra;	   Harvard-­‐Radcliffe	  Orchestra;	   et.	   al).	  Museums	   are	  more	   often	   named	   after	   their	   benefactors	   (e.g.,	   the	  Whitney,	  Frick	   and	   many,	   many	   others	   in	   New	   York;	   the	   Renwick	   in	   Washington	   DC;	   the	   Barnes	   in	  Philadelphia;	  the	  Getty	  in	  Los	  Angeles,	  etc.	  There	  are,	  of	  course,	  numerous	  counter-­‐tendencies	  of	  both	  these	  generalizations.	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  provocative	  implication	  of	  the	  commons	  theory	  of	   voluntary	   action	   is	   to	   raise	   the	   possibility,	   noted	   above,	   that	   concert	   goers,	   museum	  subscribers	  and	  donors	  (especially	  large	  donors	  and	  those	  who	  purchase	  annual	  passes)	  should	  be	   seen	   as	   just	   as	   much	   part	   of	   the	   organization	   of	   cultural	   commons	   as	   the	   performers,	  curators	  and	  arts	  administrators	  who	  make	  up	  the	  formal	  organization	  of	  paid	  employees.	  From	  the	   standpoint	   of	   the	   rational	   individualism	  of	   conventional	  mainstream	   commons	   theory,	   of	  course,	  such	  questions	  never	  arise.  
Social	  commons	  Social	   commons	   is	   listed	   as	   a	   category	   of	   new	   commons	   but	   not	   discussed	   by	   Hess	  (2008).	  Presumably,	  social	  commons	  would	  include	  a	  great	  many	  associations,	  assemblies	  and	  organized	   and	   informal	   social	   clubs,	  membership	   associations	   and	   all	   of	   the	   other	   commons	  based	  on	  communication	  and	   interaction	  discussed	  here.	  The	  basic	   idea	  of	  a	  social	  commons,	  like	   that	   of	   community,	   is	   inherently	   ambiguous,	   perhaps	   because	   of	   its	   widespread	   usage	  today.	   Discussions	   of	   community	   are	   typically	   focused	   primarily	   on	   the	   social	   relations	   of	  community	   residents,	   and	   on	   specific	   dimensions	   like	   local	   and	   regional	   power	   structures	  (Gaventa,	  1982).	  C.	  Wright	  Mills	   (1999	  [1956])	  and	  work	   in	   that	   tradition,	  such	  as	  concerned	  with	  power	  in	  the	  national	  community).	  	   For	   the	  most	  part,	   theoretical	   literature	  on	   the	  commons	  profitably	  exploits	   the	   three-­‐sector	  model	  of	  commons,	  market	  and	  government.	  Yet,	  there	  is	  a	  small	  but	  durable	  literature	  that	  explores	   the	  role	  of	  commons	  within	  markets,	  an	   idea	  that	   is	  an	  example	  of	   the	  modular	  principle	   introduced	   above.	   Araral	   (2009)	   translates	   the	   force	   of	   market	   pressure	   into	   a	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measurable	  impact	  upon	  commons	  in	  the	  Philippines.	  Hassan	  &	  Mertens	  (2010)	  treats	  financial	  risk	   as	   a	   tragedy	   of	   the	   commons.	   Boettke	   (2010)	   asks	   whether	   self-­‐regulation	   is	   the	   only	  reasonable	   form	   of	   regulation?	   From	   the	   standpoint	   of	   voluntary	   action,	   perhaps	   the	   most	  convincing	  cases	  of	  market-­‐oriented	  commons	  are	  an	  old	  and	  well-­‐established	  form	  –	  producer	  and	   consumer	   cooperatives	   (De	   Peuter	   &	   Dyer-Witheford, 2010);	   Holmberg,	   2011).	   It	   is	  important	  in	  this	  context	  to	  remember	  that	  while	  natural	  commons	  like	  moss	  or	  tree	  mold	  are	  not	  social	  commons,	  and	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  the	  hives	  and	  nests	  of	  ‘social’	  insects	  like	  bees	  and	  ants	  are	  truly	  ‘social’	  requires	  very	  careful	  sorting	  out,	  all	  property,	  information	  and	  knowledge	  commons	  as	  well	  as	  voluntary	  action	  have	  inherently	  social	  dimensions	  to	  them.	   
Infrastructure	  commons	  It	  isn’t	  completely	  clear	  in	  context	  what	  Hess	  has	  in	  mind	  under	  this	  heading.	  She	  may	  be	  referring	  to	  the	  large	  body	  of	  studies	  done	  at	  the	  Bloomington	  School	  and	  elsewhere	  of	  water	  rights,	   irrigation,	  fishing	  rights	  and	  other	  such	  commons.	  As	  noted	  previously,	  Mike	  McGinnis’	  suggestion	  that	  this	  body	  of	  work	  may	  have	  implications	  for	  understanding	  voluntary	  action	  is	  a	  good	  one.	  There	  is,	  however,	  also	  an	  enormous	  range	  of	  possibilities	  for	  specific	  examination	  of	  knowledge	   commons	   serving	   infrastructure	   roles.	   Just	   within	   third	   sector	   studies,	   many	   of	  these	  like	  ARNOVA,	  ISTR,	  Guidestar,	  the	  Center	  for	  Charitable	  Statistics,	  the	  Foundation	  Center,	  and	   others	   have	   already	   been	   mentioned.	   Within	   commons	   studies,	   the	   Indiana	   University-­‐based	  Internet	  Library	  of	  the	  Commons	  and	  the	  International	  Association	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  the	  Commons	   have	   also	   been	   mentioned,	   and	   each	   of	   these	   organizations	   is	   also	   involved	   in	  meetings,	  conferences	  and	  other	  assemblies.	  	  
Global	  commons	  The	   last	   –	   global	   commons	   –	   would	   seem	   to	   allow	   a	   genuinely	   plural,	   multi-­‐valued	  perspective.	   Susan	   J.	  Buck	   (1998)	   identifies	   four	  global	   (old)	   commons:	  Antarctica,	   the	  world	  ocean,	  earth’s	  atmosphere,	  and	  outer	  space.	  Other	  commons	  theorists	  generally	  agree	  upon	  this	  small	   set	   of	   genuinely	   global	   commons,	   including	   the	   atmosphere,	   the	   oceans	   (Auster,	   et.	   al.,	  2009;	  Vogler,	  2012),	  Antarctica	  (Tin,	  et.	  al.	  2012),	  outer	  space	  (Mills,	  2011),	  and	  some	  add	  the	  electromagnetic	  spectrum	  (Wormbs,	  2011).	  Each	  of	  these	  is	  also	  associated	  with	  a	  knowledge	  commons	  and	  to	  this	  list,	  one	  might	  add	  at	  least	  one	  more	  recent	  global	  commons/knowledge	  commons	  -­‐-­‐	  the	  human	  genome	  –	  even	  though	  there	  is	  still	  controversy	  over	  how	  much	  of	  the	  human	  genetic	  legacy	  can	  be	  patented	  and	  thereby	  enclosed.	  There	  are	  also	  a	  small	  but	  growing	  number	  of	  social	  problem	  knowledge	  commons	  that	  approach	  genuinely	  global	  commons	  status.	  These	  include	  world	  poverty,	   famine	  and	  disaster	  relief,	   humanitarianism,	   freedoms	   of	   speech,	   association,	   assembly	   and	   religion	   and	   a	   few	  others.	   This	   growing	   list	   might	   also	   include	   knowledge	   commons	   like	   the	   aforementioned	  calculus	  and	  knowledge	  of	  numerous	  diseases,	  particularly	  those	  seemingly	  following	  the	  path	  toward	  eradication	   that	  began	  with	  smallpox	   in	  1980.	   In	  each	  of	   these	  cases,	  a	  plurality	   (one	  might	   say,	   a	   community)	   of	   transnational	   nongovernmental	   organizations	   (TNGOs	   or	   INGOs)	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each	  created	  under	  the	  laws	  of	  one	  nation	  and	  operating	  in	  one	  or	  more	  others	  have	  collectively	  appropriated,	  defined,	  developed	  performances,	  practices	  and	  other	  moeurs	  and	  in	  other	  ways	  sought	   to	   ‘own’	   a	   particular	   knowledge	   commons.	   This	   is	   a	   distinctly	   contemporary	  phenomenon	  perhaps	  first	  arising	  in	  the	  universalist	  cultural	  aspirations	  of	  the	  Enlightenment	  and	  continuing	  to	  gain	  momentum	  into	  the	  21st.	  
Common	  Themes	  Thematically	   defined	   global	   knowledge	   commons	   are	   also	   in	   evidence	   in	   a	   variety	   of	  other	   instances	   as	   well.	   Hess	   (2008:	   6)	   identifies	   five	   such	   themes	   as	   “entry	   points”	   for	  understanding	   recent	   work	   on	   commons.	   Each	   one	   of	   these	   themes	   has	   similarly	   evolved	   a	  growing	   base	   of	   agreed	   upon	   knowledge,	   a	   network	   of	   organizations	   and	   associations,	   and	  other	  accouterments	  of	  knowledge	  commons.	  These	  five	  domains	  are:	  (1)	  protecting	  an	  existing	  common	  resource	  from	  enclosure	  or	  commodification;	  (2)	  investigation	  of	  peer	  production	  and	  mass	  collaboration,	  “especially	  in	  electronic	  media”;	  (3)	  identification	  of	  new	  types	  of	  commons	  tragedies;	   (4)	   efforts	   to	   advance	   civic	   education	   through	   commons-­‐like	   ideas;	   and	   (5)	  rediscovery	  of	  the	  commons.	  Again,	   there	   is	  no	  need	  to	  mention	  or	  cite	  all	  of	   the	  hundreds	  of	  studies	  Hess	   refers	   to.	  Her	   paper	   is	   readily	   available	   online,	   and	   given	  her	   announced	   intent	  may	  be	  updated	  by	  the	  time	  this	  volume	  is	  in	  print.	   	  The	  bibliography	  of	  the	  2008	  paper	  is	  34	  pages	  long	  and	  a	  wealth	  of	  additional,	  earlier	  citations	  are	  available	  at	  the	  Digital	  Library	  of	  the	  Commons.	  
Protecting	  the	  Commons	  
 One	   of	   the	   most	   universally	   shared	   sentiments	   of	   the	   knowledge	   commons	   that	   is	  contemporary	   commons	   studies	   is	   the	   trope	   that	   common	   pool	   resources	   are	   something	   of	  value	   and	   worthy	   of	   protection	   and	   preservation;	   although	   there	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   widespread	  disagreement	   on	   the	   form	  which	   such	   protection	   should	   take	   in	   specific	   cases.	   Hess	   (2008)	  notes	  that	  there	  is	  a	  “strikingly	  large	  body	  of	  work	  around	  enclosures”	  (p.	  6)	  and	  the	  threat	  to	  particular	  commonly	  shared	  resources	  enclosures	  represent.	  In	  many	  cases,	  the	  culprit	  is	  cited	  as	  markets	  or	  market	  forces,	  although	  some	  sources	  (e.g.,	  Boettke,	  2011)	  are	  more	  inclined	  to	  see	  government	  as	  the	  problem.	  Privatization	  (enclosure)	  of	  a	  previous	  commons	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  threat	  in	  academic	  work	  (Krimsky,	  2002)	  or	  the	  academy	  (Bowers,	  2006);	  culture	  (Clerc,	  2002;	  Lessig,	  2004);	  public	  art	  (Kleiman,	  2005);	  native	  culture	  (M.	  Brown,	  2003).	  Also	  important	  here	  are	  science,	  information	  and	  scientific	  data	  (Branscomb,	  1994;	  R.	  Elliott,	  2005;	  Kennedy,	  2005;	  Shiva,	   2002);	   the	   legal	   basis	   of	   the	   public	   domain	   (Benkler,	   1999);	   and	   villages	   as	   commons	  (Pelikeis,	  2003)	  Far	   and	   away,	   the	   largest	   continuous	   body	   of	   work	   over	   the	   years	   following	   Hardin	  (1968)	   has	   been	   directed	   at	   protecting	   the	   environment	   as	   a	   common	   pool	   resource	  (Brousseau,	  et.	  al.,	  2012;	  Van	  Vugt,	  2009).	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“Collective	  Action,	  Peer	  Production,	  and	  Mass	  Collaboration”	  Hess’	   use	   of	   collective	   action	   would	   seem	   to	   include	   many	   of	   the	   mass	   collaboration	  projects	  online.	  e.g.	  the	  massive,	  global	  Linux	  and	  Wikipedia	  and	  a	  huge	  and	  growing	  number	  of	  similar	  open	  source	  software	  efforts,	  collaborative	  projects	   like	   	   the	  Public	  Library	  of	  Science,	  and	   the	  Digital	   Library	   of	   the	  Commons,	   and	  hundreds	   of	   other	   information	   aggregators	   like	  Del.icio.us,	  Reddit,	  Social	  media	  like	  Facebook,	  with	  its	  billion	  registrants,	  Twitter	  and	  countless	  other	  “social	  networking”	  sites	  could	  be	  added	  to	  this	  list	  as	  well,	  although	  a	  careful	  reading	  of	  the	   peer	   production	   literature	   will	   lead	   to	   some	   serious	   questions	   about	   when	   such	   mass	  collaborations	   are	   genuinely	   productive	   and	   when	   merely	   collaborative	   without	   discernable	  productive	  outputs.	  
Commons	  Tragedies	  In	  the	  true	  spirit	  of	  Hardin’s	  (1968)	  original	  concern	  with	  the	  commons	  tragedy	  of	  the	  environment,	   it	   is	   also	   worth	   noting	   also	   that	   concern	   over	   possible	   commons	   tragedies	  continues	   to	   be	   a	   motivating	   factor	   for	   a	   considerable	   body	   of	   work	   on	   the	   commons.	   In	   a	  statement	   that	   accurately	   characterizes	   the	   introduction	   of	   commons	   theory	   into	   voluntary	  action	  (Lohmann,	  1989),	  Hess	  says	   “The	   tragedy	  of	   the	  commons	  has	  been	   the	  entry	  point	   in	  almost	  every	  sector	  of	  the	  new	  commons.”	  (2008:	  9)	  She	  then	  goes	  on	  to	  list	  nearly	  50	  studies	  that	   illustrate	   the	   point	   and	   a	   much	   larger	   updated	   list	   can	   be	   easily	   compiled	   by	   a	   Google	  Scholar	  search	  on	  the	  terms	  “commons	  tragedy”	  delimited	  by	  the	  years	  since	  2008.	  One	  of	  the	  new	  terms	  which	  more	  recent	   thinking	  about	  commons	  tragedies	  has	  produced	   is	   the	   idea	  of	  the	  anticommons,	  the	  tragedy	  of	  which	  is	  said	  to	  be	  underutilization	  (Heller,	  2011).	  	  
Civic	  Commons	  Commons	   theory	   is	   potentially	   the	  most	   radical	   departure	   in	   community	   theory	   since	  the	   incorporation	   of	   small	   group	   insights	   into	   community	   thinking	   (Northouse,	   2012).	   Peter	  Levine	  is	  one	  of	  the	  scholars	  cited	  previously	  in	  connection	  with	  movement	  of	  commons	  studies	  away	  from	  exclusive	  preoccupation	  with	  collective	  choice	  and	  rational	  individualism.	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	   that	  Hess	   (2008)	   appears	   to	   follow	  Levine’s	   lead	   and	   refer	   to	   collective	   choice	   rather	  than	  collective	  action.	  A	  number	  of	  Levine’s	  publications	  focus	  explicitly	  on	  the	  civic	  commons	  (Levine,	  2002a&b;	  Levine,	  2003;	  2007a&b;	  Gastil	  &	  Levine,	  2005).	  As	  such,	  they	  dovetail	  nicely	  with	  other	  recent	  writings	  on	  civic	  concerns	  and	  provide	  a	  basis	  for	  focusing	  on	  the	  collective	  resource	  dimensions	  of	  civic	  life.	  For	  example,	  an	  Institute	  for	  the	  Future	  publication	  (Saveri,	  et.	  al.,	  2005)	  asks	  “How	  can	  new	  insights	  about	  the	  dynamics	  of	  cooperation	  help	  us	  identify	  new	  and	   lucrative	   models	   for	   organizing	   production	   and	   wealth	   creation	   that	   leverage	   win-­‐win	  dynamics;	   and	  how	  can	  organizations	  enhance	   their	   creativity	  and	  grow	  potential	   innovation	  with	  cooperation-­‐based	  strategic	  models?”	  (Hess,	  2008:	  10)	  
Conclusion	  	  Community	   is	  one	  of	   the	  most	   fundamental	  concepts	   in	  modern	  social	  science	  but	  also	  highly	  contested	  by	  some.	  Third	  sector	  scholars	  working	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  Tönnies’	  Gemeinschaft	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und	  Gesellschaft	  have	  been	  particularly	  interested	  in	  work	  by	  Nisbet,	  Warren	  which	  can	  in	  turn	  be	  traced	  to	  Althusius.	  	  Close	   examination	   of	   the	   commons	   studies	   like	   those	   cited	   by	   Charlotte	   Hess	   (2008)	  provide	  an	  extensive	  body	  of	   literature	  supportive	  of	  the	  fusion	  of	  voluntary	  action,	   including	  association	   and	   assemblies,	   and	   various	   commons	   perspectives	   on	   cultural,	   neighborhood,	  social,	  infrastructure,	  global	  and	  knowledge	  commons.	  It	  is	  clear	  from	  this	  review	  that	  the	  two	  distinct	  knowledge	  commons	  of	  commons	  studies	  and	  third	  sector	  studies	  have	  many	  common	  issues	  and	  concerns.	  Not	  the	  least	  of	  these	  is	  a	  shared	  interest	  in	  democratic	  society	  and	  culture.	  	  It	   was	   noted	   at	   several	   points	   in	   previous	   chapters	   that	   institutional	   support	   for	  pluralism	   and	   a	  multiplicity	   of	   perspectives	   is	   one	   of	   the	   fundamental	   characteristics	   of	   the	  third	   sector	   and	   one	   of	   the	   qualities	   supporting	   those	   components	   of	   the	   third	   sector	   most	  readily	   characterized	   as	   independent	   from	   markets	   and	   states	   and	   most	   conducive	   to	   the	  production	  and	  enactment	  of	  community.	  In	  the	  following	  chapter,	  the	  closely	  related	  theme	  of	  pluralism	  is	   the	  central	  concern,	  and	   is	   linked	  to	  the	  sudden	  dramatic	  rise	  of	   interest	   in	   third	  sectors,	  civil	  societies,	  social	  economies,	  the	  penumbra	  of	  legal	  rights	  and	  other	  manifestations	  of	  the	  world-­‐wide	  association	  revolution.
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We	  are	  what	  we	  repeatedly	  do.	  Excellence,	  then,	  is	  not	  an	  act	  but	  a	  habit.	  
	   ~	  Aristotle	  	  
14.	  Pluralism	  
 Despite	   their	   descriptive	   value	   and	   explanatory	   usefulness,	   the	   concepts	   of	   voluntary	  action,	   new	   commons,	   and	   the	   associated	   ideas	   introduced	   above	   do	   not	   offer	   a	   particularly	  convincing	   explanation	   for	   the	   sudden,	   dramatic	   and	   nearly	   simultaneous	   appearances	   of	  altogether	  new	   third	  sectors	   in	   country	  after	   country	  during	   the	  second	  half	  of	   the	   twentieth	  century.	  We	   can	   concur	  with	  Lester	   Salamon	   (1993)	   that	   a	  worldwide	  association	   revolution	  has	  taken	  place	  without	  really	  grasping	  why	  and	  even	  how	  that	  revolution	  took	  place.	  We	  can	  look	  to	  the	  conservative	  reaction	  against	  the	  welfare	  state	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Great	  Britain	  sometimes	  called	  “starve	  the	  beast”	  during	  the	  Thatcher-­‐Reagan	  era	  and	  also	  identified	  as	  neo-­‐liberalism	  without	  fully	  grasping	  why	  they,	  or	  anyone,	  might	  see	  voluntary	  action	  as	  a	  plausible	  alternative.	  We	   can	   look	  with	   irony	   at	   this	   and	  what	   President	   George	  H.W.	   Bush	   termed	   “a	  thousand	   points	   of	   light”,	   noting	   sadly	   that	   this	   is	   also	   apparently	   an	   age	   of	   declining	   civic	  participation.	  In	  so	  doing,	  we	  may	  completely	  fail	  to	  see	  that	  this	  is	  not	  so	  everywhere.	  A	  great	  deal	  more	  is	  at	  work	  below	  the	  surface	  than	  the	  international	  embrace	  following	  World	  War	  II	  of	   rights	  of	   association	  and	  assembly,	  or	   the	   international	   collapse	   (or	   is	   it	   just	  a	   retreat?)	  of	  statism	   following	   the	  events	  of	  1989.	  This	   is	  more	   too	   than	  a	  simple	   intellectual	   ferment:	   the	  more	  or	  less	  simultaneous	  discovery	  by	  many	  national	  communities	  of	  researchers	  and	  scholars	  of	   national	   third	   sectors	   that	   had	   long	   existed,	   or	   the	   formation	   of	   something	   like	   an	  international	  community	  of	  interacting	  scholars	  and	  practitioners	  as	  one	  facet	  of	  globalization.	  What	   is	   at	   work	   in	   both	   the	   global	   association	   revolution	   and	   in	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	  scholarly	   community	  devoted	   to	   studying	   the	   third	   sector	   is	   a	   tectonic	   shift	   in	  our	  –	   citizens,	  political	  theorists,	  researchers	  and	  politicians	  –	  understandings	  of	  the	  nature	  and	  possibilities	  of	  liberal	  democracy.	  The	  signs	  are	  widely	  disbursed:	  We	  have	  found	  them	  among	  the	  political	  philosophers	   cited	   in	   the	   first	   chapter,	   among	   the	   pioneering	   practitioners	  working	   in	  many	  types	  of	  nonprofits,	  nongovernmental	  organizations,	  and	  INGOs	  on	  every	  continent,	  among	  the	  activists,	  community	  organizers,	  and	  nonprofit	  service	  providers	  working	  in	  local	  communities,	  social	   movements,	   among	   those	   researchers,	   investigators	   and	   practitioners	   concerned	   with	  defining	   social	   problems	   and	   necessary	   practices	   for	   dealing	   with	   them,	   including	   those	  working	  in	  the	  separate	  knowledge	  commons	  of	  third	  sector	  studies	  and	  commons	  studies,	  and	  finally	  among	  those	  elected	  officials,	  bureaucrats	  and	  corporate	  leaders	  who	  have	  seen	  similar	  things	  and	  sought	  over	  a	  number	  of	  centuries	  to	  facilitate	  these	  developments.	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Jump	  Starting	  Pluralism	  In	  this	  chapter,	  we	  will	  explore	  the	  simple	  but	  perhaps	  radical	  thesis	  that	  the	  spirit	  of	  the	  age	  bends	  toward	  pluralism.	  The	  idea	  of	  pluralistic	  democratic	  society	  and	  culture	   is	  hardly	  a	  new	  one,	  although	  most	  of	  the	  attention	  in	  the	  past	  has	  been	  directed	  to	  democracy	  as	  a	  system	  of	  government	  and	  the	  discrepancy	  pluralism	  introduces	  to	  the	  democratic	  idea.	  Several	  names	  have	  long	  been	  associated	  with	  political	  pluralism.	  Johannes	  Althusius	  is,	  by	  common	  consent,	  the	   acknowledged	   fountainhead	   of	   modern	   pluralism.	   In	   addition	   Otto	   von	   Gierke,	   Gierke’s	  translator	   and	   expositor,	   Frederick	   Maitland	   and	   Maitland’s	   lesser	   known	   student	   and	  colleague,	   J.	   Neville	   Figgis,	   as	   well	   as	   Harold	   Laski,	   together	   with	   the	   American	   sociologist	  Robert	  Nisbet,	  the	  African-­‐American	  philosopher	  Alain	  Locke,	  the	  Canadian	  philosopher	  Charles	  Taylor	   and	   the	  British	  political	   philosopher	   Isaiah	  Berlin	   (and	  others)	   all	   provide	   reasonable	  starting	  points	  for	  a	  contemporary	  pluralistic	  understanding	  of	  democratic	  society	  and	  culture	  and	  the	  role	  of	  voluntary	  action	  and	  new	  commons.	  	  Earlier	  pluralist	  work	  tends	  to	  concentrate	  on	  the	  plural	  nature	  of	  the	  state	  itself	  (Coker,	  1921).	  Yet,	  Althusius’	  pluralist	  conception	  of	  the	  state	  as	  a	  communitas	  communitatum,	  has	  somehow	  been	   lost	   along	   the	  way.	  His	   vision	   of	  a	   community	   of	   communities	   is	   quite	   a	   different	   view	  from	   the	  Weberian	   concept	   of	   the	   state	   as	   possessor	   of	   the	   legitimate	  monopoly	   of	   violence	  (Weber,	  1968),	   and	  all	   other	  monotonic	   conceptions	  of	   the	   state	   as	   the	   sole	   arbiter	  of	  public	  goods.	  Fortunately,	  for	  our	  purposes,	  we	  do	  not	  have	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  many	  complex	  and	  tricky	  issues	   involved	   in	   locating	   the	   liberal	   state	   because	   one	   of	   the	  most	   fundamental	   of	  modern	  pluralist	  insights	  is	  to	  be	  found	  in	  the	  very	  notion	  of	  multiple	  sectors:	  Households,	  markets	  and	  the	  third	  sector	  are	  defined,	  in	  large	  part,	  by	  the	  simple	  fact	  that	  they	  are	  not	  of	  the	  state.	  This	  is	  the	  most	  valuable	   insight	  of	  Cornuelle’s	  notion	  of	   the	   independent	  sector.	  There	  are	  certainly	  many	   third	   sector	   organizations,	   programs	   and	   services	   closely	   aligned	   with	   and	   deeply	  associated	  with	  governments	  of	  all	  types	  and	  at	  all	  levels	  from	  the	  local	  to	  the	  international.	  It	  is	  also	  the	  case,	  as	  Christian	  Reus-­‐Smit	  (1999,	  13)	  argues	   in	  The	  Moral	  Purpose	  of	   the	  State	   that	  certain	   “(f)undamental	   institutions	   operate	   at	   a	   deeper	   level	   of	   international	   society	   than	  regimes.	   In	   fact,	   in	  the	  modern	  society	  of	  states	  they	  comprise	  the	  basic	  rules	  of	  practice	  that	  structure	   regime	   cooperation."	   Or,	   as	   has	   been	   argued	   above,	   in	   very	   fundamental	   and	   far-­‐reaching	  ways,	  political	  states	  emerge	  from	  the	  kind	  of	  voluntary	  action	  characteristic	  of	  new	  commons.	  Before	  they	  can	  be	  effective	  at	  the	  kinds	  of	  things	  that	  governments,	  and	  particularly	  democratic	   governments	   do,	   they	   must	   undergo	   a	   state	   of	   voluntary	   action	   and	   organizing	  between	   the	   voting	   which	   legitimates	   them	   and	   the	   decisions	   and	   acts	   that	   are	   their	  characteristic	  expression. This	   is	  not	   the	  singular,	  monolithic	  and	  meaningless	  process	   it	   is	   sometimes	  conveyed	  as.	  If	  anything,	  Josef	  Stalin’s	  kvost	  (like	  Hitler’s	  putsch)	  should	  prove	  that	  the	  voluntary	  action	  of	  organizing	  a	  government	  can	  be	  an	  act	  of	  monumental,	  even	  catastrophic	  significance,	  and	  a	  key	  link	  between	   the	  plurality	  of	  diverse	  communities	  and	   the	  unified	  general	  will	   that	  Rousseau	  and	  others	  find	  so	  essential.	  In	  some	  of	  his	  later	  work,	  Robert	  Nisbet	  (1973)	  shifts	  the	  focus	  to	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“The	  Pluralistic	  Community”;	  an	  idea	  that	  accords	  well	  with	  Tocqueville’s	  earlier	  emphasis	  on	  voluntary	  action	  in	  democratic	  (civil)	  society	  and	  with	  the	  conception	  of	  democratic	  society	  and	  culture	   characterized	  by	   voluntary	   action	   in	   community.	   Close	   study	  of	  Tocqueville	  may	   also	  offer	  clues	  as	  to	  how,	  under	  conditions	  of	  pluralism,	  some	  of	  the	  states	  formed	  in	  circumstances	  of	   extreme	   plurality	   prove	   to	   be	   “failed	   states”	   while	   others	   in	   the	   long	   twentieth	   century	  proved	  to	  be	  all-­‐too-­‐devastatingly	  effective	  and	  lethal	  not	  only	  to	  humans	  but	  to	  the	  very	  idea	  of	  pluralism.	  
Pluralism	  Redefined	  Before	  we	  go	  further,	  it	  may	  be	  useful	  to	  characterize	  more	  clearly	  what	  is	  meant	  by	  the	  pluralism	   of	   the	   third	   sector.	   The	   root	   plural	   means	   more	   than	   one,	   multiple,	   numerous	   or	  several,	   and	   pluralism,	   therefore,	   is	   at	   heart	   a	   characteristic	   of	   some	   thing	   or	   system	  characterized	   by	   diversity,	   difference	   or	   multiplicity.	   As	   it	   relates	   specifically	   to	   voluntary	  action,	  pluralism	  is	  itself	  plural;	  that	  is,	  it	  has	  multiple	  possible	  meanings	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  various	  users.	  There	   is,	   for	  example,	   the	  possibility	  of	  diversity	  –	   the	  co-­‐existence	  of	  several	  different	  types	  –	  within	  social,	  economic,	  political	  or	  cultural	  systems.	  This	  can	  be	  called	  simple,	  plain	  or	  first-­‐order	  pluralism.	  Thus,	  a	  social	  club	  of	  old,	  white	  men	  that	  opens	  its	  membership	  to	  women,	  younger	  members,	   including	  members	  of	  minority	   groups	   can	  be	   said	   to	   exhibit	  diversity,	   or	  pluralism.	  Another	   type	  of	  pluralism	   is	   the	  existence	  of	  multiple	   such	  systems	  along	  with	   the	  possibility	  of	  diversity	  (or	  lack	  of	  diversity)	  within	  any	  of	  them,	  e.g.,	  when	  all	  of	  the	  social	  clubs	  within	   a	   community	   or	   region	   does	   the	   same.	   This	   represents	   a	   kind	   of	   more	   complex,	   or	  second	  order	  pluralism.	  There	  is,	  of	  course,	  a	  paradox	  that	  arises	  at	  the	  second	  level	  and	  gives	  rise	  to	  yet	  a	  third	  possibility.	  If	  all	  of	  the	  clubs	  make	  the	  same	  move,	  then	  while	  the	  individual	  units	  are	  more	  heterogeneous	  or	  pluralistic,	  the	  system	  as	  a	  whole	  remains	  quite	  singular	  and	  not	  diverse	  at	  all.	  It	  merely	  exhibits	  a	  different	  singular	  quality	  than	  it	  had	  previously.	  Thus,	  we	  must	   also	   consider	   the	   possibility	   of	   heterodox	   pluralism:	   a	   diverse	   system	   of	   multiple	  organizations,	  only	  some	  of	  which	  are	  diverse	  on	  any	  particular	  characteristic,	  while	  others	  are	  quite	   homogeneous.	   This	   brings	   us	   to	   the	   condition	   of	   the	   third	   sector.	   But	   first,	   we	   must	  consider	  another	  important	  meaning	  of	  the	  term	  pluralism.	  In	   contemporary	   U.S.	   political	   science	   and	   the	   complex	   U.S.	   federal	   system,	   the	   term	  pluralism	  gradually	  came	  to	  refer	  to	  a	  specific	  debate	  over	  the	  distribution	  of	  power.	  The	  issue	  which	  raised	  this	  was	  the	  apparent	  incongruities	  between	  a	  study	  of	  community	  politics	  in	  New	  Haven,	   CT	   by	  Robert	  Dahl	   (1961)	   that	   showed	  widely	   distributed	   power	   sharing,	   and	  Dahl’s	  
Politics,	  Economics	  and	  Welfare	  (1953)	  co-­‐authored	  with	  Charles	  Lindblom,	  which	  generalized	  this	  finding	  into	  a	  system	  they	  called	  polyarchy.	  This	  was	  in	  apparent	  disagreement	  with	  other	  studies	  including	  one	  of	  Atlanta	  by	  Floyd	  Hunter	  (1953),	  which	  showed	  a	  highly	  concentrated	  community	  power	  structure,	  and	  the	  theorizing	  of	  C.	  Wright	  Mills,	  who	  popularized	  the	  terms	  “power	  structure”	  and	  what	  others	  came	  to	  call	   the	  “military	   industrial	  complex”	  (Mills,	  1999	  [1956]).	   Rather	   than	   suggesting,	   in	   the	   spirit	   of	   pluralism,	   that	   these	   studies	   indicated	   real	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differences	   in	   study	   communities,	   most	   commentators	   saw	   them	   through	   a	   kind	   of	   national	  “mass	   society”	   lens	   as	   simply	   a	   theoretical	   conflict	   for	   which	   there	   ought	   to	   be	   a	   single	  resolution.	   Over	   time,	   this	   debate	   over	   the	   distribution	   and	   structure	   of	   community	   power	  appears	   to	   have	   overwhelmed	   other	   considerations	   and,	   ironically,	   focused	   meaning	   of	  pluralism	  only	  on	  this	  single	  dimension	  at	  the	  very	  time	  that	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  third	  sector	  gave	  it	  entirely	  new,	  more	  robust	  connotations.	  Plurality	   gives	   additional	   shades	   of	   meaning	   to	   the	   term	   independent	   sector.	   A	   third	  sector	   consisting	   of	   volunteering	   and	   other	   individual	   acts	   of	   philanthropy,	   nonprofit	   firms,	  including	   some	   engaged	   in	   social	   enterprise,	   and	   voluntary	   action	   in	   new	   commons,	   and	  possibly	   other	   forms	   of	   organization	   is	   pluralistic	   in	   the	   third,	   heterodox	   sense.	   	   It	   is	   a	  pluralistic	   entity	   (enterprise	   is	   not	   the	   right	  word	   here)	   composed	   of	   a	  multitude	   of	   entities	  some	  of	  which	  may	  be	  quite	  homogeneous.	  This	  pluralism	  is	  not	  just	  a	  matter	  of	  issues	  of	  power	  and	  gender,	   racial	   and	  ethnic	  diversity	  but	  on	  a	  whole	   array	  of	   other	  possible	  dimensions	  as	  well.	  In	  religious	  new	  and	  knowledge	  commons,	  for	  example,	  it	  may	  be	  a	  matter	  of	  doctrine	  or	  shared	   beliefs.	   In	   artistic	   enterprises,	   sciences,	   social	   services	   and	   other	   cases	   it	  may	   be	   the	  pluralism	  of	  other	  moeurs,	  including	  practices	  such	  as	  peer	  review	  and	  credentialing.	  Further,	  a	  long	  series	  of	  literally	  hundreds	  of	  court	  cases	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  beginning	  with	  the	  iconic	  Dartmouth	  
College	  v.	  Woodward	  case	  in	  1819	  and	  continuing	  through	  the	  recent	  string	  of	  Boy	  Scouts	  cases	  in	   recent	  years	  over	   the	   issue	  of	   the	  admission	  of	  homosexual	  members	  and/or	   leaders	  have	  sought	   to	   reinforce	   that	   plurality,	   even	   in	   the	   face	   of	   various	   sacred	   norms.	   The	   Boy	   Scouts	  cases	   have	   been	   particularly	   challenging	   because	   of	   the	  way	   in	  which	   they	   pit	   diversity	   as	   a	  moeur	   of	   the	   third	   sector,	   in	   which	   some	   organizations	   reinforce	   universal	   norms	   of	   social	  justice	  while	  others	  do	  not,	  against	  the	  diversity	  of	  individual	  organizations	  in	  a	  simple	  system	  where	  all	  organizations	  are	  expected	  to	  be	  uniformly	  diverse.	  
Heterodox	  Pluralism	  The	   third	   sector	   as	   a	   whole	   –	   the	   entire	   space	   outside	   households,	   markets	   and	  governments	  –	  is	  characterized	  by	  heterodox	  pluralism,	  which	  may	  at	  times	  approach	  complete	  unpredictability.	   This	   is	   an	   even	  more	   complex	   form	  of	   pluralism	   in	  which	   individual	   groups	  and	   organizations,	   networks	   of	   organizations	   demonstrating	   similar	   or	   diverse	   forms	   of	  pluralism	  along	  multiple	  dimensions	  may	  be	  homogeneous	  or	  heterogeneous	  at	  any	  level,	  and	  at	   different	   points	   in	   their	   organizational	   careers.	   While	   this	   is	   frustrating	   for	   investigators	  seeking	   generalizations	   about	   the	   third	   sector	   as	   a	   whole,	   it	   is	   an	   empirical	   condition	   that	  deserves	   respect	   and	   protection.	   It	   reinforces	   the	   importance	   of	   individual,	   unit	   and	  organizational	  missions	  or	   common	  purposes	   in	  voluntary	  action	  and	   the	  ability	  of	  groups	  of	  actors	  to	  collectively	  set	   their	  own	  missions	  and	  purposes.	  No	  one	  can	  say	  with	  any	  certainty	  quite	  what	  the	  third	  sector	  exists	  for,	  except,	  perhaps,	  to	  protect	  and	  defend	  this	  diversity.	  Deirdre	  N.	  McCloskey	  puts	  her	  own	  modern	  spin	  on	  what	  might	  be	  termed	  this	  kind	  of	  pluralism	  in	  The	  Bourgeois	  Virtues,	  when	  she	  notes	  “Until	   the	   framework	  [of	   the	  classical	  and	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Christian	   virtues]	   somewhat	   mysteriously	   fell	   out	   of	   favor	   among	   theorists	   in	   the	   late	  eighteenth	  century,	  most	  Westerners	  did	  not	   think	   in	  Platonic	   terms	  of	   the	  One	  Good	  –	   to	  be	  summarized,	   say,	   as	  maximum	   utility,	   or	   as	   the	   categorical	   imperative,	   or	   as	   the	   Idea	   of	   the	  Good.	  They	  thought	  in	  Aristotelian	  terms	  of	  many	  virtues,	  plural.”	  (McCloskey,	  2006,	  84)	  
Otto	  von	  Gierke	  and	  the	  Earlier	  Pluralist	  Movement	  
 Otto	  von	  Gierke,	  in	  a	  four	  volume	  legal	  study	  of	  associations	  published	  in	  German	  may	  be	  the	  original	   source	  of	   the	  doctrine	  of	   corporate	  personhood	  noted	   in	   the	  Citizens	  United	   case	  above.	   Von	   Gierke	   held	   that	   the	   legal	   personality	   of	   certain	   corporate	   associations	   was	   not	  artificial	  or	  fictitious,	  but	  real	  and	  natural,	  with	  inherent	  personality	  independent	  of	  and	  prior	  to	  the	   state.	   (Emphasis	  added)	   	   It	   is	   important	   to	  note	  here	   that	  Gierke’s	   concept	  of	  personality	  was	   set	   out	   prior	   to	   William	   James	   and	   modern	   psychology	   and	   more	   modern	   notions	   of	  personality	  should	  probably	  not	  be	  read	  into	  it.	  It	  was	  (and	  remains)	  primarily	  a	  “useful	  fiction”	  for	   establishing	   the	   unity	   of	   collective	   volition,	   will	   or	   purpose	   in	   collective	   institutions	  characterized	  by	  the	  plurality	  of	  will	  and	  intent	  of	  the	  diverse	  individuals	  who	  populate	  them.	  In	  this	  respect,	  it	  is	  of	  a	  kind	  with	  Rousseau’s	  concept	  of	  the	  “general	  will”.	  Even	  so,	  legal	  personality	  or	  personhood	  for	  associations	  and	  corporations	  is	  one,	  rather	  awkward,	   solution	   to	   the	   problem	   of	   the	   unity	   of	   collective	   choice	   and	   action	   by	   diverse	  biological	  persons	  acting	  in	  concert.	  It	  may	  have	  first	  entered	  the	  U.S.	  legal	  system	  in	  the	  1886	  U.S.	  Supreme	  Court	  ruling	  in	  Santa	  Clara	  County	  v.	  Southern	  Pacific	  Railroad,	  and	  as	  noted,	  was	  reaffirmed	  amid	  much	  controversy	  in	  the	  Citizens	  United	  v.	  Federal	  Election	  Commission	  case	  in	  2010.	   That	   ruling	   in	   itself	   is	   quite	   anachronistic.	   Gierke	  wrote	   and	   the	   Santa	   Clara	   case	  was	  decided	  before	  the	  origin	  not	  only	  of	  modern	  personality	  theory	  but	  also	  an	  enormous	  body	  of	  contemporary	   community,	   group,	   corporation	   organization,	   communication	   and	   commons	  theories	   and	   practices	   became	   part	   of	   the	   common	   culture	   of	  Western	   (increasingly,	   global)	  civilization.	   In	   2010,	   the	   Supreme	  Court	   Justices	   had	   no	   such	   excuse,	   and	   their	   ruling	   lacked	  even	  minimal	   face	   validity:	   Corporations,	   as	   persons,	  were	   granted	   “first	   amendment	   rights”	  most	   notably	   “free	   speech”,	   even	   though	  no	   one	   has	   ever	   heard	   a	   corporation	   speak,	   join	   an	  assemble	   or	  worship	   freely.	   The	  majority	   Justices	   resolved	   this	   dilemma	  with	   the	   even	  more	  absurd	  doctrine	   that	   “money	   is	   speech”,	   and	   the	   result	  was	   a	  predictable	   landslide	  of	  money	  from	  anonymous	  “speakers”	  in	  the	  2012	  Presidential	  election.	  The	  spillover	  effect	  for	  the	  third	  sector	  was	   the	   contamination	   of	   the	   category	   of	   501(c)4	   social	  welfare	   organizations,	  which	  became	   just	  another	   false	   front	   for	  anonymous	  big	  money	  donations.	  The	   Justices’	  reliance	   in	  2010	  on	  Gierke’s	   150-­‐year	   old	   anachronism	  as	   the	  best	  way	   to	  deal	  with	   the	  problem	  of	   the	  collective	  unity	  of	  action	  by	  corporations	  has,	  as	  of	  this	  writing,	  wrought	  untold	  damage	  to	  the	  U.S.	  political	  system	  just	  as	  critics	  said	  it	  would,	  and	  is	  likely	  to	  continue	  to	  do	  damage	  for	  years	  to	  come	  (Dworkin,	  2010).	  	  	   Gierke	  worked	  within	   a	   German	   intellectual	   tradition	   of	   association	   law	   that	   traces	   is	  roots	   back	   to	   Roman	   law,	   and	   remains	   an	   entrepot	   for	   an	   otherwise	   difficult	   to	   access	   (for	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English-­‐speaking	   readers)	   German,	   Scandinavian	   and	   northern	   European	   social	   organization	  history	  of	   “grassroots”	   community,	   association	  and	  assembly.	  Terms	   like	   thing,	   ting,	  ping	   and	  other	  variations	  appear	  in	  Germanic	  languages	  like	  Old	  Norse,	  Old	  English,	  Icelandic	  and	  several	  Scandinavian	  languages	  to	  refer	  to	  assemblies	  of	  free	  peoples	  (in	  tribes	  or	  village	  communities)	  gathered	  in	  places	  with	  designations	  like	  thingsteads,	  and	  presided	  over	  by	  leaders	  with	  names	  like	  lawspeakers,	  or	  legal	  interpreters	  (Redstone,	  1912,	  3;	  Wildte,	  1928).	  In	  Slavic	  languages,	  the	  term	   Veche	   and	   cognates	   describe	   variously	   a	   general	   assembly	   of	   the	   people	   and	   certain	  legislative	   bodies.	   Several	   of	   the	   archaic,	   and	   otherwise	   neglected,	   works	   discussed	   in	   this	  section	  are	  accessible	   through	   the	  online	  Google	  Books	   library.	  Those	  modernist	   scholars	  not	  accustomed	  to	  such	  ‘ancient’	  sources	  are	  reminded	  that	  Gierke	  and	  the	  others	  mentioned	  here	  were	  published	  roughly	  four	  decades	  after	  Tocqueville	  and	  contemporaneously	  with	  a	  number	  of	   the	   better-­‐	   known	   classical	  works	   of	   European	   and	  American	   social	   science.	   The	   fact	   that	  they	  seem	  obscure	   is	  related	  to	  the	  non-­‐recognition	  until	  very	  recently	  of	   the	  slowly	  evolving	  wider	  third	  sector	  and	  new	  commons.	  Such	  terms,	  practices	  and	  ideas	  are	  also	  found	  selectively	  among	  Slavic	  and	  Celtic	  groups	  and	  in	  Anglo-­‐Saxon	  England	  where	  tribal	  assemblies	  known	  as	  
folkmoots,	   or	  meetings	   of	   the	   people	   (Gomme,	   1880;	   Nicholson,	   1884).	   Another	   Anglo-­‐Saxon	  grassroots	  institution,	  thought	  to	  have	  operated	  from	  at	  least	  the	  7th	  to	  the	  11th	  centuries	  CE	  is	  termed	   the	   witenagemot,	   or	   meeting	   of	   the	   wise	   men	   (Oleson,	   1955;	   Zinkeisen,	   1895).	   J.K.	  Rowling	  uses	  a	  related	  term,	  the	  Wizengamot	  for	  a	  fictional	  organization	  appearing	  in	  her	  Harry	  Potter	   novels.	   This	   term	   may	   have	   been	   derived	   from	   the	   witenagemot,	   or	   it	   may	   be	   mere	  coincidence.	  These	  instances	  and	  others	  suggest	  the	  essential	  correctness	  of	  Gierke’s	  claims	  of	  ancient	  Germanic	   forms	  of	  association	  including	  Anglo-­‐Saxon	  ones	  completely	   independent	  of	  classical	  Greek	  and	  Roman	  sources.	  Unfortunately,	  there	  are	  no	  English	  translations	  of	  Gierke’s	  full	  four	  volume	  work,	  or	  current	  studies	  of	  these	  early	  folkmoots	  and	  thus	  we	  are	  deprived	  of	  what	   appears	   to	   be	   a	   rich	   source	   of	   knowledge	   of	   early	   voluntary	   action	   and	   possible	  connections	  to	  old	  commons.	  Some	  of	  Gierke’s	  ideas	  were	  both	  developed	  and	  Anglicized	  by	  the	  English	  historian	  F.W.	  Maitland	   whose	   use	   of	   pluralism	   is	   even	   more	   explicit.	   Maitland	   insisted	   upon	   the	   “real	  personality,	   the	   spontaneous	   origin,	   the	   inherent	   right	   of	   corporate	   bodies	  within	   the	   State.”	  (quoted	   from	   the	   introduction	   to	   his	   translation	   of	   Gierke’s	   Political	   Theories	   of	   the	   Middle	  
Ages.)	  For	  both	  Maitland	  and	  Gierke	  the	  term	  ‘corporate’	  here	  has	  the	  broader	  historic	  German	  connotation	   suggesting	   a	   collective	   social	   endeavor,	   rather	   than	   the	   narrower	   contemporary	  American	  meaning	  of	  a	   state-­‐recognized	  corporation.	  This	   is	  an	   important	  distinction,	  both	   it	  offers	   a	   possible	   source	   of	   some	   of	   the	   differences	   between	   contemporary	   American	   and	  European	   scholars,	   and	   for	   the	   distinction	   here	   between	   the	   (government-­‐recognized)	  nonprofit	  bureaucratic	   firm	  and	  other	   forms	  or	  organized	  voluntary	  action,	  grounded	   in	   their	  own	  autonomy.	  Like	  Gierke,	  Maitland	  has	  often	  been	  placed	  within	  the	  pluralist	  tradition,	  if	  only	  because	  of	  this	  tendency	  to	  look	  beyond	  the	  state	  and	  see	  the	  communitas	  communitatum	  first	  noted	  by	  Althusius.	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J.	  Neville	  Figgis,	  an	  obscure	  but	   important	  English	  pluralist	  working	   in	   the	   tradition	  of	  Gierke	  and	  Maitland,	  defined	  the	  state	  inclusively	  as	  “an	  ascending	  hierarchy	  of	  groups,	  family,	  school,	   county,	   union,	   church”	   (Coker,	   1923:	   188).	   It	   must	   be	   noted	   that	   Figgis’	   broad	   and	  encompassing	  notion	  of	  “the	  state”	  is	  at	  considerable	  variance	  with	  conceptions	  of	  the	  state	  as	  one	   of	   several	   coeval	   sectors	   and	   its	   plural	   character	   corresponds	   more	   closely	   with	   the	  conception	  of	  the	  pluralist	  regime	  of	  sector	  noted	  above	  as	  a	  configuration	  of	  numerous,	  diverse	  institutions.	  Reasons	  for	  not	  utilizing	  the	  concept	  of	  state	  in	  a	  foundational	  way	  in	  third	  sector	  theory	   in	   the	  U.S.	  were	  noted	   in	   Chapter	  Two	   above	   and	  won’t	   be	   readdressed	  here.	  Human	  association	   and	   the	   resulting	   interactions	   and	   social	   relations	   are	   sui	   generis	   and	   no	   prior	  understanding	  of	  either	  markets	  or	  states	  should	  be	  necessary	  to	  understand	  them.	  Translating	  these	  basic	   relations	  back	   into	  quasi-­‐market	   terms,	   in	   particular,	   has	  done	  untold	  damage	   to	  our	  understanding	  of	  what	  actually	  goes	  on	  in	  the	  wider	  third	  sector.	  	  Figgis	   is	   best	   known	   for	  his	  doctrine	   that	   communities	   and	   lesser	   associations	  within	  the	  state	  arise	  naturally	  out	  of	  what	  Coker	  terms	  the	  “associational	  instincts	  of	  mankind”.	  The	  concept	  of	  an	  “associational	  instinct”	  arose	  in	  the	  19th	  century	  world	  of	  social	  theory	  before	  the	  communications	   revolution.	   It	   may	   have	   been	   on	   the	   right	   track	   in	   at	   least	   one	   respect.	  Although	  excessively	  dependent	  on	  biological	  metaphors,	   it	  pointed	  toward	  what	  does	  indeed	  appear	   to	  be	   the	  universality	  of	   the	   tendency	   to	   freely	  and	  openly	  associate	  with	  others	  until	  other	   forces	   interfere.	   Figgis	   also	   opposed	   the	   view	   (still	   characteristic	   of	   some	   forms	   of	  rational	   individualism)	   that	   the	   state	   and	   the	   individual	   are	   the	  only	   real	  political	   actors	   and	  action	   can	   be	   neatly	   divided	   into	   public	   (activities	   of	   the	   state)	   and	   private	   (activities	   of	  individuals	   and	   associations)	   realms.	   In	   a	   perspective	   that	   corresponds	   with	   contemporary	  third	  sector	  thinking,	  Figgis	  also	  claimed	  that	  the	  collective	  activities	  of	  individuals	  in	  churches,	  labor	  unions	  are	  more	  public	  than	  private.	  Like	  all	  such	  waffling	  over	  the	  dichotomy	  of	  public	  and	  private,	  Figgis’	  semantic	  formula	  “more	  public	  than	  private”	  is	  simply	  a	  muddle.	  As	  noted	  above,	   things	   that	   are	  more	   public	   than	   private	   as	  well	   as	   things	   that	   are	  more	   private	   than	  public	  can	  both	  be	  accommodated	  under	  the	  heading	  of	  commons.	  	  Coker	   cited	   Léon	   Duguit	   in	   France	   as	   another	   “real	   pluralist”.	   Duguit,	   it	   appears,	   has	  disappeared	   completely	   from	  English	   language	  understandings	   of	   pluralism,	   although	  French	  language	  scholars	  might	  be	  able	  to	  determine	  if	  Duguit	  had	  anything	  worthwhile	  to	  say	  on	  the	  topics	  studied	  here.	  Coker	  (1921:	  188)	  also	  named	  Harold	  J.	  Laski	  as	  one	  of	  the	  first	  real	  English	  pluralists.	  Laski,	  who	  is	  more	  commonly	  identified	  with	  his	  later	  writings,	  established	  early	  and	  at	   least	   limited	   pluralist	   credentials	   by	   noting	   that	   there	   is	   never	   any	   one	   source	   of	   political	  authority	   that	   is	   absolute,	   and	   that	   the	   state	   has	   no	   superior	   claim	   to	   the	   allegiance	   of	  individuals.	  “The	  state	  is	  only	  one	  among	  many	  forms	  of	  human	  association”	  (Laski,	  Authority	  in	  
the	  Modern	  State,	  p.	  65,	  as	  quoted	  by	  Coker,	  1921.).	  We	  know	  from	  other	  comments	  that	  Coker	  does	  not	  quote	  Laski	  here	  with	  approval.	  He	  writes	  “As	  far	  as	  I	  know,	  there	  has	  never	  been	  any	  political	   thinking	   of	   any	   school	   in	   any	   era	   who	   would	   attempt	   to	   deny	   such	   facts	   as	   those	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adduced	  by	  Laski	  relating	  to	  the	  actual	  limits	  of	  state	  power,	  or	  who,	  I	  believe	  would	  be	  much	  disturbed	   by	   such	   facts.”	   (p.	   194)	   Regardless	   of	   what	   degree	   of	   universality	   one	   assigns	   to	  Laski’s	   view,	   the	   important	   point	   for	   our	   purposes	   is	   his	   embrace	   of	   a	   pluralist	   institutional	  perspective	  (or	  “multiple	  sectors”	  in	  the	  current	  parlance).	  	  	  These	  are	   just	  a	  small	   sampling	  of	   the	   intellectual	   figures	  who	  can	  be	  characterized	  as	  pluralists.	   A	   comprehensive	   listing	   would	   also	   include	   Alain	   Locke,	   an	   African-­‐American	  philosopher	   in	   the	   first	   half	   of	   the	   twentieth	   century	   and	   one	   of	   the	   founders	   of	   the	  Harlem	  Renaissance	   (see	   the	   entry	   on	   Locke	   in	   the	   online	   Stanford	   Encyclopedia	   of	   Philosophy	  
(http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/alain-­‐locke/).	   Locke’s	   opposition	   to	   what	   he	   termed	  uniformitarianism,	   or	   the	   belief	   that	   all	   members	   of	   a	   group	   must	   hold	   the	   same	   values,	   is	  important	  for	  the	  commons	  theory	  of	  voluntary	  action.	  Von	  Gierke,	  Maitland,	  Figgis,	  Laski,	  Locke	  and	  the	  others	  should	  all	  be	  associated	  with	  a	  pluralist	  legal,	  political	  and	  philosophical	  tradition	  that	  lost	  momentum	  many	  decades	  ago	  and	  failed	   to	   establish	   a	   lasting	   theoretical	   contribution	   for	   understanding	   groups,	   communities,	  commons	  or	  voluntary	  action.	  Recently,	  other	  contributors	  have	  formulated	  a	  range	  of	  new	  and	  quite	  different	  pluralisms.	  Charles	  Taylor,	  the	  Canadian	  philosopher	  and	  member	  of	  the	  Quebec	  parliament,	   offers	   several	  more	   contemporary	   perspectives	   on	   pluralism	   in	   our	   time.	   Taylor,	  Tully	   and	   Weinstock	   (1994)	   compiled	   a	   series	   of	   considerations	   by	   other	   philosophers	   of	  Taylor’s	   perspectives	   in	   a	   volume	   characterizing	   the	   present	   as	   an	   “age	   of	   pluralism.”	   In	   the	  view	   of	   his	   critics	   and	   expositors,	   Taylor	   is	   concerned	   with	   at	   least	   five	   distinct	   forms	   of	  pluralism,	   all	   of	   importance	   to	   new	   commons:	   the	   plurality	   of	   conversations	   (p.	   xiv);	   the	  plurality	  of	  goods	  (p.	  xiv);	  plurality	  of	  moral	  values	  (pp.	  50,	  52)	  and	  of	  religious	  beliefs	  (p.	  227).	  One	  of	  Taylor’s	  most	  intriguing	  concepts,	  strong	  evaluation,	  is	  particularly	  important	  to	  efforts	   to	  move	  beyond	   individualist	   rationalism	  and	  anchor	   the	   commons	  model	   in	  plurality	  and	   communication.	   In	   a	   festschrift	   for	   Charles	   Taylor,	   Daniel	   M.	   Weinstock	   highlights	   the	  importance	   of	   this	   concept,	   which	   Taylor	   has	   characterized	   as	   “something	   like	   a	   human	  universal”	  (Taylor,	  Tully	  &	  Weinstock,	  1994:	  249).	  By	  strong	  evaluation,	  “I	  mean	  simply”	  Taylor	  wrote	  that	  people	  operate	  “with	  a	  sense	  that	  some	  desires,	  goals,	  aspirations	  are	  qualitatively	  higher	  than	  others”	  (Taylor,	  Tully	  &	  Weinstock,	  1994:	  250).	  Taylor	  went	  on	  to	  dismiss	  his	  use	  of	  the	  term	  evaluation	  as	  a	  mistake,	  according	  to	  Weinstock,	  because	  its	  connotations	  of	  reflection	  and	  deliberate	  choice	  lead	  too	  easily	  back	  into	  rationalist	  individualism.	  Taylor’s	  challenge	  for	  voluntary	  action	  is	  clear:	  He	  offers	  philosophical	  cover	  to	  clarify	  the	  nature	  of	  group	  evaluation	  moeurs	   as	   collective	   behavior,	   rather	   than	   the	   individual	   mental	   calculations	   of	   a	   group	   of	  otherwise	  isolated	  individual	  minds.	  Weinstock	   notes	   that	   the	   basis	   for	   strong	   evaluation	   “stems	   from	   the	   traditions	   and	  latent	   understandings	   of	   our	   human	   communities	   –	   hence	   their	   necessary	   embeddedness	   in	  linguistic	   forms	  –	  and	  are	  perceived	  by	  us	  as	   ‘articulations’	  of	   the	   intrinsic	  goodness	  of	   those	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things	  external	  to	  us	  toward	  which	  our	  desires	  and	  feelings	  implicitly	  direct	  us.”	  He	  cites	  Taylor	  in	  distinguishing	  strong	  evaluators	  as	  agents	  from	  those	  ‘simple	  weighers’	  whose	  deliberations	  are	   based	   solely	   on	   cost/benefit	   considerations.	   Strong	   evaluators,	   he	   says,	   are	   capable	   of	  second	  order	  reflection	  on	  their	  desires	  “whose	  practical	  deliberation	  is	  guided	  by	  a	  ‘language	  of	   evaluative	   distinctions’	   identifying	   certain	   actions	   as	   base,	   noble,	   courageous,	   etc.,	   rather	  than	  by	  merely	  by	  simple	  (first	  order)	  calculation	  of	  possible	  outcomes.”	  Such	  strong	  evaluation	  is	  not	  reducible	  to	  the	  logistics	  of	  collective	  choice,	  and	  points	  directly	  to	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	  sublime	  below.	  “The	  goods	  we	   recognize	   in	   this	  manner,”	  Weinstock	  wrote,	   paraphrasing	  Taylor,	   “are	  plural”	   and	   yet	   we	   have	   the	   ability	   to	   unify	   and	   organize	   them	   (and	   ourselves)	   through	  reference	   to	  certain	   ‘hypergoods’,	  or	   sources	  of	  ultimate	  value,	   such	  as	   freedom,	  benevolence	  and	  others.	  This	  perspective	  suggests	  that	  no	  one,	  single	  perspective	  on	  voluntary	  action	  may	  be	   expected	   to	   prevail	   in	   the	   long	   run,	   although	   there	   is	   widespread	   agreement	   on	   the	  hypergoods	   that	  such	  action	  represents.	   In	   this	  study,	   for	  example,	  emphasis	   is	  placed	  on	  the	  hypergoods	   of	   “freedom	   of	   association”	   and	   philanthropy.	   It	   would	   be	   a	   relatively	  straightforward	  matter	   to	   reconstruct	  many	   of	   these	   same	  materials	  with	   other	   hypergoods:	  e.g.,	   religious	   perspectives	   on	   the	   glory	   of	   God	   or	   micro-­‐economic	   perspectives	   on	   cost	   and	  efficient	  production,	  thereby	  producing	  a	  plurality	  of	  perspectives	  on	  voluntary	  action,	  with	  no	  particular	   necessity	   of	   reconciling	   them.	   Indeed,	   much	   of	   the	   commons	   theory	   of	   voluntary	  action	   began	   as	   a	   criticism	   of	   one	   such	   set	   of	   perspectives;	   enshrining	   the	   weak	   evaluation	  emphasizing	   efficiency,	   effectiveness,	   cost/benefits,	   best	   practices	   and	   managerial	  professionalism	  as	  the	  exclusive	  hypergoods	  of	  voluntary	  action.	  Since	  the	  very	  core	  of	  Taylor’s	  objection	  to	  communitarianism	  bears	  on	  this	  question	  of	  the	  pluralism	  of	  ends,	   it	   is	  worth	  quoting	  here:	   “(T)he	  entire	  system	  of	  moral	   thinking	  which	  Bentham	   and	   Kant	   have	   in	   common,”	   Taylor	   wrote,	   “whatever	   their	   differences,	   i.e.,	   that	   it	  makes	  sense	  to	  look	  for	  a	  single	  principle	  of	  morality,	  from	  which	  everything	  can	  be	  deduced,	  strikes	  me	  as	  utterly	  misguided.	  .	  .	  .	  That’s	  (one	  of	  the	  many	  reasons)	  why	  I’m	  unhappy	  with	  the	  term	   ‘communitarianism’.	   It	   sounds	  as	   though	   the	  critics	  of	   this	   liberalism	  want	   to	  substitute	  some	  other	  all-­‐encompassing	  principle,	  which	  would	  in	  some	  equal	  and	  opposite	  way	  exalt	  the	  life	   of	   the	   community	   over	   everything”	   (Taylor,	   Tully	   &	  Weinstock,	   1994:	   250).	   As	   we	   have	  already	   seen,	   Taylor	   holds	   firmly	   to	   the	   pluralist	   view	   that	   there	   can	   be	  multiple	   goods	   and	  hypergoods,	   and	   that	   while	   they	   may,	   for	   one	   group	   or	   another,	   be	   united	   in	   some	   all-­‐encompassing	   hypergood,	   there	   is	   nothing	   inherent	   in	   that	   idea	   to	   suggest	   that	   there	   is,	   or	  would	  arrive	  at	  a	  single	  n-­‐order	  hypergood	  to	  encompass	  all	  of	  voluntary	  action,	  regardless	  of	  how	   far	   we	   pursue	   the	   process.	   That	   is	   the	   very	   essence	   of	   the	   case	   for	   pluralism	   in	   the	  independent	  sector.	  	  While	   it	  may	  be	   that	   arguments	   regarding	  democratic	   government	  must	   at	   some	   level	  pursue	   this	   issue	   further,	   it	   is	   sufficient	   in	   considering	   the	   independent	   sector	   to	   merely	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embrace	  plurality	  as	  part	  of	  the	  essential	  nature	  of	  voluntary	  action.	  Thus,	  the	  pluralistic	  legal	  penumbra	   of	   freedoms	   of	   association	   and	   assembly,	   speech,	   religion	   and	   contract	   offers	   a	  satisfactory	  hypergood	  for	  voluntary	  action.	  Likewise,	  the	  loose	  connection	  of	  philanthropy	  as	  what	  it	  means	  to	  be	  human	  is	  also	  sufficient	  for	  defining	  the	  broad	  parameters	  of	  philanthropy	  as	  a	  hypergood	  consisting	  of	  multiple	  common	  goods	  identified	  by	  associations	  and	  assemblies	  engaged	  in	  voluntary	  action.	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  Christians,	  Muslims,	  Jews,	  engineers,	  physicists,	  stamp	  collectors,	  recovering	  addicts,	  cancer	  survivors	  or	  any	  other	  group	  chooses	  to	  establish	  its	  own	  hierarchy	  of	  goods	  it	  is	  free	  to	  do	  so,	  provided	  it	  does	  not	  challenge	  the	  basic	  hypergood	  of	   the	   sector,	   which	   includes	   the	   similar	   right	   of	   others	   to	   establish	   their	   own	   goods.	   In	  democratic	   society	   and	   culture,	   no	   one	   is	   free	   to	   enforce	   its	   own	   priorities	   over	   involuntary	  others,	   or	   to	   demand	   allegiance	   from	   those	   who	   do	   not	   embrace	   its	   views.	   Efforts	   to	   do	   so	  destroy	   the	   essential	   character	   of	   the	   independent	   sector,	  making	   it,	   in	   effect,	   an	   illegitimate	  branch	  of	  government,	  or	  the	  state.	  	  Taylor	   (1990)	   also	   distinguishes	   between	   three	   senses	   of	   civil	   society	   on	   the	   basis	   of	  associations:	  In	  the	  first	  sense,	  free	  associations	  are	  those	  not	  under	  the	  tutelage	  of	  government	  power.	  This	  is	  consistent	  with	  Cornuelle’s	  earlier	  (1965)	  concept	  of	  the	  independent	  sector.	  In	  the	   second	   sense,	   society	   can	   structure	   itself	   and	   co-­‐ordinate	   its	   actions	   through	   free	  associations;	   a	   model	   of	   associations,	   he	   says,	   that	   is	   stronger	   than	   the	   first	   and	   is	   most	  compatible	  with	  a	  four-­‐sector	  regime	  in	  which	  “civil	  society”	  is	  construed	  as	  everything	  outside	  government.	   Finally,	   Taylor	   sees	   civil	   society	   as	   the	   ensemble	   of	   associations	   that	   can	  significantly	  determine	  or	   inflect	   the	   course	  of	  public	  policy.	  This	   third	  model	   is	   grounded	   in	  Tocqueville’s	   political	   associations,	   and	   compatible	   with	   the	   nonprofit	   sector	   model	   of	  Independent	  Sector	  the	  organization,	  the	  developers	  of	  the	  NTEE,	  and	  those	  scholars	  interested	  in	   the	   public	   policy	   aspects	   of	   nonprofit	   corporations.	   It	   also	   fits	   with	   what	   Theodore	   Lowi	  (1969)	  termed	  interest	  group	  liberalism	  and	  Lester	  Salamon	  termed	  “third	  party	  government”	  (Salamon,	   1987).	   According	   to	   Taylor,	   certain	   key	   historical	   developments	   account	   for	   and	  reinforce	  Western	   conceptions	   of	   civil	   society:	   the	   idea	   that	   society	   is	   not	   identical	   with	   its	  political	   organization,	   or	   the	   state;	   the	   perception	   of	   the	   church	   as	   an	   independent	   society	  insulated	   from	   political	   society;	   the	   legal	   idea	   of	   subjective	   rights,	   the	   existence	   of	   relatively	  autonomous,	   self-­‐governing	   cities,	   and	   indirect	   rule	   of	   the	   type	  pioneered	  by	  parliament	   and	  the	  British	  monarchy. 
Barber’s	  Views	  of	  pluralism	  are	  also	  directly	  related	  to	  Benjamin	  Barber’s	  previously	  mentioned	  argument	   for	   limiting	   the	   role	   of	   philosophy	   in	   democracy	   (Barber,	   1998).	   Although	   I’ve	   not	  seen	  Barber	  characterized	  as	  a	  pluralist,	  his	  work	  on	  strong	  democracy	  would	  be	  compatible	  with	  such	  a	  characterization.	  It	  might	  be	  argued	  that	  comments	  in	  Merelman	  (2003:	  273)	  make	  such	  a	  characterization.	  Even	  if	  some	  future	  association	  of	  political	  philosophers	  –	  themselves	  a	  knowledge	   commons	   –	  were	   to	   arrive	   at	  moral	   and	   political	   truth,	  much	   as	   followers	   of	   the	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utilitarian	  moral	  philosopher	  Henry	  Sedgewick	  believed	  that	  he	  had	  done	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  20th	  century	   there	   is	  no	  basis	  on	  which	   they	  would	  have	   the	   right	   to	   impose	   the	   truth	  of	   a	   single	  knowledge	  commons,	  their	  rank	  ordering	  of	  goods	  and	  hypergoods,	  upon	  other	  associations	  or	  knowledge	  commons	  in	  the	  independent	  sector,	  democratic	  society	  or	  culture.	  This	  very	  issue,	  in	   fact,	   already	   arises	   frequently	   in	   the	   context	   of	   those	   positive	   experts	   –	   managers,	  consultants,	   researchers	   and	   others	   –	  who	   believe	   that	   they	   have	   already	   established	   or	   are	  close	   to	   establishing	   “best	  practices”	   (that	   is,	   the	  most	   efficient,	  most	   effective	  or	   least	   costly	  way	  to	  do	  something),	  and	  claim	  the	  obligation	  to	  impose	  their	  views	  on	  the	  nonprofit	  world.	  As	  a	  matter	   of	   free	   and	   unconstrained	   choice,	   this	   is	   straightforward:	   In	   an	   open	   and	   free	   third	  sector,	   those	   who	   disagree	   can	   simply	   ignore	   them.	   When	   such	   views	   are	   imposed	   as	   a	  condition	   of	   government	   or	   foundation	   grants	   or	   contracts	   or	   by	   regulatory	   agencies,	   the	  problem	   becomes	   much	   more	   complex,	   because	   one	   or	   more	   of	   the	   conditions	   of	   the	   new	  commons	  are	  violated.	  
Another	  New	  Federalism?	  A	  New	  Sector	  Narrative	  One	  of	  the	  cardinal	  weaknesses	  of	  current	  models	  of	  voluntary	  action	  is	  the	  large	  stock	  of	  old,	  worn	  out	  20th	  century	  clichés:	  ‘Liberals’	  and	  those	  on	  the	  left	  are	  convinced	  that	  change	  must	  be	  initiated	  by	  an	  activist	  political	  state,	  responding	  to	  the	  organized	  demands	  of	  interest	  groups,	  while	  ‘conservatives’	  and	  those	  on	  the	  right	  are	  equally	  certain	  that	  meaningful	  change	  –	   contrary	   evidence	   of	   the	   civil	   rights	   movements,	   health	   care	   reform	   and	   much	   else	   not	  withstanding	  –	   can	  never	  be	   initiated	  by	  government	  and	  will	   always	  come	   from	   the	  market.	  Both	   are	   wrong	   in	   important	   respects,	   most	   notably	   in	   their	   failure	   to	   take	   account	   of	  philanthropic	   motivations,	   the	   rationality	   of	   giving	   and	   gifts,	   and	   the	   independent	   sector	   of	  voluntary	  action	  outside	  both	  the	  political	  state	  and	  the	  economic	  market.	  Current	  generations	  of	   ‘liberals’	  would	  have	  it	   that	  voluntary	  action	  is	  always	  only	  a	  prelude	  to	  state	   legislative	  or	  judicial	  action,	  while	  ‘conservatives’	  would	  see	  voluntary	  action	  only	  in	  complete	  isolation	  from	  the	   state.	   If	   the	   insights	   offered	  here	   are	   anywhere	   close	   to	   reaching	   a	   truth,	   there	   is	   a	   third	  possibility,	  one	  closely	  aligned	  with	  the	  ideas	  of	  both	  market	  failure	  and	  state	  failure.	  That	  is	  the	  idea	  of	  voluntary	  action	  arising	  directly	  from	  the	  perception	  of	  problems	  experienced	  in	  daily	  living	   through	  which	  perception	  of	   the	  problem	   leads	  direction	   to	  organization	  of	  a	   response	  and	  action.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  third	  way,	  or	  the	  way	  of	  the	  third	  sector.	  
Nearly all of the major nation states that have produced the most important social 
imaginaries of the last two centuries are both federal in nature with strong local institutions. 
There is, of course, the antiquated 18th century “states’ rights” view favored by American 
conservatives. More to the point, the United States also has more than 250 major metropolitan 
areas and hundreds of other smaller local communities where the lion’s share of voluntary 
action takes place. Great Britain is a federation of England, Scotland, Northern Ireland and 
Wales, with a similar array of regions and metropolitan regions. Federalism is inherently a 
pluralist construct, but the possibilities of this construct for voluntary action have yet to be 
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fully explored. In political terms, it is often treated rather simplistically as a simple division of 
labor among levels or spheres of government. This is perhaps most evident in the American 
theory of government with its assorted and multiple balances of powers and responsibilities. 
In the context of the emerging theory of sectors, and the idea of a third sector in particular, 
federalism can also be seen as a doctrine of a division of labor among sectors, with each 
occupying a unique domain, but also interdependent with the others in democratic society and 
culture.	  Democratic	   governments	   will	   never	   be	   effective	   initiators	   of	   major	   change	   while	  remaining	  democratic;	  they	  are	  inherently	  reactive	  to	  shifts	  in	  public	  opinion	  despite	  the	  clichés	  about	  “leadership”	  from	  political	  officials,	  and	  we	  probably	  want	  them	  to	  remain	  so.	  Social	  and	  cultural	  change	  must	  emerge	   from	  “the	  people”	   (that	   is,	   from	  society	  and	  culture	  via	  shifts	   in	  public	   opinion)	   and	   it	   is	   essential	   to	   recognize	   that	   such	   emergence	  must	   be	   channeled	   and	  directed	   through	   organized	   voluntary	   action	   in	   communities	   and	   directed	   at	   individual	  governmental	   bodies.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   contemporary	   conservative	   (which	   is,	   actually,	  anarchist)	  mantra	   that	   there	   is	   nothing	   government	   can	   do	   effectively	   and	   nothing	   that	   “the	  private	   sector”	   cannot	   do	   better	   is	   woefully	   out	   of	   touch	   with	   reality.	   It	   ignores	   the	   simple	  question	   of	   what	   happens	  when	   neither	   governments	   nor	  markets	  will	   act	   on	   a	   problem	   or	  issue	  that	  a	  substantial	  number	  of	  people	  think	  is	  important.	  	  Recognition	   of	   this	   circumstances	   requires	   construction	   of	   a	   new	   narrative	   of	   social	  action;	  one	  which	  takes	  more	  fully	  into	  account	  the	  possibilities	  and	  circumstances	  of	  voluntary	  action.	  Another	   facet	  of	   the	  new	  narrative	   involves	   some	   important	  omissions	   from	  the	  basic	  historical	  narrative	  of	  voluntary	  action	  in	  the	  U.S.	  That	  story,	  like	  the	  larger	  American	  narrative,	  has	   often	   been	   told	   predominantly	   from	   the	   viewpoint	   of	   a	   supposedly	   (and	   often	   actual)	  ‘dominant	   majority’,	   and	   numerous	   political	   forces	   in	   the	   contemporary	   U.S.	   seek	   to	   cling	  tenaciously	  to	  this	  myth.	  American	  readers	  and	  commentators	  have,	  for	  example,	  often	  ignored	  the	   inconvenient	   realities	   that	   Alexis	   de	   Tocqueville	   was	   French,	   politically	   active	   in	   French	  politics,	   and	   wrote	   in	   his	   native	   language	   for	   a	   French	   audience.	   Most	   English	   speakers	  (including	  me)	   only	   encounter	   Tocqueville	   in	   translation	   and	   some	   appear	   not	   to	   know	   that	  there	   is	   a	   French	   and	   broader	   European	   critical	   literature	   devoted	   to	   analysis	   of	   his	   work	  seldom	  cited	  in	  the	  U.S.	  My	  Swiss	  colleague	  Antonin	  Wagner	  and	  I,	  for	  example,	  often	  seem	  to	  disagree	   in	   our	   readings	   of	   Tocqueville,	   but	   I	   always	   come	   away	   from	   these	   exchanges	  with	  further	  insight.	  (C.f.,	  Lohmann,	  2013;	  Wagner,	  2012;	  Wagner,	  2013)	  Thus,	  at	  least	  until	  the	  mid-­‐twentieth	   century,	   the	   civic	   engagement	   practices	   of	   white,	   Anglo-­‐Saxon	   protestant	   (WASP)	  males	  was	   taken	  as	  normative.	  The	  experiences	  of	   their	  wives	  and	  daughters	   in	   the	  same	  (or	  similar)	  organizations	  were	  largely	  discounted,	  along	  with	  the	  experiences	  of	  Japanese,	  Chinese	  and	  other	  Asian	  immigrants	  entering	  along	  the	  West	  Coast,	  and	  the	  Hispanic	  populations	  of	  the	  Southern	   rim,	   as	  well	   as	   African-­‐American	   and	   native	   American	   populations	   everywhere.	   All	  were	  largely	  discounted	  or	  (more	  frequently)	  ignored	  entirely.	  For	  most	  of	  the	  past	  half	  century	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a	   sporadic	   but	   continuous	   series	   of	   “new	   social	   movements”	   have	   been	   underway	   in	  communities	  across	  much	  of	   the	  world	   to	  resist,	  overturn,	  and,	   in	  some	  cases	  reconcile	   these	  new	  gender,	  class,	  ethnic	  and	  racial	  perspectives	  with	  the	  old	  ways	  of	  doing	  things.	  In	  this	  light,	  the	  principal	  value	  of	  a	  consistent	  community	  focus	  in	  the	  commons	  theory	  of	  voluntary	  action	  is	   as	   an	   antidote	   to	   the	   very	   kind	   of	   false	   majoritarianism	   that	   has	   long	   been	   practiced	   by	  political	  ideologues	  seeking	  to	  defend	  various	  facets	  of	  an	  increasingly	  indefensible	  old	  order.	  At	   the	   heart	   of	   the	   plurality	   of	   new	   narratives	   has	   been	   the	   consistent	   vision	   of	   a	  pluralistic	  society	  (without	  the	  kind	  of	  pluralism	  of	  a	  third	  sector	  portrayed	  here,	  the	  very	  idea	  may	  be	  an	  oxymoron)	  enabling	  many	  differing	  approaches	  to	  ways	  of	  living	  and	  accompanying	  differences	  in	  values,	  beliefs,	  and	  the	  like.	  Indeed,	  the	  ultimate	  challenge	  of	  the	  commons	  theory	  of	   voluntary	   action	   and	   related	   perspectives	   is	   to	   seek	   solid	   foundations	   to	   understand	  why	  such	  pluralist	  unity	  is	  not	  fundamentally	  oxymoronic.	  Failure	  to	  find	  such	  ground	  would	  mean	  that	   the	  defenders	  of	   traditional	  autocracy	  and	  new	  totalitarianisms	  arising	   in	  both	  state	  and	  market	  sectors	  are	  justified	  in	  their	  seemingly	  endless	  efforts	  to	  establish	  hegemony	  over	  our	  various	   life	   worlds.	   It	   is	   a	   regime	   in	   which	   basic	   needs	   for	   the	   majority	   are	   accommodated	  through	  the	  market,	  but	  in	  which	  disagreements	  will	  always	  be	  present	  over	  what	  to	  do	  about	  the	  basic	  needs	  of	   the	  minority	  whose	   interests	  are	  not	  well	   served	  by	   the	  market.	  Then,	   the	  question	   becomes	   one	   of	   what	   portions	   of	   those	   needs	   can	   be	   properly	   left	   to	   the	   intimate	  spheres	  (family,	  friends)	  of	  their	  own	  lives,	  what	  portion	  are	  to	  be	  handled	  by	  government,	  and	  on	  what	  basis:	  majority	  will	  only	  or	  some	  other	  basis?	  Finally,	  we	  face	  important	  questions	  of	  what	  the	  role	  of	  voluntary	  action	  is	  in	  this	  regard	  and	  how	  such	  action	  is	  to	  occur.	  Likewise,	  in	  the	  cases	  of	  education,	  culture,	  the	  arts	  similar	  questions	  arise,	  and	  will	  be	  treated	  below	  under	  the	   general	   heading	   of	   civic	   humanism,	   a	   grand	   old	   doctrine	   traceable	   ultimately	   to	   the	   city	  states	  of	  the	  Italian	  Renaissance,	  and	  currently	  being	  revived	  by	  a	  variety	  of	  scholars.	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Remember	  your	  humanity	  and	  forget	  the	  rest.	  
~	  Albert	  Einstein 
15.	  Civic	  Humanism	  In	  European,	  Asian,	  African,	  Polynesian,	  pre-­‐Columbian	  American	  and	  other	  contexts,	  old	  commons	   involving	   land	   use,	   forestry,	   fishing	   rights,	   and	   other	   similar	   natural	   resource	  questions	   were	   primarily	   situated	   in	   traditional,	   tribal,	   folk	   and	   rural	   communities.	   In	   such	  settings,	  primary	  and	  secondary	   forms	  of	   instrumental	  association	  and	  voluntary	  action	  were	  crucial	  to	  define	  common	  goods,	  establish	  harvesting	  and	  other	  rules	  and	  protect	  against	  anti-­‐social	  behavior	  such	  as	  free	  riding	  and	  enclosure.	  	  However,	  the	  voluntarism	  (and	  occasionally	  vigilantism)	   of	   folk	   cultures	   has	   proven	   to	   be	   insufficient	   defense	   against	   determined	   and	  powerful	   advocates	   of	   enclosure	  who	  would	   expropriate	   the	   resources	   of	   commons	   for	   their	  own	  gain.	  This	  may	  be	  as	  true	  today	  in	  attempts	  at	  personal	  exploitation	  of	  public	  lands	  in	  the	  American	   West	   as	   it	   was	   in	   sixteenth	   century	   England.	   The	   powers	   of	   new	   commons	   to	  formulate	   entirely	   new	   and	   necessary	   moeurs,	   therefore,	   have	   proven	   to	   be	   much	   more	  responsive	  and	  durable	  instruments	  for	  community	  self-­‐protection.	  The	  enclosure	  movements	  of	  the	  late	  middle	  and	  early	  modern	  ages	  had	  particularly	  dire	  implications	   for	   the	   previously	   self-­‐sufficient	   village	   poor	  whose	   access	   to	   food,	   fuel,	   gainful	  employment	  and	  other	  resources	  was	  cut	  off.	  	  The	  ensuing	  legal	  infrastructure,	  the	  Elizabethan	  Poor	  Law	  (1601)	  and	  the	  Statute	  of	  Charitable	  Uses	  (1601),	  and	  subsequent	  constitutional	  and	  legal	   developments	   in	   various	   countries	   and	   eventually	   Chapter	   Nineteen	   of	   the	   U.N.	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights	  adopted	   in	  1948	  (Shabas,	  2013;	  Wronka,	  1992)	  not	  only	   legally	  enabled	  the	  establishment	  of	  “new”	  commons,	  it	  also	  forged	  indelible	  links	  between	  commons	  and	   philanthropy,	   charity	   and	   community	   that	   remain	   strong	   and	   vital	   today	   throughout	   the	  world.	  By	  law,	  it	  became	  possible	  to	  extend	  the	  resource	  sharing	  of	  the	  commons	  from	  its	  rural	  tribal	   and	   village	   origins	   to	   modern	   urban	   settings.	   The	   modern	   corporation,	   foundation,	  freedoms	  of	   association	   are	   all	   part	   of	   this	   culture	   complex,	   as	   are	   the	  modern	   awareness	  of	  social	  problems	  as	  treatable	  conditions	  rather	  than	  permanent	  features	  of	  the	  human	  condition,	  and	  modern	  social	  movements.	  
Origins	  of	  Civic	  Humanism	  
 
 To	  fully	  understand	  how	  these	  diverse	  pieces	  fit	  together	  in	  the	  modern	  world	  and	  what	  their	  connection	  is	  to	  new	  commons	  and	  to	  future	  prospects	  for	  democracy	  and	  the	  association	  revolution,	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   look	   beyond	   the	   Anglo-­‐American	   world,	   and	   competing	   sector	  schemes	   for	   counting	   nonprofit	   corporations,	   and	   link	   up	  with	   the	   baseline	   tradition	   of	   civic	  humanism	  as	  it	  developed	  in	  the	  self-­‐governing	  early	  modern	  communes	  of	  Italy.	  According	  to	  Reus-­‐Smit	   (1999:	   65)	   merchant	   associations	   in	   the	   12th	   century	   were	   the	   first	   popular	  associations	   in	   the	   Italian	   city	   states.	   They	   were	   only	   the	   first	   of	   many	   –guilds,	   charitable	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societies,	  art	  and	  science	  collaboratives,	  political	  associations	  and	  much	  more.	  In	  this	  communal	  tradition,	  we	  find	  not	  only	  the	  origins	  of	  “civic	  republicanism”	  as	  it	  has	  re-­‐emerged	  today	  as	  the	  contemporary	  successor	  to	  communitarianism	  in	  political	   theory,	  but	  also	  critical	   links	  to	  our	  core	   topics	   of	   philanthropy,	   charity,	   the	   arts,	   education,	   public	   deliberation,	   and	   all	   of	   the	  various	  domains	  of	  voluntary	  action.	  “Practical”	  administrative	  and	  leadership	  perspectives	  on	  most	   forms	   of	   voluntary	   action	   have,	   in	   recent	   decades,	   excised	  much	   of	   the	   civic	   humanist	  tradition	   from	  their	  knowledge	  even	  while	  adapting	  the	   full	  range	  of	  civic	  humanist	   ideals	  on	  liberty,	   citizenship,	   community,	   the	   vita	   activa,	   and	   other	   concepts	   to	   “value	   neutral”	   and	  contemporaneous	   ahistorical	   social	   science	   perspectives.	   The	   effort	   here	   is	   to	   reignite	  consciousness	   of	   those	   connections	   by	   drawing	   explicit	   connections	   between	   new	   commons	  and	  civic	  humanism.	   In	  the	  contemporary	  knowledge	  commons	  of	  universities,	   focus	  on	  early	  modern	  communes	  is	  itself	  a	  distinct	  knowledge	  commons	  consisting	  at	  present	  mostly	  of	  the	  college	   educated,	   especially	   those	   who	   have	   taken	   introductory	   humanities	   or	   “western	  civilization”	   courses	   in	   which	   the	   ideals	   of	   civic	   humanism	   in	   the	   Italian	   Renaissance	   were	  highlighted.	  Other,	  mostly	  unrelated,	  developments	  in	  political	  philosophy	  are	  providing	  newer	  and	  unprecedented	  reasons	  to	  take	  a	  second	  look	  at	  these	  older	  ideals.	  Historians	   and	   humanities	   scholars	   are	   currently	   the	   people	   most	   responsible	   for	  tending	  the	  knowledge	  commons	  of	  renaissance	  Italian	  studies,	  while	  political	  philosophers	  are	  forging	   the	   most	   complete	   contemporary	   understandings	   of	   civic	   humanism.	   Although	   not	  widely	  credited,	  Jane	  Addams	  and	  her	  European	  grand	  tour	  during	  the	  1880s,	  which	  included	  stops	  in	  Dresden,	  Florence	  and	  other	  Italian	  city	  states	  and	  at	  Toynbee	  House	  social	  settlement	  in	   the	   slums	  of	  East	   London,	   together	  with	  Mary	  Parker	  Follette’s	  work	   in	   the	  neighborhood	  schools	  movement	   are	   two	   of	   the	   important	   links	   in	   formation	   of	   this	   particular	   knowledge	  commons.	   Regrettably,	   Addams’	   vigorous	   humanism	   often	   survives	   in	   only	   very	   attenuated	  forms	   in	   much	   of	   contemporary	   professional	   social	   work.	   Much	   the	   same	  might	   be	   said	   for	  Veblen’s	  humanistic	  portrait	  of	  engineers.	  From	  the	  standpoint	  of	  a	  philanthropic	  perspective	  on	  democratic	   society	  and	  culture,	  both	  professions	  and	  many	  others	   including	  philosophers,	  economists	   and	   political	   scientists,	   have	   succumbed	   to	   many	   of	   the	   weaknesses	   noted	   by	  Donald	  Hodges	  in	  the	  following	  chapter.	  	  Social	   scientists	   interested	   in	   community,	   social	   problems,	   social	   movements	   and	  voluntary	  action	   typically	  work	   the	  same	   fields	  and	  use	  many	  of	   the	  same	  concepts,	  but	  have	  neglected	  the	  sources	  and	  too	  often	  failed	  to	  acknowledge	  this	  tradition	  even	  as	  they	  embraced	  civic	  humanist	  values.	  	  In	  this	  particular	  knowledge	  commons	  both	  the	  rational	  individualism	  of	  human	   deciders	   found	   in	   economics,	   and	   modern	   knowledge	   commons	   like	   behavioral	  psychology	  and	  decision	  science	  and	  the	  “over-­‐socialized”	  social	  science	  models	  of	  humans	  as	  simple	  products	  of	   their	  environment	  give	  way	   to	  a	  more	  balanced	  view	  of	  humans	  as	  actors	  and	   agents	   in	   communities.	   In	   the	   civic	   humanist	   view,	   individuals	   strive	   for	   personal	  fulfillment,	   growth	   and	   personal	   development	  within	   the	   context	   of	   their	   own	   life	   plans	   and	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among	   the	   active	   lives	   of	   others	   in	   their	   developing	   and	   changing	   communities.	   The	  contemporary	   civic	   humanist	   view	   thus	   brings	   together	   a	   wide	   variety	   of	   notions	   of	   active	  citizenship	   and	   civic	   engagement,	   civic	   duties	   and	   obligations,	   with	   notions	   of	   rights	   and	  responsibilities.	   That	   is	   to	   say,	   it	   incorporates	   the	   main	   outlines	   of	   the	   more	   recent	  communitarian	  movement	  in	  combination	  with	  a	  rich	  range	  of	  additional	  ideas.	  “From	   the	   end	   of	   the	   Tricento	   (that	   is,	   the	   thirteenth	   century)	   onward,	   the	   ever-­‐recurring	  leitmotifs	  in	  the	  humanistic	  philosophy	  of	  life	  were	  the	  superiority	  of	  the	  vita	  activa	  over	   ‘selfish’	   withdrawl	   into	   scholarship	   and	   contemplation;	   the	   praise	   of	   the	   family	   as	   the	  foundation	  of	  a	  sound	  society,	  and	  the	  argument	  that	  the	  perfect	  life	  is	  not	  that	  of	  the	  ‘sage,’	  but	  that	   of	   the	   citizen	  who,	   in	   addition	   to	   his	   studies,	   consummates	   his	  humanitas	   [the	   Greek	   of	  which,	  as	  noted	  above,	  is	  philanthropia]	  by	  shouldering	  man’s	  social	  duties,	  and	  by	  serving	  his	  fellow-­‐citizens	  in	  public	  office”	  (Baron,	  1955,	  7).	  	  Practitioners	   and	   students	   of	   voluntary	   action	   generally	   recognize	   this	   in	   desiccated	  form	   as	   the	   preference	   of	   practice	   over	   theory.	   Some	   contemporary	   conservatives	  who	   rage	  against	   “humanism”	   as	  well	   as	   social	   scientists	  who	   see	   the	   family	   as	   the	  most	   fundamental	  social	  institution	  of	  society	  may	  both	  be	  surprised	  to	  learn	  that	  many	  of	  their	  shared	  beliefs	  are	  grounded	   in	   civic	   humanist	   traditions.	   The	   problem	   of	   ‘the	   sage’,	   such	   as	   the	   peculiar	  nineteenth	  century	  German	  variety	  known	  as	  Kathedersozialisten	  (‘socialists	  of	  the	  chair’)	  is	  not	  usually	  seen	  as	  a	  major	  contemporary	  issue;	  it	  is	  not	  seen	  as	  a	  major	  cause,	  for	  example,	  of	  the	  decline	  of	  civic	  participation.	  In	  the	  final	  chapter	  below,	  several	  other	  more	  pertinent	  examples	  will	  be	  identified.	  The	  medieval	  communes	  in	  Italy,	  Florence,	  Venice,	  Genoa,	  Pisa,	  Lucca,	  and	  the	  others	   where	   civic	   humanism	   first	   flourished	   were	   dramatically	   different	   from	   much	   of	  medieval	   Europe	   in	   that	   they	   never	   developed	   genuine	   feudal	   societies	   based	   in	   rural,	  agricultural	   land	   and	   feudal	   obligation.	   Instead,	   these	   small	   cities	   survived	  and	  grew	  and	   the	  lords	   of	   large	   landed	   estates	   living	   in	   those	   communes	   were	   “forcibly	   transformed	   into	   city	  dwellers	   and	   members	   of	   town	   society”	   (Baron,	   1955,	   8).	   Consequently,	   just	   as	   the	  transformation	  of	   the	  public	   sphere	   first	   emerged	   later	   in	  London,	  Paris	   and	  Vienna,	  modern	  values	  of	  civic	  humanism	  and	  civic	  republicanism	  can	  be	  accurately	  placed	  in	  the	  public	  sphere	  of	  this	  archipelago	  of	  small	  cities	  at	  a	  time	  when	  most	  of	  the	  rest	  of	  Europe	  was	  still	  mired	  in	  feudalism.	  J.	  G.	  A.	  Pocock’s	  The	  Machiavellian	  Moment	  (1975)	  is	  probably	  the	  most	  important	  source	  for	   the	   current	   civic	   republican	   revival	   in	   political	   philosophy,	   although	   numerous	   others,	  including	  the	  previously	  discussed	  Hannah	  Arendt,	  the	  American	  historians	  Bernard	  Bailyn	  and	  Gordon	  Wood	  and	  others	  are	  also	  singled	  out	  for	  their	  important	  contributions.	  In	  the	  practice	  arena,	   the	  work	  of	  David	  Matthews,	   Julie	  Fisher,	  Betty	  Knighton	  and	  the	  staff	  of	   the	  Kettering	  Institute	  on	  practice	  models	  of	  citizenship	  and	  public	  deliberation	  and	  of	  Harold	  Saunders	  and	  the	  International	  Institute	  for	  Sustained	  Dialogue	  is	  of	  great	  importance	  (Lohmann	  and	  Van	  Til,	  2011).	  Civic	  republican	  thought	  also	  links	  readily	  with	  recent	  work	  in	  nonprofit	  studies,	  both	  in	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the	   past	   and	   present:	   Tocqueville’s	   associations;	   George	   McCully’s	   model	   of	   philanthropy	  discussed	  above,	  virtually	  all	  of	  the	  work	  on	  voluntary	  action	  by	  David	  Horton	  Smith,	   Jon	  Van	  Til,	   Thomasina	   Borkman,	   Carl	   Milovsky	   and	   others,	   and	   the	   concepts	   of	   voluntary	   action	  discussed	  above.	  	  Antonin	  Wagner	  represents	  an	  important	  connection	  between	  emergent	  civic	  humanism	   and	   contemporary	   European	   civil	   society	   traditions	   (Wagner,	   2012).	   Cohen	   and	  Arato’s	   writings	   on	   civil	   society	   are	   also	   heavily	   dependent	   on	   the	   civic	   humanist	   tradition	  (Cohen	  and	  Arato,	  1992).	  Harpham	  noted	  in	  the	  early	  1980s	  that	  in	  the	  previous	  half	  century,	  “a	  number	   of	   important	   attempts	   have	   been	  made	   to	   reinterpret	   seventeenth-­‐,	   eighteenth-­‐,	   and	  nineteenth-­‐century	  individual	  citizen	  in	  the	  performance	  of	  one's	  thought	  through	  a	  reading	  of	  the	  republican	  or	  civic	  humanist	  tradition	  (Bailyn,	  1967;	  Kramnick,	  1968;	  Pocock,	  1973,	  1975a,	  1975b;	  Robbins,	  1959;	  Wood,	  1972)”	  (Harpham,	  1984:	  76).	  This	   is	   not	   to	   suggest	   that	  Machiavelli’s	   Florence	   or	   the	   other	   Italian	   City	   States	   from	  which	  contemporary	  humanism	  arose	  were	  democracies;	  they	  were	  not.	  For	  the	  most	  part,	  they	  vacillated	  between	  autocracy	  and	  oligarchy.	  They	  did,	  however,	  display	  a	  rich	  associational	  life,	  in	  many	  respects	  quite	  different	  from	  our	  own	  21st	  century	  perspectives	  but	  approachable	  via	  pluralist	  perspectives	  noted	   in	   the	  previous	  chapter..	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   the	   strongly	   religious	  nature	  of	  the	  art	  of	  Fra	  Angelica,	  Botticelli,	  Leonardo,	  Michelangelo,	  and	  the	  other	  artists	  of	  the	  Italian	   Renaissance	   should	   alert	   those	   in	   the	   contemporary	   U.S.	   who	   will	   see	   in	   the	   term	  “humanism”	   an	   inevitable	   and	   atheistic	   “secular	   humanism”.	   There	   are	   many	   humanisms:	  religious,	  secular,	  scientific,	  popular,	  et.	  al.	  It	  should	  be	  enough	  to	  note	  that	  if	  all	  humanism	  was	  of	  any	  single	  type,	  such	  adjectives	  would	  be	  unnecessary.	  The	  civic	  humanist	  tradition,	  in	  fact,	  is	  robust	   enough	   to	   include	   the	   assorted	  Christian	  humanisms	  of	   the	  19th,	   20th	   and	   the	  present	  centuries,	   the	   settlement	  house	  movement	  of	   Jane	  Addams	  and	  others,	   and	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  other	  concerns	  for	  community,	  collective	  behavior,	  social	  movements,	  and	  social	  problems.	  	  From	  another	  perspective,	   the	  perspective	  on	  civic	  humanism	  presented	  here	   is	   firmly	  grounded	   in	   a	   distinct	   interpretation	   of	   the	   Machiavellian	   republican	   tradition.	   Donald	   L.	  Hodges	  outlines	  two	  principal	  interpretations	  of	  Machiavelli	  regarding	  the	  state	  and	  the	  role	  of	  intermediate	  institutions	  and	  an	  independent	  sector.	  He	  argues	  convincingly	  that	  the	  “shallow	  republicanism”	  of	   John	  Locke,	   James	  Madison	  and	  the	  Anglo-­‐American	  tradition,	  which	  would	  include	  the	  legal	  rights,	  protections	  and	  immunities	  noted	  previously,	  has	  been	  more	  successful	  in	  historical	  terms	  than	  the	  “deep	  republicanism”	  of	  Rousseau,	  Lenin	  and	  the	  European	  socialist	  tradition	  with	  its	  emphasis	  on	  the	  monopoly	  of	  the	  state	  and	  the	  subordinate	  nature	  of	  private	  associations	  (Hodges,	  2003).	  This	  may	  be	  the	  largest	  implication	  of	  the	  rise	  of	  civil	  society	  after	  1989,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  difficulties	  civil	  society	  has	  posed	  in	  several	  European	  nations.	  This	  matters	  here	   because	   the	   commons	   theory	   of	   voluntary	   action	   is	   embedded	   in	   precisely	   this	   kind	   of	  “shallow”	   republicanism,	   including	   the	   legal	   immunities	   of	   the	   First	   Amendment,	   the	   UN	  Declaration,	  which	  limit	  and	  constrain	  the	  state	  and	  enable	  not	  only	  the	  market	  as	  some	  have	  suggested	  but	  also	  the	  independent	  action	  of	  commons.	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Because	   much	   of	   the	   ongoing	   contemporary	   re-­‐interpretation	   of	   civic	   humanism	   is	  occurring	   in	   the	   rarified	   and	   self	   contained	   academic	   knowledge	   commons	   of	   history	   and	  political	   philosophy,	   diffusion	   has	   been	   restricted	   largely	   to	   students	   taking	   courses	   in	   those	  areas	  and	   those	   interested	  enough	  to	  brave	   this	   intimidating	   literature	  on	   their	  own.	  The	   full	  significance	   has	   not	   been	   catalogued	   by	   researchers	   interested	   in	   such	   topics	   as	   civic	  engagement	  civil	  society,	  community	  funds	  and	  foundations,	  social	  service	  agencies,	  community	  arts	   institutions,	   or	   in	   social	   problems	   and	   social	   movements.	   For	   example,	   the	   social	  construction	   turn	   in	   social	   problem	   studies	   following	   Spector	   and	   Kitsuse	   (1987)	   discussed	  previously	   is	   entirely	   consistent	   with	   civic	   humanist	   perspectives.	   The	   civic	   humanist	  connection,	  however	  is	  often	  deeply	  hidden	  as	  contributors	  continue	  to	  try	  to	  work	  exclusively	  with	   familiar	   social	   science	   paradigms	   dating	   from	   nineteenth	   century	   Europe,	   and	   citing	  approaches	   to	   ‘community’	   by	   Tocqueville,	  Weber,	   Durkheim,	   Tönnies	   and	   others	   as	   though	  these	  were	   free-­‐standing	   inventions	  and	  not	   themselves	  derived	   from	  earlier	   sources.	  Recent	  work	   noted	   above,	   and	   in	   particular,	   Pocock’s	   study	   of	   Machiavelli,	   have	   produced	   what	  Harpham	  called	  “a	  striking	  revisionist	  understanding	  of	  an	  evolving	  Anglo-­‐American	  tradition	  of	  political	  discourse”	  (Harpham,	  1984,	  764).	  McCully’s	  model	  of	  philanthropy,	  Saunders’	  model	  of	  sustained	  dialogue	  and	  Anderson’s	  cosmopolitan	  canopy	  might	  be	  among	  the	  most	  striking	  examples	  to	  date	  of	  what	  such	  revisionism	  could	  mean.	  	   “Civic	   republicanism	   (aka	   civic	   humanism)	   is	   one	   of	   several	   versions	   of	   virtue	   and	  community	   that	  came	  to	   the	   fore	   in	   the	  1980s”	  (Olsen,	  2006,	  1).	  At	   the	  core,	   like	   that	  of	  both	  neo-­‐conservatism	   and	   communitarianism	   of	   the	   time,	   is	   a	   critique	   of	   conventional	   liberal	  political	  ideas.	  ‘Liberalism’,	  in	  this	  context,	  refers	  not	  just	  to	  ‘welfare	  liberalism’	  and	  the	  critique	  of	  the	  welfare	  state.	  It	  refers	  to	  the	  entire	  tradition	  that	  places	  the	  rights,	  interests,	  and	  choices	  of	   the	   individual	   at	   the	   center	   of	   theories	   of	   justice,	   civil	   obligation,	   and	   governmental	  legitimacy	   and	   authority.	   Communitarianism	   in	   the	   1980s	   indicted	   liberalism’s	   flawed	  conception	   of	   “moral	   personality”	   in	   familiar	   terms	   close	   to	   those	  used	   above	   to	   critique	   the	  Bloomington	   model	   of	   the	   commons:	   The	   liberal	   self	   (or,	   as	   termed	   above,	   the	   rational	  individual)	   is	   socially	  disembodied,	   radically	  unencumbered	  and	   lacks	  any	  overarching	   social	  attachments.	  	  	   Although	   the	   embodied	   rationalism	   and	   humanitarianism	   of	   this	   model	   date	   back	  hundreds	  of	  years	  in	  the	  civic	  humanist	  tradition	  there	  have	  been	  important	  modern	  advances.	  At	   least	   since	   the	   1920s	   assorted	   pragmatists	   like	   Dewey,	   interactionists	   following	   Mead,	  ‘Chicago	   school’	   sociologists	   and	   numerous	   others	   have	   been	   foremost	   in	   objecting	   to	   the	  centrality	   of	   the	   model	   of	   ‘the	   individual’.	   Even	   so,	   it	   is	   often	   exactly	   that	   ‘individual’	   as	   a	  ‘socially	   disembodied’	   and	   ‘radically	   unencumbered’	   being	   or	   Cartesian	   mind	   that	   one	  encounters	   in	   contemporary	   sector	   theories	   of	   voluntary	   action,	  with	   their	   heavily	   economic	  bent	   and	  management	   focus.	   “I	   think,	   therefore	   I	   am”	   (cogito	   ergo	   sum)	   only	   because	   I	   have	  learned	  how	  to	  think	  from	  significant	  others,	  making	  use	  of	  the	  materials	  of	  my	  own	  experience,	  our	  collective	  cultural	  and	  historic	  traditions,	  and	  thinking	  about	  how	  my	  thoughts	  will	  impact	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them.	  And,	  as	  a	  socially	  and	  historically	  situated	  person,	   I	  may	  abstract	  part	  of	   this	   totality	  of	  knowledge,	  heritage	  and	  experience	  as	  my	  individual	  identity	  as	  an	  inviolable	  bearer	  of	  rights	  and	  obligations.	  However,	  my	  interactions	  with	  others	  will	  also	  impact	  upon	  that	  identity,	  not	  just	  once	  in	  a	  formative	  stage,	  but	  continually.	  	   Communitarianism,	   with	   its	   narrow	   and	   abstract	   emphasis	   on	   individual	   rights	   and	  obligations	   mounted	   a	   powerful	   and	   important	   critique	   of	   rational	   individualism.	   More	  recently,	  “civic	  republicans	  put	   forward	  a	  version	  of	   the	  communitarian	  critique	  of	   the	   liberal	  self	  that	  emphasized	  the	  threat	  to	  the	  public	  liberty	  of	  self-­‐governing	  citizens.	  Liberalism,	  on	  the	  civic	  republican	  view,	   is	  marked	  by	  a	  pronounced	  tendency	   to	  view	  politics	  and	  public	   life	  as	  mere	  instruments	  for	  the	  furtherance	  of	  self-­‐interest.	  Such	  a	  vision	  impoverishes	  and	  ultimately	  threatens	  democracy	  by	  validating	  forms	  of	  identity	  in	  which	  individuals	  have	  few	  (if	  any)	  civic	  attachments	  and	  lack	  norms	  of	  responsible	  civic	  engagement.	  ”	  (Olsen,	  2006,	  1-­‐2)	  	   Within	  social	  work,	  the	  discipline	  where	  I	  spent	  my	  professional	  career,	  there	  have	  been	  ongoing	  (but	  seldom	  acknowledged)	  forms	  of	  civic	  republicanism	  traceable	  to	  Jane	  Addams	  and	  the	  practices	  of	  the	  settlement	  house	  movement	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  to	  Mary	  Parker	  Follett	  and	  the	  community	  centers	  movement	  on	  the	  other.	  The	  social	  work	  educational	  formula	  that	  arose	  in	  the	  1940s	  emphasized	  individual	  human	  growth	  and	  development	  in	  the	  context	  of	  ‘healthy’	  vibrant	  communities.	  Likewise,	  the	  various	   ‘community	  action’,	   ‘community	  development’	  and	  social	  development	  proposals	  clearly	  fall	  within	  this	  same	  purview.	  All	  of	  these	  were	  important	  influences	   on	   my	   original	   perspective	   in	   The	   Commons	   (1992),	   and	   in	   my	   critique	   of	   the	  limitations	   of	   economic	   individualism	   and	   the	   Bloomington	   School	   model	   of	   the	   commons	  noted	  previously	  in	  this	  volume.	  The	  extent	  of	  this	  connection	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  following:	  “Civic	   republicanism	   is	   now	   a	   well-­‐established	   theoretical	   perspective.	   Its	   imprint	   is	  seen	   in	   numerous	   areas,	   including	   the	   following:	   the	   emergence	   of	   virtue-­‐centered	   forms	   of	  liberal	   theory,	   the	   rediscovery	   of	   civil	   society,	   the	   effort	   to	   outline	   and	   defend	   a	   deliberative	  form	  of	  democracy,	  the	  ongoing	  examination	  of	  Arendt’s	  thought,	  the	  philosophical	  debate	  over	  the	   question	   of	   whether	   ‘teleological’	   conceptions	   of	   the	   human	   good	   or	   ‘deontological’	  conceptions	  of	  the	  right	  should	  have	  priority,	  the	  recovery	  of	  civic	  virtue	  as	  a	  norm	  of	  American	  constitutional	   law,	   and	   the	   reinvigoration	   of	   the	   project	   inaugurated	   by	   Leo	   Strauss	   of	  grounding	   western	   liberal	   democracy	   in	   the	   Socratic	   quest	   for	   wisdom	   about	   the	   good	   life”	  (Olsen,	  2006,	  3).	  Concern	   for	   civil	   society,	   deliberative	   democracy,	   what	   Olsen	   (2006:	   3)	   calls	   Hannah	  Arendt’s	   thought	   of	   “excelling	   in	   a	   public	   realm	   of	   action”,	   the	   nature	   of	   human	   goods	   –	  common,	  as	  well	  as	  public	  and	  private	  goods	  –	  and	  the	  role	  of	  associating	  with	  others	  in	  civic	  and	  social	  projects	  are	  all	  important	  themes	  in	  the	  commons	  theory	  of	  voluntary	  action.	  	   At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  term	  republicanism	  inherited	  from	  the	  practices	  of	  self-­‐governing	  city	   states	   like	   Florence,	   Venice	   and	   Lucca	   has	   the	   current	   connotation	   of	   reference	   to	   the	  nation-­‐state.	   McCully’s	   previously	   noted	   discussion	   of	   the	   American	   Revolution	   as	   a	  philanthropic	  project,	  and	  numerous	  references	  to	  the	  “American	  Republic”	  have	  huge	  numbers	  of	  analogous	  examples	  at	  the	  community	  level.	  The	  same	  may	  be	  said	  of	  the	  numerous	  levels	  of	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community	   above. 	   The	   notion	   that	   it	   might	   apply	   also	   to	   local,	   democratic,	   self-­‐governing	  communities	  rings	  strange	  to	  many	  contemporaries.	  Because	  of	  this,	  and	  to	  assure	  a	  continuing	  connection	   with	   community-­‐level	   philanthropy	   and	   to	   avoid	   the	   partisan	   political	  misunderstandings	   that	   are	   possible	   by	   association	   with	   the	   name	   of	   one	   of	   the	   principal	  national	   political	   parties	   in	   the	  U.S.,	   the	   term	   civic	   humanism	   is	   preferred	  here	  but	   explicitly	  tied	  to	  the	  characteristics	  of	  civic	  republicanism	  noted	  immediately	  above.	  
Social,	  Economic	  &	  Formal	  Organizations	  The	   first	   two	   steps	   in	   moving	   beyond	   the	   iron	   cage	   view	   that	   all	   mission-­‐oriented	  “nonprofit	   organizations”	   have	   already	   been	   taken.	   First,	   the	   entire	   presentation	   here	   is	  directed	   partly	   at	   identifying	   the	  ways	   that	   nonprofit	   “bureaucratic	   firms”	   are	   different	   from	  common	   goods	   associations.	   Secondly,	   by	   setting	   aside	   the	   rationality	   standards	   of	   political	  philosophy,	  economics,	  and	  the	  commons	  theory	  of	  the	  Bloomington	  School,	  we	  could	  embrace	  a	   communicative	   standard	   of	   rationality	   as	   the	   giving	   and	   acceptance	   of	   reasons	   or	  explanations.	   We	   can	   also	   embrace	   the	   previously	   noted	   autonomy	   standard,	   whereby	   it	   is	  assumed	   that	   participants	   in	   a	   commons	   are	   capable	   of	   determining	   their	   own	   standards	   of	  rationality	   as	   well	   as	   other	   values.	   This	   suggests,	   for	   example,	   that	   any	   commons	   –	   an	  association	   of	   research	   economists,	   for	   example	   –	   is	   fully	   capable	   and	   justified	   in	   adopting	  another,	   more	   rigorous	   standard	   of	   rationality.	   It	   also	   suggests	   that	   some	   other	   commons	   –	  associations	  of	  romantic	  poets	  or	  non-­‐Western	  theologians,	   for	  example	  –	  are	  equally	  capable	  and	  justified	  in	  completely	  rejecting	  any	  standard	  of	  rationality.	  	  
Formal	  (Rational)	  Organization	  Given	  all	  of	  this,	   it	  remains	  to	  be	  noted	  that	   formal	  or	  “rational”	  organization	  is	  simply	  one	  type	  of	  the	  much	  broader	  category	  of	  social	  organizations,	  or	  organized	  social	  relations,	  and	  that	   for	   commons	  recognition	  and	  realization	  of	   this	  broader	  category	  may	  offer	   the	   route	  of	  escape	  from	  the	  iron	  cage	  of	  rationality	  and	  the	  debilitating	  effects	  of	  institutional	  isomorphism.	  Not	   all	   voluntary	   organization	   involves	   the	   accouterments	   of	   formal	   organization,	   such	   as	  established	  offices,	  paid	  employees,	  and	  formal	  careers	  paths.	  Simply	  listing	  the	  characteristics	  of	   formal	  organization	   identified	  by	  Henri	  Fayol,	  Max	  Weber,	  Talcott	  Parsons	  and	  others	  also	  points	  up	  a	  variety	  of	  vested	  interests.	  Strong	  incentives	  for	  recognizing	  nonprofit	  bureaucratic	  firms	  as	  the	  only,	  or	  principal,	  option	  exist	  for	  students	  studying	  all	  aspects	  of	  the	  wider	  third	  sector	  as	  a	  step	  toward	  careers	  in	  such	  organizations,	  as	  well	  as	  for	  teachers	  of	  those	  students	  who	  wish	   to	   assure	   a	   continuing	   cadre	  of	   such	   students	   in	   their	   courses.	   In	   the	   absence	  of	   a	  strong,	   vigorous	   civic	   humanism,	   careerism	   can	   serve	   as	   a	   strong	   deterrent	   to	   genuine	   civic	  engagement.	   Groups,	   voluntary	   and	   community	   associations,	   grassroots	   organizations	   and	  committees,	  mutual	  aid	  and	  self-­‐help	  networks,	  the	  many	  foundations	  and	  trusts	  not	  employing	  paid	  staff,	  advocacy	  groups,	  arts	  and	  cultural	  and	  religious	  groups,	  a	  variety	  of	  social	  movement	  organizations,	  and	  all	  of	  the	  multi-­‐step	  “flows”	  of	  opinion,	  including	  social	  problems	  represent	  examples	  of	  such	  social	  organization.	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Other	  Types	  of	  Organized	  Commons	  One	  of	  the	  common	  forms	  of	  organization	  not	  taken	  sufficiently	  into	  account	  in	  the	  field	  presently	   is	   what	   might	   be	   termed	   adhocracy,	   a	   term	   formed	   from	   the	   Latin	   root	   ad	   hoc,	  meaning	  spur	  of	  the	  moment	  or	  peculiar	  but	  most	  of	  all	  dedicated	  or	  single	  purpose.	  In	  some	  of	  my	   earlier	   work,	   I	   spoke	   of	   this	   as	   special	   purpose	   and	   single	   purpose	   activities.	   In	   the	  fundraising	  literature	  adhocratic	  activities	  are	  sometimes	  referred	  to	  as	  special	  events.	  There	  is	  currently	  a	  strong	  bias	   toward	  studying	  enduring	  and	   institutionalized	  organizations,	   thereby	  giving	   a	   somewhat	   false	   impression	   of	   order,	   stability	   and	   stasis	   in	   the	   nonprofit,	   third,	  nongovernmental	  and	  independent	  sectors	  and	  all	  of	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  space	  between	  the	  market	  order	   and	   government.	   Certainly	   those	   organizations	   and	   institutions	   exist,	   but	   they	   operate	  alongside,	   through	  and	  with	  a	  huge	  array	  of	   adhocracies	  engaged	   in	   the	  production	  of	  public	  and	   common	   goods	   through	   the	   application	   of	   common	   pooled	   resources:	   committees	   of	   all	  types,	  coordinating	  vehicles,	  special	  event	  organizations,	  parade	  and	  festival	  organizations,	  like	  municipal	  bands,	  orchestras	  and	  groups	  like	  the	  Mardi	  Gras	  krewes	  in	  New	  Orleans,	  Shriners’	  motorcycle	  units,	  (horse)	  riding	  clubs	  and	  countless	  others.	  Adhocracies	  usually	  rely	  heavily	  on,	  and	   work	   best	   with	   common	   pool	   resources	   derived	   from	   volunteer	   labor	   and	   donated	  resources	  that	  “well	  up”	  from	  the	  members	  themselves.	  Although	  foundations	  and	  government	  agencies	  are	  accustomed	  to	  awarding	  grants	  to	  support	  such	  activities,	  the	  reality	  is	  that	  if	  there	  are	   not	   some	   indigenous	   resources	   of	   enthusiasm,	   trust,	   that	   the	   adhocrats	   can	   call	   upon	   in	  their	   efforts	   even	   relatively	   huge	   amounts	   of	   such	   support	   are	   unlikely	   to	   make	   much	  difference.	  	  Another	   distinctive	   type	   of	   organized	   effort	   in	   the	   independent	   sector	   was	   hinted	   at	  early	  in	  the	  last	  century	  with	  Max	  Weber’s	  identification	  of	  charismatic	  authority.	  We	  might	  call	  these	   guru	   associations,	   and	   as	   the	   Weber	   typology	   suggests,	   it	   is	   quite	   different	   from	   the	  rational	  organizations	  that	  have	  been	  the	  center	  of	  attention	  in	  nonprofit	  management.	  Both	  the	  charisma	   of	   an	   idea	   and	   a	   charismatic	   leader	   are	   possible,	   and	   guru	   associations	   seem	  particularly	  closely	  associated	  in	  their	  early	  stages	  with	  social	  movements.	  Thus,	  the	  Tea	  Party	  movement	  (Rasmussen	  and	  Schoen,	  2010),	  the	  assorted	  Occupy	  movements	  (Hardt	  and	  Negri,	  2011),	  Jonestown	  (a	  bad	  commons	  if	  ever	  there	  was	  one;	  Hall	  and	  Hall,	  2004)	  and	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  Father	  Divine	  (Burnham,	  1979;	  Wisebrot,	  1992)	  are	  a	  few	  of	  the	  many	  examples	  that	  might	  be	  cited.	  	  Guru	   associations	   seem	   to	   be	   particularly	   evident	   in	   the	   early	   organizational	   states	   of	  religious	   and	   cultural	   organizations.	   Presumably	   in	   organizing	   the	   exit	   from	  Egypt	   and	   entry	  into	   Israel,	  Moses	  didn’t	   act	   alone,	   but	   likely	   had	   an	  organized	   group	  of	   sub-­‐leaders	  working	  with	  him.	  Certainly,	  Jesus’	  disciples	  and	  the	  subsequent	  groups	  of	  apostles,	  including	  Paul	  were	  fundamental	   in	  the	  spread	  of	  Christianity	   in	  the	  Roman	  Empire.	  The	  same	  can	  be	  said	   for	  the	  guru	  associations	  of	  Buddhism.	  The	  role	  of	  close	  associates	  and	  family	  members	  of	  the	  prophet	  
  295 
Mohammed	   both	   in	   the	   spread	   of	   Islam	   and	   in,	   for	   example,	   the	   Shia	   and	   Sunni	   and	   other	  schisms	  that	  still	  exist	  in	  that	  religion	  are	  particularly	  well	  documented	  (Rogerson,	  2006)	  Finally,	  based	  on	  work	  by	  Charles	  Taylor	  and	  others	  in	  the	  past	  decade,	  we	  might	  predict	  a	  theoretically	  plausible	  type	  of	  organized	  voluntary	  action	  that	  we	  might	  call	  the	  imaginarium.	  	  	  We	   can	   pick	   up	   with	   Taylor’s	   original	   work	   on	   The	   Social	   Imaginary	   (Taylor,	   2002;	   Taylor,	  2004),	   in	  which	   he	   projects	   that	   the	   principal	   problem	   of	   social	   science	   is	   “modernity	   itself”	  (Taylor,	  2002).	  A	  social	  imaginary	  “is	  not	  a	  set	  of	  ideas”	  according	  to	  Taylor.	  	  “Rather	  it	  is	  what	  enables,	  through	  making	  sense	  of,	  the	  practices	  of	  a	  society.	  In	  this	  sense,	  social	  imaginaries	  are	  closely	  related	  to	  Tocqueville’s	  category	  of	  moeurs.	  There	  is	  also	  a	  close	  relation	  between	  social	  imaginaries	   and	   the	   origins	   of	   knowledge	   commons.	   The	   three	   purest	   examples	   of	   social	  imaginaries	  in	  Taylor’s	  sense	  affecting	  this	  book	  have	  formed	  around	  the	  ideas	  of	  civil	  society,	  commons	  and	  sectors.	  During	  the	  period	  since	  1985,	  all	  three	  of	  these	  ideas	  have	  been	  imagined	  into	   their	   present	   form	   in	   ways	   not	   previously	   envisioned,	   and	   gradually	   fleshed	   out	   as	  meaningful	   ideas	  by	  diverse	  but	   interacting	  associations	  of	   strong-­‐minded	   individuals,	   just	  as	  the	  original	  imaginaries	  of	  the	  17th	  century	  scientists	  previously	  discussed.	  Each	  of	  those	  loose	  associations	  and	  focused	  publics	  devoted	  to	  a	  particular	  idea	  constitutes	  an	  imaginarium	  in	  the	  sense	  used	  here.	  Not	   far	  behind	   these	   three	  are	   the	   social	   imaginaries	   forming	  around	   social	  enterprise,	   social	   economy,	   and	   social	   capital.	   When	   L.J.	   Hanifan	   first	   used	   the	   term	   social	  capital	  as	  a	  chapter	  heading	   in	  1920,	   it	  was	   little	  more	  than	  a	  clever	  but	   idiosyncratic	   turn	  of	  phrase,	  which	  had	  no	  lingering	  effects	  for	  the	  next	  eighty	  years.	  However,	  when	  Robert	  Putnam	  (1995;	   2000)	   used	   the	   same	   phrase	   (and	   cited	   Hanifan’s	   earlier	   contribution)	   it	   ignited	   a	  veritable	  firestorm	  of	  recognition	  and	  interest;	  in	  short	  it	  became	  a	  social	  imaginary.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  imaginings	  like	  civil	  society,	  it	  is	  customary	  to	  speak	  of	  a	  renaissance.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  new	  and	  unfamiliar	   ideas	   like	   social	   capital	   (or	   somewhat	   earlier,	   Everett	   Rogers’	   diffusion	   of	  innovations,	   where	   there	   is	   little	   or	   no	   prior	   history,	   it	   is	   more	   appropriate	   to	   speak	   of	   a	  florescence.	  To	  use	  a	  popular	  vernacular	   term	  (based	   in	  part	  on	  the	   Jonestown	  experience)	   it	  can	   be	   said	   that	  many	  who	   encountered	   the	   social	   capital	   idea	   “drank	   the	   kool	   aid”	   (and,	   it	  would	  appear,	   the	  effects	  have	  been	  altogether	  different!)	   In	   its	  own	  modest	  way,	  my	   lettuce	  paper	  (1990)	  provoked	  a	  similar	  social	  imaginary	  for	  some	  people	  within	  ARNOVA.	  
Uncertainty	  and	  Performatory	  Drama	  
 In	   religion,	   some	   of	   this	   is	   captured	   in	   the	   “mystery	   of	   the	  mass”.	   One	   of	   the	   reasons	  people	  like	  live	  theater	  is	  because	  of	  its	  edgy	  character.	  Will	  the	  diva	  be	  able	  to	  reach	  that	  high	  note	   tonight?	   Will	   the	   new,	   young	   understudy	   remember	   her	   lines?	   Will	   the	   playwrights’	  original	  dramatic	  sense	  be	  captured?	  Sports	  are	  always	  full	  of	  uncertainty;	  “That’s	  why	  they	  call	  it	   a	   game!”	   Will	   the	   quarterback	   be	   injured?	   Who	   will	   win	   the	   division	   or	   conference	  championship?	  NCAA	  Basketball	  even	  has	  its	  own	  month,	  dedicated	  to	  March	  Madness!	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A	  republic	  of	  virtue?	  A	  republic	  of	  equals?	  For	  that	  a	  biological	  mutation	  is	  needed,	  the	  coming	  of	  superman.	  Contrary	  to	  
the	  prevailing	  image,	  Machiavelli	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  a	  dreamer	  after	  all.	  Farewell,	  Niccolo.	  
~	  Donald	  C.	  Hodges.	  Deep	  Republicanism,	  p.	  202.	  
16.	  Conclusion	  Not	   everyone	   in	   my	   lifeworld	   shares	   the	   vision	   of	   a	   democratic	   society	   and	   culture	  brought	   into	   being	   and	   advanced	   through	   voluntary	   action	   and	   resource	   pooling	   in	  communities	  or	  the	  ideal	  of	  a	  civil	  society	  characterized	  by	  civic	  engagement.	  For	  those	  who	  do,	  the	   various	   elements	   of	   voluntary	   action,	   including	   voluntary	   association	   and	   assembly,	  nonprofit	  civic,	  educational,	  religious,	  artistic,	  cultural,	  charitable	  and	  philanthropic	  and	  other	  institutions	   forming	   the	   spontaneous	   order	   of	   an	   independent	   sector	   poses	   a	   powerful	   and	  enticing	  avenue	  for	  future	  advancement	  of	  democracy.	  For	  us	  the	  new	  commons	  represents	  the	  institutional	   companion	   to	   liberal	   capitalism	  and	   liberal	  democracy	  and	  a	   first	  among	  equals:	  truly,	  a	  third	  sector.	  	  Even	   so,	   questions	   remain	   about	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   it	   is	   among	   friends	   in	   the	   civic	  companionship	  of	  civil	   society,	  a	  spouse	   in	  a	  ménage	  a	   trois,	  or	  a	  concubine	  available	   to	  both	  markets	   and	   governmental	   actors	   to	   use	   as	   they	   please	   and	   abandon	   at	   will.	   Less-­‐than-­‐independent	  nonprofit	  firms	  with	  strong	  ties	  to	  government	  bureaus	  or	  market	  firms	  may	  have	  numerous	  other	  policy	  or	  economic	  justifications,	  but	  the	  expectation	  that	  they	  can	  contribute	  in	  important	  ways	  to	  strengthening	  democracy	  in	  society	  and	  culture	  seems	  fairly	  remote.	  For	  those	  who	  do	  not	   share	   the	   vision	  of	   strengthening	  democracy	   through	  voluntary	   action,	   the	  future	  seems	  to	  hold	  a	  range	  of	  other	  possibilities,	  some	  perhaps	  equally	  promising,	  and	  some	  quite	  disturbing.	  	  The	  concept	  of	  new	  commons	  framed	  in	  terms	  of	  voluntary	  action	  by	  associations	  and	  in	  assemblies	  fits	  easily	  with	  existing	  concepts	  of	  civil	  society	  and	  democratic	  society	  even	  though	  it	  still	  has	  not	  been	  widely	  or	  deeply	  integrated	  into	  social	  and	  political	  theory	  despite	  several	  decades	  of	  intense	  interest	  in	  both.	  Regardless	  of	  where	  new	  initiatives	  for	  the	  advancement	  of	  democracy	   come	   from,	   however,	   it	   is	   likely	   that	   new	   commons	   will	   play	   an	   important	  supportive	   role	   in	   their	   spread	   and	   implementation.	   In	   any	   event,	   the	   future	   of	   democratic	  society	   and	   culture	   is	   by	   no	   means	   assured	   and	   not	   altogether	   sanguine.	   As	   advocates	   of	  enhanced	   accountability	   continually	   point	   out	   we	   need	   to	   learn	   to	   distinguish	   more	   clearly	  between	  good,	  bad	  and	  evil	  commons,	  lest	  charlatans,	  imposters,	  and	  criminals	  spoil	  things	  for	  everyone	  (Ebrahim	  2003;	  Lipman	  2011;	  Sloan	  2009;	  Steinberg	  2008).	  	  
Rivals	  to	  Voluntary	  Action	  in	  Civil	  Society	  The	   problem	   that	   originally	   drove	   the	   libertarian	   Richard	   Cornuelle’s	   (1993)	  formulation	  of	  the	   independent	  sector,	  and	  his	   later	  calls	   for	  denationalizing	  community	  have	  also	  concerned	  others	  across	  the	  political	  spectrum	  from	  democratic	  socialists	  to	   libertarians.	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In	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  the	  dream	  –	  or	  Orwellian	  nightmare	  –	  of	  society	   and	   culture	  under	   the	   leadership	  of	   the	   state	  has	   fallen	   into	   the	   ashbin	  of	  history	   for	  most	  people	   in	   the	  wake	  of	   the	  civil	   society	   revolutions	  of	  1989.	   In	   roughly	  half	  of	   the	  world	  other	  than	  China,	  North	  Korea	  and	  the	  more	  autocratic	  regimes	  of	  central	  Asia	  and	  the	  Middle	  East,	  the	  dream	  of	  the	  ascendant	  state	  has	  given	  way	  to	  ‘mixed’	  or	  pluralist	  regimes	  of	  multiple	  institutional	  sectors	  in	  which	  a	  principal	  political	  dynamic	  has	  been	  debate	  over	  the	  size,	  scope	  and	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  state	  (Habermas	  1988;	  Nozick	  1974).4	  When	  this	  is	  spoken	  of,	  as	  it	  often	  is,	   in	   terms	   of	   “socialism”	   vs.	   “capitalism”	   or	   similar	   language,	   important	   dimensions	   of	  collective	   action	   apart	   from	   the	   state	   and	  markets	   are	   cast	   aside.	   And,	   even	   in	   the	   officially	  autocratic	   world,	   everywhere,	   perhaps	   except	   North	   Korea,	   dissident	   individuals	   and	  associations	  continue	  to	  contest	  the	  supremacy	  of	  the	  state.	  Meanwhile,	  in	  a	  great	  many	  locales	  in	  Central	  Asia	   and	   the	   ‘Middle	  East’	   including	   Iraq,	  Afghanistan	   and	   Syria	   a	   kind	  of	   de	   facto	  associationism	   of	   tribes,	   gangs,	   clans,	   warlords	   and	   terrorist	   groups	   gives	   the	   lie	   to	   official	  autocratic	  rhetoric.	  	  In	  the	  sometimes	  arcane	  language	  of	  contemporary	  social	  theory,	  these	  important	  issues	  are	  often	  spoken	  of	   in	  terms	  of	  “colonization”;	  specifically	  the	  colonization	  of	  the	   lifeworld	  by	  markets	   or	   states	   (Habermas	   1984).	   In	   particular,	   the	   possibilities	   for	   colonization	   of	   the	  plurality	   and	   diversity	   characterizing	   the	   life	   worlds	   of	   commons	   by	   either	   markets	   or	  governments	  appear	  to	  be	  growing.	  External	  and	  internal	  threats	  of	  such	  colonization	  may	  be	  due	  either	  to	   lack	  of	  confidence	   in	  the	  traditional	  moeurs	  of	  collective	  behavior	  as	  these	  have	  evolved	  in	  international	  dialogue	  since	  the	  17th	  century.	  Accompanying	  declines	  in	  genuine	  civic	  participation,	   may	   be	   due	   to	   relative	   restrictions	   on	   the	   resources	   available	   for	   collective	  voluntary	   action	   in	   commons.	   Foremost	   among	   the	   internal	   forces	   of	   colonization	  within	   the	  existing	   nonprofit	   sector	   are	   the	   strong	   tendencies	   in	   nonprofit	  management	   suggesting	   that	  only	   “businessification”	   or	   being	   more	   business-­‐like	   will	   suffice;	   i.e.	   for	   the	   democratic	   new	  commons	   in	  society	  and	  culture	  to	  become	  more	  business-­‐like	  by	  adopting	  the	  moeurs	  of	   the	  marketplace,	  which	  are	  alleged	  to	  be	  efficiency	  effectiveness	  and	  the	  embrace	  of	  ‘best	  practices’.	  Democracy	   in	   organization	   or	   community	   may,	   particularly	   in	   the	   short	   run,	   be	   wretchedly	  inefficient,	  so	  what	  is	  needed	  once	  short-­‐run	  perspectives	  are	  securely	  in	  place	  is	  often	  said	  to	  be	  the	  autocracy	  of	  the	  leader/CEO,	  and	  greater	  professionalization	  of	  activity	  and	  the	  embrace	  of	  national	  or	  industry	  wide	  “best	  practices.”	  In	  this	  final	  chapter	  we	  will	  examine	  a	  number	  of	  different	  alternative	  futures,	  including	  the	   convergence	   of	   public,	   private	   and	   commons	   institutions	   through	   institutional	  isomorphism,	   the	   more-­‐or-­‐less	   complete	   privatization	   and	   commodification	   of	   democratic	  society	   and	   culture,	   which	   is	   termed	   the	   rise	   of	   ‘treason’,	   armed	   society,	   café	   society,	   and	  
                                                
4 It must be said, however, that the extreme limits on the state posed by the libertarian view of 
Cornuelle and others has served largely as a critical and limiting view, rather than the major future 
alternative he intended.  
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perhaps	  most	  disturbing	  of	  all,	   the	  dystopia	  outlined	  by	  Donald	  C.	  Hodges	  under	  such	  diverse	  headings	   as	   managerial	   socialism,	   or	   socialism	   without	   socialists,	   post-­‐capitalism	   and	  professionalism.	  	  
Real	  and	  Imagined	  Treason	  For	   several	   decades,	   the	  books	   and	  periodical	   literature	  of	   the	  American	   far	   right	   and	  more	   recently,	   the	   airwaves	   of	   Fox	   News	   and	   ‘talk	   radio’	   have	   been	   filled	   with	   claims	   of	  duplicity,	   treachery,	   and	   ‘treason’	   by	   public	   officials	   and	   a	   variety	   of	   political	   associations	  including	  the	  United	  Nations,	  the	  Council	  on	  Foreign	  Relations,	  the	  NAACP	  and	  other	  civil	  rights	  organizations,	  and	  the	  American	  Civil	  Liberties	  Union.	  Similar	  themes	  were	  earlier	  sounded	  by	  Attorney	  General	  Mitchell	  Palmer	  in	  the	  early	  1920s,	  in	  the	  1950s	  by	  Sen.	  Joseph	  McCarthy	  and	  J.	  Edgar	  Hoover,	  and	  in	  the	  1960s	  by	  the	  John	  Birch	  Society	  and	  publication	  of	  the	  “backstairs	  political”	   classic	   by	   John	   Stormer	   titled	  None	  Dare	   Call	   It	   Treason	  which	   has	   sold	  millions	   of	  copies.	  (Hannah	  Arendt	  is	  credited	  with	  coining	  that	  phrase	  “backstairs	  political	  literature”	  for	  works	  of	  this	  type.)	  Perhaps	  the	  closest	  thing	  to	  it	  in	  the	  past	  decade	  is	  Anne	  Coulter’s	  screed,	  
Treason:	  Liberal	  Treachery	  from	  the	  Cold	  War	  to	  the	  War	  on	  Terrorism	  a	  best	  seller	  that	  clearly	  illustrates	  the	  style.	  So	  significant	  and	  durable	  is	  this	  drumbeat	  that	  it	  has	  provoked	  a	  literature	  of	  analysis	  and	  response	  (or,	  if	  you	  are	  a	  true	  believer	  in	  this	  sort	  of	  thing,	  a	  literature	  of	  apologetics	  and	  attempted	  deflection)	   among	  historians	   and	   social	   scientists	   (c.f.,	   Fenster	   2008).	   Perhaps	   the	  two	  most	  original	  and	  enduring	  works	  in	  this	  vein	  are	  by	  Richard	  Hofsteder:	  The	  Paranoid	  Style	  
and	  Other	  Essays	  (2008	  [1965])	  and	  Anti-­‐Intellectualism	  in	  American	  Life	  (1963)	  It	  is	  beyond	  my	  brief	  here	  to	  analyze	  or	  even	  to	  cite	  in	  any	  detail	  any	  of	  this	  backstairs	  political	   literature	   or	   the	   responses	   it	   has	   provoked,	   even	   though	   they	   are	   related	   to	   themes	  explored	   here	   like	   social	   capital	   and	   moral	   economy.	   I	   wish	   to	   note	   only	   that	   both	   the	  breakdown	   of	   trust	   signaled	   by	   what	   Hofstadter	   called	   the	   paranoid	   style	   and	   Fenster	   and	  others	  have	  termed	  conspiracy	  theories,	  that	  any	  organization,	  association	  or	  institution	  can	  be	  said	  to	  constitute	  a	  conspiracy	  against	  the	  public	  interest,	  and	  the	  climate	  of	  distrust	  and	  even	  fear	   that	   such	   accusations	   may	   engender	   can	   act	   as	   powerful	   incentives	   for	   declining	   civic	  engagement	  and	  participation	  for	  a	  great	  many	  people.	  In	  such	  a	  climate	  new	  commons	  cannot	  thrive,	  and	  may	  even	  shrivel	  and	  die.	  
Armed	  and	  Uncivil	  During	   the	   writing	   of	   this	   book,	   more	   than	   half	   a	   dozen	   mass	   killings	   at	   schools,	  including	   the	   horrendous	   Virginia	   Tech	   killings	   and	   the	   Columbine	   high	   school	   massacre	   in	  Colorado	   the	   attempted	   assassination	   of	   Arizona	   Rep.	   Gabrielle	   Giffords,	   and	   perhaps	   most	  disturbing	  of	  all,	  the	  killing	  of	  20	  five	  and	  six	  year	  olds	  in	  Newtown,	  Connecticut	  combined	  with	  the	  slightly	  implausible	  District	  of	  Columbia	  v.	  Heller	  decided	  in	  2008	  and	  McDonald	  v.	  Chicago	  decided	   in	  2010,	   Supreme	  Court	   rulings	   that	   the	   Second	  Amendment	  of	   the	  U.S.	   Constitution	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extends	   the	   “militia”	   concept	   to	   the	   virtually	   unlimited	   ownership	   of	   a	   limitless	   range	   of	  weapons	  and	  ammunition	  by	  private	  individuals.	  By	  the	  beginning	  of	  2013,	  nearly	  half	  of	  state	  legislatures	   had	   also	   enabled	   the	   carrying	   of	   concealed	  weapons	   in	   public	   places	   –	   including	  virtually	  all	  of	  the	  traditional	  spaces	  of	  voluntary	  action.	  	  One	   aspect	   of	   this	   that	   has	   drawn	   virtually	   no	   attention	   in	   the	   published	   literature	   of	  voluntary	  action	  is	  the	  threat	  of	  a	  radical	  alternative	  to	  conventional	  conception	  of	  civil	  society	  these	   decisions	   and	   enactments	   pose	   and	   enable.	   Lest	   there	   be	   any	   doubt	   on	   this	   matter,	  speeches	  and	  press	  releases	  of	  the	  National	  Rifle	  Association,	  calling	  among	  other	  things	  for	  the	  posting	  of	  armed	  guards	  at	  all	  public	  schools	  and	  the	  carrying	  of	  concealed	  weapons	  at	  public	  gatherings	  make	   this	  clear.	  Even	  where	   ‘no	  weapons	  allowed’	  postings	  are	   in	  place,	   this	   logic	  may	  transcend.	  I	  have,	  for	  example,	  had	  acquaintances	  tell	  me	  and	  show	  me	  several	  times	  how	  they	   carried	   both	   knives	   and	   pistols	   into	   sporting	   events	   with	   crowds	   numbering	   in	   the	  thousands.	   In	   West	   Virginia,	   the	   state	   motto	   is	   Montani	   Semper	   Liberi	   (Mountaineers	   Are	  Always	  Free).	  This	  sense	  of	  freedom	  often	  translates	  into	  precisely	  the	  kind	  of	  code	  of	  personal	  weapons	   possession	   espoused	   by	   the	   National	   Rifle	   Association,	   including	   carry	   arms	   to	  sporting	   events,	   parades,	   church	   services,	   other	   civil	   assemblies	   and	   even	   university	   classes.	  The	  question	  of	  why	  one	  might	  need	  to	  be	  armed	  at	  a	  football	  game,	  basketball	  game	  or	  public	  hearing	  is	  asked,	  but	  goes	  largely	  unanswered.	  Lest	  one	  think	  this	  is	  some	  type	  of	  ‘uncivilized’	  but	   colorful	   remnant	   of	   a	   largely	   rural,	   Appalachian	   past,	   one	   need	   only	   Google	   “shooting	   at	  high	  school	  football”	  or	  any	  other	  scholastic	  sports	  to	  find	  evidence	  to	  the	  contrary	  in	  many,	  if	  not	  most,	  urban	  centers	  and	  a	  great	  many	  suburban	  communities	  as	  well.	  Any	   answer	   to	   the	   question	   of	   why	   seems	   to	   involve	   moving	   beyond	   ordinary	  conceptions	   of	   civil	   society.	   Conversation	   and	   communication	   are	   the	   essence	   of	   voluntary	  action	  in	  democratic	  society,	  but	  as	  the	  political	  philosopher	  Hannah	  Arendt	  observed,	  violence	  is	  mute.	  At	   the	  same	  time,	   there	  are	  perceptions	  of	   the	  sinister	  and	   threatening	  nature	  of	   the	  “other”.	  One	  need	  only	  imagine	  the	  dampening	  effect	  on	  discussion	  in	  a	  pluralistic	  gathering	  of	  citizens	  to	  discuss	  a	  controversial	  community	  measure	  where	  numerous	  participants	  are	  visibly	  armed	  and	  fearful;	  yet	  this	   is	  a	  plausible	  explanation	  for	  the	  decline	  of	  civic	  participation	  that	  has	  received	  little	  or	  no	  attention	  in	  the	  current	  literature.	  Discussion	  where	  some	  participants	  are	  armed	  would	   likely	  be	  constrained	  in	  the	  extreme	  out	  of	   fear	  of	  provoking	  such	  warriors,	  and	   civil	   discourse	  would	   descend	   into	   simply	   bullying	   and	   society	   descend	   to	   the	   so	   called	  “dark	  ages”	  of	  knights	  and	  brigands.	  The	  same	  would	  hold	  for	  all	  of	  the	  assemblies	  and	  canopies	  discussed	  above.	  Such	  reservations	  also	  extend	  far	  beyond	  assemblies;	  within	  living	  memory	  in	  the	  United	   States,	   Europe	   and	  numerous	   other	   places	   in	   the	  world,	   the	   dampening	   effects	   of	  armed	  gunmen	  has	  been	  all	  too	  clearly	  demonstrated.	  It	  is,	  in	  fact,	  not	  a	  stretch	  at	  all	  to	  suggest	  that	   an	   armed	   society	   is	   the	   antithesis	   of	   conventional	   ideas	   of	   voluntary	   action,	   public	  deliberation	   and	   civil	   society.	   The	  message	   is	   clear	   and	   simple:	   An	   armed	   citizenry	   with	   no	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limits	   or	   effective	   controls	   as	   the	   Court	   has	   enabled	   them	   represents	   the	   breakdown	   of	   civil	  society	  in	  any	  meaningful	  sense	  of	  that	  term.	  
The	  Iron	  Cage	  There	  are	  other	  challenges	  and	  alternatives	  to	  philanthropic	  action	  by	  new	  commons	  in	  civil	   society,	   and	   some	   of	   them	   even	   come	   from	   within	   “the	   sector”.	   No	   matter	   what	  organizational	   problem	   nonprofit	   and	   nongovernmental	   organizations	   encounter,	   it	   would	  appear,	   a	   single	   contemporary	   answer	   in	   practice	   is	   always	   a	   nonprofit	   firm	   or	   quasi-­‐public	  bureau	   or,	   in	   more	   general	   terms,	   a	   ‘formal	   organization’.	   And	   when	   appeals	   to	   policy	   and	  incentives	  fail	   to	  satisfy	  as	  organizational	  solutions,	  the	  answer	  would	  appear	  to	  be	  still	  more	  and	  better	  (e.g.,	  “more	  efficient	  and	  effective”)	  policies	  and	  incentives.	  Thus,	  voluntary	  action	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  merely	  preliminary,	  impermanent	  stage	  in	  the	  institutionalization	  of	  nonprofit	  firms.	  Fellow	  citizens	  are	  experiencing	  a	  problem?	  The	  first	  and	  most	  obvious	  answer	  for	  many	  is	   to	   organize	   a	   ‘program’	   to	   ‘meet	   their	   needs’,	   hire	   a	   staff	   of	   professional	   workers	   and	  transform	  victims	  into	  clients.	  Recipients	  of	  a	  large	  donation	  or	  grant	  don’t	  behave	  as	  expected?	  The	  answer	  must	  be	  to	  promulgate	  additional	  regulations	  and	  requirements	  or	  tie	  them	  down	  with	   more	   explicit	   contracts!	   Publicly	   funded	   nonprofit	   bureaus	   don’t	   meet	   the	   multiple,	  imprecise	  and	  conflicting	  expectations	  of	  city	  councilors,	  state	  agency	  officials,	  foundation	  staff	  and	  members	  of	  Congress?	  Rewrite	  the	  guidelines!	  And	  if	  that	  doesn’t	  work,	  impose	  penalties!	  	  And,	  when	  those	  familiar	  pathways	  fail	  to	  produce	  the	  desired	  solutions,	  we	  look	  to	  our	  foundations	  to	  create	  financial	  incentives	  for	  “innovative”	  programs,	  but	  preferably	  nothing	  too	  innovative,	   lest	   they	   embarrass	   the	   rest	   of	   us.	   For	   these	   and	   similar	   reasons,	  most	   forms	   of	  ‘nonprofit	   organization’	   in	   recent	   decades	   tend	   more	   and	   more	   toward	   a	   single	   model	   of	  organization	   identified	   in	   previous	   chapters	   as	   ‘bureaucratic	   firms’:	   Where	   mission	   should	  always	  be	  a	  prelude	  to	  measurable	  goals	  and	  objectives,	  where	  any	  problem	  can	  be	  attacked	  by	  policy	  and	  procedures	  manuals,	  where	  all	   consequences	  of	  organized	  action	  are,	   in	  principle,	  measurable,	  and	  where	  the	  only	  forms	  of	  permissible	  human	  behavior	  are	  those	  deemed	  by	  the	  authority	   of	   widespread	   agreement	   to	   be	   ‘best	   practices’.	   This	   view	   is	   falsely	   narrow	   and	  misleading.	  Voluntary	  action	  outside	  the	  household,	  market	  and	  state	  may	  take	  many	  forms	  and	  types.	  But	  under	  the	  present	  regime	  most	  of	  these	  are	  simply	  written	  out	  of	  third	  sector	  notions	  by	   fiat.	   This	   has	   produced	   a	   distinct,	   and	   discouragingly	   effective	   “iron	   cage	   of	   rationality”	  locking	   in	   many	   nonprofit	   services,	   removing	   them	   from	   the	   vital	   core	   of	   civil	   society,	   and	  making	  it	  unlikely	  that	  they	  can	  ever	  be	  a	  part	  of	  any	  future	  transition	  to	  great	  democratization	  of	  society.	  	  
The	  Steely	  Bounds	  of	  Reason	  
 We	  have	  already	  noted	  a	   looser	   standard	  of	   rationality	  used	   in	   this	   argument.	  Now,	   it	  remains	  to	  outline	  the	  reasons	  for	  this	  tack.	  The	  general	  critique	  of	  the	  bounds	  of	  rationality	  in	  organizations	   and	   social	   institutions	   is,	   in	   considerable	   part,	   traceable	   to	  Max	  Weber.	   In	   the	  original	  German	  language	  of	  Die	  Protestantesche	  Ethik	  und	  der	  Geist	  des	  Kapitalismus;	  translated	  as	  The	   Protestant	   Ethic	   and	   the	   Spirit	   of	   Capitalism	   (1958),	  Weber	   used	   the	   term	   stahlhartes	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Gehäuse,	  which	  translates	  literally	  as	  hard	  steel	  housing.	  Housing,	  in	  this	  sense,	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  residences	   for	  people,	  but	   rather	   in	   an	  engineering	   sense	   to	  a	   case	   that	   encloses	  and	  bounds	  moveable	  parts,	  as	  in	  a	  transmission	  housing.	  In	  his	  1958	  translation	  of	  Weber’s	  book,	  Talcott	  Parsons	  chose	  instead	  the	  term	  ‘iron	  cage’	  and	  for	  half	  a	  century	  Parsons’	  term	  has	  been	  closely	  associated	  with	  Weber	  among	  English	  language	  readers.	  	  
Institutional	  Isomorphism	  And	  Sector	  Convergence	  
 As	   noted	   previously,	   DiMaggio	   and	   Powell	   (1983)	   applied	   Weber’s	   perspective	   with	  their	   intriguing	   hypothesis	   of	   institutional	   isomorphism	   and	   inadvertently	   touched	   off	  contemporary	   “sector	   convergence”	   thinking.	   The	   question	   naturally	   arises	   from	   this	   view,	  whether	  there	  is	  any	  place	  for	  an	  independent	  sector	  in	  a	  fully	  converged	  world:	  As	  it	  happens,	  Steven	  Ealy	  (2004)	  examined	  this	  precise	  question	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  progressive	  liberalism	  of	   William	   James	   and	   the	   activist	   conservatism	   of	   George	   Will.	   He	   concluded:	   “At	   best,	  philanthropy	   might	   achieve	   the	   status	   of	   an	   intermediary	   institution	   to	   which	   government	  might	   delegate	   a	   chore	   or	   two,	   but	   certainly	   not	   the	   status	   of	   independent	   institutions	   from	  which	  alternative	  visions	  of	  the	  good	  life	  could	  flow	  and	  which	  could	  legitimately	  participate	  in	  the	  public	  life	  of	  the	  community	  as	  a	  proponent	  of	  those	  views”	  (S.	  Ealy,	  2004).	  The	  problem,	  in	  Ealy’s	  view	  is	  traceable	  to	  a	  view	  of	  the	  state	  exemplified	  by	  Leo	  Strauss’	  claim	  that	  “the	  political	  association...is	  the	  most	  comprehensive	  or	  authoritative	  association	  in	  society”	  and	  to	  offer	  the	  political	  philosophies	  of	  Michael	  Polanyi	   and	  Michael	  Oakeshott	   as	  alternative.	  As	   is	   common	  among	  political	  philosophers,	  neither	  has	  anything	  explicit	   to	   say	  about	  voluntary	  action,	  but	  both	   illustrate	   forms	   of	   the	   pluralist	   regime	   discussed	   above,	   and	   the	   idea	   that	   the	   political	  sphere	  is	  but	  one	  of	  several	  sectors	  or	  zones	  in	  modern	  life.	  	  
Putnam’s	  Couch	  Potatoes	  The	  essence	  of	  the	  celebrated	  case	  for	  the	  decline	  of	  civil	  society	  made	  by	  Robert	  Putnam	  rests	  upon	   the	  decline	  of	   civic	   involvement.	  Some	  critics	  harbor	  doubts	   that	   such	  decline	  has	  occurred	  and	  a	  number	  of	  critics	  have	  suggested	  that	  Putnam	  is	   incorrect	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  the	   problem.	   Others	   accept	   the	   case	   and	   the	   arguments	   and	   have	   moved	   on	   to	   propose	   a	  growing	   inventory	   of	   correctives	   to	   arrest	   the	   decline;	   most	   of	   which	   are	   taken	   from	   the	  familiar	  play	  books	  of	  voluntary	  action	  as	  fashioned	  by	  progressive	  liberalism	  (organize;	  get	  a	  grant	   –	   or	   a	   sugar	   daddy;	   etc.).	   One	   very	   plausible	   rival	   to	   a	   robust	   and	   plural	   civil	   society	  characterized	   by,	   civic	   engagement	   and	   voluntary	   action	   is	   the	   one	   mentioned	   in	   Putnam’s	  
Bowling	   Alone	   (2000).	   Putnam	   found	   television	   to	   be	   a	   major	   factor	   in	   the	   decline	   of	   civic	  participation	   but	   left	   the	   door	   open	   to	   additional	   explanations.	   We	   can	   call	   this	   “the	   couch	  potato”	   thesis;	   the	   suggestion	   that	   the	   middle	   class,	   or,	   in	   another	   light,	   working	   class	   and	  bourgeoisie,	   prefers	   the	   entertainment	   of	   television	   watching	   to	   participation	   in	   voluntary	  action.	  The	  metaphor	  of	   “Putnam’s	  couch	  potatoes”	  came	  to	  me	   in	  an	  email	   from	  Jon	  Van	  Til.	  The	   attractions	   of	   this	   option	   have	   expanded	   recently	   to	   include	   ‘surfing	   the	   net’,	  movies	   on	  demand,	  and	  the	  various	  virtual	  attractions	  of	  online	  gaming	  and	  social	  media.	  As	  noted	  above,	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the	   threats	   and	   intimidation	   and	   the	   prospect	   of	   armed	   adversaries	   both	   offer	   strong	  disincentives	  for	  many	  people	  who	  wish	  to	  withdraw	  from	  civic	  engagement	  to	  the	  comfort	  and	  safety	  of	  their	  television	  and	  computer	  screens.	  This	  is,	  it	  would	  seem,	  potentially	  a	  kind	  of	  soft	  totalitarian	   control	  of	   the	  very	   sort	  many	  of	   the	  most	  paranoid	   claim	   to	  be	   concerned	  about;	  except	   it	   is	   the	  tyranny	  of	   the	  vocal	  and	  armed	  minority	  rather	  than	  the	  majority	  or	  the	  state	  which	  may	  poses	  the	  greatest	  threat.	  The	  list	  of	  such	  inducements	  continues	  to	  grow	  longer	  and	  more	   strident,	   ranging	   from	  McCarthyism	   in	   the	  1950s	   and	   anti-­‐communist	   rhetoric	   through	  the	   1980s,	   concerns	   about	   civil	   rights,	   Vietnam	   war,	   and	   counter-­‐cultural	   protesters	   in	   the	  1960s,	   the	  Patriot	  Act	  of	  2002	  and	  successive	  waves	  of	  rhetoric	  suggesting	   that	   “anyone	  who	  disagrees	  with	  me	  is	  a	  Traitor!”	  from	  the	  populist	  talk	  radio	  industry.	  Given	  that	  such	  rhetoric	  is	  sometimes	  accompanied	  by	  actual	  death	  threats	  or	  threats	  of	  physical	  violence,	  it	  is	  not	  hard	  to	  see	  how	  some	  people	  could	  be	  put	  off	  by	  this	  climate.	  Yet,	  it	  appears	  that	  there	  is	  another,	  much	  larger,	  phenomenon	  that	  may	  account	  for	  the	  lion’s	  share	  of	  withdrawal	  from	  civil	  society,	  and	  that	  can	  be	  termed	  the	  rise	  of	  café	  society	  as	  a	  substitute	  form	  of	  intermediate	  institution. 
The	  Dubious	  Intermediacy	  of	  Café	  Society	  Many	  people	  I	  value	  –	  and	  in	  particular	  younger	  people	  –	  act	  and	  lead	  their	  lives	  as	  if	  the	  world	  outside	  of	  markets,	  states	  and	  their	  own	  intimate	  spheres	  was	  not	  at	  all	  a	  world	  of	  civil	  society,	  social	  economy	  and	  voluntary	  action,	  but	  another	  type	  of	  social	  world	  entirely.	  Many	  of	  those	  people	  in	  fact	  share	  a	  style	  of	  voluntary	  association	  and	  community	  in	  their	  social	  life	  to	  which	   I	   have	   never	   been	   particularly	   drawn	   but	   recognize,	   perhaps	   with	   the	   clarity	   of	   an	  outsider:	   This	   is	   not	   society	   organized	   around	   the	   kinds	   of	   public	   spheres	   or	   coalitions	   of	  radically	   decentered	   associations	   usually	   associated	   with	   the	   third	   sector.	   Nor	   is	   it	   an	   ideal	  society	   of	   speaking	   and	   listening,	   of	   writing	   and	   reading	   on	   issues	   of	   public	   concern	   and	  importance	  that	  is	  generally	  what	  people	  mean	  by	  civil	  society.	  It	  is	  instead	  society	  built	  upon	  radically	  different	  forums	  of	  public	  life	  entirely.	  In	  fact,	  it	  is	  so	  distinct	  and	  different	  from	  what	  is	  ordinarily	  meant	  by	   civil	   society	   that	  one	  can	   fairly	   suggest	   that	   it	   exists	  as	  a	  public	   realm	  outside	   of	   or	   apart	   from	   civil	   society	   in	   another	   space	   entirely.	   The	   term	   that	   best	   fits	   and	  describes	   this	   public	   sphere	   is	   ‘café	   society’,	   although	   others	   have	   used	   terms	   such	   as	  clubculture	  (Redhead	  &	  Henry,	  1997)	  and,	  of	  course,	   there	   is	  the	  generic	  alternative	  from	  the	  1960s	  counterculture	  (Yinger,	  1960).	  	  
Café	  Society	  Café	   society	   is	   hardly	   a	   new	   idea	   or	   ideal,	   although	   the	   term	   is	   not	   quite	   as	   old	   as	   its	  more	   serious	   sibling,	   civil	   society.	  Characterizations	  of	   the	   late	  Roman	  Empire	  often	   speak	  of	  “bread	  and	  circuses.”	  Modern	  café	  society	  was	  a	  feature	  of	   la	  belle	  epoch	  Paris	  in	  the	  1890s	  as	  seen	  in	  the	  drawings	  of	  Toulouse	  Lautrec,	  and	  in	  surviving	  photographs	  of	  Delmonico’s	  in	  New	  York.	   By	   the	   1920’s	   a	   nightclub	   in	   New	   York	   City	   bore	   the	   name	  Café	   Society,	   a	   term	  which	  might	  well	   characterize	   the	   Jazz	  Age	  portrayed	  by	  F.	   Scott’	   Fitzgerald’s	  The	  Great	  Gatsby	   and	  others.	   Chapters	   One	   and	   Two	   of	   Stefan	   Zweig’s	   The	   World	   of	   Yesterday	   contains	   a	   similar	  portrait	   of	   community	   life	   for	   the	   Jewish	   haute	   bourgeoisie	   in	   Vienna	   from	   the	   mid-­‐19th	   to	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World	  War	   I	   (Zweig	   and	  Bell,	   2013).	  Terms	   like	  Bell	  Epoche,	  Gay	  Nineties,	  Roaring	  Twenties	  and	  whatever	  we	  choose	  to	  call	  the	  present	  indicate	  particular	  periods	  of	  ascent	  of	  café	  society.	  Like	  civil	  society,	  café	  society	  is	  associated	  with	  a	  distinct	  repertory	  of	  associations,	  assemblies	  and	  such	  social	  institutions	  as	  night	  clubs,	  music	  halls,	  and	  more	  recently	  discotheques,	  stadium	  concerts	   attracting	   thousands,	   fan	   clubs,	   flash	  mobs,	   and	   a	  wide	   network	   of	  media	   including	  radio	   stations,	  magazines,	   posters,	   audio	   and	   video	   recordings,	   specialized	   clothing,	   fads	   and	  fashions	  and	  much	  more.	  In	  fact,	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  modern	  institutions	  of	  civil	  society	  is	  paralleled	  closely	   and	   frequently	   overshadowed	   by	   the	   rise	   of	   café	   society	   throughout	   the	   developed	  world.	  This	  proximity	  is	  much	  more	  important	  for	  some	  facets	  of	  voluntary	  action	  like	  theater,	  museums	  and	  arts	  activities	  than	  for	  others,	  notably	  charities	  and	  social	  services.	  Café	  society	  as	  a	   legitimate	  alternative	   to	  civil	   society	   is	  an	  urban	  phenomenon	   in	  a	  predominantly	  urban	  world,	   especially	   since	   the	  world	  population	  officially	  became	  more	  urban	   than	   rural	  on	  May	  28,	   2007.	   (See	   http://www.gizmag.com/go/7334/).	   London,	   Paris,	   Berlin,	   New	   York,	   Los	  Angeles,	  Chicago,	  New	  Orleans,	  San	  Francisco,	  Tokyo,	  Budapest,	  Bangkok,	  Beirut,	  Havana,	  Cairo	  and	  hundreds	  of	  other	  cities	  have	  all	  been	  celebrated	  at	  one	  time	  or	  another	  for	  their	  “nightlife”,	  a	  phrase	  which	  takes	  on	  singular	  meaning	  everywhere	  in	  connection	  with	  café	  society.	  	  It	  is	  often	  the	  appeal	  of	  café	  society	  –the	  opportunity	  to	  drink,	  dance,	  laugh,	  cry	  and	  be	  thrilled	  or	  otherwise	  entertained	  to	  a	  far	  greater	  extent	  than	  the	  appeal	  of	  civil	  society	  to	  talk	  and	  listen,	  to	  read	  and	  write,	  to	  volunteer	  and	  donate	  –	  that	  attracts	  millions	  of	  young	  people	  to	  particular	  urban	  centers	   throughout	   the	  world.	  Excitement,	   rather	   than	  engagement	   is	  one	  of	  the	   hallmarks	   of	   café	   society.	   Recently,	   for	   example,	   one	   hears	   frequently	   that	   Berlin	   rivals	  London	  as	  the	  world’s	  most	  exciting	  and	  interesting	  city,	  or	  that	  the	  excitement	  is	  returning	  to	  New	  Orleans	  or	  that	  Shanghai	  is	  more	  exciting	  than	  Beijing.	  Certainly,	  this	  should	  not	  be	  news	  to	  anyone	  with	  a	  serious	  grasp	  on	  current	  reality,	  although	  few	  serious	  social	  theorists	  of	  civil	  society	   have	  been	   so	   gauche	   as	   to	   broach	   the	  matter	   very	  directly.	   In	   general,	   contemporary	  social	  and	  political	  research	  and	  theory	  has	  for	  the	  most	  part	  been	  reluctant	  to	  grapple	  with	  the	  rather	  obvious	  implications	  of	  a	  relationship	  between	  the	  development	  of	  café	  society	  and	  the	  decline	   of	   civil	   society.	   Putnam’s	   (2000)	   focus	   on	   television	   as	   a	   reason	   for	   declining	   civic	  participation	  opens	  this	  avenue	  but	  does	  not	  explore	  it.	  	  Thus,	   it	   may	   be	   disturbing	   for	   some	   readers	   to	   consider	   the	   suggestion	   that	   it	   is	   the	  ascent	  of	  the	  entire	  vast	  subculture	  of	  café	  society	  –	  and	  not	  merely	  television	  –	  that	  is	  offsetting	  and,	   in	   some	   respects,	   compensating	   for	   the	   declining	   civil	   society,	   and	   that	   declining	   social	  capital	   in	   civil	   society	   may	   be	   traced	   not	   only	   to	   the	   mass	   entertainment	   media	   (radio,	  television,	  movies)	  but	  also	  to	  the	  underlying	  sub-­‐cultures	  of	  café	  society	  of	  which	  they	  are	  part.	  This	  also	  impacts	  on	  such	  other	  trends	  as	  the	  commercial	  transformation	  of	  the	  Internet	  from	  an	   invention	   tailored	   for	   the	   knowledge	   commons	   of	   scientists	   and	   humanists	   into	   an	  entertainment	  medium,	   the	   rise	   of	   “infotainment”,	   “reality	   television”,	   theme	   parks,	   sporting	  events	  and	  public	  spectacles	  of	  all	  types.	  	  When	  considered	  as	  a	  whole,	  café	  society	  offers	  a	  more	  or	  less	  complete	  alternative	  set	  of	  new	  commons	   (or	  at	   least	   faux	   commons	  with	   close	   ties	   to	  markets);	   commons	  which	  are	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similarly	  voluntary	  in	  nature,	  expressive	  of	  their	  own	  distinctive	  purposes,	  able	  to	  generate	  and	  mobilize	   their	   own	   resources,	   including	   creating	   a	   sense	   of	   identity	   and	   solidarity	   among	  participants	  and	  provoking	  their	  own	  emergent	  norms	  of	  justice	  and	  fair	  play.	  At	  its	  very	  best,	  the	  practices	  of	  café	  society,	  in	  the	  work	  of	  Cole	  Porter,	  Duke	  Ellington	  and	  other	  contributors	  to	   the	   “American	   songbook”	  and	   selected	   “best	   sellers”	   in	  drama	  and	   literature,	  have	  already	  begun	  to	  merge	  with	  and	  meld	  into	  older	  (“classical”)	  civil	  society	  cultural	  practices	  in	  concert	  halls,	  theaters	  and	  markets.	  	  Perhaps	   the	   greatest	   challenge	   facing	   contemporary	   civil	   society	   theory	   is	   the	   task	   of	  stating	   in	   plausible	   terms	   –	   as	   distinct	   from	   the	   self-­‐contained	   tropes	   of	   classic	   social	   theory	  inherited	   from	   ancient	   Greece,	   where	   café	   society	   was	   all	   but	   nonexistent	   and	   18th	   Century	  Europe,	  where	  it	  was	  part	  of	  the	  “underworld”	  and	  not	  a	  fit	  subject	  for	  “polite	  society”	  –	  	  a	  case	  for	   the	   superiority	   of	   civil	   society	   over	   café	   society,	   or	   at	   least	   the	   relation	   and	   connections	  between	  the	  two.	  Clearly	  for	  many	  of	  our	  peers,	  the	  tides	  are	  running	  strongly	  in	  the	  opposite	  direction.	  While	  nonprofit	  symphony	  and	  opera	  companies	  struggle	  economically,	  for	  example,	  rock,	  pop,	  hip	  hop,	  country,	  jazz,	  and	  other	  musical	  styles	  are	  highly	  profitable,	  as	  are	  NASCAR	  races,	  NFLs,	  NBAs	   and	  Premier	  Leagues	   and	   innumerable	  other	  professional	   sporting	   events.	  For	  members	  of	   contemporary	   societies	  all	  over	   the	  world,	   the	   faux	  commons	  of	   café	   society	  constitute	   very	   potent	   alternatives	   to	   the	   associative	   commons	   of	   civic	   participation,	   club	  membership,	  even	  religious	  participation,	  and	  working	  for	  social	  causes.	  By	  café	  society	  I	  refer	  to	  voluntary	  participation,	  shared	  purposes	  and	  shared	  resources	  in	  which	  dining,	  drinking,	  dancing,	  dating	  and	  casual	  conversation	  provide	  the	  structure	   for	  a	  sizeable	  portion	  (perhaps	  the	  majority)	  of	  the	  association	  and	  non-­‐work	  related	  social	  action	  of	  large	  numbers	  of	   people.	  Networks	  of	   specialized	   social	   organizations	   and	   institutions	   (night	  clubs,	  dance	  halls,	  theaters,	  cabarets,	  dating,	  “hang	  outs”,	  etc.)	  exist	  to	  further	  this	  interest	  and	  provide	  a	  vast	  milieu	  for	  such	  behavior.	  In	  addition,	  a	  variety	  of	  household-­‐based	  activities	  from	  formal	  dinner	  parties	  to	  cocktail	  parties	  and	  soirees,	  pool	  parties,	  holiday	  parties,	  Super	  Bowl	  parties	   and	   other	   events	   and	   assemblies	   can	   also	   be	   characterized	   as	   household-­‐based	   café	  society.	  Of	  all	  household-­‐based	  activities	  of	  this	  type,	  salons	  perhaps	  have	  the	  most	  in	  common	  with	  the	  traditional	  focus	  of	  civic	  participation.	   	  Specialized	   networks	   of	   micro-­‐institutions	  also	  serve	  to	  further	  this	  interest	  like	  dating	  –	  and	  its	  contemporary	  variant	  –	  not	  dating,	  just-­‐friends,	   just-­‐go-­‐out-­‐for-­‐a-­‐drink,	   a	   dance,	   or	   “hooking	   up”.	   Café	   society	   also	   includes	   casino	  gambling	  and	  bingo	  clubs	  for	  senior	  citizens.	  Being	  “out	  in	  public”	  today	  is	  just	  as	  likely	  –	  in	  many	  cases,	  more	  likely	  –	  to	  mean	  regular	  participation	  in	  the	  institutions	  of	  café	  society	  than	  it	  is	  to	  be	  participating	  in	  civil	  society.	  Social	  capital	  generation,	  to	  the	  extent	  it	  happens,	  arises	  as	  much	  in	  the	  contexts	  and	  situations	  of	  café	  society	  as	  in	  the	  more	  traditional	  forms	  of	  civil	  society.	  Thus,	  as	  a	  trust	  building	  exercise,	  board	  members	   of	   an	   association	   are	   likely	   to	   try	   “going	   out	   for	   a	   drink	   after	   the	  meeting”	   before	  hosting	  a	  trust-­‐building	  workshop.	  Even	  though	  most	  social	  scientists	  participate	  in	  café	  society	  and	  use	  its	  resources	  to	  generate	  a	  goodly	  share	  of	  their	  own	  social	  capital	  they	  have	  generally	  been	  reluctant	  to	  see	  this	  as	  a	  “serious”	  phenomenon.	  Daily	  life	  outside	  of	  work	  is	  organized	  to	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an	   important	   degree	   around	   the	   requirements,	   expectations	   and	   demands	   of	   café	   society	   for	  many	  participants.	   	  (Get	  off	  work	  early	  to	  go	  to	  a	  concert	  or	  nightclub.)	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  lost	  world	   of	   exclusive	   class-­‐based	   participation	   portrayed	   by	   Stefan	   Zweig,	   in	   The	   World	   of	  
Yesterday	   contemporary	   café	   society	   includes	   participation	   from	   all	   SES	   and	  most	   groups	   in	  society.	  	  There	  has	  also	  been	  a	  continuing	  but	  largely	  ineffectual	  backlash	  from	  the	  religious	  right,	  exemplified	  by,	  among	  other	  things,	   the	  WCTU,	  Prohibition,	  and	  Sunday	  Blue	  Laws,	   the	  Moral	  Majority,	   “culture	  wars”	  and	   the	  Tea	  Party.	  One	  can	  hear	  elements	  of	   café	   society	  denounced	  every	   Sunday	   in	   churches	   throughout	   the	   land.	   Such	   messages	   are	   directed	   partly	   at	   those	  people	  who	   the	   night	   before	  went	   clubbing.	   The	   conflict	   between	   religion	   and	   “night	   life”	   is	  immortalized,	  for	  example,	  in	  the	  character	  of	  Sportin’	  Life	  in	  Porgy	  and	  Bess,	  and	  the	  trope	  of	  
Saturday	  Night	  and	  Sunday	  Morning,	  which	  were	  also	  the	  titles	  of	  a	  1958	  novel	  and	  1960	  film,	  and	  has	  been	  the	  subject	  of	  innumerable	  sermons	  before	  and	  since.	  The	  phenomenon	  of	   café	   society	   is	   an	   international	  one	   that	  has	  been	  evolving	  across	  many	  decades.	  In	  the	  1980’s	  the	  single	  most	  vivid	  impression	  of	  an	  international	  visitor	  to	  our	  college	  town	  was	  the	  paucity	  of	  nightclubs	  like	  those	  she	  was	  accustomed	  to	  in	  Cairo	  (Egypt,	  not	  Illinois).	   Café	   society	   even	   has	   a	   range	   of	   its	   own	   policy	   issues	   and	   controversies.	   These	   are	  often	  captured	  in	  movies	  and	  songs:	  	  
Moulin	  Rouge,	  Woody	  Allen’s	  Midnight	  in	  Paris,	  Casablanca,	  Follies,	  Irma	  La	  Duce,	  and	  Can	  
Can,	  Ocean’s	  Eleven	  and	  its	  sequel	  and	  numerous	  other	  films	  deal	  with	  café	  society	  tropes	  and	  themes	  or	  are	  set	  in	  café	  society	  locales.	  Many	  of	  these	  films,	  within	  the	  norms	  of	  café	  society	  represent	   “pure	  entertainment”;	  displaying,	   in	   the	  words	  of	  Noel	  Coward,	  one	  of	   the	  genuine	  inventers	   of	   the	   genre,	   “a	   talent	   to	   amuse.”	   Some,	   like	   the	   indie	   documentary	   Crazy	   Horse,	  released	   in	  2011,	  aspire	  to	   the	   level	  of	  serious	  works	  of	  art.	  The	  translation	  of	  burlesque	  and	  vaudeville	  to	  the	  new	  medium	  of	  television	  in	  the	  1950s	  and	  such	  “hit	  shows”	  as	  Jackie	  Gleason,	  Ed	   Sullivan,	  Milton	   Berle,	   Jack	   Bennie,	   Lucille	   Ball,	   Bob	  Hope	   and	   numerous	   others	   that	   laid	  down	  the	  most	  successful	  formulas	  for	  early	  television	  success	  and	  many	  of	  the	  major	  tropes	  of	  café	  society.	  	  Some	  contemporary	  urban	  residents	  move	  easily	  between	  the	  contrasting	  social	  worlds	  of	  café	  society	  and	  civil	  society,	  but	  it	  seems	  unlikely	  that	  the	  privately	  owned	  venues	  of	  night	  clubs,	   sports	   arenas,	   race	   tracks,	   and	   casinos	   or	   even	   the	  multitudinous	   online	   social	   media	  offer	  a	  social	  matrix	  or	  institutions	  capable	  of	  sustaining	  genuine	  common	  space	  or	  performing	  the	   kind	   of	   mediating	   roles	   necessary	   to	   protect	   the	   autonomy	   of	   the	   individual	   that	  Tocqueville,	  Berger	  and	  Neuhaus	  and	  others	  have	  highlighted.	  In	   café	   society	   advocates	   of	   civil	   society	   are	   faced	   with	   a	   fundamental	   question	   of	  whether	   it	  poses	  a	   friendly,	  or	  at	   least	   civil,	   competitor	   for	   the	   time	  and	  attention	  of	  modern	  citizens,	  who	  may	  divide	  their	  free	  time	  between	  ‘clubbing’	  and	  more	  traditional	  forms	  of	  civic	  participation.	   Or	   does	   café	   society	   represent	   a	   fundamentally	   antagonistic	   competitor	   to	  traditional	  civic	  engagement,	  in	  which	  people	  will	  choose	  to	  ‘hang	  out’	  with	  their	  friends	  at	  NBA	  games,	   NASCAR	   races,	   and	   Facebook,	   over	   serving	   on	   civic	   boards,	   volunteering,	   donating,	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participating	   in	   community	   parades	   or	   pageants	   or	   any	   of	   the	  multitudinous	   other	   activities	  that	  have	  defined	  ‘civic’	  voluntary	  action.	  Must	  advocates	  of	  civic	  engagement	  settle	  merely	  for	  the	  remnant;	  the	  minority	  of	  those	  who	  are	  bored	  or	  uninterested	  by	  the	  bright	  lights	  and	  loud	  noises	  that	  café	  society	  offers.	  Much	  hangs	  on	  the	  answer	  to	  these	  questions.	  
	  ‘Socialism	  without	  Socialists’	  
 This	  final	  chapter	  concludes	  with	  a	  brief	  discussion	  of	  another	  alternative	  to	  civil	  society,	  as	  outlined	  in	  the	  four	  volume	  series	  of	  books	  by	  the	  American	  political	  philosopher	  Donald	  C.	  Hodges	   (1923-­‐2009).	   Hodges	   wrote	   on	   the	   global	   rise	   of	   a	   new	   political	   order	   he	   calls	  professionalism.	  A	  student	  of	  Walter	  Burnham,	  who	  is	  best	  known	  for	  his	  critique	  of	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  managerial	  class,	  Hodges’	   four	  volumes	  seek	  to	  revise	  and	  extend	  Burnham’s	   legacy.	  Both	  are,	   perhaps	   ironically,	   little	   known	   among	   independent	   sector	   and	   commons	   scholars,	  although	   their	   arguments	   extend	   both	   Weber’s	   iron	   cage	   of	   rationality	   and	   the	  DiMaggio/Powell	   isomorphism	   in	   a	   variety	   of	   interesting	   directions.	   I	   only	   stumbled	   across	  Hodges’	   last	  work,	  entitled	  Deep	  Republicanism	  (2003),	  when	  I	  was	   in	  a	   late	  stages	  of	  writing	  this	   book	   and	   trolling	   the	   political	   philosophy	   section	   of	   the	   university	   library	   for	   work	   on	  corporatism.	  It	  was	  the	   last	   in	  a	  series	  that	  began	  with	  America’s	  New	  Economic	  Order	  (1996)	  and	   also	   included	   Class	   Politics	   in	   the	   Information	   Age	   (2000)	   and	   Mexico:	   The	   End	   of	   the	  
Revolution	  (2002),	  the	  latter	  co-­‐authored	  with	  Ross	  Gandy.	  My	  purpose	  in	  introducing	  Hodges	  here	  is	  more	  provocation	  than	  polemic:	  food	  for	  further	  review	  and	  consideration.	  I	  rely	  heavily	  in	  these	  comments	  on	  a	  review	  of	  Hodge’s	  opus	  by	  Benli	  M.	  Shechter	  (2009)	  	   The	   remarkable	   principal	   thesis	   of	   this	   four-­‐volume	   series	   is	   Hodges’	   claim	   that	   the	  contemporary	   world	   order	   is	   in	   the	   invulnerable	   grip	   of	   a	   complex	   development	   he	  alternatively	   calls	   “managerial	   socialism”	   (Hodges,	   1996),	   “post-­‐capitalism”	   (Hodges,	   2000),	  “socialism	   without	   socialists”	   and	   “fascism	   without	   fascists”,	   “corporatization”	   (Hodges’	  substitute	   term	   for	   globalization),	   and	   ultimately	   “professionalism”	   (Hodges,	   2003;	   Hodges,	  2008).	  The	  implications	  for	  voluntary	  action	  in	  the	  independent	  sector	  are	  at	  least	  as	  stark	  and	  profound	   as	   café	   society.	   Professionalism,	   in	   his	   view,	   has	   gradually	   come	   to	   replace	   the	  bourgeois	   capitalism	   of	   the	   modern	   world.	   Hodges	   traces	   a	   gradual,	   growing,	   and	   largely	  unstoppable	   takeover	  of	   the	   economy	  of	   the	  U.S.,	   Britain,	   France,	  Germany,	  Russia	   and	   Japan	  and	  is	  moving	  into	  other	  countries	  as	  well.	  He	  finds	  its	  origins	  during	  World	  War	  I,	  maturing	  in	  the	   post-­‐war	   boom	   years	   after	   World	   War	   II,	   and	   coming	   to	   fruition	   in	   the	   contemporary	  information	   economy	   or	   knowledge	   economy.	   Contemporary	   American	   libertarian	   and	  conservative	   intellectuals	   trace	   the	   origins	   more	   exactly	   to	   American	   progressivism	   and	  ‘liberalism’.	  	  	  (See	  Lloyd,	  2006).	  	  The	  decline	  of	  citizen	  participation	  together	  with	  the	  takeover	  of	  the	  voluntary	  action	  of	  assorted	  knowledge	  commons	  by	  experts,	  professional	  and	  disciplinary	  specialization,	  and	  the	  replacement	   of	   voluntary	   associations	  with	   nonprofit	   bureaucratic	   firms	   is	  merely	   one	   small	  facet	   of	  what	  Hodges	   sees	   as	   a	  much	  broader	   trend.	  However	   it	   is	   labeled,	   this	   development	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poses	  a	  major	  alternative	  to	  the	  egalitarian	  civil	  society	  of	  contemporary	  lore	  and	  raises	  many	  of	  the	  same	  concerns	  as	  Weber,	  Burnham	  and	  Hannah	  Arendt.	  Professionalization	  also	  offers	  a	  powerful	  alternative	  explanation	  for	  the	  decline	  of	  civic	  participation;	  alternative	  to	  Putnam’s	  couch	  potatoes,	  anxiety	  about	  political	  character	  assassination	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  café	  society.	  And,	  if	  Hodges	  is	  correct,	  merely	  encouraging	  citizens	  to	  “get	  involved”	  in	  their	  communities	  is	  likely	  to	   result	   only	   in	   a	   disneyfication	   (or	   disneyization)	   of	   civil	   society;	   faux	   participation	  with	   a	  cartoon-­‐like	  feeling	  of	  reality	  after	  the	  manner	  of	  theme	  parks.	  One	  of	  the	  clearest	  examples	  of	  such	  a	  trend	  are	  the	  “silver	  haired	  legislatures”	  in	  West	  Virginia	  and	  other	  states,	  where	  senior	  citizens	  get	  together	  for	  several	  days	  to	  pretend	  to	  make	  legislative	  decisions	  and	  in	  other	  ways	  simulate	   civic	   activism.	   The	   suggestion	   is	   that	   such	   simulations	   will	   lead	   to	   increased	   civic	  engagement	  among	  the	  elderly.	  Some	  of	  the	  “opportunities”	  for	  “participation”	  offered	  by	  both	  major	  political	  parties	  already	  have	  this	  flavor.	  Comment	  has	  already	  been	  made	  above	  about	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  contemporary	  scholars	  have	   tended	   to	   accept	   with	   no	   discomfort	   the	   substitution	   of	   professionally	   staffed	   and	  managed	  nonprofit	  organizations	  for	  the	  voluntary	  action	  of	  Tocqueville,	  the	  dramatic	  growth	  of	  bureaucratic	  firms	  and	  even	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  peculiar	  form	  of	  Hooverite	  associationism	  labeled	  “third	  party	  government”.	  Another	  of	  the	  relatively	  obvious	  evidences	  of	  Hodge’s	  thesis	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  reluctance	  of	  contemporary	  activists	  to	  proceed	  on	  just	  about	  any	  front	  without	  the	  advice	  and	  ‘clearance’	  of	  lawyers	  offering	  expert	  opinions	  that	  what	  they	  seek	  to	  do	  is	  legal.	  Yet	  CEO’s	   and	   other	   managers	   and	   lawyers	   are	   hardly	   the	   only	   professionals	   complicit	   in	   this.	  Hodges	  locates	  this	  multivalent	  development	  relative	  to	  the	  legacy	  of	  Niccolo	  Machiavelli,	  which	  he	   subdivides	   into	   what	   he	   calls	   the	   shallow	   republicanism	   of	   the	   “Atlantic	   Republican	  Tradition”	   (Pocock,	   1975)	   of	   civic	   humanism,	   Tocqueville	   (whom	   Hodges	   doesn’t	   mention),	  James	  Madison	   and	   the	  American	   founding	   fathers.	  On	   the	   other	  branch	  of	   his	   dichotomy	  he	  finds	   the	   deep	   republicanism	   of	   the	   European	   republican	   tradition	   of	   Rousseau,	   the	   French	  Revolution,	   Marx,	   the	   First	   International	   and	   what	   Shechter	   (2009)	   terms	   “the	   greatest	  experiment	   in	   deep	   republicanism	   still	   known	   to	   man”	   the	   Russian	   Revolution	   and	   Soviet	  Communism	   and	   the	   yet-­‐to-­‐fully	   play	   out	   Chinese	   experiment	   with	   communism.	   Shechter	  (2009)	  notes	  that	  Hodges’	  distinction	  between	  deep	  and	  shallow	  republicanism	  is	  “not	  part	  of	  the	  conventional	  wisdom;”	  which	  certainly	  qualifies	  as	  an	  understatement.	  This	   is	   in	  contrast,	  for	  example,	  with	  Weber’s	  iron	  cage	  of	  rationality.	  It	  is	  doubtful	  that	  Hodges	  means	  “greatest”	  in	  this	   context	   as	   anything	   more	   than	   longest,	   most	   sustained,	   to	   which	   might	   be	   added	   and	  ultimately	  failing.	  Another	  bit	  of	  evidence	  supportive	  of	  Hodges’	  claim	  is	  found	  in	  the	  growing	  income	  inequality	  in	  the	  U.S.	  and	  elsewhere,	  and	  the	  role	  of	  the	  “new	  class”	  of	  professionals	  –	  physicians,	   professors,	   managers,	   engineers,	   lawyers,	   and	   expert	   knowledge	   elites	   –	   in	   that	  disparity.	  	  There	   is	   something	  deeply	   provocative,	   and	  profoundly	   challenging	   in	  Hodge’s	   claims,	  and	  the	   implications	   for	  voluntary	  action	  run	  quite	  counter	   to	   the	  claims	   for	  voluntary	  action	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made	  throughout	  this	  volume.	  Superficially,	  Hodges’	  argument	  could	  be	  read	  as	  a	   justification	  for	   further	   replacement	   of	   democratic	   association	   and	   assembly	   with	   professionally	   staffed	  bureaucratic	   firms	   capable	   of	   ‘managing’	   the	   civic	   engagement	   of	   communities	   for	  maximum	  effect,	   and	   further	   growth	   of	   third	   party	   government.	   However,	   both	   of	   these	   conclusions	  constitute	   naturalistic	   fallacies,	   equating	   an	   empirical	   trend	   toward	   something	   with	   what	  should	  be.	  Just	  as	  importantly,	  such	  conclusions	  would	  completely	  overlook	  the	  capabilities	  of	  voluntary	  action	  for	  creative	  action	  through	  the	  distillation	  of	  new	  moeurs.	  Hodges’	  work,	  like	  those	   of	   Habermas	   on	   colonization	   and	   other	  works	   cited	   previously,	   deserves	  more	   careful	  attention	   than	   can	  be	  devoted	   to	   it	   here.	  The	  principal	   challenge	   for	   voluntary	   action	   in	  new	  commons	   for	   the	   foreseeable	   future,	   is	   likely	   to	  be	   to	   try	   to	   reconcile	   the	  claims	  of	  voluntary	  action	  with	  new	  thinking	  in	  political	  philosophy	  like	  that	  of	  Hodges.	  So,	   what	   does	   the	   vision	   of	   new	   commons	   outlined	   in	   the	   preceding	   chapters	   tell	   us	  about	  the	  future,	  particularly	  as	  an	  analytical	  element	  of	  civil	  society	  and	  an	  important	  feature	  in	  recent	  history	  of	  the	  appearance	  and	  spread	  of	  social	  democracy?	  Unfortunately,	  the	  crystal	  ball	   is	   decidedly	  murky.	  Without	   doubt	   some	   variant	   of	   contemporary	   society,	   including	   the	  elements	   of	   philanthropy,	   charity	   in	   community	   and	   an	   underlying	   civic	   humanism	   will	  continue	  for	  quite	  some	  time.	  If	  Hodges	  is	  correct,	  civil	  society	  in	  the	  future	  will	  be	  stratified	  in	  entirely	   new	   ways,	   yet	   knowledge	   commons	   will	   likely	   be	   very	   much	   part	   of	   the	   action,	  becoming	   in	   effect	   part	   of	   the	   new	   power	   structure	   of	   society.	   If,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   more	  egalitarian	   thinkers	   about	   commons	  operating	   from	  within	   the	  deep	   republican	   tradition	   are	  correct,	  entirely	  new	  forms	  of	  solidarity	  and	  equality	  may	  be	  emerging	  to	  counter	  the	  influence	  of	   professionalization.	   Democratic	   society	   and	   culture,	   unlike	   the	   state,	   is	   not	   a	   one-­‐option	  “winner	  take	  all”	  condition,	  and	  in	  the	  short	  run	  many	  different,	  even	  contrary	  or	  antagonistic,	  possibilities	   may	   play	   out	   at	   once.	   Democratic	   society	   is	   truly	   a	   “big	   tent”	   within	   which	   an	  extremely	  broad	  range	  of	  possible	  options	  can	  be	  accommodated.	  That	  is	  the	  very	  essence	  of	  its	  pluralism.	  What	   is	   clear	   is	   that	   the	   principal	   venue	   for	   the	   evolution	   of	   the	   next	   stages	   of	  democratic	   society	   that	  are	  anticipated	  by	  some	  contemporary	  political	  philosophers	  will	  not arise	   initially	   from	   either	   the	   state	   or	   the	   market.	   They	   will	   come	   from	   the	   vast	   arenas	   of	  voluntary	  action	  in	  the	  public	  and	  semipublic	  spaces	  that	  some	  contemporary	  analysts,	   for	  no	  good	  reason,	  call	  the	  third	  sector.	  The	  major	  challenge	  for	  the	  state	  under	  these	  conditions	  will	  not	   be,	   as	   in	   some	  Marxian	   communist	   utopia,	   to	   wither	   away,	   but	   instead	   to	   be	   limited	   to	  enforcing	  the	  boundaries	  of	  justice	  as	  these	  may	  be	  agreed	  to	  by	  a	  popular	  majority.	  At	  the	  very	  least	   this	   will	   include	   protecting	   the	   possibilities	   of	   imagining,	   proposing	   and	   forming	   new	  social	   institutions,	   making	   credible	   commitments,	   and	   allowing	   mutual	   monitoring	   of	  expressions	  and	  actions	  of	  peers.	  The	   main	   challenge	   for	   the	   market	   sector	   with	   respect	   to	   voluntary	   action	   is	   more	  complex.	   At	   one	   end	   of	   the	   spectrum	   are	   the	   important	   entrepreneur-­‐philanthropists,	   well	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represented	   in	   our	   time	   by	   Hewlett,	   Packard,	   William	   Gates,	   Steve	   Jobs,	   perhaps	   Mark	  Zuckerberg,	  and	  numerous	  others.	  There	  is	  also,	  however,	  the	  challenge	  of	  curtailing	  the	  market	  colonization	  arising	  from	  the	  enthusiasm	  of	  “free	  market”	  enthusiasts	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  a	  tiny	  fraction	  of	  the	  population	  is	  not	  allowed	  to	  gobble	  up	  all	  of	  the	  available	  fungible	  wealth,	  in	  the	  process	   destroying,	   not	   only	   the	  market	   sector,	   e.g.,	   the	   purchasing	   power	   of	   the	   rest	   of	   the	  population,	  but	  also	   severely	   limiting	   the	   capacity	  of	  most	  of	   the	  population	   to	  engage	   in	   the	  good	  work	  of	  philanthropy.	  One	  of	  the	  persistent	  ironies	  of	  the	  independent	  sector	  that	  adherents	  of	  strict	  sectoral	  (market	  or	  state)	  perspectives	  don’t	  have	  to	  accept	  or	  even	  acknowledge	  is	  the	  multiple	  ways	  in	  which	  voluntary	  action	   insinuates	   itself	   into	  other	  sectors,	  particularly	   the	  commercial	   sector	  devoted	  to	  buying	  and	  selling.	  Thus,	  we	  saw	  how,	  for	  the	  price	  of	  a	  cup	  of	  coffee	  or	  a	  sandwich,	  denizens	  of	  Philadelphia’s	  Reading	  Market	  are	  able	  to	  create	  and	  participate	  in	  a	  “cosmopolitan	  canopy”	  of	  inter-­‐racial	  mixing	  in	  an	  otherwise	  highly	  segregated	  city.	  People	  sitting	  reading	  the	  newspaper	   and	   engaging	   in	   casual	   conversation	   in	   Philadelphia	   are	   not	   terribly	   far	   removed	  from	  the	  emergence	  of	  public	  spaces	  in	  the	  18th	  century	  coffee	  houses	  of	  London,	  Paris,	  Berlin	  and	  elsewhere	  in	  Europe	  who	  brought	  about	  a	  “structural	  transformation	  of	  public	  space”.	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Appendix	  A	  
 The	  wider	  third	  sector	  may	  include	  (among	  others	  and	  alphabetically):	  	  •	  	  	  	  An	  arts	  and	  culture	  sector	  (Cameron,	  1991;	  Selwood	  and	  Brown,	  2001);	  	  •	  	   Civic	  engagement	  and	  citizen	  participation	  (Kettering,	  2012);	  	  •	   Common	   resource	   pooling	   of	   the	   third	   sector	   (Hess,	   2008;	   Hess	   and	   Ostrom,	   2007;	  Lohmann,	  1992);	  	  •	   Community	  organization	  (Briggs,	  2008;	  Milofsky,	  2008;	  Safford,	  2009);	  	  •	   communitarian	  perspectives	  (Etzioni,	  et.	  al.,	  2004);	  •	   Cooperatives	   and	   economic	   cooperation	   (Quarter,	   Mook,	   and	   Armstrong,	   2009;	  Rothschild	  and	  Whitt,	  1986);	  	  •	   Development	  NGOs	  (Fisher,	  1998;	  Fisher,	  2012;	  Lewis	  and	  Kanji,	  2009);	  	  •	   Donor	  wealth	  and	  social	  class	  (Ostrower,	  1997;	  Schervish	  and	  Havens,	  2001);	  	  •	  	   European	  exceptionalism	  (Evers	  and	  LaVille,	  2004;	  LaVille,	  2011);	  	  •	   Foundations	  (Lagemann,	  et.	  al.	  1999;	  Lindemann,	  1936	  [1988];	  Ostrander,	  2007);	  	  •	   Gifts/gift	  theory	  (Titmuss,	  1970;	  Godbout,	  et.	  al.,	  1997);	  	  •	   Grassroots	  organizations	  (Clifton	  and	  Dahms,	  1993;	  Horton	  Smith,	  2000);	  	  •	   Human	  services	  (Beito,	  2000;	  Beito,	  et.	  al.,	  2002;	  Billis,	  1984;	  Perlmutter,	  1997);	  	  •	   Libertarian	  model	  of	  an	  independent	  sector	  (Cornuelle,	  1965;	  issues	  of	  Conversations	  on	  
Philanthropy;);	  	  •	   Marketing	   (Sargeant	  and	  Wymer,	  2008;	  Sargeant,	  2009;	  Sargeant	   ,	  2010;	  Wymer,	  et.	   al.	  2006)	  Issues	  of	  International	  Journal	  of	  Nonprofit	  Marketing);	  	  •	   Mutual	   Aid	   and	   Self	   Help	   (Borkman,	   1999;	   Gitterman	   and	   Shulman,	   2005;	   Katz	   and	  Bender,	  1976);	  	  •	   Nonprofit	  accounting	  (Mook,	  2013);	  	  •	   Nonprofit	  organizations	  (Anheir,	  2005;	  Salamon,	  various	  years;	  various	  other	  sources)	  •	   Organizational	  culture	  (Martin,	  1992);	  	  •	   Organization	  theory	  (Galaskiewicz	  and	  Bielefeld,	  1998);	  	  •	   Philanthropy	  (Burlingame,	  2004;	  McCully,	  2008;	  Payton,	  1988);	  	  •	   Planned	  change	  (Mayer,	  Moroney	  &	  Morris,	  1974;	  Wilson,	  1964;	  Billis,	  1980);	  	  •	   Policy	  (Phillips	  and	  Smith,	  2011);	  	  •	   Prosocial	  behavior	  (Lohmann,	  1992,	  pp.	  237-­‐252);	  	  •	   Religious	  organization	  and	  collective	  behavior	  (Cnaan,	  Wineburg,	  &	  Boddie,	  2001;	  Harris,	  1995;	  Wineburg;	  2001;	  Wuthnow	  &	  Hodgkinson,	  1990)	  	  •	   Small	  groups	  (Follett,	  1920;	  Gamm	  and	  Putnam,	  1999;	  Harrington,	  2004;	  Olson,	  1965);	  	  •	   Service	  learning	  (Furco	  and	  Billig,	  2002);	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•	   Social	   economy	   (Bouchard,	   2013;	   LaVille,	   2011;	   Quarter,	   Mook	   and	   Armstrong,	   2009;	  Vaillancourt,	  2003);	  	  •	   Social	  enterprise	  (Young,	  et.	  al.,	  1983;	  	  Sherraden,	  2005);	  	  •	   Spontaneous	  order	  (De	  Zerega,	  2011);	  systems	  (Boulding,	  1990);	  	  •	   Volunteering	  (Rochester,	  2012);	  	  •	   Voluntary	  action	  (Van	  Til;	  Horton-­‐Smith;	  1991;	  Horton-­‐Smith,	  1992;	  Smith,	  1937).	  	  The	   suggestion	  here	   is	   that	  each	  of	   these	  perspectives	  makes	  contributions	   to	  our	  overall	  understanding	  of	  what	   the	  mission	  statement	  of	  Voluntary	  Sector	  Review	  calls	   the	  wider	   third	  
sector.	   There	   are	   also	   important	   concepts	   like	   coproduction,	   federalism	   (Ostrom,	   2008);	  hybridity	   (Billis,	   2010),	  membership	   (Horton-­‐Smith,	   1991;	   Skocpol,	   2003),	   polyarchy	   (Dahl),	  polycentrism	  (Ostrom,	  Tibout	  &	  Warren,	  1961);	  self-­‐governance,	  social	  capital	  and	  spontaneous	  order	  (De	  Zerega,	  2009;	  Lohmann,	  2011).	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